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

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Drake on Board the "Revenge."

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THE STORY OF THE GREAT ARMADA

BY

JOHN RICHARD HALE

AUTHOR OF

"FAMOUS SEA FIGHTS FROM SALAMIS TO TSU-SHIMA"

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PREFACE.

THE late Mr. James Anthony Froude, in his review of Captain Fernandez Duro's collection of Spanish papers referring to the Armada, describes the campaign as "the most dramatic event in our national history," and makes the forecast that "when the asperities of theology shall have mellowed down at last, Spanish and English authorities together will furnish materials for a great epic poem." Then he goes on to speak of "that happy time" as being still "far distant."

I fail to see what the "asperities of theology" have to do with the story of a naval campaign, and it seems to me that though the time for some inspired singer attempting the epic of the Armada may be far distant, and indeed may never come, it is time to attempt a record of the great struggle between the fleets of Queen Elizabeth and King Philip, based on contemporary English and Spanish documents, and written, as history should be written, without any intention of proving this or that preconceived theory.

Apart from the stirring interest of the events themselves, the record is especially timely now, when hardly a day passes without something being written or spoken on the question of England's naval position, and the defence of these countries

against invasion. The story of the Armada conveys lessons on these problems that are almost too obvious to require any insistence on their meaning and importance.

I have built up my story chiefly from two sources—Sir John Laughton's "Armada Papers," published by the Navy Records Society, and the similar collection of Spanish documents in Fernandez Duro's "La Armada Invencibile." It was only when the work was far advanced that I turned to Froude, Martin Hume's Essays, and Mr. Julian Corbett's "Drake and the Tudor Navy." I have found this last book particularly helpful.

In the series of maps and plans I have tried to set forth the story of the campaign graphically. They do not of course pretend to be more than rough sketches showing with approximate correctness what occurred. We have no log-books of either Howard's ships or Medina Sidonia's galleons from which accurately to lay down the course of the fleets. We can only gather from various indications in the letters and dispatches their probable position from day to day. But with this reservation, the maps will, I believe, be a great help to the reader in following the narrative.

J. R. H.

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THE STORY OF THE GREAT ARMADA.

CHAPTER I.

THE CAUSES OF THE QUARREL.

THE bitter quarrel between Spain and England in the latter part of the sixteenth century has obscured in popular tradition the historic fact that for hundreds of years before that time the two countries had been good friends and often allies. In crusading days adventurous English soldiers, like Chaucer's Knight,* aided the Christians of Spain against the Moors. Edward the First took for his queen a Spanish princess. The Black Prince was the ally of Pedro of Castille, and English archers helped to win the battle of Navarette for the Castilian king. A brother of the Black Prince, Edward, Duke of York, married Pedro's daughter Isabella. There was a regular trade between England and the northern ports of the Peninsula, and a colony of Spanish merchants in London. When Henry the Seventh married his heir to Catherine of Aragon, he was following the traditional English policy of cultivating friendly relations with Spain, as a

* "In Gernade (Granada) atte siege hadde he be of Algesir" (Algeciras).

counterpoise to the power of France, the enemy of England since the days of the Hundred Years' War.

The old friendship broke down under the clash of material interests in the wonderful century of world expansion that followed the great year 1492—the year of two epoch-making events, the conquest of Granada, and the first voyage of Columbus across the Atlantic. Spain had conquered the Moor, and the energy that for centuries had been devoted to war against the infidel was diverted to the larger sphere of world-wide empire-making.

In the first fifty years of the sixteenth century Pinzon found the great waterways leading into the heart of the Southern Continent from the Rio de la Plata—the "Silver River." Balbao crossed the Isthmus of Darien and discovered the "Sea of the South"—the Pacific Ocean. Cortez, with a handful of adventurers, conquered Mexico. Pizarro destroyed the Inca Empire of Peru. De Soto conquered Florida and explored the Mississippi valley.

The ports of Santiago de Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nombre de Dios, and Cartagena became flourishing centres of trade, and their commerce was of the kind that in all ages has most deeply stirred the cupidity of adventurous men. The first navigators to the New World had been excited at seeing ornaments of gold in the possession of the Indians, and while the Spaniards still believed that they had found the borderlands of Eastern Asia, they dreamed of making their way to the discovery of Cambalu, the golden city of the great Khan. Then, when it was realized that they had found a New World, there was the real wealth in gold and silver of Mexico and Peru, and the story of El Dorado, the golden-robed king of the city of Manoa. The search for El Dorado was the quest of a fleeting mirage that lured many a gallant adventurer to destruction, but the mines of the New World were solid realities. Each year the mule trains bore their loads of precious metal to the shores of the Mexican

Gulf, and each summer a fleet of treasure-laden galleons and caravels crossed the Atlantic to pour the wealth of the New World into the coffers of Spain.

Discovery and colonization in those days implied the monopoly of trade. In the first half of the sixteenth century the only flag that flew in the Gulf of Mexico and the seas that wash the northern coast of South America was that of Spain. English voyagers, following the lead of Cabot, had made their way to the northern lands of America, which then offered no such opportunities for the swift acquisition of wealth. In the rich tropical lands of America, the only competitor of Spain was Portugal, and her sphere had been restricted to Brazil by the award of Alexander the Sixth, acting as arbitrator on the colonial claims of two Peninsular monarchies. But the Portuguese navigators and adventurers had won their way to other avenues of empire. The voyages of Bartholomew Diaz and Vasco da Gama opened out the Far East. Albuquerque founded a new Indian Empire. Trading centres were established in the Spice Islands and on the coasts of China and Japan, and Lisbon became the chief centre of European commerce with Asia.

And then all that had been won by the soldiers, sailors, and traders of both Portugal and Spain in the East and West became the heritage of King Philip the Second. By the abdication of Charles the Fifth, Philip, on his accession to the throne, was the ruler of Spain, Naples and Sicily, the Milanese territory of northern Italy, the province of Franche-Comté, the Netherlands, and the new colonies of America. On the downfall of the old Burgundian line of Portugal he made himself master of that country, and, with it, added to his empire Brazil, the islands of the Atlantic, Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique in Africa, and the Indian possessions of the little kingdom Macao, and the Philippines, and the vast system of trade that had been organized in the Far East. Until then no one man had ever ruled over such world-wide dominions.

FLANDERS
FRANCHE COMTÉ
MILAN
AZORES
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
NAPLES
SICILY
FLORIDA
CANARY Is
WEST INDIES
CUBA
MEXICO
NEW SPAIN
CAPE DE VERDE Is
MACAO
LUZON
GOA
GUINEA
SEA
Equator
TIERRA FIRMA
MALACCA
OF THE
SOUTH
(PACIFIC OCEAN)
BRAZIL
PERU
ANGOLA
MOZAMBIQUE
EMPIRE OF PHILIP II.
AFTER THE ANNEXATION OF PORTUGAL
Spanish Possessions shown in Black

The British Empire was still one of the undreamt of possibilities of the future. Compared with the Spanish monarchy, England was one of the minor powers of Europe. Her only colony was the "English Pale" in Ireland, held with difficulty against the Irish chieftains who ruled the rest of the island, and of all the more doubtful tenure because the English settlers had an awkward way of becoming, in the course of a few generations, "more Irish than the Irish themselves." There was a vague claim, by right of Cabot's discovery, to the territory of Newfoundland, but not one square mile of the New World had been occupied by Englishmen. And under the existing international law of exclusive commerce with colonial possessions, English traders and sailors found themselves cut off from traffic with the greater part of the world by the growth of King Philip's empire. The first Englishman who showed his national flag on the coasts of the Spanish Main was John Hawkins of Plymouth, and he came as a contraband trader, engaged in a traffic that did scant honour to his country. The Spaniards had been importing negro slaves from Guinea to work in the mines of the New World—a kind of labour for which the Indians had been found unfit, and to which they were stubbornly averse. Hawkins was the first Englishman to adopt the trade of a slaver, and though he had at best a disputable right to enter the Spanish ports of the West Indies, the colonists were so eager to obtain black labour that the authorities winked for a while at his breach of the law, and allowed him to dispose of his cargoes of negro prisoners. He made his first voyage in 1562, and it was so profitable that he twice repeated the venture. Like only too many of the men of his time, he saw no evil in the business, and he found others to imitate him. The strange state of mind of these Elizabethan slavers is shown by such incidents as one of them recording that he and his slave ship had been saved from peril on the sea by "Almighty God, who never suffers His elect to perish."

The Spanish government, however, at last took steps to put an end to this new development of the Guinea slave trade. The foreign flag must be kept from the Spanish West Indies, and if negroes were wanted for the mines and plantations, the king's subjects must have the monopoly of importing them. Hawkins, with a flotilla of slavers, two of which were the ventures of Queen Elizabeth herself, was attacked by the Spanish fleet at Vera Cruz, and escaped with the loss of nearly all his ships, getting away with only the little *Judith*, of 50 tons, in which he reached Plymouth in angry mood against the narrow views of King Philip's officers.

The captain of the *Judith*, in this disastrous expedition of John Hawkins in 1567, was Francis Drake of Tavistock. Drake was one of the world's great sailors, destined to play a large part in the coming quarrel with Spain. He was about twenty-seven years of age at this time, and most of these years he had spent on the sea. He was soon to be the pioneer of another kind of venture. In 1570 and 1571 he made voyages to the West Indies, nominally with a view to opening trade with the natives, really for the purpose of making himself thoroughly acquainted with those seas and with the condition of the Spanish settlements. In 1572 he set out on his first serious venture with only two small ships and 73 men. The Spanish ports were garrisoned by mere handfuls of men. They were supposed to be safe enough under such weak guard, for the only danger anticipated was a possible riot or revolt of the local Indians and negroes. The ports were therefore open to attack, except during the brief period when the galleons—the armed trading ships—lay at anchor in their harbours. But there was peace between Spain and England, and no attack from oversea was expected. This was Drake's opportunity. He had learned that at the Port of Nombre de Dios, on the Isthmus of Darien, the mule trains had unloaded a huge store of silver and gold from Peru for transport across the Atlantic

by the annual treasure fleet. He attacked the place, and only the fact that he was badly wounded prevented him from carrying off the coveted wealth of its warehouses. Recovering from his wound, he plundered and burned Puerto Bello, captured several Spanish trading ships on the high seas of the Gulf of Mexico, landed in Darien, climbed the ridge between the two oceans, and was the first Englishman to gaze upon the Pacific. There it was that he "besought Almighty God of His goodness to give him life and leave to sail once in an English ship in that sea." A pious man was Francis Drake in his own peculiar way. When he reached Plymouth again on a Sunday morning in August 1576, the congregation rushed out of the parish church to welcome him, "all hastening to see the evidence of God's love and blessing towards our gracious queen and country."

The Spaniards who had suffered by his ventures were so rudely plain-spoken as to call him a pirate. It would certainly be difficult to find in any code of international or maritime law justification for his proceedings. He himself had no scruples on the subject. He had somehow persuaded himself that, though Queen Elizabeth and King Philip were at peace, he had a mission to levy private war on the Spaniards. During this very voyage he had said to one of them, "I am resolved by the help of God to reap some of the golden harvest you have got out of the earth, and sent to Spain to trouble the earth." And if the truth must be told, English seamen of the days of Elizabeth played the pirate nearer home than the West Indies. "Even before her accession," says Dr. Gardiner, "the Channel and the seas beyond it swarmed with English pirates. Though the pirates cared nothing for the nationality of the vessels which they plundered, it was inevitable that the greatest loss should fall on Spain. Spain was the first maritime power in the world, and her galleons as they passed up to Antwerp to exchange the silks and spices of the East for the commodities

of Europe, fell an easy prey to the swift and well-armed cruisers which put out from English harbours." With such wild work in the Channel, it is no wonder that the adventurers who sailed to the West Indies had not clear views as to the question of the criminality of robbery on the high seas.

Philip the Second had no wish for a quarrel with England. He had been its king for a while as Queen Mary's consort, and had tried to win the hand of Elizabeth. After the rejection of his overtures he had persisted in maintaining an attitude of friendship towards this country, though more than once the two nations had been on the verge of war. Even before Drake's first raid on the Spanish settlements in America, and his captures of galleons in the West Indian seas, the Spanish ambassador in London had not only to complain of the misdeeds of the Channel pirates, but also of the seizure of his master's property by Elizabeth herself. In the summer of 1568 there sailed from Spain for Antwerp a squadron of five ships under the command of Esteban de Sierra—a *nao* or full rigged ship and four *zabras* or brigs — conveying more than a million of silver ducats for the pay and expenses of the Spanish army under Alva in the Netherlands. At the entrance to the Channel the squadron was chased by a fleet of Huguenot corsairs from La Rochelle, and took refuge in British ports, the *zabras* running into Plymouth and Falmouth, and the big *nao* into Southampton Water. Espès de Guerau, the Spanish ambassador in London, complained to Elizabeth that there had been at least two English ships in the Rochelle squadron; but the matter was arranged in a friendly way, and it was agreed that the treasure on board of the *nao* should be landed at Southampton, transported by road to Dover, and thence conveyed to Flanders in English ships. But meanwhile Elizabeth's governor of the Isle of Wight, on the pretext that even in Southampton Water the Spanish ship was not safe from the Channel pirates, had taken possession of the *nao* and landed

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Elizabeth boarding the "Golden Hind."

(From the picture by Frank Brangwyn, A.R.A. By kind permission of Messrs. Lloyds.)

the treasure, 159 barrels of coined silver, which he said he would keep in safety on shore. Elizabeth assured Guerau that this had been done entirely in his master's interests. But once in possession of the Spanish silver, she showed a growing reluctance to part with it. In vain the ambassador urged that the agreement already arrived at should be executed, and the money shipped from Dover to Antwerp. After many delays, Elizabeth at last admitted that the silver had been turned over to her own treasury, and offered to pay interest on it.

Meanwhile Alva was reduced to dire straits for want of the money. On hearing from Guerau that Elizabeth had seized it, he laid an embargo on the English shipping in the ports of Flanders. The queen replied by seizing Spanish ships in her ports, and King Philip retaliated by an embargo on her ships in the ports of Spain. In London Guerau was arrested and charged with having sent misleading information to Madrid, and used insulting expressions in reference to the queen. It was a situation that with any other ruler than King Philip would have soon ended in war. But he was never influenced in his policy by impulse or anger. He was a marvel of self-restrained calculating policy, and he considered that for the time being it was better not to add England to the number of his open enemies, however hostile and irritating the conduct of the queen might be. He sent a special envoy to London to try to induce her to disgorge her plunder. The negotiation dragged on for years without result. She kept the million of ducats, nor can I find anywhere a record of her having even paid any interest on them.

There were other causes for a quarrel, if Philip had not been determined to keep the peace at any cost. English adventurers fought on the side of the revolted Netherlanders. Some of them went with direct encouragement from the queen, though she was ready, if need be, to disavow them. She provided funds for the war chest of the Dutch rebels. It is quite possible that some of the very ducats seized in Southampton Water went to swell the

resources of the men who were fighting against Alva, for whom these supplies had been originally destined. Still King Philip remained at peace with England.

In vain zealous Catholics appealed to him to venture upon a new crusade to deliver their persecuted brethren in England, and friends of the unfortunate Queen of Scots denounced her imprisonment by Elizabeth as an outrage on all the rights of sovereignty, and urged Philip in the name of Spanish chivalry to take up her quarrel. The king remained unmoved, and silently pursued his own settled plans—the reduction of Flanders, the struggle against France, the war with the Turk that ended gloriously at Lepanto, and the development of his oversea empire.

It was the raids of the English seamen on his transatlantic trade and his possessions in tropical America that finally drove him to war with England. But even this did not come for many years after Drake's first insults to his flag in the West Indian seas, and only after that daring sailor had twice renewed his raids, each time on an enlarged scale. In December 1577 he sailed from Plymouth with five small ships, passed through the Strait of Magellan, and entered the Pacific. He encountered bad weather for several weeks, and some of his consorts were lost. One of the ships deserted him and sailed homewards, and at last he found himself alone in unexplored and uncharted seas with only his flagship, the little *Pelican*, of 100 tons, which he renamed the *Golden Hind*. Sailing along the coasts of Chile and Peru he raided the Spanish settlements from Valparaiso to Callao. There was no idea that an English ship was in the Pacific, and wherever he came he was at first taken for a friendly Spaniard. Surprise thus made his enterprise fairly easy, and on land he had nowhere to deal with organized defences or large garrisons, and plundered every church and warehouse on the coast. On the sea, after some sharp fighting, he captured two trading galleons. His last prize, taken off Cape San Francisco, was a galleon from the Philippines carrying a cargo to be transhipped for Europe at

Panama. He found on board of her boxes of gems, rolls of silk, rich store of valuable spices, 13 chests of silver coin, 26 tons of silver ingots, and 80 lbs. weight of gold bars. Laden up with plunder, ballasted with silver, and fearing that his passage through the Strait of Magellan might be watched for, he sailed boldly across the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and came back to Plymouth on September 26, 1580—the first Englishman who had circumnavigated the world.

He had been counted as lost, though news of some of his exploits had already reached the queen in the form of complaints from the Spanish ambassador and demands for compensation for injuries done in time of peace to King Philip and his subjects. Elizabeth hesitated at first what course to take, but she received her full share of the plunder, and the ambassador got only vague promises from her, but never one farthing of the gold and silver taken from seacoast towns on the Pacific and from the captured galleons. The *Golden Hind* was brought round to Deptford, and on April 4, 1581, the queen visited the ship and knighted her commander. The successful raider of the Indies was now Sir Francis Drake. But still King Philip contented himself with writing diplomatic protests and pleas for redress.

The king was busy at the moment making good his claim to Portugal and her oversea dominions. He easily disposed of the various native pretenders to the Portuguese throne, and the last of them, Dom Antonio, took refuge in the Azores. He had got together a fleet of 60 sail, a nondescript armada of many nations, under the command of the Italian admiral, Filippo Strozzi. In the fleet, which lay off the island of Terceira, there were Portuguese vessels, Huguenot corsairs from La Rochelle, and some English ships. Against this armament King Philip sent a fleet under the best of his sailors, one of the greatest admirals of the time, Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of Santa Cruz.

The Spaniards spoke of Santa Cruz as "that light of war,

the father of his soldiers, that valiant and unconquered leader."* In Spain he held a position of pre-eminence in all naval affairs that none could challenge. He had served with distinction in the wars of the Emperor Charles the Fifth against France and the pirate states of Barbary. In the decisive victory of Lepanto he had borne a splendid part. He commanded the reserve squadron of Don Juan of Austria's Christian armada, and in the final crisis of the fight his timely aid decided the victory. He had driven his flagship into the midst of Ulugh Ali's squadron of Algerines, and though twice wounded with arquebus bullets, he had remained in command to the end, and joined in the brief pursuit of the beaten corsairs.

In July 1582 he sailed to attack Dom Antonio's armada with 50 galleons and 12 galleys. Strozzi had to be driven from the Azores, not only because his fleet supported the pretender, but also because it lay in a favourable position for intercepting the Spanish silver fleet from the West Indies. Santa Cruz won a complete and decisive victory by sheer hand-to-hand fighting, and Strozzi was killed and his ships captured and dispersed. The battle of Terceira is notable as the last great naval engagement in which the fighting was carried on in the fashion of the days of the oar, when ships were little more than floating platforms, on whose decks victory was decided by personal conflict between their crews, without any attempt to use their artillery with effect before closing side to side. Raleigh, writing after the year of the Great Armada had inaugurated a new period of naval tactics, expresses contempt for Strozzi's leadership at Terceira. "To clap ships together without consideration," he says, "belongs rather to a madman than to a man of war; for by such ignorant bravery was Strozzi lost at the Azores, when he fought against the Marquis of Santa Cruz."

The islands were quickly reduced to submission, and in the

* "Aquel rayo de la guerra, padre de los soldados, venturoso y jamas vencido capitan."—Duro, i. 15.

following summer, in the same waters of Terceira, Santa Cruz won a second victory over a Huguenot fleet, commanded by Aymar de Chasles, flying the flag of the pretender. By the double victory of Terceira, Santa Cruz had set the crown upon his reputation as an admiral, and no man could speak with greater authority at the court of King Philip. He it was that first proposed to the king a great naval expedition against England. On the morrow of his second triumph he wrote to the king, on August 9, 1583, from "the city of Angla in the island of Tercera," a letter proposing that in the coming year his fleet should be employed in a campaign against England. He suggested that the conquest of the island kingdom would be the best means to facilitate the reduction of the Netherlands. He outlined a plan for drawing reinforcements and supplies from various parts of the king's realms. The viceroys of Naples and Sicily were to be directed to send well-armed ships laden with a reserve of 600 tons of biscuit. Wine and oil could be bought cheaply in large quantities at the coming vintage in Andalusia. The galleons under construction in the harbours of Portugal were to concentrate at Lisbon, and cannon would be cast for them during the winter. The ships of Biscay were to be refitted and to join the fleet with the nine galleons that were being built for his Majesty at Santander. He knew that objections would be made to his proposal, "but if one looks at difficulties, nothing will be done." "I beg your Majesty," he wrote, "to take courage and undertake this campaign, and I hope in God to come successfully out of it as I have out of everything else that I have undertaken for the service of your Majesty."

The letter was characteristic of the man. Eager for action, he thought of the campaign against England not vaguely but with the practical details for the execution of his proposal already shaping themselves in his active mind. He swept possible objections aside, and promised success. The "never conquered captain" (*jamas vencido capitan*) could appeal to his past successes as a

warrant for his self-reliance, and he was ready, as he said, "joyfully to peril life and fortune in the enterprise." Philip, less eager and enthusiastic, thanked him for his victory and his unasked-for advice. There were many things to be considered, he remarked, before deciding to act upon it, but whether the decision was yes or no, he would during the winter carry out some of the proposed measures of preparation.*

The prudent king thought more of difficulties than his admiral, and let the opportunity pass. It needed further provocation to goad him at last to action. English money and English volunteers in the queen's pay continued to aid the Dutch insurgents, who had now built up an independent state in the northern Netherlands. English sailors followed Drake's example in daring raids upon the West Indies. In the autumn of 1585 Sir Francis Drake ventured on a more ambitious enterprise than anything that had till then been attempted against the Spanish colonies in the New World. With the consent and help of the queen he fitted out a fleet of no less than 25 sail, crossed the Atlantic, captured and sacked Puerto Rico, San Domingo, and Cartagena, took numerous ships on the high seas, and returning by the coasts of North America, brought back to England 160 ruined and dispirited colonists who had failed in an attempt to establish an English settlement in Virginia. The time for colonization was yet in the future. For the present English adventurers found raids on the Spanish colonies a more speedy way to fortune. And this wild work was building up a navy for Elizabeth.

When a fleet of 25 ships could be armed and equipped in English ports and go forth across the ocean to destroy Spanish settlements and plunder Spanish trade, it was idle to pretend any longer that there was peace between Spain and England. Philip was forced to take up the gage of battle. He withdrew his ambassador, the Count de Feria, from London, and at last the two countries were at open war.

* King Philip to Santa Cruz, Madrid, September 23, 1583 (Duro, i. 243).

Such was the origin of the conflict in which the chief episode was the campaign of the Great Armada. It will have been remarked that in tracing through long years the story of how Spain and England—once friends and even allies—became open enemies, I have said little of the influence on the course of events of the religious quarrel of the time. I shall have to say something presently of this aspect of the matter, but I have purposely left it in the background at the outset, because popular tradition in England, and even the writings of some of our historians, have given it an utterly misleading prominence. The whole story of the Armada has been placed in a false light by this mistaken view. The destruction of King Philip's fleet has even been attributed not to such purely mundane causes as incompetent leadership and the daring and skill of English seamen and soldiers, but to something like a miraculous intervention of Heaven sending the winds and waves to destroy the enemies of England.

But we have to deal with sober history, not with wild legends. True it is that his Most Catholic Majesty Philip the Second was ready enough to allege religious motives in order to increase the enthusiasm of his subjects for his cause, but he himself was swayed from first to last by reasons of calculating worldly policy. In the same way her Protestant Majesty of England cared little for the diffusion of Genevan Calvinism when she sent succour to the insurgents of the Netherlands, but only considered how best she could weaken and divide her continental rivals, and she certainly had no missionary or philanthropic zeal when she helped Drake to fit out squadrons to harry the Spanish Indies, and took her fair share of the plunder. It was this fight for trade across the ocean that was the chief element in producing the war of the Armada.

This view of the matter is confirmed by the weighty words of a pre-eminent authority on the history of the Elizabethan navy. Sir John Laughton in his introduction to the "State

Papers relating to the Armada" puts the matter so forcibly and clearly that I make no apology for quoting him at length. Alluding to the popular English view that the war was a religious quarrel decided by the intervention of Providence on the side of Elizabeth, he says:—

"It is not strange that the action of the fleet was for long misunderstood, and that the failure of the Spaniards should have been represented—as it often is even now—as due to a Heaven-sent storm. '*Flavit Deus et dissipati sunt*' was accepted as at once a true and pious explanation of the whole thing. It was, too, a flattering and economical belief. We were, it has been argued, a nation peculiarly dear to the Almighty, and He showed His favour by raising a storm to overwhelm our enemy when the odds against us were most terrible. From the religious point of view such a representation is childish; from the historical it is false. False, because the Spanish fleet, after being hounded up Channel, had sustained a crushing defeat from the English, a defeat in which they lost many ships and thousands of men before they fled to the north. . . . Childish, because in affairs of state Providence works by recognized means, and gives the victory, not by disturbing the course of nature and nature's laws, but by giving the favoured nation wise and prudent commanders, skilful and able warriors; by teaching their hands to war and their fingers to fight.

"But, in fact, much of the nonsense that has been talked grew out of the attempt, not unsuccessfully made, to represent the war as religious; to describe it as a species of crusade instigated by the Pope, in order to bring heretical England once more into the fold of the true Church. In reality nothing can be more inaccurate. It is, indeed, quite certain that religious bitterness was imported into the quarrel; but the war had its origin in two perfectly clear and wholly mundane causes."

He then proceeds to show that these causes were (1) the raids of Drake and his comrades and imitators on the Spanish-American trade, and the refusal of Elizabeth to disavow and make amends for their acts; and (2) "the countenance and assistance which had been given by the English to the king's rebellious subjects in the Netherlands."

The former was undoubtedly the chief factor in producing the conflict. Like so many other wars, the struggle between England and Spain arose from the clash of trade interests and colonial ambitions.

(1,666)

The Boyhood of Raleigh.

(By Sir J. E. Millais, P.R.A.)

CHAPTER II.

PLANS FOR THE GREAT ARMADA.

When the news reached Spain that Drake was raiding the West Indies with a formidable fleet, and King Philip decided to make this new aggression a *casus belli*, Santa Cruz wrote to him again proposing once more a naval expedition against England. His letter was dated from Lisbon on January 13, 1586.* He reminded the king that nearly three years before he had made the same proposal when he was in the Azores at the head of a victorious fleet and army after the battle of Terceira. He urged that the best way to protect the trade of the Indies was to strike directly at England, and argued that the total cost of the suggested expedition would be less than the losses suffered in a few months at the hands of the English corsairs. Writing from Gandia on the 24th of the same month,† the king's secretary, Juan de Idiaquez, thanked Santa Cruz for his letter, and asked him to prepare and forward, with the utmost secrecy, a plan and estimates for the expedition against England.

It was not till March 22 that Santa Cruz sent his detailed proposals to the king. That he had had to devote nearly two months to the preparation of the dispatch is not surprising. It occupies more than seventy printed pages of Captain Duro's collection of the Spanish papers relating to the

* Duro, i. 245. † Duro, i. 247.

Armada. Santa Cruz had been thinking of his plan ever since he had first written to King Philip on the subject from the Azores, and doubtless had during these three years collected much of the necessary data for his estimates, but he had to revise and complete them, and bring them up to date. It was no fanciful scheme, but a practical estimate of what could be done and the cost of doing it, and he shows throughout the most intimate knowledge of the resources of the king's widespread dominions. He notes not only what ships, arms, equipments, and supplies must be brought together, but where they are to be obtained, and at what cost of time and money. He counts up the available shipping, actually afloat, under construction, or yet to be built, and catalogues the necessary crews of sailors and rowers and the number of soldiers to be embarked, pointing out where all these officers and men are to be drawn from. There are calculations of the required stores, the weight and price of each article being duly noted. Genius has been described as an infinite capacity for taking pains, and this capacity the great Spanish admiral assuredly possessed. There is something Napoleonic in his combination of far-reaching views and attention to the most minute details.

He proposed to concentrate in the Channel the whole naval power of the Spanish dominions, and disembark an army of some fifty thousand men, with over a hundred cannon, on the English coast. The main strength of the fighting fleet was to be made up of 150 large ships and galleons. There were besides these to be 40 transports (*urcas* or cargo ships) and 320 light craft of all sizes down to fishing-boats. To form the fleet a considerable part of the seagoing and coasting craft of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the Levant, and Flanders would have to be impressed for the proposed Armada. Only a few of the ships belonged to the king. The majority of them would have to be hired from their owners. Santa Cruz based his estimates of hire of tonnage and pay and provisions for the

men on the calculation that the whole enterprise could be carried through in eight months. Some of the sailors would have to be obtained from outside of the king's dominions. Thus, for instance, he noted that 400 mariners could be recruited from the Genoese Riviera. His estimate of the numbers and tonnage of the main Armada was:—

	Ships.	Tons.
Great ships	150	77,250
Transports (*urcas*)	40	8,000
Small craft	320	25,500
	510	110,750

He noted that according to the maritime laws of the king's dominions the crews should be calculated at the rate of 20 seamen for every 100 tons. But he suggested that on account of the difficulty of finding skilled sailors for so large a fleet the proportion should in this case be reduced to 15 men for every 100 tons of shipping. This would give a total of 16,612 seamen. Further to facilitate recruiting, some of these might be soldiers who had had experience of voyages to the Indies, and there would be a certain proportion of boys. There would be 190 master mariners and as many pilots. As the ships would sail in squadrons, it would not be necessary to provide these highly skilled navigators for every vessel.

Besides the great fleet of large and small sailing ships, he proposed to send on the expedition a squadron of 40 of the king's galleys, manned by 8,000 rowers (20 Spanish, 14 Neapolitan, and 6 Sicilian galleys). With the galleys would go 6 Neapolitan galleasses—heavily armed Mediterranean craft of a transition type, having besides their sail power a number of long oars. These would require 720 seamen and 1,800 rowers. Forty light craft would be added to this supplementary fleet (20 fregatas and 20 Italian feluccas). This would bring up the total of the Armada and the supplementary

squadron to 596 ships. Two hundred large flat-bottomed barges would be built for the disembarkation. These would be carried on the decks of the larger ships.

The infantry embarked would number 55,000 men of various nations (28,000 Spaniards, 15,000 Italians, and 12,000 Alemanes—that is, Germans and Flemings). He made the large allowance of 10,000 men for deaths, sickness, and desertions, and estimated that 45,000 would be available for the landing in England. Santa Cruz counts up the numbers of soldiers already in the king's pay in various places, and notes those available for the expedition, and the numbers yet to be recruited. Some thousands of Portuguese are included in his estimate of "Spanish infantry." Of Spaniards and Portuguese there will be 140 companies, each 200 strong; 27 companies will be formed of arquebusiers; the rest are to be pikemen. The common soldier's pay is three crowns a month, with four crowns for the arquebusiers. To each company is attached a captain, an ensign or standard bearer, a chaplain, a sergeant, two drummers, and a fifer. The companies are to be grouped in ten *tercios* or regiments. Among the officers forming the headquarter staff of the *tercio* are enumerated a sergeant-major, an auditor or military magistrate assisted by an *alguazil* or gendarme, and (grim reminder of the stern military discipline of the time) a *verdugo* or hangman. There are also a quartermaster, a drum major, a doctor, and a surgeon. The 15,000 Italian infantry are organized on the same general lines in six *coronelias*—colonelcies or regiments—each of 12 companies; and the German infantry in three colonelcies, each of 10 *banderas* or bands of 400 men.

The difficulty of transporting a large number of horses makes Santa Cruz provide only a small body of cavalry to go with his 55,000 infantry. He enumerates first 400 heavy armed horsemen of the Royal Guard; then 200 mounted men of the coast guard patrols, and 200 men-at-arms to be supplied

by the nobles and prelates of Andalusia under old feudal tenures; then 200 light horse, "Don Sancho Bravo's existing company of 100 mounted arquebusiers," and another company of 100 more to be raised on the same lines—1,200 horse in all. Four hundred other horses will have to be embarked for the general and various officers and officials and gentlemen volunteers, and with these 400 grooms.

Under the head of artillery Santa Cruz counts up 4,290 officers and men, but of these 3,000 are pioneers, 700 muleteers, and only 160 are gunners. The rest are artificers and employees of various kinds. At this time the gunner was an expert, who made something of a mystery of his craft. He had to understand the making of powder as well as the use of artillery, and in action he was assisted by a number of less skilled men—probably in this case to be taken from the pioneers.

Finally, Santa Cruz throws in a round number of 3,000 men, to cover "adventurers," gentlemen volunteers, servants, and camp followers. His grand total of *gente de mar* and *gente de guerra*, seamen and soldiers, amounts to 94,222.

He then gives a detailed estimate of the provisions required for these 94,222 "mouths" during an eight months' campaign. He carefully counts up quantities, weights, and prices, and sets down the places where the supplies can best be bought. The first item is 379,337 quintals (hundredweights) of biscuit. Then come 46,800 pipes of wine. Other items in the estimate are huge quantities of salt pork and beef, dried tunny, cheese, pease, oil and vinegar, rice and onions. Besides the water barrels already on board ship, 20,000 more will have to be bought—10,000 at Lisbon, and the other 10,000 in Galicia. Forty thousand skins for holding water and wine are to be ordered—20,000 in Naples, 10,000 at Seville, and 10,000 at Lisbon. There is an estimate of supplies and stores for the horses, slings for their safety on board ship, horseshoes, pails, mangers, and barley for their feed. Tents will

be wanted, though not many. They are required chiefly for protecting stores when landed, and for the field hospital. Forty thousand pair of leather shoes and 20,000 of hempen sandals (*zapatas*) are the reserve of footgear for the soldiers. Then we hear of thousands of lanterns, candles, and torches; steelyards and balances and measures for the distribution of supplies; buckets; 100,000 pieces of crockery (from Seville and Lisbon); camp kettles of iron and copper; tools of all kinds, and metal in sheets and bars and wire for the artificers and armourers. There is a special estimate for the hospital, which includes 2,000 blankets, lint and linen for bandages and dressings, twelve tents, medicines, and provisions that would now be classed as "medical comforts"—eggs, chickens, and preserves. The hospital has a fairly large staff, including three administrators or superintendents, a chief medical officer and chief surgeon, six doctors, four "barbers" or assistant surgeons, two apothecaries, four infirmarians and four chaplains, a treasurer, and a number of servants.

After the details of the hospital comes an estimate for extra anchors and cables for the ships. Then Santa Cruz deals with the requirements of the artillery. He proposes to land no less than 130 guns with the army. He notes the fortresses and arsenals from which they can be taken. He will have four batteries of 12 heavy guns each—*canones reforzados*, big guns strengthened with rings shrunk on to them, with six more in reserve for casualties—54 in all. This is apparently the proposed siege train. The rest will be lighter pieces, demi-cannon, culverins, and sakers. He will want 1,150 more cannon—large and small—for the fleet. The galleys and galleasses and the galleons of Portugal and Andalusia are already sufficiently armed, but some extra guns will have to be mounted on the galleons of Biscay and the Levant, and in some of the other squadrons. The swarm of small craft will require in the aggregate a large number of these guns. About half the required artillery can

be drawn from Italy, Andalusia, and Seville. For the rest he has 5,000 quintals of gun-metal in store in the Lisbon arsenal, and can arrange to have the rest of the guns cast in good time.

The estimate for ammunition for the cannon of the fleet and army seems to provide a miserably parsimonious supply. But it must be remembered that artillery was still in the days of its small beginnings. On the battlefield the guns only fired a few shots, though there was a larger expenditure of ammunition in sieges. But even here there would not be many guns in the batteries. In a sea fight Santa Cruz hoped to have to expend very few shots from his guns, before closing and boarding the enemy, as he had done at Lepanto and Terceira. So he asked for only 7,040 quintals of balls (28,000 rounds) for the artillery of the army, and 10,000 quintals of iron balls for the fleet—say 800 tons of projectiles in all, or less than the weight of shell to be found in the magazines of a single battleship of to-day.

For the artillery and small arms he estimated a necessary supply of 22,080 quintals of gunpowder, 10,000 quintals of leaden balls and lead for the arquebuses, and 10,000 quintals of *cuerda* or match for the arquebusiers and gunners. Besides the arms already in possession of the troops, 16,000 arquebuses would be wanted at 25 reals per piece, and 5,600 muskets, 10,000 pikes, and 3,200 corselets. An additional list of stores for the artillery and pioneers includes wagons, gun-carriages and their parts, 2,000 bombs for sieges, sulphur and saltpetre, a great variety of tools, and planks for gun platforms and for timbering the galleries of mines, and stakes for barricades. Fourteen hundred mules are to be embarked for the artillery.

There is a special estimate for the extra allowances of the general in command, who has on his staff besides a number of *gentiles-hombres*—"gentlemen" not otherwise described—his lieutenant, secretary, two quartermasters, a chaplain and his clerk, four interpreters, and six trumpeters. The general of the cavalry and the general of the galleys have each a smaller staff.

Then there is a paymaster-general with a crowd of secretaries and clerks, and the provost-marshal's department with its three judges, its guard of halberdiers, its standard bearers, alguazils, jailer, and executioner.

This remarkable state paper is interesting on account of the light it throws on the organization of the fleets and armies of the Spanish monarchy in the latter part of the sixteenth century. It could also be made the basis of a study of the resources of King Philip's dominions, the current prices of a great variety of products, and the centres of industry and the great markets for such supplies.

The total cost alarmed the king. Santa Cruz summed it up, assigning a proportion of the expenditure to the king's Italian dominions. He made the following division :—

To be paid for by the			kingdom of Naples...	780,725 ducats
,,	,,	,,	state of Milan.....	209,777 ,,
,,	,,	,,	kingdom of Sicily....	221,266 ,,
,,	,,	,,	crown of Castille...	2,589,519 ,,
			Total.....	3,801,287 ,,

The ducat as a unit of account was worth about 8s. 9d. of the English money of the time, but allowing for the change of values since then, it would come to not far from five pounds of the money of to-day. So the expedition, the expenditure for which Santa Cruz had patiently calculated down to the last odd units, would cost King Philip the equivalent of nearly twenty millions sterling of to-day. We are so used to huge naval and military estimates that the sum appears moderate enough, but the budgets of the sixteenth century were arranged on more economic lines.

Santa Cruz argued that it was well worth the cost. Such an armament would ensure victory, and at one blow would secure the trade of the Indies and cut off the chief support of the revolt in the Netherlands. The whole expenditure would

be less than the losses suffered at the hands of the English corsairs in a few years.

Philip thanked the admiral for his project. He considered it "a good one," but must think over it. Meanwhile he had given him some less important work to do. Addressing him as his "Captain General of the Ocean Sea and of the military forces of my Kingdom of Portugal," Philip ordered Santa Cruz to assemble a fleet in the Tagus, and be ready to put to sea at the end of April or the beginning of May, to cruise along the coasts and protect them from a possible raid of Drake's flotilla. He was to take from other ports as many ships as he required, so as to be able, if need be, to give battle "with advantage and superiority." *

In acknowledging the dispatch, Santa Cruz suggested that it would be better for him to take his fleet to the *Islas*—the West Indian Islands. Like a good admiral, he did not like a mere defensive attitude. After some hesitation on the score of the difficulty of providing local defence for his home coasts, the king agreed to the expedition to the West Indies, authorizing Santa Cruz to reinforce his fleet with the Andalusian squadron, and telling him that he thought his project for the expedition against England excellent, and this voyage to the West Indies did not mean that it was abandoned, but, on the contrary, would be a helpful preliminary operation. But while Santa Cruz was still engaged in fitting out his fleet the news came that Drake had returned across the Atlantic. He had been content with a mere raid, and had not attempted—as the Spaniards feared he would—to establish a permanent post anywhere in the islands.

On this news the king countermanded the West Indian expedition. As for the great plan that Santa Cruz had submitted to him, though he found it "extremely good," he shrank from the cost of operations on so vast a scale. But he elaborated

* The king to Santa Cruz, dated Valencia, January 26, 1586 (Duro, i. 323).

a new scheme on more economic lines, and this was the plan on which the attempt to conquer England was actually made in the year of the Great Armada.

It was a combination of the project of Santa Cruz and another plan that had been suggested to him a few years before by his half-brother, Don Juan of Austria, the victor of Lepanto, when he was governor of the Netherlands. Don Juan had proposed that the veteran, war-hardened Spanish army of the Netherlands should be used for the invasion of England, as soon as either the Dutch rebels were conquered or a peace could be patched up with them. Don Juan was dead, but he had been succeeded in the Spanish Netherlands by the greatest soldier in Europe, Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma. There was no better strategist or tactician living, and he was a master of the art of the attack and defence of fortresses. He had the common gift of personal courage, and the less common endowment of absolute coolness and quickness of decision in the midst of the tormoil and danger of battle. But he was more than a soldier. He was a statesman and a diplomatist. Just, patient, courteous, and considerate for others, he won the hearts of those he ruled and those with whom he had to deal. He pacified by concessions the southern provinces of the Netherlands—an easier task than winning back the north, where militant religious differences complicated the problem.

With the Seven United Provinces of the North now organized as a republic, and receiving covert or open help from France and England, Parma had to wage war. In 1585, the year of Drake's great expedition to the West Indies and of the open rupture between Spain and England, he began the famous siege of Antwerp. To cut the city off from succour by sea, Parma constructed a fortified bridge across the Scheldt below Antwerp. Giambelli, an Italian engineer who was assisting in the defence, sent floating down the river a ship packed with gunpowder stored in chambers of stone, with a slow match

burning in her hold. This floating mine tore a breach 200 feet wide in the bridge, and hurled to their death nearly a thousand Spaniards. The horror of that terrible explosion haunted the memory of Spanish soldiers and captains for years to come, and, as we shall see, had a remarkable influence on the fate of the Great Armada itself. The Dutch fleet was not ready to take advantage of the opportunity offered by Giambelli's success. Parma repaired his barrier bridge, and after hard fighting was master of Antwerp by the middle of August.

Before the end of the year an English army under Elizabeth's favourite, Leicester, was sent to help the Netherlanders. But Leicester was no match for Parma. His abortive campaign is chiefly remembered among us for the story of Sir Philip Sidney's death at Zutphen. The taking of Antwerp, the failure of the English intervention, and the steady progress of the Spanish arms encouraged King Philip to believe that Parma's victorious veterans would soon be available for campaigning in England.

The project he formed was therefore that Santa Cruz, with a fleet not of 500 or 600 sail, but of much more moderate force, should sail northwards and obtain command of the Narrow Seas between England and the Continent. He was then to cover the transportation of Parma's army to the English shores, partly in the ships of the fleet, partly in a flotilla of light craft collected or built in the ports of Flanders. The execution of the project was fixed for the summer of 1587.

Compared to the ambitious plan of Santa Cruz, it had the defect of a want of unity. Santa Cruz had proposed that he himself should be both admiral and general; that he should set out from Lisbon, or some other port of the Peninsula, with an army embarked on board his galleons and transports, and with the single purpose of putting it on English ground at the earliest opportunity. There would be one mind, and that a vigorous one, controlling the operations. He would have a perfectly free hand once he put to sea. There would be no

need to take the risks of a voyage up Channel—a difficult business in the days of the old sailing ships; he doubtless counted upon seizing one of the western ports by a combined land and sea attack, and then marching on London. The other plan—that imposed by the king—meant that a smaller naval force than Santa Cruz had considered proper for the enterprise should make its way through the Narrow Seas, under the necessity of reaching the waters at the eastern end of the Channel. Arrived there, further operations would depend on the readiness and the orders of another chief, who, splendid soldier as he was, knew nothing of the ways of the sea. In the final crisis there would be a divided authority, and the further series of adverse possibilities arising from the fact that the expedition would not be self-contained, would not have its landing force already on board, but must embark it at the last moment. The army might not be ready; the position of affairs in the Netherlands might hold Parma back; there might be serious delays, during which the great fleet would have to take the risks of lying idle off unfamiliar shores, where the weather even in summer was notoriously changeable.

Santa Cruz was bitterly disappointed at being given a subordinate position in the greatest naval expedition the world had yet seen, and this after his forty years of service on the sea. But like a loyal subject he accepted the new situation, and set to work to carry out the plan dictated from the king's study.

CHAPTER III.

HOW DRAKE "SINGED THE KING OF SPAIN'S BEARD."

In his first correspondence with Santa Cruz in 1583 on the project for an attack upon England, and again in the correspondence of 1585, King Philip had insisted more than once on the necessity of absolute secrecy. Now that a definite plan of action had been adopted, and the long period of preparation had begun, the king tried his best to conceal from the world the object he had in view. All the more important letters were written by one trusted secretary, and went direct from his study, without passing through the routine official machinery. Special couriers were charged with their transmission. Orders were sent to the commandants of ports, arsenals, and garrisons, telling them of work to be done, without conveying any hint of the end in view. Recruiting officers displayed their banners in city, town, and village, and enrolled soldiers for the king's army and navy, but England was never mentioned. There were reports studiously circulated of reinforcements to be sent to Flanders, of a possible campaign against the Turks or the Barbary States, or of a great expedition to the Indies, where those who served the king might find a ready-made fortune in gold and silver.

But such a secret could not be kept for long without at least some suspicion of what was contemplated. Elizabeth was well served by the system of continental espionage organized by Cecil and Walsingham—an intelligence department that, with

much wild rumour, sent to London a considerable amount of real news, including from time to time a summary or even a copy of confidential Spanish dispatches. But even without the hints that could be gathered from such rare documents, there was ever accumulating evidence that King Philip must be preparing for an expedition on a much larger scale than anything that had as yet been attempted. Parma's steady progress in the Netherlands would not need such enormous expenditure of money and labour to maintain the forces at his disposal. There seemed therefore good reason for suspecting that a blow was to be aimed at England itself. No lighter enterprise could justify this sudden outburst of activity in ports and fortresses, arsenals, workshops, and market-places throughout Spain and Portugal, Naples and Sicily, and northern Italy. Elizabeth and her prudent counsellors saw the danger and strove to avert it by negotiations. The King of Denmark intervened as a mediator, and exchanged letters with King Philip, with the result that English and Spanish commissioners met at Bourbourg, near Gravelines, to discuss a possible treaty. Elizabeth was quite willing, if need be, to abandon the cause of the Netherlands, in order to protect her own interests. But the negotiations dragged on for months. The envoys had not full powers. There was much time lost in references to their respective courts, and neither party trusted the other. Philip thought that Elizabeth was only trying to gain time for defensive preparations; and Elizabeth was alarmed at the reports that the Spanish arsenals were as busy as ever, and that in the shipyards and factories of Biscay and Andalusia work was being carried on day and night.

In the summer and autumn of 1586 events occurred in England that had a most important bearing on the crisis. Mary Queen of Scots had been for long years the prisoner of Elizabeth. The Queen of England had persistently refused either to marry or to name an heir to her kingdom. From the latter precaution for securing a Protestant successor she shrank in the same half

superstitious spirit in which so many people hesitate to make their wills. "I am not going to dig my own grave," she said, when it was urged upon her. In default of an heir to the queen, or a successor named by her and accepted by Parliament, Mary Queen of Scots stood next in succession to the English throne.* So long as Mary lived, even as a captive, she was the centre of the hopes of all who looked forward to seeing the old religion of England restored on the death of Elizabeth, who was nine years her senior. There was a somewhat similar situation in France, where the hopes of the Huguenots centred on the eventual succession of Henry of Navarre. There was among the English Catholics, chiefly among the exiles on the Continent, a small party that was eager to see Elizabeth deposed by force, and the Queen of Scots proclaimed in her stead. There was a still larger party, both at home and abroad, that sympathized with Mary, and would have gladly worked for her deliverance from captivity. There were a few wild spirits who would not have hesitated to remove Elizabeth by assassination, a crime that had been committed more than once in recent years by men of various parties in the fierce struggle of the French civil wars. Elizabeth herself soon showed that she would have no scruple about ridding herself of the rival queen in this way. In the

* The following table shows the nature of Mary's claim by descent to the English succession, and the double claim (in right of his father and mother) of her son, James the Sixth of Scotland and First of England :—



summer of 1586 there was a sudden alarm at a story of a conspiracy for the liberation of the Queen of Scots, and the assassination of Queen Elizabeth. I am not going to try to unravel the tangled mystery of "Babington's Plot." Cecil and Walsingham were aware of its existence long before they crushed it out. It is quite possible that they even helped in its development as a means for the destruction of Queen Mary. There were certainly involved in it spies and hirelings of the English ministry. There were also among the conspirators gallant English gentlemen who, ready as they might be to work for the liberation of the captive queen, would have shrunk with horror from assassination. When the moment came Walsingham "discovered" the plot and arrested the conspirators. In October Mary was brought to trial before a court of which she refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction. She admitted that she was ready to do anything to obtain her freedom, but indignantly denied to the last that she knew anything of a plot against Elizabeth's life. She was found guilty, and condemned to death in October. Elizabeth shrank from sending her to execution, but did not hesitate to try to induce Paulet, her jailer at Fotheringay Castle, to murder his prisoner. Paulet repelled such suggestions, and on February 8, 1587, the hapless Queen of Scots was brought to the block. Elizabeth went through the farce of putting on mourning for her victim, and asserting that the death warrant which she had signed had been forwarded for execution without her consent.

Such pretences were useless. All over the Continent there was a general outburst of horror at the death of Mary at the hands of her sister queen. But apart from all feelings of humanity, and on grounds of mere policy, the execution of Mary made any accommodation between Spain and England more hopeless than ever. If Philip had held his hands for years and avoided to the last a quarrel with England, not the least weighty motive for his patient forbearance was the existence of Mary's

claim to the English crown. To overthrow Elizabeth would very probably have meant to substitute for her the Scottish queen, and Mary's accession would mean that England and Scotland would be the allies of France, whose power and influence it was Philip's policy to weaken. For the Queen of Scots was almost a French princess, daughter of a Guise mother, and herself for a while queen-consort of a French king. With her death disappeared the serious risk of playing into the hands of France by any success against Elizabeth. Philip became more eager than ever for the joint expedition of Santa Cruz and Parma against England.

The negotiations at Bourbourg still dragged on without any sign of progress towards a definite result. The preparations in the Spanish ports were well advanced, and the early summer was to see the concentration of the Armada at Lisbon and the start for the Channel. Elizabeth was still trusting to policy to avert the storm, and anxious to avoid any large expenditure on serious preparations for war. The government busied itself chiefly with plans for meeting the Spaniards on shore if they landed. Its whole policy was one of passive defence.

But the danger was averted for a whole twelvemonth by the clear-sighted enterprise of one man — Sir Francis Drake—who saw further than the queen's counsellors in London, and realized the fact—true now as then—that the best way of defending England is not by merely guarding her coasts, but by carrying the war across the seas to those of her enemies. The Spanish fleets were not yet concentrated, and the rumour ran that, with a false sense of security, their ports were but carelessly guarded. Drake promised that if he were given a fleet he would "singe the King of Spain's beard" and destroy his armaments in detail.

On much the same lines as the fleets for his West Indian raids had been got together, he assembled in April twenty-six ships in Plymouth Sound. Some of the ships and most

of the men had already had experience of irregular warfare in the Spanish Main. The necessary funds for the equipment of the expedition and the pay of the crews were provided partly by the queen, and partly by speculators, who were to be repaid with profits out of the expected plunder of the Spaniards. As negotiations were still pending at Bourbourg, the nominal object of the expedition was to cruise off the Spanish coasts and obtain information of the enemy's preparations.

Drake sailed from Plymouth in the middle of April. On the 29th he made a wholly unexpected swoop upon Cadiz. Eighteen great ships lay in the harbour fitting out for the expedition, but as yet without crews and in the hands of the shipwrights. By a culpable carelessness there were no guardships and no adequate batteries to protect them. Exchanging fire with the few guns that could be brought to bear from the land, Drake ran in and seized and burned the fleet of galleons. Leaving them ablaze, he put out to sea again, and cruised for a while off the south coast of Portugal. He landed at Cape St. Vincent, and plundered and burned the monastery which stood upon the headland, and then attacked the neighbouring castle of Sagres. Proceeding along the coast, he took the castles at Valiere and Udiche. Off the coast he picked up a number of ships that were at sea before the news of his raid had reached the Spanish ports. Some of these were traders with valuable cargoes; others were transports conveying stores for the Armada. In the list of captured ships in the Spanish Armada papers 24 vessels are enumerated as taken and mostly sunk or burned by Drake. Amongst them are three *urcas* from Malaga laden with biscuit for the Armada, two others laden with wine, and a Portuguese ship with a cargo of wheat. Two French traders; a barque from Seville with a cargo of muskets; a Levantine laden with cochineal, leather, and wool;

a Biscayan with a cargo of iron and other goods; several ships carrying wine, and one laden with salt, appear on the list.

At Lisbon Santa Cruz had only a few ships ready for sea. There was, it is true, a forest of masts in the Tagus, but this crowd of galleons and smaller craft was still in the stage of preparation. Some of them were being repaired and refitted. Others were waiting for the guns which were still on shore and the stores heaped up in the magazines, and very few of the sailors and soldiers who were to man them had arrived. After the disaster at Cadiz, Santa Cruz was on the alert, and had guardships and batteries watching the narrows below the city. But when Drake's fleet appeared off the river mouth offering battle, the Spanish admiral, though he was safe from attack, found himself in the humiliating position of being unable to accept the challenge.

Drake remained off the coast till June. During this time the king's dispatches from Aranjuez and Madrid are full of pressing orders to the various ports for measures of defence, and for instant preparations to get together a sufficient force to attack and drive off the English raiders. But nowhere was there a fleet in any one port ready to put to sea, and the attempt to reinforce Santa Cruz by sending a few ships along the coast might have meant disaster. The king gave orders for considerable bodies of troops to march by land to Lisbon to enable the admiral to man his fleet. Other orders were sent to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who was in charge of the preparations in Andalusia. He was to send men and supplies to Lisbon by land, and to collect at Cadiz a second fleet from the ports of the Mediterranean and the south. One of the orders directs him to send some of the king's galleys to bring guns from Gibraltar. Medina Sidonia seems to have displayed considerable energy, and was soon getting together a fleet at Cadiz, taking adequate precautions against a second surprise.

Drake's position off the coasts of Portugal was not only a menace to the ports, but also a serious danger for the treasure ships which would arrive in the summer from the West Indies. When the "English armada" was reported to have left the coast early in June, it was supposed that it had steered for the Azores, to capture the silver fleet which called at the islands. Santa Cruz received pressing orders to sail at once. Medina Sidonia would follow with the Cadiz fleet and join him at sea. But neither fleet was ready. Meanwhile Drake had made a prize that of itself more than repaid all the expenses of his expedition. Off the Azores he captured a large Portuguese ship, the *San Felipe*, homeward bound from the East Indies. She was laden with spices and silk, gems and bullion. Cargo and ship were worth £100,000. As his fleet was now running short of supplies, and there was much illness among the crews, he set his course for England. The fleet was dispersed by a storm, but all the ships reached Plymouth safely about the end of June. The same storm struck the Lisbon fleet of Santa Cruz as it steered for the Azores too late to bring the daring raiders to action.

Drake's bold stroke had not only inflicted great loss on the Spaniards, disorganized their preparations, and forced King Philip to defer his attempt upon England till the next summer, but it had also put fresh courage and hope into the English seamen, and given them a confidence in themselves and a contempt for their opponents that were a great factor in influencing the course of events, when at last the crisis came. The men who, with a handful of ships, had paralyzed the naval power of the Spanish king on his own coasts, were not likely to be wanting in dash and enterprise in their own waters, even when a huge armada crowded the Channel. There is no truer maxim than Napoleon's famous saying that in war the moral is to the physical as three to one. And what had encouraged the English had a corresponding effect of disheartening and

discouraging their opponents. Drake had prepared the way for the successes of 1588 by his dash at Cadiz and his cruise off the coasts of Portugal and to the Azores. He had kept his word and "singed the King of Spain's beard."

But King Philip himself was in no way discouraged, deeply as he felt the insult to his arms, and disappointed as he was at Santa Cruz having, for the first time in his long career, been the victim of a failure. There were some things to be set off against the bad news of Drake's raid. In France, the Duke of Guise was more than holding his own against the Huguenots, and there was now no fear of their being able to give any help to his enemies in Flanders. The reports of the general indignation excited by the execution of the Queen of Scots encouraged the hope that he would find new allies, and confirmed him in the idea that if his troops could gain a footing in England, they would find there a divided people. There had already been some notable defections from the side of Elizabeth. Almost on the same day that he heard of Mary's death, he received the report that one of Leicester's officers, Sir William Stanley, had opened the gates of Deventer to Parma, and joined him with his regiment of 1,400 men. This was even more important than the earlier desertions of the Scottish Colonel Semple or Sempill, who had handed over the fort of Lierre to the Spaniards, and taken service with them; and of Sir Roland York, who had in the same way placed Zutphen in Parma's hands. When soldiers in the field thus abandoned their allegiance to Elizabeth, he was more inclined to rely on the promises of the English exiles who assured him that the persecuted Catholics would welcome his army of deliverers. He was not even certain that all the English seamen would prove loyal to the queen when the moment came, for he had, filed among his private papers, an old agreement by which the redoubtable John Hawkins, the hero of the first raids on the Indies, agreed with his ambassador, for good consideration, to join

his forces with 16 ships, mounting 400 guns, and manned with 1,500 men.*

The event, however, proved that Philip was mistaken. When the hour of danger came, there was no division among the people of England, and the Catholics, harried and impoverished as they were by the Penal Laws, stood shoulder to shoulder with their Protestant fellow-countrymen in opposing the foreigner. But it would be absurd to say that Philip had not reasonable grounds for expecting to find the English resistance paralyzed by internal divisions. A hundred years after the failure of the Great Armada, another foreign fleet and army crossed the sea to effect a change in the affairs of England on mixed political and religious grounds. In 1688 the foreign armada, invited to our shores by Englishmen at home and the English exiles in Holland, found—what Philip had hoped for—a divided people, and soldiers and generals ready to desert their sovereign for the invader, who came as the champion of their ideals. The result was the Revolution, which made a new starting-point in English history. In judging of the enterprise of Philip of Spain, it is only fair to bear in mind the roughly parallel undertaking of William of Orange.

King Philip's information as to the state of parties in England was mainly derived from the exiles, and was therefore misleading. For amongst these were to be found men who (like the English Protestant exiles in Holland a century later) looked to a change of ruler in England as the one hope of freedom for their co-religionists. Allen, the author of a fierce denunciation of Elizabeth as a lawless persecutor, and Father Parsons both believed that a foreign invader would be hailed as a liberator. But this was not the mind of the English Catholics,

* Hawkins is supposed to have been fooling the ambassador. But dangerous as it was to correspond with the queen's enemies, several of the worthies of Elizabeth's court (including her favourite, Leicester) were at one time or another seriously bargaining with Spain.

then forming—especially in the north—no inconsiderable part of the nation. Zealous as they were, even unto death, for their faith, the religion of England for a thousand years, they did not look to foreign arms to secure its restoration. More English than the men of 1688 who hailed Schomberg's veteran Dutch battalions as deliverers from the feeble intolerance of James the Second, they stood by Elizabeth under the fury of a relentless persecution. Popular historians of the time have so little to say of their sufferings that few realize how fierce was the trial to which their loyalty was subjected. In the years when England was menaced by the Armada, in 1587 and 1588, the prisons were crowded with Catholics; the spies and priest-hunters were busy, and the courts were passing sentence after sentence of death in a horrible form on Catholic priests and laymen and women. Many of these sentences were executed. But it is remarkable that, all-important as it was for Burleigh and Walsingham to justify the persecution by bringing forward against the accused proof of treason in the real sense of the word—proof of such acts as correspondence with the enemy, or incitement to or preparation for rebellion—not one word of this appears in the evidence given at the numerous trials. The priests who were half-strangled and then ripped to pieces with the hangman's knife were all found guilty not of treasonable practices of this kind, but of the statute-made treason, which consisted in refusal to accept the royal supremacy in matters of religion, or receiving holy orders abroad and saying Mass in England. The laymen and women were condemned for harbouring them or trying to effect their escape from prison. Every English historian grants that the Catholics loyally supported the Government, but none of them seem to realize that they thus acted in spite of provocation far greater than that which the men of 1688—with the approval of English political opinion ever since—held to be enough to justify rebellion, and a league with the foreigner to effect an invasion of England,

and the substitution of a foreign sovereign for the reigning king.*

Though the reports he received at second hand about the state of parties in England were misleading, Philip had on other matters spared no pains to collect information that would be of real use for the expedition. He had had memoirs drawn up on earlier invasions of the British Isles. He had secured charts of the Channel and detailed plans of the English ports. He had sent one of his captains, Diego Ortiz de Urizar, to Ireland to report on the possibility of making that island a base of operations against England. He had an agent in Scotland who gave some hopes of the young King James the Sixth becoming an active ally against the executioners of his mother.

Now that the sailing of the Armada was deferred for another year, King Philip discussed with those best qualified to advise him the question as to whether the original plan ought to be in any way modified. Sir William Stanley suggested a preliminary operation in Ireland. He said he knew the country well, having served there for fifteen years on the English side, and he promised that, if he were given 6,000 Spanish troops and arms for native auxiliaries, he would drive out Elizabeth's garrisons. Ireland, he said, could supply good horses and plenty of fighting men, and its ports would form secure bases for the fleet in the subsequent attack upon England. The Milanese engineer, Captain Bautista Plauti, who had actually visited England and Scotland in order to obtain charts of the British ports for the king, joined the Scots colonel, Sir William Semple, in proposing a diversion by way of Scotland, holding out a hope that James the Sixth could be gained over to give his co-operation. Plauti also suggested that, if the attack were

* In Appendix III. will be found some notes on the persecution of the Catholics in the Armada years, 1587–88. Without some knowledge of this, one cannot realize either the grounds for Philip's hope to find a divided nation, or the marvellous loyalty of the English Catholics to the queen.

(1,666)

SIR FRANCIS DRAKE.

made by the Channel, the Isle of Wight should be seized as an advanced base of operations against the south of England. The most practical and pertinent suggestion was sent by Parma. He proposed that the expedition should be deferred until he had completed the conquest of the islands at the mouth of the Scheldt, the province of Zeeland. The Dutch still held most of this country, and an English garrison occupied the fortress of Flushing on the Scheldt. So long as the enemy held Flushing, the Scheldt and the port of Antwerp were closed to the Armada. If they could be opened there would be a secure stretch of water where hundreds of ships could lie in safety, and the embarkation of the army be easily effected. Then the expedition could choose its own time for putting to sea. But with Flushing still in hostile hands, the fleet of Santa Cruz would have no port that could shelter more than a few small ships. It would have to lie in dangerous open roadsteads at the mercy of a change in the weather. The embarkation of the troops would be difficult. The whole operation would have to be hurried through. A hundred unnecessary risks would be incurred.

But King Philip clung to his original plan. If Parma could conquer Zeeland before the summer of 1588, well and good; if not, he must do the best he could without the Armada being able to anchor in the Scheldt. There would be no time for preliminary descents in Ireland or Scotland, and Plauti's proposal as to the seizure of the Isle of Wight was rejected, as it would have entailed a division of forces. The descent on England was to be made farther eastward, within easy reach of the coasts of Flanders, and within a short march of London. The disembarkation would therefore be on the seashores of Kent or Essex or in the estuary of the Thames.

Parma was directed to carry out important works in the coast province of West Flanders before the coming summer, and thousands of men were employed upon them for nearly a twelve-

month. The canals from the Scheldt above Antwerp to Bruges and Ghent, and between these cities and Nieuport, Gravelines, and Dunkirk, were deepened and widened in places and connected by cross waterways. At Antwerp and at improvised shipyards on the canals, 170 craft of various kinds were built, none of them larger than 200 tons burden. These were to be employed to convey the army by the network of inland waterways to the outlets in the ports from Ostend to Dunkirk, and thence across the Channel under the convoy of the fleet of Santa Cruz. The force to be embarked was to be made up of 30,000 infantry and 1,800 picked cavalry. Of the foot there would be 16,000 of the famous Spanish infantry, the best in Europe. It had acquired the reputation of being invincible on a pitched field of battle, a record unbroken till Condé's victory at Rocroi more than half a century later. There were 1,000 Irish foot in Stanley's regiment; the rest were Germans, Italians, and Walloons. Among Parma's infantry generals were distinguished soldiers of many nations—Don Carlos of Austria, Philip of Lorraine, Amadeus of Savoy, and Giovanni dei Medici.

There could be little doubt that if such an army once set foot in England it would win a swift and easy victory over the half-trained and ill-armed militia of the counties marshalled by the lord-lieutenants, stiffened though it might be by some small proportion of veterans and professional soldiers. But then, as now, it did not matter so much what forces were gathered on the shores of the Continent for the invasion of England, or how inefficient might be the local levies to be opposed to them if they effected a landing on our shores; for unless the command of the sea could be secured by the invader, he was helpless. So the danger of the moment lay not with Parma's army in Flanders, but with the ships that were being fitted out in the ports of Spain and Italy, soon to be concentrated to form the "Great Armada" in the waters of the Tagus.

CHAPTER IV.

THE "GREAT ARMADA" AND ITS CHIEFS.

THE great fleet which assembled at Lisbon in the spring of the year 1588 is generally spoken of as "the Armada," and since that time the word has been freely used, not only in English but in other European languages, to signify a fleet of unusual numbers and strength. But the meaning of the word in Spanish is not restricted either to a great fleet or to a fleet of any kind. It is applied to a small squadron as well as to the largest collection of fighting ships. It can be used to include a land army as well as a fleet, for its literal meaning is simply an armed force or armament.

In English popular tradition and in many English writers, in serious historical works as well as in Macaulay's stirring ballad and Kingsley's partisan romance, there is the further error of stating, or implying, that the Spaniards boastfully named the famous fleet "the Invincible Armada." Captain Duro gives the name to his story of the Armada.* But he is careful to point out that this was never its official title. The word *invencibile* is not once used with reference to it in the correspondence of King Philip and his admirals and generals. It never appears in the proclamations of the time; it is not once used by any of the numerous contemporary Spanish writers on

* "La Armada Invencibile." Por el Capitan de Navio Cesareo Fernandez Duro de la Real Academia de la Historia. Madrid. 1884. Two volumes.

the great enterprise. It may have been used (Captain Duro suggests) in the talk of boastful young adventurers at Lisbon, and so have found its way into the reports of Walsingham's spies; but the official title of the fleet was simply *La Armada* or *La Grande Armada*—literally "The Armament" or "The Great Armament"—a term which would include the soldiers embarked as well as the ships on which they served. The Spaniard is by nature matter of fact and not inclined to empty boastfulness, and so far was Philip the Second from any over-confidence, that before the Armada sailed he wrote that "the result was in the hands of God, who gives or refuses victory as He wills;" and when false reports reached him of a great victory in the English Channel he forbade their publication, saying that the event of war was always doubtful, and no news of victory must be given to the world until it was absolutely certain.

At the time the wildest rumours were circulated in England and throughout Europe as to the number of the Spanish ships, the huge size of individual vessels, the enormous army embarked upon the Armada. These stories were long repeated by historians, especially in England, where national pride found a pleasure in representing that an almost miraculous victory had been won against overwhelming odds. Such stories are still repeated by uncritical writers.* But the English victory was quite brilliant enough to need no such exaggerations to enhance it.

The great fleet of 1588 was far inferior in numbers to the armament which Santa Cruz had originally proposed as necessary for obtaining the command of the narrow seas of the north. It may be that rumours of these earlier plans helped to spread in England the exaggerated stories of the might of the "Invincible

* Thus, in a popular work published in 1888 on the occasion of the Armada tercentenary, it was gravely stated that the Spanish galleons were gigantic floating structures, more like castles than ships; that the great fleet hid the sea and looked like a moving town, so that "it seemed as if room would scarce be found on the ocean for so vast an armament."

Armada." If we take into account the varying conditions of naval warfare, it may be said that as powerful fleets had been assembled in earlier days; for the conditions of sea fighting in the Mediterranean, the fleet of 278 ships that conquered at Lepanto was, relatively speaking, as formidable an armament. But until now no fleet so numerous and powerful had been seen upon the open ocean. There were in all 130 ships, large and small, and none were very large, and the great ships were few in number. The total capacity of the fleet was only some 58,000 tons, so that the average size of the ships was rather less than 450 tons.* In the whole Armada there were only 7 ships of over 1,000 tons, and there were only 14 more of over 800. A considerable number were small coasting craft, some of them mere fishing boats.

Among all the 130 ships there were only 8 that were essentially warships, built specially for fighting, and of these only 4 ever reached the Channel. The remaining 122 vessels were, strictly speaking, armed merchantmen. But the difference between the man-of-war and the armed merchantman was not what it became in the following century, or in any way as great as it is in our own times. The galleon, the typical "great ship" of Spain and Portugal, was, in the first place, a cargo ship —she was not designed for carrying a powerful armament—and mounted only light guns with which to defend herself against piratical attacks. As the danger of attack during a trading voyage increased, the galleons were given more guns, so that some of the newer ships of the Armada, and especially those

* Tonnage and displacement are different things, but we may assume them not to differ greatly for the purpose of a very rough but interesting comparison. As showing the growth of modern naval armaments, we may thus compare the Great Armada with the first three Dreadnoughts launched for our navy :—

(3 ships.)		(130 ships.)
Dreadnought	18,600 tons.	
St. Vincent	19,250 ,,	The Great Armada.
Neptune	20,250	
Total	58,100 ,,	Total tonnage.....57,868.

of the Portuguese squadron, had a comparatively numerous battery, but the guns were mostly 3 or 4 pounders.

The main fighting force of the great fleet was made up of the 6 squadrons or "armadas" of Portugal, Biscay, Castille, Andalusia, Guipuzcoa, and the Levant, mustering altogether 65 galleons and 12 smaller craft (77 sail in all).* Then there were the 4 galleasses of Naples. This was the effective fleet. There were, besides, the 4 galleys of Portugal, which never reached the Channel, and 2 squadrons of *urcas* or store-ships (23 sail), and brigs and tenders (22 sail).

The Great Armada was a fleet belonging to a time of rapid change, and included types of the new and of the old period of naval warfare. Thus the galleys of Portugal represented a type derived from the triremes of Greece and Rome. They were ships of low freeboard, with a row of long oars on either side. Several men tugged at each oar, the number of rowers on a galley being over two hundred. This oar-power rendered them to a great extent independent of the wind, and made the galleys formidable enemies to sailing ships in the inland sea; but they were not good craft for the wilder waters of the Atlantic and the Bay of Biscay. Besides the oars, they had a considerable amount of sail-power. There were two or three masts, each carrying on a long crossyard a triangular lateen sail. The galleys fought in line abreast with their bows to the enemy, and to protect the rowers from a raking fire, there was a strong breastwork built up across the foredeck. Behind this were mounted three or four light guns firing directly ahead. Another gun was mounted aft to be used as a stern-chaser, to check a pursuing enemy by bringing down his spars and sails with well-aimed shots.

The galley was essentially a fighting ship; so were the four galleasses sent by the Viceroy of Naples. These were a transition type, a connecting link between the oared ships of

* See the detailed catalogue of the Armada in Appendix I.

the past and the heavily-armed sailing fleets of the near future. They were big three-masted ships, two of the masts (the foremast and mainmast) full rigged and carrying square sails, the mizzenmast carrying a long lateen yard and one large sail.* They had full, rounded bows, and a considerable breadth of beam in proportion to their length; in fact, they were "tubs"—not built for speed and handiness, but to give room for plenty of guns. This reliance on gun-power was their most marked feature, the fact that made them the forerunners of the future broadside battleship. They were built with what English sailors afterwards called "tumble home" sides, the width athwart ship being smaller at the bulwarks than at the level of the main gun deck below, and the greatest width being a little above the water-line. The object of this "tumble home" was to bring the heavier guns nearer the centre line of the ship, and so reduce the strain and leverage on the frames.

Besides the guns mounted behind the ports of the gundeck, the galleass had lighter pieces on the bulwarks, and others, again, mounted in her high forecastle and poop, to fire ahead, astern, and on the broadside. To repel boarders from the waist of the ship, small cannon were mounted as swivel guns on the after part of the forecastle and the fore part of the poop or "stern castle." Under the main or gun deck there was a rowers' deck, with twelve or fifteen huge oars or "sweeps" on each side, each oar worked by several men. The galleasses of the Armada carried each no less than 300 rowers, and this large number enabled them to work in a series of reliefs or watches. With her sails only, the heavy, round-bowed galleass was a slow ship, but with sail and oar she could make good speed and work with a fleet of galleys. At Lepanto four galleasses had been stationed out in front of Don Juan's battle line of two

* The long lateen yard on the mizzenmast lived on through various forms in the fighting and trading ships of Europe up to near the end of the eighteenth century, and the memory of it is preserved in the name of the lower yard on the mizzen of a full-rigged ship—still called the "crossjack" yard.

hundred galleys, and their artillery fire had broken the onset of the Turkish fleet. The guns of the galleass were high above the water-line, and the galleys had reason to dread their plunging fire.

For some strange reason, the popular reports of the time told wonderful stories of the galleasses, which have been repeated by many English writers up to the present day. They were represented as ships of enormous size, containing in their vast deck spaces great halls and chapels fitted with altars and pulpits, and having towers and turrets on their upper works. They were really not the largest ships of the Armada. Some of the galleons were bigger; but no galleon was so heavily armed. Each of Hugo de Moncada's four galleasses carried 50 guns, small and large. Even the huge *Reganzona*, the largest of the galleons, mounted only 30; and the galleasses were well manned. Besides the rowers, each had more than 100 sailors, a larger crew than that of the galleons—suggesting that the galleass had a very considerable spread of sail. The soldiers of two of them numbered 264 each; the two others had 178 and 169. The soldiers were mostly arquebusiers, so that at close quarters a heavy fire of small arms could be sent down on an enemy from the bulwarks and fore and stern castles. The galleasses were probably the most formidable fighting ships of the Armada.

The main strength of the fleet was made up of the 65 galleons; but they were ships that looked more formidable than they really were. The galleon was essentially a trader, but a trader built in days when every merchant ship that crossed the ocean or even voyaged in the inland Mediterranean might have to fight in self-defence against pirates. The galleon was a "tall ship," to use the description so often applied to her, and she was sometimes a comparatively big ship; but in popular tradition and popular history there has always been much wild exaggeration as to the size of King Philip's galleons.

A considerable number of them were under 500 tons; but even the smallest of them gave a misleading impression of considerable size. This was because the galleon had high bulwarks amidships, and the fore and stern castles were of an exaggerated size. They were more lightly built than the hull, and could only mount a few of the smallest guns, these being mostly so placed that they commanded the main deck amidships. The "castles," besides affording quarters for officers and men, were designed for the defence of the ship against boarders. The rush would come over the lower bulwarks in the middle of the ship, and the boarding party would be under the cross-fire of the castles. They had another use in the attack of an enemy. The few guns mounted on the lower deck were neither of heavy calibre nor of long range, and there was not much ammunition for them. The Spaniard did not believe in fighting with his batteries, and did not understand the full use of them. His method was that which the galleys of Don Juan had used at Lepanto, and the galleons of Santa Cruz at Terceira—the old style of naval fighting. He would try to close with the enemy; then a heavy fire of swivels and arquebuses from the tall castles, fore and aft, would pour down on the enemy's decks to cover the rush of swordsmen and pikes, and hand-to-hand fighting would do the rest. The Armada was doomed to suffer badly in the Channel because the English seamen had learned a better way than this, and one against which the "tall ship" was all but helpless.

The galleons were rigged with very heavy masts and spars, to carry a great spread of canvas. They were ideal ships for the ordinary trade of the tropic seas, where, at the season chosen for their voyages, they could count upon fair weather and steady winds. But they were not the ships for the wilder seas and more broken weather of the north. They rolled badly, and the big masts strained them, so that there was soon trouble with leaks. With a strong wind abeam, the high

bulwarks and castles presented surfaces that were practically sails that could not be reefed. This complicated all manœuvres, and made sailing near the wind impossible. The galleon could not be a handy ship.

But, so far as appearances went, no more glorious craft ever sailed the sea. Under full sail, a great ship of the Armada was a splendid sight. There were not so many "great ships" in those days, and the building and launching of a big merchantman was an event of moment, and it was thought well worth while to spend money, labour, and time with lavish generosity on her decorations. No mere handicraftsmen, but famous artists, were employed in carving elaborate designs on bow and stern. The tall castles were bright with colours and gilding. The great lantern of the poop was an elaborate work of art. The sails were no dull stretches of canvas, but glowed with brilliantly embroidered or painted designs, huge red crosses, or the armorial bearings of some city or province or some noble house, or pictures of saints with golden haloes round their heads. From the masts fluttered long pennon streamers, 40 or 50 yards of good silk, and from the fore and stern castles flew the king's flag and the banners of the commander and of cavaliers who were serving with him as officers or volunteers.

Most of the galleons had the full proportion of one seaman to every twenty tons which Santa Cruz had noted as the established rule for the manning of ships. A few had less than this, but in most cases it was exceeded. But in all the ships there were four or five times as many soldiers as sailors. This was necessary for the fighting tactics of the galleon. In the English ships the proportions are reversed, and there were always more sailors than soldiers, as befitted the new English methods of essentially naval tactics.

In all there were 2,088 oarsmen, 8,050 sailors, and 19,295 soldiers on board the Armada when the muster at Lisbon was completed. There was no trouble about finding the sailors, but

the recruiting of the soldiers caused some difficulty and delay. At last, to make up the required numbers, untrained men were freely impressed. There would be time to teach them their business on board, and they would be required only for service on the ships. Only some of the best of the 19,000 soldiers embarked were to make the expected land campaign in England. The main army of invasion would be made up of Parma's 30,000 veterans.

Besides the galleons, galleasses, and galleys, there were two other squadrons. There were the 23 *urcas*—transports or store-ships. Some of them were among the largest ships of the fleet. Nine of them were of 500 tons and upwards. The largest, the *Castillo Negro* (the "Black Castle"), was of 750 tons; the flagship, the *Gran Grifon* (the "Great Griffin"), was of 650. They carried a considerable number of light guns, and each had on board a detachment of soldiers, so that they could fight if need be; but primarily they were cargo ships, conveying a reserve of stores and supplies for the fleet and army.

There was also a squadron of "patasses," "zabras," brigs and smaller craft, coasters and fishing boats, destined to act as tenders to the bigger ships, and far handier and more seaworthy than the best of them. The largest, the flagship, was the *Nuestra Senora del Pilar*, of 200 tons and 11 guns. But most of them were under 100 tons. Many mounted only 2 small guns, and, unlike the big ships, they had more sailors than soldiers in their crews. They were not fighting ships.

Such was King Philip's Great Armada—a mighty armament even when all exaggerations are swept away and one reckons up its strength in ships, guns, and men, and allows for every deficiency. But the whole history of naval war proves that the mere numbers count for little if there is not the master mind in command. It is the fashion to measure the relative power of fleets by the figures in the navy lists. But the might of one man counts for more than many ships and guns when it comes to the

grim test of battle. A Nelson, a Farragut, or a Tegethoff on the deck of the flagship is a factor that no figures can measure. And the Armada, though it had many brave and experienced men among its officers, had no great admiral to lead it. When the preparations for its departure from Lisbon were far advanced, King Philip had the misfortune to lose his best admiral, the one man who might have been the living soul of the huge body—Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of Santa Cruz.

He had been greatly depressed by the success of Drake's raid and the general unreadiness that had forced him to decline the English sea rover's challenge to battle. He had sailed at last when it was too late to do anything. He felt that his great career was ending in disgrace. Then there were new disappointments. It had been hoped that the Armada would be concentrated at Lisbon in February 1588, but delay upon delay kept the squadrons in their own ports, and in January it was evident that some weeks of preparation were still necessary. Santa Cruz took the king's letters urging all haste as unmerited censures upon himself. He was now in his sixty-third year, and it was clear that, under the prolonged strain of anxious work and repeated disappointment, his health was breaking down. He promised the king that the fleet would be ready to sail in February. But in the first days of that month he was reported to be ill "of a fever"—a description then applied to a wide range of maladies. On the 9th he died. King Philip wrote to the dead admiral's son a brief letter expressing his regret, his sense of the great sailor's services, and his desire to show his gratitude by protecting his sons.

The death of Santa Cruz caused a general depression among the officers and soldiers of the Armada. They had lost the one man whom they thoroughly trusted as the leader of such an enterprise. Who was to succeed him? There was none left so renowned and so experienced as Santa Cruz: but the king had the choice of many good sailors and soldiers. He passed over them

all and made the strangest selection of a commander-in-chief for the Armada.

Don Alonso Perez de Guzman was the head of a noble house that ranked second only to the royal line itself. The Guzmans were famous in Spanish history and romance. One of the national heroes was an earlier Alonso Perez de Guzman, a soldier of the thirteenth century—the first Christian governor of Tarifa, and its defender against the Moors in the celebrated siege of 1294. His exploits were the subject of more than one of the traditional historic ballads of Spain. The Guzmans held great estates in Andalusia, and had their home at Sanlúcar, at the mouth of the Guadalquivir. On one of these estates was a bronze foundry, from which many presents of cannon had been sent to the Spanish kings. In 1505, when Philip the Fair and Juana of Castille were coming from Flanders to Spain, the Guzman of the day invited them to land at Sanlúcar, and promised to meet them with an escort of 2,000 horse and 8,000 foot and give them a loan of 50,000 ducats.

The Guzman of the Armada was born in 1550, and succeeded to the estates and titles of the family eight years later. He was the twelfth Lord and fifth Marquis of Sanlúcar de Barrameda, ninth Count of Niebla, and seventh Duke of Medina Sidonia. This last is the title by which he is remembered in history. He married Donna Aña de Silva y Mendoza, the daughter of Ruy Gomez de Silva, a noble who stood so high in the favour of Philip the Second and had such influence with him that he was popularly known as "King Gomez" ("el Rey Gomez," a feeble pun upon his name).*

The Duke of Medina Sidonia was a short, broad-shouldered man, with a dark, handsome face. He was a splendid horseman,

* Donna Aña's mother was the famous Aña de Mendoza, Princess of Eboli and Duchess of Patrana. The scandalous gossip of the time linked her name with that of Philip the Second, and found in the supposed intrigue an explanation of the favours shown to her son-in-law. But there is no proof that these stories had any real foundation, and there are the strongest reasons for rejecting them.

skilled in the Moorish game of the *djereed*, played by cavaliers with blunted javelins, and he had appeared as an amateur *torero* in the bull ring. His friends appealed to his prowess in these dangerous sports as a proof of his personal courage when he was accused of cowardice in the conduct of the Armada. Wealthy as he was, he had a reputation for fits of miserliness. He had a pleasant manner, and made a good impression on those who met him for the first time. His great ambition was to obtain a position at the king's court, and he showed a strange slackness in matters demanding more active qualities.

On the occasion of the annexation of Portugal he had offered to march on Lisbon at the head of his vassals. The king declined his offer, but rewarded his zeal by giving him the Order of the Golden Fleece, and appointing him Captain-General of Lombardy, directing him to proceed at once to Milan. The duke delayed his departure, pleading ill-health, and after a year of waiting asked to be relieved of the proffered command, and he was allowed to remain in Spain. He was appointed Captain-General of the Coast of Andalusia, and was at Cadiz when Drake made his raid of 1587 and burned the galleons in the harbour. The duke assembled a force to defend the citadel and the neighbouring landing-places, but the general opinion was that he might have done more, and there were loud complaints against him. The king, however, wrote to him that he was quite satisfied with his conduct, and told him he might treat the reports against him with contempt.

During the following months King Philip wrote several letters to the duke, giving him directions for fitting out a squadron at Cadiz to reinforce Santa Cruz at Lisbon, and, after Drake had left the coast, further letters as to the preparations in the southern ports for the assembly of the Armada at Lisbon, and with these orders came repeated expressions of the royal pleasure at the zeal and industry of Medina Sidonia, who had his headquarters at Cadiz during the winter. At last, when the news came that

Santa Cruz was dying, Juan de Idiaquez, Philip's confidential secretary, wrote to the duke that the king intended to appoint him "Admiral of the Ocean Sea," and to give him command of the Armada, which was to sail at the earliest possible date.

On February 16 the duke wrote from Sanlúcar to Idiaquez a letter which might well have made Philip hesitate to entrust him with the command. "Kissing his Majesty's feet and hands," and thanking him for the great honour done to him, Medina Sidonia begged to be excused from accepting it. He had not the health for a sea voyage. He suffered from sea-sickness. He had *muchas reumas* (bad colds). He was not wealthy enough for the expenses of such a position; he had had to borrow money for his journeys to Madrid, and owed 900,000 ducats. He could not in conscience accept the post, for "with such a vast armament and so important an enterprise, it was not right that it should be accepted by one *who had no experience of the sea or of war.*" If he joined the Armada, he would take up the command without any knowledge of its officers, or of the ships and men, of the plan of campaign, of the information collected regarding England, of its ports, or of the correspondence which the Marquis of Santa Cruz had carried on for years. He protested that, if the king insisted on his embarking as admiral of the great fleet, he foresaw that he would have to give, later on, only a bad account of the business; for he would have to proceed blindly, guiding himself by the ideas and opinions of others, without being able to judge what was good or what was bad, or who was trying to deceive him and lead him to disaster. The king, he said, had many experienced officers to whom he might give the command, and he suggested "the Adelantado of Castille." The reference is probably to Diego Flores de Valdes, who commanded the Castilian squadron and was a friend of Medina Sidonia, and his chief adviser in the subsequent campaign.

But before this letter could reach Madrid, King Philip had

written again to Medina Sidonia, on February 18, informing him that Santa Cruz was dead, and ordering him to go at once to Lisbon and take command of the Armada. The reasons for this strange choice are still a mystery. One may set aside the scandalous stories of the king having been influenced by an old amour with the Princess of Eboli or an actual intrigue with the Duchess of Medina Sidonia. Philip was not the man to allow such considerations to imperil the vast enterprise that he had been contemplating for years and on which he staked so much. The generally accepted theory is that he dreaded rivalries and dissensions among the leaders of the Armada. Santa Cruz had held a position that none could challenge, and would have been gladly obeyed by all; but the promotion of one of his lieutenants to the place left vacant by his death might have excited the jealousy of some of those who were passed over in the selection. It was, therefore, advisable to bring in a new man, and as, outside the circle of the squadron commanders, there was none whose services could give him sufficient prestige to impose obedience and discipline on the rest, the king chose the greatest noble in Spain, hoping that his rank would secure for him the unhesitating subordination of the veteran commanders of the squadrons and of the noble adventurers who had volunteered for the campaign. As for Medina Sidonia's lack of "experience of the sea and of war," he would have able counsellors to advise him. The king disregarded the duke's very reasonable plea that for lack of knowledge he would be unable to judge of the value of the advice offered to him. Captain Duro suggests that Philip was also not sorry that, when the fleet and the army at last combined, the admiral would not be a man who could challenge the decisions of Parma, in whom he trusted for the execution of the final operation of the landing in England. Once Parma came upon the scene, there was not any danger of Medina Sidonia trying to exercise a rival authority.

But no explanation is sufficient to clear up the problem of how or why it was that a king like Philip the Second came to give the Armada a figurehead instead of an admiral. Nor, again, can one explain why he dealt so leniently with the duke after his failure, gave him new commands, and, when he failed once more, excused instead of blaming him.

If the king had thought only of placing at the head of the Armada a seaman or a soldier who had earned his confidence by valiant service, he had ample choice. There were some remarkable men among the subordinate commanders who were now to serve as the lieutenants of the great landlord of Sanlúcar, whose only experience of war had been the distant sight of Drake burning the king's ships at Cadiz.

The captain-general, or admiral, of the Biscay squadron was Juan Martinez de Recalde. He was a native of Bilbao, an experienced sailor and a skilled shipwright. He had superintended the building of the king's ships in the northern dockyards. Several times he had convoyed the treasure fleet from the Indies. He had done valuable service to the crown by recovering the bullion from ships sûnk off Madeira; he commanded the squadron which escorted the Duke of Medina Celi to Flanders in 1572; he had arrived at Terceira with 20 galleons to reinforce the Marquis of Santa Cruz on the day after the battle. Disappointed of his share in the victory, he had taken a leading part in the conquest of the Azores, and had been rewarded with the knighthood of Santiago.

Diego Flores de Valdes, the admiral of Castille, had the reputation of being a skilful and enterprising seaman. Medina Sidonia looked to him as his chief counsellor. He was a man of quick temper and suspicious character, and this made him many enemies, but he had a record of service second to none of his colleagues. Like so many sailors of the time, he was a practical shipbuilder. He had a remarkable knowledge of the West Indian seas and the coasts of the American continent,

having since 1566 repeatedly been in command of the "Fleets of the Indies." In 1581 he commanded an expedition of 23 ships to the Strait of Magellan. On his return voyage he attacked and destroyed a French post established at Santo Domingo de la Parsiva, on the Brazilian coast, storming the fort and capturing five large ships and a number of smaller vessels. His namesake, Pedro de Valdes, who commanded the galleons of Andalusia, had reached the rank of admiral by long service in the fleets of the Indies. In the war of the Portuguese succession he blockaded Oporto, and was wounded in the attack on some English ships in the service of the Pretender that had taken refuge at Ferrol. He had served with Santa Cruz in the Azores, and he had sailed the northern seas, and Medina Sidonia was informed that he might rely on his local knowledge.

Miguel de Oquendo, the admiral of the Guipuzcoan squadron, was one of the best fighting sailors of his day. He had taken part in all the chief operations of the navy of Philip the Second. He had distinguished himself in the attack on Oran in 1571. Ten years later, at Terceira, when the flagship of Santa Cruz was hard pressed by several of the enemy, he had dashed in among them, and personally led the boarders who captured the flagship of the admiral of La Rochelle. After the battle he reconnoitred the Azores, and directed the disembarkation of the Spanish troops in Fayal and Terceira.

Martin de Bertendona commanded the galleons of the Levant. He was a sailor of Bilbao, and son of the captain of the same name who commanded the ship that brought King Philip to England to marry Mary Tudor.

Alfonso de Leiva, the general of the troops embarked on the Armada, was a famous soldier. He had raised for the wars of Flanders a company of volunteers, in which every man in the ranks was a noble or had already served as an officer, and he commanded this picked force with distinction under Don Juan

of Austria. He had then commanded the galleys of Sicily, and had shown, in several cruises and fights with the Mediterranean corsairs, that he was "a soldier and sailor too." He was in command of the Spanish cavalry in North Italy when he was called from Milan to Lisbon to serve as general of the army distributed in the various ships. He embarked on board the *Rata Coronada*, an 820-ton galleon of the Levant squadron, with 300 of his men, and acted as the fighting captain of the great ship during the battles in the Channel.

Among such men, and others like them, King Philip might easily have found an admiral on whose experience, courage, and resolution he could count with certainty. When he forced the command on the reluctant Guzman, Duke of Medina Sidonia, he committed the first great error of the campaign.

CHAPTER V.

MEDINA SIDONIA'S DELAYS.

Santa Cruz had reported to the king that the Armada would be ready to sail from Lisbon on February 15. The fact was that the veteran admiral, impatient of further delay, had decided to put to sea on that day with the force which he calculated would be then available—about 55 ships and 16,500 men.* The ships from other ports that had not joined him by that date could be sent after him as reinforcements, but he was not going to wait indefinitely for them. He considered, doubtless, that more would be lost than gained by deferring his departure. It would give the English more time to complete their preparations, and if he suddenly appeared in the Channel with more than fifty sail, he hoped to be able to gain command of the narrow seas and join hands with Parma. The king's letters had made him nervously impatient to get to work at once.

When the news reached Madrid that the admiral was dangerously ill, and then that he was dead, King Philip believed that the Armada was ready to leave the Tagus, and this was why he ordered Medina Sidonia to proceed at once with all haste to Lisbon. But the duke—always dilatory, and now thoroughly disliking the business that had been imposed upon him—was in no hurry to leave Sanlúcar and

* Report of Santa Cruz (Duro, i. 411, No. 51).

Cadiz. He sent excuses to the king. He was most anxious to go to Lisbon, but there were so many affairs he had to arrange before leaving home. Perhaps he cherished a secret hope that Philip, in his impatience for the setting out of the Great Armada, would change his mind and give the command to Valdes or Recalde, and leave him "at peace among his olive groves at Sanlúcar."

But the king was strangely patient. Medina Sidonia had written to him that, having cleared his conscience by confessing to his Majesty his many deficiencies, he accepted the command only because the king insisted on it, and Philip had replied with a letter of friendly encouragement. The king had expressed a hope that the Armada would put to sea on March 1, but it was not till the 15th of that month that Medina Sidonia at last reached Lisbon. On the 21st Philip sent him his formal letter of appointment as Captain-General of the Ocean Sea. He was to have the same pay and allowances that had been granted to Santa Cruz, and to retain his commission as Captain-General of the Coasts of Andalusia. Further, moved by his plea of poverty and debt, the king sent him a gift of 20,000 ducats as a help towards his expenses.

But the duke was no more eager to sail from Lisbon than he had been to leave Sanlúcar. He found excellent reasons for putting off the departure of the Armada from week to week. A forest of masts crowded the broad waters of the Tagus, but he had made up his mind not to go till the last pinnace that could be sent him from the other ports of the peninsula had joined his flag. The king had sent him reports received from England of the mustering of ships at Plymouth and Dover; of an alliance with the Dutch, who were to provide a squadron to watch the ports of Flanders; of a rumour that Drake might attempt another raid on the Spanish harbours. All the more reason, thought the duke, for gathering every possible ship.

Then the king himself sent orders that implied some further

delay. On the report of certain of the commanders that their ships were short of guns, he writes to Medina Sidonia on March 14, telling him to take sixty or seventy cannon from foreign ships detained in the Tagus, paying the owners for them. On his arrival at Lisbon the duke had spent three days inspecting the fleet. On March 19 he sent the king a list of ships, with notes on their state of preparation. He reported the flagship *San Martin* "*toto punto œparejado*" ("ready in every particular"), and then contradicted himself by adding that he was taking out of her 400 quintals of biscuit, 50 barrels of wine, 50 of water, "in order that she might be in better trim." These stores were being transferred to a smaller ship that would act as a tender to the big galleon. Medina Sidonia was thus making an ill-advised change in the arrangements of Santa Cruz, who was an experienced seaman. The old admiral no doubt counted on the stores being lightened by daily consumption before the galleon was far up Channel, and meant to have a good supply in hand without trusting to getting what was wanted from tenders, perhaps in rough weather. But Medina Sidonia was making the same alteration in the lading of several ships. The *San Juan*, *San Marcos*, *San Luis*, and *San Felipe* had all orders to transfer part of their stores to tenders. The *San Mateo* is noted as "ready." The *Santiago* is adding to the height of her bow and stern castles with new constructions to make her a better fighting ship. The same work had been ordered on board the *San Cristobal*. The *San Rafael*, though ready for sea, was an old ship, not in good condition, besides being small. He proposed to leave her at Lisbon. The two brigs, or *zabras*, of the Portuguese squadron were ready, but he was having some carpenters' work done to give the crews better cover. All the ships of Recalde's Biscay squadron were ready, but the carpenters were at work on the "castles" of five of them, to improve their fighting qualities. There was the same report for the squadron of Guipuzcoa.

Here, too, the carpenters had been put to work to make improvements in five of the galleons. In the duke's slipshod and contradictory style, every ship of the Andalusian squadron is stated to be ready for sea, and at the end of his list he notes that "all these ships are short of seamen and artillery." The Italian ships, the *urcas*, and the galleasses are reported ready. There are in all 97 ships on the list, so that before he at last sailed the duke added 33 more to the Armada.

One cannot help suspecting that Medina Sidonia was "making work" in order to provide an excuse for further delay, and so give time for these other ships to join him. A month before, Santa Cruz thought that he had ships enough to make the attempt, and was ready for it when his fatal illness struck him down. Medina Sidonia, a weak man, hesitated to make the great venture till he had gathered together every brig and pinnace whose presence could increase that illusion of strength in mere numbers that has so often been the refuge of feeble commanders.*

The king felt somewhat anxious at his new admiral's delays. On March 20 he acknowledged his report on the condition of the Armada, and, after expressing his confidence in Medina Sidonia's zeal and energy, expressed in courtly phrase his dissatisfaction at the loss of time, and told him he must be ready to sail on March 31. If he wanted more soldiers, he could take them from the garrison of Santarem. But he must at once

* One is reminded of the way in which the feeble Russian Admiralty delayed its fleet before the battle of Tsu-shima, in order to send a number of worthless ships to handicap the admiral they were supposed to reinforce. Lowell's protest against the theory that weak leadership can be compensated for by mere numbers is worth remembering:—

"More men? More *man!* It's there we fail;
Weak plans grow weaker yet by lengthenin':
Wut use in addin' to the tail
When it's the head's in need o' strengthenin'?
We wanted one that felt all chief
From roots o' hair to sole o' stockin',
Square set, with thousan'-ton belief
In him an' us, ef earth went rockin'!"

embark all available men, telling them off to their ships and dispersing the new recruits among the old soldiers. He might leave four or five ships behind at Lisbon, and turn over their guns and men to the others to save time. As for the carpenters' work on the castles of the ships, it could be completed while they were at sea. The same day he sent another letter, telling the duke that on second thoughts he considered it would be better not to leave behind any of the ships assigned to the Armada. Yet a third letter, written on the 20th, told the duke to save time by taking any men he needed from Portugal without waiting for more distant reinforcements to arrive. These repeated letters show how anxious Philip was to hurry on the preparations; but all his energy was wasted on the stolid slowness of Medina Sidonia.

On the 21st the king sent to his admiral the formal warrant appointing him "Captain-General of the Ocean Sea"—a lengthy document, accompanied by still longer "Instructions" as to the powers, privileges, and duties of the office. Four days later he wrote again a characteristic letter, full of directions as to matters of detail—forbidding the noble officers and volunteers to put up cabins between decks that would interfere with the working and fighting of the ships, suggesting means for obtaining rapidly a further supply of soldiers, and pointing out that great care should be taken, when the fleet made its way out of the narrows of the Tagus below the port of Lisbon, to avoid collisions and other accidents. But the important point of the letter was its insistence on the necessity of putting to sea within the next few days.

But the duke found excellent reasons for remaining in the Tagus. He made statements which it is hard to believe, considering that Santa Cruz and lieutenants of his such as Recalde and Valdes had been for months getting the ships ready, and were experienced sailors, not likely to make palpable blunders for a landsman to correct. He protested that no one could be more

anxious than himself to get to sea, but for the Armada to sail in the condition in which he had found it would be to run terrible risks. All the artillery had to be rearranged, because, as it stood, it would be impossible to use it with effect. Some ships had to be lightened of their cargo, and others laden with the stores thus removed. The ships were short-handed, and their crews had to be completed. Soldiers were wanted. Several ships were unfit for sea, and the necessary repairs must be carried out. There was not more than half the proper amount of gunpowder. There were at most only 30 cannon balls for each gun; there ought to be 50. Lead and bullets for the arquebuses and muskets were also deficient, and more would have to be distributed to the ships. The king suggested the 5th or 6th of April as the date for sailing. Medina Sidonia gave him no hope of being ready so soon.

The wonder is that King Philip did not tell the duke to hand over the Armada to Recalde, his second in command, and go back to his seaside palace at Sanlúcar. Instead of this, he showed a strange patience in the face of these everlasting delays and disappointments. Once more he thanked the duke for his zeal and energy, and assured him of his continued confidence, but he urged again and again that the fleet should sail as soon as possible. "The chief point is that the Armada should start," he writes with his own hand, underlining the words, in a letter dictated to Idiaquez, before signing it. He sends money to Lisbon, orders the dispatch of more soldiers, and then proceeds to discuss minor details with the laborious exactitude which was part of his character.

For a while there is no attempt again to fix a day for sailing. Medina Sidonia fills his letters with reports and notes on matters of detail. Sometimes he tells the king he has not followed his instructions. Thus he mentions that as to the order that no cabins should be fitted up between decks, there were so many nobles and gentlemen on board the ships that it was impossible

to prevent this, but he had seen that the cabins were so erected that they could be easily taken to pieces when clearing for action.

On April 6 the fleet of galleons for the Indies sails from Lisbon, in fine weather, with a fair wind. These were the ships that went each year to the West Indies and the ports of the *tierra firma* conveying reinforcements, stores, and merchandise for the Spanish settlements, and returning with rich cargoes that included the produce of the mines. The departure of this fleet enabled all the resources of the port to be devoted to the Armada. On the 10th Medina Sidonia interviewed a new arrival from England. He was one of his own neighbours, Francisco de Valverde from Sanlúcar. He told the duke how in 1586 he was returning from New Spain with a little ship of 150 tons and a crew of 16 men, and when he thought he was safe home, he was captured off Cape St. Vincent by a squadron of four English ships, commanded by "Juan Aquines" (John Hawkins). They took him to "Posmua" (Portsmouth) in England. He was kept there three months, and then sent to "Antona" (Southampton). After another stay of some months there he went to London. At last—how, he did not explain *—he obtained his release, and with "a passport from the queen's secretary," embarked in the "river of London," and reached Lisbon by way of Dieppe and Havre.

Asked what he could tell of the English preparations, he said that when he left London, two months ago, "Francisco Draques" (Drake) was there, and it was reported that he had collected at "Plemua" (Plymouth) 40 ships, 5 of them large vessels belonging to the queen, of 400 to 500 tons, armed with bronze guns; the rest smaller. There were 8,000 men on board of them, sailors and soldiers, the most of the latter being arquebusiers. There was a rumour that there was sickness in the fleet, some said the plague, but it was being kept secret.

* Probably by paying a ransom.

There was another fleet in the "river of London"—20 sail —2 ships being of 500 or 600 tons, but none of the others over 200. Some light craft had been sent to watch the Channel and the Scottish coast. Eight or nine thousand men had been enlisted for this second fleet. It was not likely that further ships would be fitted out, for the queen was very short of money. Recruiting for the fleet, said Valverde, was not easy, the men holding back, though if it were for a voyage to the Indies it would be easy to find men for even 200 ships.

To use a familiar but expressive phrase, Drake had "got on the nerves" of the Spaniards. Medina Sidonia asked Valverde, not what were reported to be the plans of Elizabeth's government, but what "Draques" meant to do. He replied that at first it was said that "Draques" would go to Lisbon and "burn the Armada of our lord the king," but that when he (Valverde) left London everything was in suspense, for there was talk of a peace being patched up, and envoys had gone to Flanders. But some said that even if there were negotiations, the foreigners were only giving them false hopes in order to find them unprepared. Asked if news of the great armament at Lisbon was talked of in London, and if it "caused any fear," Valverde answered "Yes," but added that "others said that there were not enough sailors and soldiers for it, and that most of those enlisted for the Armada had died, and so they were of good courage, and without much thought of hearing that the Armada could do anything effective." Asked if the Catholics would welcome the Armada, he said that they would, and that half the kingdom was of this mind. Here it is plain that Valverde was telling the duke what he thought would please him Asked if the queen was enlisting foreign mercenaries, he said that he heard nothing of this in England, but in France there was a report that 12,000 Germans were to be brought over to England. Then he told the duke of a report he had heard in London that the English had found a way through the northern

seas to the spice islands, the Moluccas, "and if this were so it would be most injurious to the service of his Majesty."

Finally he was asked if he could give any information about the English ports, and if any work was being done to fortify them. He replied that at "Presencia" a bastioned fort was being built, with earthwork and gabions, for a garrison of about 200 men. It is impossible to identify "Presencia" with the name of any English port, and one can only suppose that, being utterly ignorant of the elementary geography of the country he was going to attack, Medina Sidonia caught the name mentioned by Valverde wrongly, and did not know enough to doubt if he had heard him correctly.

This was the last information about England that the duke received before sailing—a mixture of true and false, but, on the whole, likely to encourage him.

The preparations for sailing went on in a very leisurely way. The duke asks more than once for money, and is sent a further supply. He explains to the king the arrangements for distributing the soldiers in the ships so as to keep the men of the same regiments and companies in the same squadrons and galleons. The king informs him of the dispatch from the northern ports of 100 mariners and 9 pilots (navigators or sailing masters), and adds that "as it would be well that the said pilots should receive a certain amount of consideration, being men worthy of honour, I charge you to give orders that it shall be so, and it is my pleasure that they shall be well treated." Deep-sea navigation was a mystery as yet known to comparatively few, and the *piloto* was a man of importance. The duke was offered a large quantity of powder by some of the merchants, and, after haggling over the price, purchased 400 quintals. He wrote to the king that he would see it was not wasted, though there would have to be some firing of salutes, "which rejoice and encourage the soldiers."

On Monday, April 25, there was some of this firing.

Lisbon was *en fête* for a stately ceremony—the delivery of a special standard to the commander-in-chief of the Armada. Guards of honour were landed from the ships, more than 1,200 men in all, mostly arquebusiers. They were ranged in glittering lines before the palace and the cathedral. The galleys had been moored near the quay, and these and the ships of the fleet were gay with fluttering colours. The Duke of Medina Sidonia was escorted from the quay to the cathedral by a brilliant band of nobles and cavaliers, officers of the Armada and volunteers of many nations. To name them would be to write a catalogue of the historic houses of Spain, Portugal, Naples, and Sicily. Names such as those of Francisco Cortes, Alonso Pizarro, Pedro Ponce de Leon, and Juan de Sandoval told that the kindred of the *conquistadores* of the New World were represented there. Ireland, still but half conquered, was represented by a group of the sons of its chiefs, headed by Don Carlos O'Connor. There were a few of the English exiles who had taken service with King Philip. One finds their names in the courtly list of cavaliers disguised by the Spanish spelling of the secretary who noted them—names like Guillermo Brun (William Brown) and Enrique Miguel (perhaps Henry Mitchell).

The *caballero* of the day, when on military duty that was a mere ceremonial parade, wore what would now be counted a court suit, hose and doublet, and cloak of brightly-coloured silk and velvet, with a plumed cap tricked out with jewels. The sword and dagger, often with a gemmed hilt and scabbard, were ornaments as well as weapons. Perhaps he would wear also a corselet, but it would not be a piece of heavy battle armour, but a light steel breastplate artistically engraved and damascened with gold. So the escort of Guzman, Duke of Medina Sidonia, was such as might well befit the greatest of kings. And it was no mere parade of courtiers. Among these men were veterans who had sailed the ocean, fought in epoch-making battles like Lepanto and Terceira, and explored hitherto

unknown lands in the far west, and younger men eager for their first campaign, and pledged to emulate the renown of the historic names they bore.*

At the cathedral the duke was received by the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon and the Indies. High Mass was sung, and as the solemn rite ended, the cardinal took the great silken standard, embroidered not with the lilies of Aragon, the lions of Leon, and the castles of Castille, but with a representation of Christ on the cross, and the Blessed Virgin, and St. John, blessed it, and handed it to the admiral, who received it on bended knee. At that moment, by a prearranged signal, the arquebusiers in the streets fired their heavy muskets in the air, and the ships on the Tagus answered each with three cannon shots—a thundering salute of more than 300 guns. An answering roar of cannon came from the ramparts of the citadel.

Then the duke handed the banner to his standard-bearer, Don Luis de Cordova, and, walking beside it, passed out of the cathedral, followed by a long procession of nobles and cavaliers, priests and monks, and religious confraternities. Between the ordered lines of the saluting troops the stately pageant moved on to the quay on the river front. There a flotilla of flag-decked boats was waiting, and, as the duke and his officers embarked, the guns of the fleet fired a second salute. Through the drifting clouds of smoke, bright with the spring sunshine, the admiral's barge rowed for the huge *San Martin*, and, before the thunder of the cannon had ceased, Medina Sidonia was on the deck of his flagship watching the silken standard running up the halliards to the truck of the tall mainmast.

Those who witnessed this splendid display of armed

* The pageant was watched by one of Walsingham's spies, Sir Antony Standen, a Surrey gentleman. He had been in Italy, and had just reached Lisbon by way of Spain. It is likely he posed as one of the persecuted Catholic refugees. He was able to send Walsingham a short report of the blessing of the standard, but the difficulty of communication prevented him sending his master any really useful information in the critical time that followed.

pageantry must have seen in it the presage of glories to come. Alas for human hopes and calculations! Of the thousands of seamen and soldiers, officers and adventurers who crowded the decks and the tall castles of the Armada, how many were doomed to death within a few months of that bright day of rejoicing! Few were to meet their death in battle, to which they looked forward as one of the chances of a soldier's life. Starvation, fever, shipwreck were to end their lives, and most of them would find a grave in the depths of the open ocean or under the wild cliffs of the northern islands they had hoped to conquer.

CHAPTER VI.

KING PHILIP'S ORDERS—THE SAILING OF THE ARMADA.

For five weeks after he thus displayed his standard in the Tagus, Medina Sidonia remained at Lisbon. It was not till Saturday, May 14, that he wrote to King Philip that his preparations were at last complete and the Great Armada was ready for sea. He had, he said, during the two months doubled the number of the men embarked, and this "with the utmost order and quietude." But he could not leave the Tagus even now, for the weather was bad—"as unfavourable as if it were December."

He had received his final instructions from the king. There were three documents: (1) General directions for the expedition; (2) confidential instructions; (3) a sealed letter to be handed to the Duke of Parma in case he made the descent upon England, but in any other case to be returned by Medina Sidonia to his Majesty. The opening up of the archives of Europe has left few secrets of the past unrevealed, and we can now read the secret instructions and the sealed letter, of which copies were filed in the Simancas archives. Captain Duro has published the full original text.

The three important state papers may be thus summarized:—

As to the general objects of the expedition, the king refers the duke to earlier instructions given to Santa Cruz, directing him (after Drake's raid) to refit and complete the Armada, in

(1,666)

PHILIP II. OF SPAIN.

(*From the painting by Alonzo Sachez Coello in the Berlin Museum.*)

order to clear the Channel of the enemy and cover an invasion of England by the Duke of Parma from the Spanish Netherlands.

He is instructed to proceed direct to the English Channel with the whole of the Armada, and to sail up it as far as the "Cabo de Margat" (the North Foreland). Here he would be in a position to cover the crossing of the army from Flanders. He was to inform Parma of his progress in order to concert measures with him. For this purpose he was to send light craft with dispatches in cipher to the ports of Flanders—Gravelines, Dunkirk, or Nieuport—or messengers by land, who would be put on shore from boats at night on the coast of Normandy, or the "county of Boulogne." These messengers were to be trusty men, who would be given no letters but only a verbal message for Parma.

Before sailing from Lisbon he was to select certain points as the rendezvous for the ships to reassemble in case they were separated by bad weather. In case of a storm scattering the fleet in this way in the first stage of the voyage, the rendezvous was to be some place near Cape Finisterre, such as the Bay of Vigo or the port of Corunna. In the case of a storm occurring near the entrance of the Channel, it would be well, subject to the opinion of practical men who knew these seas, to appoint a rendezvous under the shelter of the Scilly Islands (*las islas Sorlingas*). In case of bad weather in the Channel itself, the duke was to consult the experienced men he would have with him as to whether the Armada could take shelter in some unfortified port or bay of the coast of England itself, and as to whether it was better to steer eastward or westward; but he was to keep away from the coasts of France and Flanders, on account of the shoals and banks on that side.

Information from England pointed to the existence of two fleets in the Narrow Seas, one under the terrible Drake, based on Plymouth, the other up Channel, perhaps still in the Thames,

under Lord Admiral Howard, the "*Almirante de Inglaterra*" of King Philip's instructions. Medina Sidonia is reminded by the king that "the success of the business depends on going to the root," and is therefore warned that even if—as reports from England seem to indicate—"Draques" should put to sea with a fleet of some kind (*alguna armada*) to make a diversion by harrying the shores of the Peninsula, he is not to change his course, but hold on for the Channel without going in pursuit of the enemy. But if the fleet of Drake should follow him up or meet him at the entrance of the Channel, he is to engage him, for it will be a good thing to be able to fight before the enemy has concentrated. If he does not meet an enemy till he reaches the "Cabo de Margat," and if he finds there either the "Admiral of England" with his fleet, or even both the armadas of the admiral and of "Draques," he will be strong enough to fight with advantage on his side, and is to offer them battle, trusting in the Lord for victory.

The king says that he has few instructions to give him for the actual day of battle, as to the array of his fleet and the method of fighting, for it will be for the duke himself to direct matters according to circumstances, but he impresses upon him that "it will be the plan of the enemy to fight at a distance, on account of the advantage he has in artillery" (which shows that Philip's counsellors were well informed), and that, on the contrary, he must endeavour to come to close quarters. He sends him information as to the way in which English sailors mount and fight their guns, noting that they aim low at the hulls to sink their opponents. In case of victory, he is to take care to keep his fleet together, and beware of allowing ships and squadrons to disperse in hope of plunder or in a disordered pursuit. Such imprudence after victory has led to many disastrous losses both on sea and on land.

So far, the king's instructions are admirable; but now comes a feeble admonition which reveals that Philip and his advisers

had not grasped the elementary principle that unless the fleets of Howard and Drake were destroyed, or driven into harbour and closely blockaded, there could be no safety for Parma's transports and no invasion of England.

"This instruction as to fighting is to apply if there is no other means of securing the passage to England of my cousin the Duke of Parma, for it will be well if, keeping your forces intact, you can secure the same result either by misleading the enemy, or in some other way."

With a commander like Medina Sidonia vague talk of this kind was an invitation to avoid a decisive action in the Channel.

If the Armada gets through without fighting (a strange supposition), Medina Sidonia is to reinforce Parma's invading army with 6,000 of the troops on board his ships, selecting Spaniards for this service. If there has been a fight, he is to reduce this number in proportion to the losses incurred.

After Parma's landing, Medina may keep the Armada at the mouth of the "river of London," blockading it, and using some of his ships to protect the communications with Flanders. He is to act in close accord with Parma, land no one and attempt nothing on land without his consent, for his own business is only the fighting on the sea, "which in truth is the main thing," adds Philip, a point not kept in mind in that unfortunate passage about evading battle.

The king, after insisting on the necessity of union in council and action between Parma and Medina Sidonia, notes, almost in passing, that if the English campaign is successful, the Armada may make an attempt on Ireland, provided Parma agrees to this.

He tells his admiral that he relies on him to keep good order in the fleet, and he is especially to repress blasphemy and evil speaking. There must be great care in the regular and economical issue of all stores and supplies. "This is not a mere matter of business, but one on which victory often depends."

In the "secret instruction" sent at the same time, the king tells the duke to give Parma the accompanying sealed

letter as soon as he has landed in England. He is to arrange all details with the duke, and put Alonso de Leyva in command of the Spanish infantry landed from the Armada. Then comes a passage which shows that King Philip had no delusions about his Armada being "invincible."

"If God grants us the desired success which we hope of Him, you will follow in all particulars the orders of your open letter of instructions. But if, for our sins, matters turn out otherwise, and the duke, my cousin, cannot pass over into England, or you cannot assist him to this end, in this case, after having communicated with him, you will, if you can, take possession of the Isle of Wight (*isla de Wych*), which is not so strong that it is likely to offer resistance. And once captured, it can be held, and will give you a good port to shelter the Armada, and where steps can be taken that this place, which is most important, may serve to open the way for further operations, and so it will be well to fortify yourself strongly in it."

The admiral is further informed that the eastern entrance (Spithead) to the waters inside the Wight is wider and better than the western (the Solent). But there must be no thought of this raid on the Isle of Wight till after he has reached the North Foreland (*Cabo de Margat*), and, after doing his best, has found that the chief object of the expedition cannot be carried through.

A final note mentioned that Don Antonio, the Portuguese Pretender, was in England, and, if the Spaniards landed, steps were to be taken to effect his capture.

The contents of the sealed letter to be delivered to Parma on his landing in England are important and interesting, as showing how very moderate were King Philip's real views. He was so far from counting upon an easy conquest of England that he devotes the whole of the letter to instructing the Duke of Parma as to the conditions on which he was ready to conclude peace, in the event of "the result being not so favourable that the matter could be decided by force of arms, and yet not so adverse that the enemy would be freed from all anxiety." In such a case he left the duke free to conclude peace if Elizabeth would agree to the following terms:—

1. Freedom for the practice of the Catholic religion in England.

2. Restoration of the fortified places in the Netherlands held against him by the queen's forces.

3. Compensation for losses inflicted on his subjects, which would amount to a large total (that is, compensation for the damage done in the raids of Drake and the rest on Spanish trade and the over-sea colonies).

The first condition, he noted, was the most important. Parma might point out that Elizabeth could all the more readily grant it because the King of France had made the like concessions to the Huguenots. He might also urge that such a concession would be useful to England, as it would put an end to troubles in the commercial intercourse between English and foreign traders. Further, in order to smooth the way for the granting of toleration to the English Catholics, he might consent to waive a large part of the claim for compensation under the third head. As to the second point, what the king was chiefly anxious to obtain was the possession of Flushing, in order to free the navigation of the Scheldt, and open up the trade of Antwerp.

In making these proposals, Philip assumed that his army would have won a footing on English ground, for he suggested that certain places should be temporarily occupied as security for the due execution of the treaty of peace. He appears to have had the Isle of Wight in mind in this connection, for he proceeds to point out to Parma (as he had already done to Medina Sidonia) the advisability of trying to occupy the island and fortify it, in the event of the chief part of the enterprise being unsuccessful.

Here, once more, the plain facts of the case are very different from the wild stories of Philip's plans which, first circulated in England at the time to fan into fury the national hatred of the foreign enemy, have been repeated in

grave histories and lighter romances, dressed up anew in controversial pamphlets, and re-echoed in the popular tradition of three centuries. In England at the time broadsheets were printed with blood-curdling accounts of the barbarities said to have been practised by the Spaniards in the Indies; of their alleged cruel treatment of English prisoners;* of the horrors of the Inquisition—these being illustrated with pictures of racks and instruments of torture. It was declared that the Spanish king hoped to establish an Inquisition in England, and that the queen herself would be sent to Rome to be burned as a heretic. This story of the projected Spanish Inquisition in England has found its way into several historical works. It is gravely stated that an Inquisitor-General and his officials embarked on board the Armada, bringing with him a supply of racks and other engines of torture. A few years ago the warders at the Tower of London used to exhibit to the visitors they conducted round the building a thumbscrew and the iron hoops of the "Scavenger's Daughter," and explain that these were instruments of torture taken from captured vessels of the Armada, and this though the "Scavenger's Daughter" was notoriously an English invention, and years before the Armada sailed the Tower had a very complete equipment of such horrible implements as the rack and the thumbscrew.

Philip had so little idea of annexing England to his dominions that he proposed to the young King of Scots to become the ally of Spain, avenge his mother's death, and add the crown of England to that of Scotland, as James actually did under other conditions some fifteen years later. It is quite clear, from his instructions to Parma, that the Spanish king's chief object was to secure his traders, his colonies, and his possessions in the Netherlands from English attacks. In posing, further, as the champion of the Catholics of

* See Appendix IV. for a discussion of the evidence on this point.

England, he was doing what was an obvious course for a Catholic king to take; he hoped thereby to strengthen his hands, and he was doing openly for his co-religionists what Elizabeth had done more or less covertly for the Protestants of the Netherlands and France.

In his general orders to the Armada, issued at Lisbon, Medina Sidonia put the crusading element of the Armada in the forefront, saying nothing of the more worldly motives of the king's policy. He declared that the chief object of the expedition was "to serve God our Lord, and bring back to the bosom of His Church many people and many souls now oppressed by heretic enemies of our Holy Catholic Faith." The form of words thus used is open to criticism on theological grounds, for, however much oppressed by "heretics" the persecuted Catholics might be, they were still members of the church of which the duke posed as a champion, and there could be no question of "bringing them back" to it. It would seem that Medina Sidonia was making a clumsy attempt to express the idea, put forward more clearly by the king, that the first object of the expedition should be to secure freedom of worship for the Catholics of England. He made the statement the basis of an appeal to those he commanded to act so as to obtain a blessing on the enterprise. All were to confess and communicate before the departure of the Armada. Blasphemy and bad language of all kinds were to be sternly repressed. Prayers were to be said on board the ships each day. There was to be a truce in all personal quarrels. Any one contravening this last order was to incur the guilt of treason and suffer death. To draw sword or dagger against a comrade was to be a capital crime.

The signal for sailing would be a gun fired from the flagship, which the other ships would acknowledge by sound of trumpet. At sea the flagship would lead, and the other

ships were to keep their stations, and on no account go ahead of the *San Martin*, either by day or night, without express orders.

Each afternoon the admirals commanding the squadrons were to send a pinnace to the flagship to receive the watch-word for the night, which they were then to communicate to the ships under their command. For times of bad weather, when boats could not be used to carry messages from ship to ship, a series of seven watchwords was given, one for each day of the week. The light craft were to be distributed among the various squadrons, most of them being with the flagship and the Portuguese "Armada."

After leaving Lisbon the course was to be, first for Cape Finisterre, then for the south side of the Scilly Islands.* In case of dispersion by a storm, the rendezvous in the first part of the voyage would be off Cape Finisterre, where the ships were to wait for orders, and if they did not receive them were to proceed to Corunna. The duke did not say how long they were to wait for orders off the Cape.

In the voyage across the Bay of Biscay to the Scillies, no ship was voluntarily to leave the Armada, or to turn back to Spain. A breach of these orders would incur the penalty of "death and forfeiture of goods" for the commander. In case of a dispersion in this second stage of the voyage, if the ships collected to leeward of the Scillies did not find the flagship there, they were to look for their admiral in Mounts Bay, or, as he curiously describes it, "the Bay of St. Michael of Montesbay (*sic*), which is between the Capes of Land's End and the Lizard,"† where they would find either the *San Martin* or some of the light craft with his orders.

* Medina Sidonia when writing these orders cannot have referred to his chart, for he writes as if he thought there was only one island, not a group. He speaks of "*la Sorlinga*" and "*la dicha isla.*" In other parts of his correspondence he refers to "*las Sorlingas*"—that is, the Scillies.

† "La bahia de San Miguel de Montesbay, que es entre los Cabos de Longaneos y Lizart."

Then came some directions for the primitive signalling of the time. At night the flagship was to be carefully observed, to see if she changed her course and went on another tack. Before tacking, the *San Martin* would fire a gun, and show a second light at the stern at some distance from the poop lantern burning as a guide to the fleet. The ships would acknowledge the signal by showing a light, and would tack and follow on the new course. If she shortened sail, the flagship would display two lights, one astern and the other amidships. If the flagship had to lie to, she would fire a gun and show three lights—at the stern, bow, and amidships. The rest of the fleet would acknowledge the order with three lights in the same positions. Look-out men with good sight were to be aloft in the tops, and be specially vigilant at sunrise and before sunset, when they were to count the ships of the Armada in sight, and if they discovered that there were more ships (and therefore strange sail in view), a signal was to be made by firing a gun and hauling up the topsail twice. The nearest ships were then to bear down on the strangers and examine them. The recall signal for the ships thus chasing was to be a gun fired by the flagship. This was to be at once obeyed—"even though they should be on the point of capturing the stranger."

The ship sighting strange sail was to fly a flag from her topsail yard after signalling them, but in case the strangers were more than four, two guns were to be fired and the signal flag flown from the mainmast head. In this case the fleet was to wait for orders from the flagship before further action.

A flag flown over the stern of the flagship by the great poop lantern was to be the signal for other ships to send for orders to the admiral. If—"which God forbid"—any ship caught fire, her nearest consorts were to keep away from

her after sending boats and pinnaces to her help. Special care was to be taken that in every ship the galley fire was extinguished before sunset.

It was ordered that the *gente de mar*—the seamen—should be lodged in the fore and stern castles. The gun-decks were left for the soldiers. These were to take special care to clean their arms at stated times. Each man was to be told off to his battle station. In action, barrels of water were to be placed between the guns, and old sails and rope mantlets were to be wetted and kept ready for smothering any fires that might break out on board. So that no one could plead ignorance of these general orders, they were to be read publicly to each ship's company three times a week.

On Wednesday, May 11, there were at last signs that the Armada was about to put to sea. A light breeze blew from the eastward, and all day long the people of Lisbon watched from the quays the ships of the squadrons of Andalusia, Biscay, and Guipuzcoa getting up their anchors in succession, and sailing down into the narrows below the city. They anchored again in the river mouth between the fort of Belem and the village of Santa Catalina. Towards evening the wind went round to the westward, and the rest of the fleet remained at its moorings opposite the city, the orders for putting to sea being countermanded.

The west wind which stopped the movement of the great ships brought into the Tagus a small dispatch boat, commanded by Captain Francisco Morosin, bringing letters from the Duke of Parma, written at Ghent on March 22. Morosin had been six weeks at sea. He ran up the Tagus and reported to Medina Sidonia on board the *San Martin*. The duke's letters told that he had got together 17,000 men and 1,000 light horse, with 300 small craft for their transport to England. Morosin was anxious to put to sea again the same evening, to carry to Parma the news that the Great Armada was on

the point of sailing; but Medina Sidonia feared that he might fall into the hands of the English cruisers in the Channel, and bade him accompany the fleet, promising to send him on with letters for the Duke of Parma at the first opportunity.

For some days the wind blew steadily and strongly from the west, and there was a further delay. In order to be ready for the first favourable change in the weather, the ships were towed down by the galleys and rowing boats to the narrows at the river mouth, and the great forest of masts crowded the river channel from Belem down to the seaward headlands. King Philip had hoped that weeks before this time the Armada would be in the Channel, and he waited from day to day for news of its sailing. He had ceased to urge his admiral to put to sea. Medina Sidonia's stolid deliberation had conquered the impatience of the king.

At last, on the evening of May 29, the wind worked round to the north-north-west. The pilots advised the admiral that he could work out of the narrows with this wind abeam, and then run southwards for a while to get sea room, before beating up to the northwards to clear Cape Roca. The marvel is that he took their advice and did not persist in waiting for a wind from the east to carry him out to sea. That night he issued orders that, if the wind held, all should be ready to sail in the morning.

At sunrise on the 30th—a bright summer day, with a light wind and smooth sea—the signal-gun was fired from the *San Martin*, as she ran up the admiral's flag on her mainmast. The rest of the ships acknowledged the signal with a flourish of trumpets, and displayed their colours. The shouting crews tramped round with the capstans bringing up the anchors, the huge painted sails were shaken out, the heavy yards braced round to catch the north-west wind on the starboard tack, and, with the leadsmen in the bows feeling for the deep channel between the shelving banks, the *San Martin* led the fleet out between the headlands of the Tagus. From both shores vast

crowds watched the long procession of tall galleons and galleasses, and the swarm of smaller craft that streamed out to sea—the greatest fleet that had yet displayed the standard of the King of Spain and the Indies. From Belem the Cardinal Patriarch gave the Armada a parting blessing, and then sent off a courier riding hard for Madrid to tell the king that at last the great venture had begun.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIRST FAILURE.

After leaving the narrows of the Tagus, the Armada sailed slowly to the southwards during the afternoon of May 30 and the following night. Before the light breeze the fleet straggled over miles of sea, and the galleons had to shorten sail to allow the heavily-laden *urcas* to keep up with them. At dawn on the 31st the *San Martin*, with the squadron of Portugal, was off Cape Espichel. The admiral then stood out to sea in order to gain room to weather Cape Roca. He tacked during the night, and at sunrise on June 1 Cape Roca bore north-east. It was the third day of the voyage, and the great fleet was still off the mouth of the Tagus.

The wind had shifted a little. It blew from the west-north-west—still an unfavourable point. It was a light breeze, with a perfectly smooth sea, and, however welcome this might be to a crowd of landsmen and an admiral who was liable to sea-sickness, the pilots and sailors were in ill-humour at those baffling northerly breezes. Beating slowly to windward, the Armada crept up by the coast of Portugal. Medina Sidonia sent frequent dispatches to the king reporting the progress of the fleet. At first they told that all was well. Then the duke sent the disquieting news that in the hot weather the provisions, notwithstanding all the care he had given to their selection, were going bad, and much

rotten meat had been thrown overboard. He asked for further supplies to be sent to him off the Galician coast.

It was not till June 13—a fortnight after leaving Lisbon—that Cape Finisterre was passed. The wind was now blowing



DEPARTURE OF THE ARMADA FROM LISBON.

directly from the north, and, after rounding the cape, progress was slower than ever. Off the Zizarga Islands a flotilla of fishing-boats joined the fleet, and transhipped a considerable quantity of dried tunny and salt fish. The galleys were sent into Corunna to

bring out fresh provisions. On June 18, in a letter written to the king, and dated "Off Cape Prior," Medina Sidonia reported that the pilots had advised him to take the whole fleet into the harbour of Corunna and wait for a more helpful wind; but he had declined their advice, because he feared that if he went into port he would lose a large number of soldiers and seamen through desertion.

The very day after the king received this letter there came another from the admiral, dated from Corunna on June 19, and conveying the surprising news that the *San Martin* and a great part of the fleet were lying in the harbour. On the 18th the wind had gone round to the south-west, and towards evening was blowing a gale. When it began, the *San Martin* was near Cape Prior with the galleons of Portugal, the rest of the fleet strung out over the sea for miles to the westward, and the *urcas* apparently well out to the northward. The gale was not a very heavy one, but seems to have done a great amount of damage. Several ships lost sails and spars, and numbers sprang a leak under the straining of their heavy masts. Medina Sidonia ran for the shelter of Corunna, accompanied by the ships that lay nearest him, but seems to have given no general order to the fleet. The *urcas* went before the gale, accompanied by a few of the galleons, and were soon well out into the Bay of Biscay. Relying on the general orders that in the event of the fleet being dispersed during the second stage of the voyage the rendezvous was to be off the Scillies, they steered for the mouth of the Channel, making rapid progress before the south-westerly gale.

During the next few days scattered ships that had lost spars and sails, and some of them leaking so badly that only hard labour at the pumps kept them afloat, came straggling into the northern ports of Spain—most of them to Corunna and Ferrol. Medina Sidonia was in a state of utter depression at the collapse of the great enterprise. In his first brief letter to King Philip he had told him only that on account of heavy weather and

shortness of water he had, with the advice of the pilots and captains, put into Corunna, where he would make only a short stay. After the delays at Lisbon the king not unnaturally feared that more time would be wasted. He wrote to the admiral, urging him to put to sea again at once and continue the voyage.

Before the king's letter reached him, Medina Sidonia wrote to him again on June 21, telling his Majesty something of the disaster that had overtaken the Armada, of which he had given no hint in his first letter. The fleet was dispersed. Only a part of it was at Corunna. Recalde's flagship had lost her mainmast. Other ships were damaged. There was much sickness among the crews. Leyva reported that he had taken refuge in the port of Vivero, east of Corunna, with 10 other ships. The governor of Asturias reported that two of the galleasses were at Gijon. A further report from the admiral gave a long list of ships that had lost spars in the storm or were leaking badly.*

The king had sent orders for the immediate refitting of the fleet, and instructed the governors of the northern provinces to collect and dispatch to Corunna supplies of all kinds. The undaunted spirit and energy of Philip was in striking contrast to the despairing irresolution of his admiral. Medina Sidonia had utterly lost heart. On June 24 he wrote to the king letters betraying so much discouragement and irresolution that one wonders he was not promptly relieved of his command.

He told how several of the ships had rejoined him, but many were still missing. Some must have gone on to the rendezvous at the Scillies. He had sent light craft to recall them. Others were scattered over the Bay of Biscay, perhaps badly disabled. He feared that the disaster to the Armada

* Captain Duro points out that the shipbuilders of the sixteenth century were not able, especially in the case of the larger ships, to fit and secure the planking on the frames so as to make the work permanently water-tight. The water-tightness of the hulls depended on calking, and ships were careened and recalked after every voyage. Leaks soon started in heavy weather, and the pumps had often to be kept going throughout the whole of a voyage.

would soon be known in England, and that English ships and Huguenot corsairs from La Rochelle would hurry to the Bay of Biscay to hunt down the distressed vessels that had not succeeded in reaching some sheltering port. The weather, he said, continued to be unfavourable. It was more like December than June. There was much sickness among the sailors and soldiers, and so much of the provisions taken on board at Lisbon had proved to be worthless that there were only supplies for a short campaign. After communicating all this depressing news to the king, he told him that he felt bound in honour and conscience to put before his Majesty certain proposals and considerations of which he had hesitated to speak till now. He reminded him that he had at first refused the command of the Armada. He now gave as a reason for this refusal that he did not consider that the force collected at Lisbon in the spring was sufficient for the enterprise. He had given no such reason in his letters from Sanlúcar, but had dwelt upon his own lack of experience of war and of the sea. But he now argued that if the fleet of which he had reluctantly taken command at Lisbon was not adequate for the campaign against England, this was still more the case now that it had been so roughly handled and seriously damaged by the Biscay gales. If the reports from England were reliable, it would have to meet greatly superior forces; and in any case, it could not continue the voyage till a long time had been spent in repairing and reprovisioning the ships and collecting reinforcements. Meanwhile there would be grave danger to the trade of the Indies and to the king's dominions, for his enemies, and especially those of Flanders, would take fresh courage at the news of the mishaps of the Armada. In order further to impress on the king his adverse view of the situation, Medina Sidonia went on to make a startling statement. The danger was all the greater, he said, "because neither the men nor the officers were as efficient as they ought to be, and he must in conscience declare

to his Majesty that he could find few, and indeed hardly one, of them who understood and was capable of discharging the duties of his office."

This passage in the admiral's letter ought to have been enough in itself to open the eyes of the king to the ignorant incapacity of the writer. It was an impertinent slander for a man like Medina Sidonia, "without experience of war and of the sea" (to use his own frank description of himself), to pass this sweeping condemnation on men like Recalde, Oquendo, Leyva, Bertendona, Moncada, the two Valdes, and the rest of his veteran officers—on men who had again and again voyaged the ocean, who had fought at Lepanto and Terceira, who were at home upon the sea, and had seen years of hard service while he was idling in his palace at Sanlúcar. It was a cowardly attempt to throw upon others the burden of his own deficiencies. He suggested further that Parma would not be able to muster the required force even if the Armada reached the Channel, and he himself would not be able to detach many men to help him. Finally, he ventured to suggest that the enterprise should be regarded as having miscarried, and should be abandoned, and that his Majesty should try to conclude peace on honourable terms.

Having sent off this dispatch on June 24, he followed it up next day with a list of the ships still missing. It included two of the galleasses and several of the largest of the galleons, among them Recalde's flagship the *Santa Aña* and the *Gran Grifon*, the flagship of the *urcas*. In all there were on the list 35 ships, having on board 6,567 soldiers and 1,882 seamen—a total of 8,449 men. But Recalde reached Corunna soon after the dispatch was sent off, and there came news that other ships on the list had entered various ports in the north of Spain.

On the 27th Medina Sidonia convened a council of war on board the *San Martin* at Corunna. The admirals and captains present were Juan Martinez de Recalde, Francisco de

Bobadilla, Jorge Manrique, Diego Flores de Valdes, Pedro de Valdes, Miguel de Oquendo, Hugo de Moncada, Martin de Bertendona, Juan de Velasco, and Gaspar de Hermosilla. To this gathering of veterans of the Spanish wars seated round the table of his great cabin Medina Sidonia timidly put forward the reasons he had stated to the king for abandoning the great enterprise. He told them that there were still missing ships with some 6,000 men on board. But if he hoped to find support from his captains, he was disappointed. One after another declared that there was still time to concentrate and refit the ships at Corunna and sail for the Channel with good hope of success. There was only one dissident, and he asked that a statement of his view should be forwarded to King Philip. It was Pedro de Valdes, and if he differed from his colleagues, it was not to side with Medina Sidonia, but to propose a more daring course of action than the rest of the council thought practicable. Declaring that he knew the northern seas and the probable resources of the enemy better than any one else, he urged that, after the briefest delay for refitting the ships, the admiral should sail for the Channel with the force that was actually at Corunna, without waiting for other ships to rejoin or wasting time in going in search of them. Probably a good many would rejoin the Armada during the voyage across the Bay of Biscay; but even if they did not, he held that the fleet would be strong enough to deal with any force it would find in its way, and he predicted that they would very likely be able to fight the enemy in detail, meeting the Plymouth fleet at the entrance of the Channel and the Thames fleet further up. In any case, he believed that more would be lost than gained by further delays.

To the dispatches from Corunna King Philip replied in a long letter, dated from the palace of Aranjuez on July 5. Beyond a passing complaint that Medina Sidonia's reports from Lisbon as to the provisioning of the fleet did not accord with

those he had sent from Corunna, there was not one word of blame for the admiral. The suggestion that the enterprise should be abandoned was not even discussed by the king. It was swept aside by simply reminding the duke that he had already orders to refit the fleet and put to sea again at the earliest possible date. He told him that to save time he might leave behind twelve or fifteen of the less seaworthy ships, transferring their crews and stores to the others. He was resolved that the campaign must be continued with all diligence, and this was all the more necessary because so much time had already been lost and the season was advancing.

He expressed some surprise at the statement as to shortness of provisions and water, considering the optimistic reports the admiral had sent him from Lisbon, but reminded him that he could now make good all deficiencies. He ordered that while the ships were in port the crews and the soldiers should be fed with fresh bread, meat, and fish, not only to economize the biscuit and salted provisions in store, but also to improve the general health of the expedition.

As to the available ships, he noted that besides those at Corunna there were now ten at Vivero, two at Gijon, two at Rivadeo, one at Santander, besides the two galleasses. He was anxious about so many being still missing, but took the hopeful view that they would yet rejoin. Probably several of them had run before the gale, and would make their way back now that the weather had moderated. The *urcas* and the smaller craft, and even some of the ships of the Mediterranean, had often navigated the northern seas in safety, so he did not fear their loss. But he hoped that by the 10th or 12th he would put to sea again with whatever force he had then concentrated at Corunna.

By the time the king's letter reached the admiral several of the missing ships had rejoined. The *Gran Grifon*, with many of the *urcas* and some galleons, came back from the Scillies. They had run northwards before the gale, making for the

entrance of the Channel, where they expected to be joined by the rest of the Armada. Their appearance caused considerable alarm in England, which was then in a fever of preparation to meet the threatened invasion, and had already received news of the sailing of the Great Armada from Lisbon. Merchantmen ran for shelter to Plymouth, and reported that off Land's End and in the entrance to the Channel they had sighted two squadrons of large ships with red crosses on their sails. One of the English ships had had a narrow escape. She was chased by a tall Spaniard, which fired on her from her bow guns. But ships sent out from Plymouth to look for the strangers could see nothing of them. It was thought they might have gone to Ireland, but inquiries in the Irish ports gave no result. All trace had been lost of the enemy. It was known, however, that there had been bad weather in the Bay of Biscay, and it was rightly conjectured that the squadrons seen off Land's End were only detachments of the Armada which had been dispersed by the storm, and that they had gone back to Spain to rejoin their consorts. This was before long confirmed by news from France.

The Spaniards, in accordance with the orders issued at Lisbon, had assembled at the appointed rendezvous at the Scilly Islands, and sent a ship to look for the admiral in Mounts Bay. Then finding themselves isolated, and fearing an attack from the Plymouth fleet, they had without further delay started to return to Spain, expecting that they would perhaps meet the admiral and the main body of the fleet on the way. In the Bay they picked up the light vessels sent to recall them, and rejoined Medina Sidonia's flag at Corunna. Other ships had reached various ports of the north. One of the galleons ran into Gijon with an opening between her planks through which three fingers could be put when she was careened. Her having escaped foundering at sea was regarded as little less than a miracle.

Not a ship had been lost, and Medina Sidonia was able to

report that, although he could not sail at the early date named by the king, he was concentrating his whole force in the waters of Corunna, and repairing and refitting the ships, and would soon be able to resume the voyage. He had landed the sick, and the Archbishop of Santiago had arranged to take care of them in the hospitals of his city. He had established a rigorous system of guards at all landing-places to prevent desertions. Good supplies of provisions were coming in and were being embarked, and parties of recruits were arriving to replace the disabled men. Some of these recruits proved unsatisfactory. Four hundred Galicians collected by the Count of Lemos were dismissed after a few days. The admiral said that they would only uselessly eat up his supplies. Many of them were married men of mature years and with several children: he "could not in conscience" take them with him; and—most serious reason of all—none of them knew what an arquebus or any other kind of weapon was like. Many of the recruits accepted for service knew hardly any more, but they were younger men who could be taught.

At last, in the middle of July, the duke was able to report that the Armada was again ready for sea and waiting only for a favourable wind. The work of refitting and reorganizing the great fleet had been carried through with dispatch and energy, that contrasted favourably with the long delays at Lisbon, and must have made Philip more hopeful about his admiral. After a general inspection of the fleet on July 13, a list of the ships was drawn up, with the numbers of the seamen and soldiers serving on each of them.

Comparing this list with that which was drawn up and sent to the king before the Armada left Lisbon, one is able to trace some of the results of the first failure of the expedition. It is evident, in the first place, that the losses by sickness had been serious during the three weeks' voyage and the stay at Corunna. Although large numbers of recruits had joined, the total number

of seamen and soldiers was diminished by some three thousand men. A few of the ships, thanks to the fresh recruiting, were more strongly manned than when they left Lisbon, but these were the exceptions. In almost every case there were fewer men on board, and the decrease in the number of sailors was all the more serious because even at Lisbon some of the ships had been short-handed in this respect. The following summary shows what was the total amount of the decrease:—

	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.
Lisbon	19,295	8,050	27,345
Corunna	17,017	7,050	24,067
Decrease	2,278	1,000	3,278

There were some changes in the organization of the fleet. There were 130 ships on the Lisbon list and 131 on that drawn up after the review at Corunna, but there was really a slight decrease in the total tonnage of the Armada, for two or three large ships had to be left behind, and the ships that replaced them were small craft. The great galleon *Duque de Florencia*,* of more than 900 tons, was transferred from the Portuguese squadron to that of the Levant. Recalde's flagship, the *Santa Aña* required such serious repairs that she was ordered to remain behind, and he transferred his flag to the *San Juan Bautista*. The *Santa Aña* was, however, repaired in time to sail with the fleet, but, as we shall see, had soon to leave it. A good galleon of Corunna, the *Santa Cruz*, of about 500 tons, was added to Oquendo's squadron, "the Armada of Guipuzcoa," which was also reinforced with two smaller craft. Several of Lopez de Medina's squadron of *urcas* were so damaged that they had to be left at Corunna. These were the *Casa de Paz Grande* (650 tons), the *San Pedro Menor* (500), the *Falcon Blanco Mediano* (300), the *David* (450), and the *Paloma Blanca* (250). Mendoza was ill and resigned

* Generally known in the records of the Armada as the *Florencia*.

the command of the squadron of light craft, which was given to Augustin de Ojeda. He had to leave behind two of his ships, and had only one small brig given him in their stead. Nine small sailing ships—caravels—without either guns or soldiers, and with very small crews (125 men in all for the nine ships), were temporarily attached to his command to convey a reserve of water in casks for the Armada. Seven feluccas, with half a dozen sailors for each of them, were attached to the squadron of galleys.

Medina Sidonia had two legitimate causes for anxiety. He sent the king a list of his pilots, which showed that the most he could do was to assign a few of these skilled navigators to each of the squadrons. There were not enough of them to put one on board of each ship; and some of them had no experience of the Channel and the northern seas, having been employed only in voyages to the Indies.* But many of the ordinary seamen had been in the Channel, and it was hoped their experience would be useful.

Another possible cause of trouble was that the crews of some of the smaller ships were to a great extent composed of foreign sailors. The king suggested that in each case there should be two trusty Spanish seamen in each ship so manned, who would watch their comrades, and be ready to warn the officer commanding the soldiers on board if there were any signs of disaffection or mutiny. But as a matter of fact there was no trouble of this kind during the voyage.

Except for the decrease in men, the Armada, when it was reported ready to sail from Corunna, was as imposing a fleet as when it passed out of the narrows of the Tagus seven weeks earlier. It was better supplied and sufficiently manned for the work it had to do. Its weakest point was its commander.

* The pilots were mostly men of the northern ports of Spain. Some noted in the list have distinctly Basque names. There appears to have been among them an Irishman, "Guillermo [William] Brian," and a Scot, "Juan Gordon."

King Philip had had an opportunity of remedying that cardinal defect by sending Medina Sidonia back to Andalusia, and replacing him with one of his veteran lieutenants. But he had let the opportunity go by, and still showed a blind trust in the man to whose feeble hands he was committing the fortunes of his empire.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE VOYAGE ACROSS THE BAY OF BISCAY.

In the spring of 1587 Medina Sidonia had seen the terrible "Draques" burning the king's ships in the harbour of Cadiz, and while the Armada was refitting at Corunna he had been haunted by the fear that Drake would come again, and sweep down on the disabled fleet while so many of its ships were still in the hands of carpenters and shipwrights, some of them scattered in adjacent ports, and not a few temporarily beached or "hove down" for the calkers to stop their leaks. For once he showed true insight, for in war, whether by land or by sea, it is well to take it for granted that the enemy will do the best thing under the circumstances. And what Medina Sidonia feared was precisely what Drake, Hawkins, and others of the Plymouth captains were urging on Queen Elizabeth and her council. When the news came that wild weather in "the Bay" had driven the enemy back to his ports, they declared that now was the time to take the English fleet to the Spanish coast and destroy the crippled Armada in its harbours—to "singe the King of Spain's beard," as Drake had done at Cadiz. But the queen and her advisers at Whitehall hesitated to adopt so bold a policy. They insisted on the fleet keeping a mere defensive watch on the approaches to the Channel, and, as we shall see, it was in defiance of his orders that Howard eventually took his ships out into the

Bay of Biscay, and with such a thorough consciousness that he was acting against the advice of the council, that he said very little about the operation, and most writers on the story of the Armada are in consequence silent regarding it.

Medina Sidonia had meanwhile sent a scouting expedition across the Bay. For the collecting of information he relied on Don Juan de Cardona, who, seventeen years before, had commanded the vanguard of Don Juan of Austria's fleet in the campaign of Lepanto. When the Christian fleet sailed across the Adriatic to challenge battle with the Ottomans, Cardona, with seven swift galleys, was always forty miles ahead by day and twenty after dark, and to his untiring vigilance much of the success of the campaign was due. When Medina Sidonia asked him to obtain news of the English fleet, and above all, ascertain if it had put to sea, Cardona sent Pablo de Arambur, a veteran seaman and captain of a galleon, the *San Juan Bautista*,* with two *zabras* or brigs to scout off the mouth of the Channel.

Arambur sailed from Corunna on July 7. In three days he reached the headlands of Brittany. From the crew of an Ushant fishing-boat he heard that two days before a couple of English ships had passed that way bound for La Rochelle. They had asked for news of the Armada, but the fishers had none to give. They told the Spaniards that there were English ships watching the entrance of the Channel.

Nevertheless Arambur ran across to near Land's End on the 12th in rather wild weather, without sighting an enemy. On the 13th it was still rough, and he went into the "Manga de Bristol"—the Bristol Channel. He did not go far up. Apparently, with a strong wind from the south-west, he did not like having the Cornish cliffs to leeward, so he went round Land's End and cruised for a while off the south coast of Cornwall. There seems to have been no news

* There were several ships of this name in the Armada.

in England of these Spanish ships off the shores of the West Country.

On the 14th they took an English ship which was coming into the Bristol Channel. She must have been but a small craft, for she had a crew of only eight men. They surrendered at once, and the ship was sent off to Spain in charge of a prize crew and one of the pilots. As the weather moderated the Spaniards came round Land's End, and looked into Mounts Bay on the 17th. Still there was no sight of an enemy. Next day the two brigs were north of the Scillies. On the 19th and 20th they ran south across the entrance of the Channel, and then swiftly across the Bay of Biscay. On the 20th three ships were seen in the distance, one of about 200 tons, the others smaller. In the morning of the 21st a ship was sighted, and at three in the afternoon, some 40 leagues off Llanes, on the Spanish coast,* a great fleet of some 60 ships, 10 of them very large, steering north-north-east. Arambur followed them at a respectful distance for two hours, and made up his mind that they were English. Unnoticed and unchallenged, he drew off at five o'clock and steered for Spain. Next day he spoke a French ship, and asked for news from Spain.† She had come from San Sebastian, but could tell him nothing of the Armada. At midnight on the 23rd Arambur ran into the harbour of Santander. If he had steered for Corunna he would have met with the Armada, for Medina Sidonia had at last put to sea from that port on July 22.

On the 20th a council of war had been held on board the *San Martin*. The admirals of the squadrons were all present, with Leyva, the general of the troops, and Andres de Alva, the duke's secretary. The duke asked his officers to

* A small town west of Santander. A league was $\frac{1}{20}$ of a degree = three nautical miles.

† Duro, No. 156.



THE COURSE OF THE ARMADA FROM CORUNNA TO THE LIZARD.

give their opinions as to whether the Armada should sail at once. The chief point of discussion was the state and prospects of the weather. It had been rather rough outside the port for some days, but it does not appear that there was anything like what the sailors of to-day would call a heavy gale; and on this very July 20, Arambur, with his two little *zabras*, was running safely across the Bay of Biscay, bound for Santander. It would seem that the leaders of the Armada were inclined to exaggerate a little their reports of bad weather. Some of them were landsmen, others were fair-weather sailors, used to the light winds and smooth seas of the South Atlantic, in the region of the trade winds and in the summer season. All were anxious that the Armada should get across the Bay without being caught by another storm such as had driven it back to Corunna. So the debate turned largely on forecasts of the weather for the next few days, forecasts necessarily based on the defective knowledge of the time.

Leyva, who spoke first, said that he understood from the sailors that the fleet could get out, though much care would have to be taken, and he gave it as his opinion that if it was possible the attempt should be made. Diego Flores de Valdes thought it better to wait a while. He forecasted bad or doubtful weather. That morning, he said, there had been a heavy swell running into the harbour, and though it had gone down somewhat, he still looked for bad weather, and did not think the fleet should sail till it was calmer, with a clear sky to north-east. There was a new moon on the 23rd, and the wind was likely to be northerly; still, if the wind was fair from the south next day and the sky clear to the north-east they might sail. Otherwise he gave his vote for delay.

Pedro de Valdes agreed with him. Neither yesterday nor to-day had the weather been good enough. He pointed out

that a fair fresh wind was needed at the start to clear Cape Prior. Once they were out at sea they could make a shift with less favourable winds, but it would be risky to try to clear the cape without a really fair wind. The Spanish ships might do it with a wind abeam, for they were good sailers and handy enough, but the *urcas* and the Mediterranean ships should not attempt it. He looked for a change of weather at the new moon, and there might be a calm or light winds, and if they were caught inside Cape Prior it would be dangerous for the fleet.

Bertendona took a directly opposite view. Both to-day and yesterday, he thought, the weather had been quite good enough for a start, and he said the pilots agreed with him, and he had told this to the duke. Enriquez took the same view. They had for days had a south-east wind in the early morning, changing to the westward later in the day. If the weather was the same as this to-morrow, they might get out; if they waited till the moon was older, they were likely to have northerly winds.

Oquendo sided with the two Valdeses. He was anxious to wait for better weather. Bobadilla said he was no sailor, and could not decide which of the generals and pilots were right, but he insisted on the necessity of making every effort to get to sea as soon as there was a prospect of safely doubling Cape Prior. Manrique too said he was no sailor, but as the summer was slipping away and time was important, and several of the pilots held they could run safely out beyond Cape Prior, he thought they should make a start, recognizing that no great business could be carried through without facing some risks and difficulties. Recalde also voted for an immediate start. He had noticed, he said, that the nights were calm and there was a fair wind, though a light one in the early hours of the day. He reckoned that the fleet could get out in six hours of good weather, and it

was good enough up to eleven in the morning. He proposed that they should sail without troubling as to forecasts of weather at the new moon. Gregorio de las Alas supported him. Thus the majority of the council were in favour of the fleet sailing at once.

Medina Sidonia sent for the chief pilots of the Armada and held a second council. They agreed that if the fleet was got ready for sea during the night there was good prospect of its being able to sail at dawn. So the duke gave orders that if he fired a gun any time after midnight the ships were to begin getting up their anchors, so as to be ready to make sail at sunrise.

All were on the alert, but no signal was given during the following night. Medina Sidonia thought that there was still too much sea running outside the harbour. During the 21st it went down. After midnight he at last made up his mind that the time had come for attempting to put to sea, and the signal gun boomed from the *San Martin*. The crews at once set to work, and soon all the ships were riding to a single anchor. As the first light of the dawn whitened the sky a second gun was fired; the anchors came up, the ships set their great painted sails, and led by the *San Martin* began to run out between the headlands of the harbour before a light wind from the south-east. The last ship was hardly out and the *San Martin* was only "three leagues" from the harbour mouth when the light breeze died away to a dead calm. To avoid drifting ashore between Corunna and Cape Prior the fleet anchored, and all day lay rolling in the Atlantic swell, to the intense discomfort of the duke and the rest of the landsmen. Pedro de Valdes must have felt some satisfaction in the realization of his warning as to the chance of being becalmed inside the cape. If it came on to blow hard from the west the fleet would be in serious danger. Medina Sidonia spent an anxious day.

But in the night between the 22nd and 23rd the wind

freshened from the south-east, and the duke fired a gun at dawn as a signal to get under way again. Some delay was caused by the galleass *Zuñiga* reporting that her helm was broken down. But it was quickly repaired, and in fine sunny weather the fleet slipped past Cape Prior, and by the afternoon was off Cape Ortegal and well clear of the land. A pinnace was sent into Ortiguera with a report to the king from his admiral that at last the Armada was at sea.

For three days the weather was perfectly fine and the wind fair.* The rate of progress had, of course, to be regulated by the speed of the slowest ships. The course steered was nearly north, and very little to the east of that point, so as to keep well out from the dangerous headlands of Brittany. Once the fleet was north of the latitude of Ushant it was to steer for the Lizard.

On the morning of the 26th the fleet was in latitude 48° 30′, or nearly due west of Ushant and well out to sea. The weather had suddenly changed. The morning was dull and cloudy, and before noon the wind went round to the northward and increased to half a gale, raising a heavy sea, "such as the sailors said they had never seen in the month of July." † The course was changed to the westward, with all the ships under shortened sail. The four galleys, low freeboard open craft, built for summer service in southern seas, were soon in difficulties in the long Atlantic waves. Their crews were buffeted and drenched with the water that broke over them, the labour at the oars became difficult and well-nigh impossible, and presently they set a close-reefed lateen sail and ran away to the south-eastwards before the gale, never to rejoin the Armada again.

They were driven into the south-east corner of the Bay. Three of them took shelter in the Gironde estuary, and when the weather moderated put to sea again and reached Spain. The

* "Con buen tiempo . . . sin poderse desear mejor en el mundo."

† Duro, ii. 219.

fourth, the galley *Diana*, was lost. She ran for the mouth of the Adour at Bayonne, but failed to get into the river, and was driven ashore among the breakers on the coast near the entrance. Though the galley became a total wreck, few lives were lost. The Frenchmen helped to save the officers and crew, they were hospitably entertained by the magistrates of Bayonne, and returned to Spain by land.

Among the galley slaves of the unfortunate *Diana* there was a Welshman, one David Gwyn. He made his escape in the confusion of the shipwreck, reached La Rochelle, and was sent on to England by the Huguenots of that place. He afterwards told a wonderful story, "a lie from beginning to end," to use the words of Professor Laughton. But lie as it was, and a palpable lie to boot, it has found its way into sober histories. He said he was serving on board the galley *Bazana*, and when the galleys were forced by the gale to part company with the Armada, they presently saw the *Diana* go down with all hands in the open sea. The other galleys were in grave danger of sharing her fate when the captain of the *Bazana*, knowing that Gwyn was an experienced and skilful seaman, asked him to advise as to how the galley could be saved. Gwyn agreed to navigate the ship to safety provided the captain would follow his directions, and as a first condition asked that most of the Spaniards should be sent below. This having been done, he waved his cap as a signal to his friends among the galley slaves, and drawing a dagger, stabbed and killed the captain. His comrades disposed of the other Spaniards by suddenly stabbing them in the same way, and then killed the Spaniards who had gone below. This done, they attacked and captured the galley *Capitana*, so that only one of the four galleys, the *Princesa*, got away to Spain. Gwyn took the captured galleys to La Rochelle and returned in triumph to England.

It does not appear that he ventured at once to "spin a yarn" of this portentous kind. We hear of him being employed to

interrogate the prisoners of the Armada, for he had some knowledge of Spanish, but less than he professed to have, as we see by the obvious blunders in the notes he took of their statements. He was, however, convicted of plundering the prisoners, or rather of taking for himself valuables of theirs which should have gone into the common stock of booty. He was also proved to have lied to his employers, and he was finally dismissed in disgrace. He then drifted over to Holland, and there he told the romance of the captured galleys, a story unknown to all the contemporary Spanish and English writers, irreconcilable with known facts, and including such absurdities as galley slaves being allowed to wear daggers, and being unchained and free to capture a ship while their guard was stowed away under the narrow deck space of the ship. But the "yarn" found its way into the Dutch histories of the Armada, and has been repeated by serious English writers. It figures in Motley's "History of the United Netherlands." It must, however, be counted as one of the many wild legends associated with the story of the Armada. "It is not often," says Sir John Laughton, "that a fable can be so completely exploded as this is now." *

We return to the story of the voyage. All day during July 26th the storm raged furiously. The waves broke over even the high decks of the galleons that nearly rolled their yardarms into the water. Several were pooped by following seas, and the whole of the stern gallery of the *San Cristobal*, the flagship of Diego Flores, was swept away.† In the darkness of the night many ships parted from the main body. On the 27th the gale was not so heavy, and the Armada was beating slowly to the northward to avoid being driven on to the reefs and rocks of Brittany, the ships scattered over miles of stormy sea. It looked as if there might well be a second and more disastrous failure.

But during the night the gale ceased, and on Thursday 28th

* "Armada Papers," vol. i. p. lxxix. † Duro, ii. 219.

(to quote Medina Sidonia's report) "the day dawned clear and bright, the wind and sea more quiet than the day before, and forty ships were counted to be missing." Some pinnaces were sent to look for them, while very slowly the rest of the fleet sailed across the opening of the Channel with no land in sight, some of the crews busy repairing damages to sails, spars, and rigging.

On Friday, July 29, the pinnaces rejoined with the good news that all the missing ships except one were with Pedro de Valdes off the Lizard. They rejoined the fleet in the course of the day. The ship of which there was still no news was the galleon *Santa Aña* of the Biscay squadron. Originally assigned to Recalde's squadron as its flagship at Lisbon, she had suffered so severely during the gale of the first voyage that on her return to Corunna it was at first proposed to leave her there. But she had been patched up and again accompanied the fleet, though no longer flying an admiral's flag. In the gale of July 26th she was so strained that she was leaking like a sieve. She lost spars and sails, and, escaping shipwreck on the headlands of Brittany, drove up Channel, abandoning all hope of rejoining the Armada. Her captain kept her afloat till he brought her into Havre, where she was subsequently abandoned.

Picking up the forty ships of Valdes on his way, Medina Sidonia steered for the Lizard during the Friday, and towards evening the bold rocky headland was in sight. The duke, as soon as the pilots pointed it out to him, hoisted at his mainmast the standard of the Armada, the great banner of the Crucifixion, which he had received in the cathedral at Lisbon. He saluted it by firing three guns. Each ship hoisted her flags, banners of Spanish provinces and of noble houses, and with these on every ship, the red St. Andrew's Cross of the House of Burgundy, King Philip's flag. As pennon and standard fluttered to the breeze the crews gathered on the decks, and the chaplains, gray friars of St. Francis and black and white robed Dominicans,

recited a prayer for the further success of the great enterprise, the first stage of which had been thus accomplished by bringing the Armada across the stormy Bay and into sight of English ground.

On Saturday, the 30th, Medina Sidonia notes in his diary that "at dawn the Armada was near the land, so that we were seen therefrom, whereupon they made fire and smokes." Macaulay, writing his ballad of the Armada before the detailed records of the time were available, describes with more picturesque effect the English beacons being lighted, not at dawn but in the night, and red flame, not trailing smoke, sending the alarm through England, and he imagines how

> "From the deep the Spaniards saw,
> Along each southern shire,
> Cape beyond cape in endless range,
> Those twinkling points of fire."

Although, even if the beacons had been fired in the night, the enemy could hardly have seen more than one or two of them.*

The wind was blowing lightly from the south-west, and mist and rain limited the view. Some of the smaller ships were scouting towards Plymouth. Later in the day they sent back a captured fishing-boat, the crew of which told the Spaniards that the English fleet was coming out of Plymouth Sound. Before this news was received a council of war had assembled

* Poetry is not history, so it is only as a matter of passing interest that one notes other errors of fact in Macaulay's stirring ballad. He represents the news of the approach of the Armada as having been brought to Plymouth by a "gallant merchantman," which

> "Had seen Castile's black fleet,
> Beyond Aurigny's Isle,
> At earliest twilight on the waves
> Lie heaving many a mile."

"Black" is hardly a well chosen epithet for a fleet that was bright with many colours, and the Armada never came within a hundred miles of Aurigny's Isle (Alderney) till it passed up the Channel. The "gallant merchantman" was chased till noon by the "tall *Pinta*." There was no such ship in the Armada. Macaulay took the name of one of the caravels of Columbus, and conjectured that there must have been a ship of that name in the Spanish fleet, without troubling himself to turn to already available catalogues of the Armada.

on board the *San Martin*. Recalde, Leyva, Oquendo, and others of the admirals and generals proposed that Plymouth should be attacked. They pointed out that there was a fair wind to take the Armada in, and the same wind would make it difficult for the English ships to work out of the harbour. These would be caught crowded together in land-locked waters, where the galleons would be able to force a close fight, and send the Spanish infantry to storm the hostile decks, covered by fire from the tall castles of the attacking ships. The soldiers were eager to carry out this plan. Some of the sailors present objected that there were only two narrow entrances into Plymouth Sound—the channels on each side of the shoal on which the present breakwater stands. Through these the Armada would have to enter in double line ahead, and the leading ships might each have to face a raking fire from several hostile vessels. This, however, was not the reason for which Medina Sidonia rejected the proposal. He objected that the king's orders directed him to proceed up Channel and join hands with the Duke of Parma, and that to attempt anything else would be a departure from these instructions.

Among the Spanish apologists of Medina Sidonia, more than one writer argues that the admiral's freedom of action was restricted by the king's instructions, and that he could not have taken the initiative in attacking the English without going beyond them. It would be more correct to say that the unfortunate passage in King Philip's letter that suggested the possibility of running up the Channel without a fight with the enemy's fleet was an inducement to a weak man like Medina Sidonia to try to avoid battle. But the advantage of attacking Plymouth was so obvious that many of the officers at the council of war protested that if the king himself were present he would order the attack. There can be no doubt that if a man like Santa Cruz had been in command the attempt would have been made, and the result might well have been

disastrous for England. For the Armada, running before a fair wind, would have come upon a part of the Plymouth fleet outside the harbour while the rest was slowly working its way out from the Hamoaze, and the Spaniards would have been able to force a close fight with an immense superiority of numbers on their side, and no scope for the tactics that gave the English such an advantage in the running fight up Channel.

But Medina Sidonia refused the best chance that was offered to him in the whole campaign. In a report sent off to the king that day he did not even allude to the long debate as to whether an attack on Plymouth should be attempted, and mentioned only that the council had decided that the Armada was not to go beyond the Isle of Wight (*Isla de Duich*) until news was received that Parma was ready to embark his army. The motive stated for this decision was that it might be dangerous for the fleet to lie for some time off the shoals and shallows of the Flanders coast waiting for the co-operation of the army.

The early hours of the day had been wasted, the fleet lying to off the Lizard during the discussion in the cabin of the *San Martin*. After the council had broken up, one of the light craft returned with a captured fishing-boat, the crew of which said that the English fleet was coming out of Plymouth, and that not only Drake's squadron but that of Lord Admiral Howard had been there for some days. By this time the Armada was running up Channel, on a course about east-north-east. Rain was falling from a cloudy sky, and as evening drew on a mist towards the land further obscured the view. Towards sundown the fleet was between Fowey and Plymouth, and through the rain and haze a crowd of ships were dimly seen outside the latter port, but in the thick weather "we were unable to count them," writes the Spanish admiral. Medina Sidonia ought to have avoided waste of time and kept nearer the land. If he had done so, he would by that time have been

in among them, with fair chance of victory, for only part of Howard's fleet was yet at sea.

So on this rainy Saturday night of July 30, 1588, the 130 ships of the Armada, grouped together round the flagships of their squadrons, covered many a mile of the Channel, the ships keeping their stations by the light of huge stern lanterns on the high poops. Howard's fleet was gathering strength hour by hour as ship after ship worked out between the headlands of Plymouth Sound, with leadsmen feeling for the dangerous midway shoal. Throughout England, "from Eddystone to Berwick bounds, from Lynn to Milford Bay," there was the feverish activity of anxious preparation to meet the peril of invasion. But the moment of the greatest danger had passed.

There was the augury of victory for England in the fact that despite the counsel of better men the admiral of the Great Armada was holding his way up Channel, anxious, if it might be, to avoid a fight; and that in the fleet that was gathering in the rain and darkness outside Plymouth Sound every man from Howard and Drake down to the youngest sailor was eager to come to blows, and waiting only for their comrades to join them, and for the Sunday morning's sun to give them light to begin harrying the huge fleet of Spain.

CHAPTER IX.

PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE DEFENCE OF ENGLAND.

So far we have traced the fortunes of the Armada up to its appearance off the English coast and the eve of its first encounter with the fleet of Howard and Drake. We must now see what forces had been collected to oppose it, and generally what steps had been taken to defend England from the peril of a Spanish invasion.

The England of Elizabeth's days had no regular army, but had some beginnings of a royal navy. Still, neither for sea nor shore warfare was there any regular establishment of officers and men. They had to be enlisted or assembled when a campaign was to be undertaken or an emergency had arisen. Though there was no army, and indeed just because there was no army in the modern sense of the word, the Englishmen of the sixteenth century accepted as a matter of course the obligation laid upon every able-bodied man to take a part in the national defence against invasion. This had been the recognized law of England for many centuries, though the method of putting it in force had varied at different times. The Tudor period was a time of transition from one system to another.

To some extent the change was a reversion to the levy of the counties, which had provided the hastily assembled

national armies of Saxon days. During the Norman and Plantagenet periods most men owed military service not directly to the crown, but indirectly, through their duty of following to the field the lord, baron, or knight whose tenants and dependants they were. The Wars of the Roses had broken the power of the great nobles. Henry the Seventh—the first of the Tudors—had enforced a law against their practice of maintaining bands of armed retainers. The feudal militia, rallying under the banners of the great landlords, had disappeared. There was a reversion to the levy of the armed men of the counties, which now mustered under the lord-lieutenants named by the crown.

This levy of the counties was an undisciplined force. There was no annual training; in times of peace there was at most an occasional muster for a few hours. But the men were individually trained to the use of some kinds of arms. Shooting with the bow and arrow was still practised, though firearms had long since come into very general use in war. The old law was still in force that made it the duty of young men to learn the use of the older weapon that had made the English archers the terror of so many battlefields in the Middle Ages. Few who were below the class of nobles and gentlemen possessed firearms as their personal property, but many men had learned the use of them when serving for a while in the Netherlands or on shipboard, and the queen had a reserve of these new weapons in the Tower and in the armoury of the Master of the Ordnance in the Minories. The spear was still a recognized weapon for close fight, and among the miscellaneous armament of the common people there were plenty of the broad-bladed "bills" that had been only less formidable than the longbow and cloth-yard arrow in the battles of the past. Quarter-staff and cudgel play were common forms of sport, and helped to make those who practised them good men-at-arms. Steel headpieces, leather or buff coats, and bucklers were in the possession of many families

as part of the household equipment—especially in the Border districts. There was thus ready to hand the material for a great mass of irregular infantry.

In London and other cities and towns there were regularly organized and often very well equipped companies of "trained bands." The Londoners had a fairly formidable militia, and at a review in the days of Henry the Eighth, the queen's father, had turned out with companies of pikemen, musketeers, and archers, and twelve heavy guns. There were batteries for the defence of many of the seaports, and in these and in the royal castles on the coast and at the Tower there would be one or two professional gunners and some less skilled assistants. Cavalry would be supplied by the nobles and gentry and their immediate dependants, including yeomen farmers, whose tenure still frequently was conditioned, amongst other things, on their supplying one or two mounted men, properly armed for war, in the event of the levy of the county being called out for service.

Thus the manhood of England was ready to assemble in arms at the call of danger, and it would be a fairly simple matter to obtain volunteers to serve continuously for some months in the pay of the queen, and receive regular training, when danger of invasion could be foreseen. A partly trained army could quickly be got together, and when the crisis arrived it could be reinforced by calling out the militia of the counties.

There was no serious alarm in England at the threat of invasion until the first months of the year 1588. Drake's successful raid on Cadiz in the preceding summer had encouraged a hope that King Philip would abandon his preparations for war, and that the peace negotiations that had been dragging on for months would have a satisfactory result. But the news that the Armada was assembling at Lisbon, and still more, the tidings of Parma's activity on the other side of the Channel,

showed that the Spaniards were in deadly earnest, and men began to realize the possibility of having to meet foreign soldiers in battle on English ground.

Even in our own day, with the lessons of three centuries of naval history accessible to every educated man, there are far too many who cling to the old-world notion that the defence of England against invasion depends as much on military as on naval power. This idea is not always put forward in so many words, but it lurks in the minds of those who, while professing the fullest confidence in the fighting power of our fleets, are still anxious to see the country turned into an armed camp and our coasts studded with fortifications in order to secure us against the horrors of invasion. It is therefore not to be wondered at that in the days of Elizabeth, when naval strategy in its modern sense was still in the stage of its crude beginnings, an immense amount of energy was devoted to organizing the land defence of the country. The army of the Duke of Parma on the other shore of Dover Strait seemed a more imminent danger even than the Great Armada of Lisbon. The news that the duke was building and collecting a huge flotilla for the transport of his forces across the Narrow Seas suggested even to those who had had some experience of naval matters that he might effect a landing independently of the co-operation of Medina Sidonia's fleet. The west of England expected a descent of the Spaniards from the ships of the Armada. London, Kent, and the eastern counties saw a more pressing danger in the presence of the hostile army in Flanders. A camp of some 30,000 men was therefore formed at Tilbury, a point where they directly covered London, and could march into Essex or be ferried across the river into Kent. Leicester, the queen's favourite, was put in command. If the Spaniards had effected a landing, Parma, the best soldier of his time, at the head of the veteran regulars of the Flanders wars, would have had to meet a half-trained force directed by an incompetent leader, who owed his position

entirely to court intrigue. No one can doubt that the result would have been an English defeat.

Raleigh was directed to organize the land defence of the western shires. Throughout England, from Cornwall to the Scottish border, fagots and firewood had been piled on every headland and hilltop, and these were to be fired on the appearance of the enemy, so as to send the alarm through the kingdom by a chain of flaming beacons. The horse and foot of the levy *en masse* of the counties and the militia of towns and cities were then to muster and march to protect the nearest coasts or reinforce Leicester's army near London. There was in the minds of most men the idea that these hurriedly assembled forces might even succeed in meeting the Spaniards at the points where they attempted to land, and driving them back from the very shore. But even if they failed in this, it was hoped that, falling back on reinforcements pouring towards the coast from all the neighbouring shires, the local militia would finally stop the progress of the invasion. Leicester's army was meant to secure London from a *coup de main;* and as a further precaution, steps were taken for blocking the river against the light craft of the enemy by sinking ships across the Thames below Gravesend.

But happily for England she had experienced seamen who realized and succeeded in persuading the queen's council that it was on the sea and not on the land that England must be defended. They pointed out that it was better to prevent the Spaniards from landing than to prepare for doubtful battles on English ground, and they insisted that no military force was likely to stop the actual landing.

Raleigh writing his "Historie of the World" some years later, when he was a prisoner in the Tower, sums up the argument for the naval as opposed to the military defence of England against invasion, and his reasons must have been much the same when at the council board of Elizabeth he urged this

policy of meeting the Spaniards upon the sea. Long as the passage is, and often as it has been quoted, it is too important to be passed over here.

"Great difference, I know, there is [he says], and a diverse consideration to be had, between such a country as France is, strenghtened with many fortified places, and this of ours, where our ramparts are but the bodies of men. But I say that an army to be transported over sea, and to be landed again in an enemy's country, and the place left to the choice of the invader, cannot be resisted on the coast of England without a fleet to impeach it; no, nor on the coast of France or any other country, except every creek, port, or sandy bay had a powerful army in each of them to make opposition. For let the supposition be granted that Kent is able to furnish twelve thousand foot, and that those twelve thousand be laid in the three best landing-places within that county—to wit, three thousand at Margat, three thousand at the Nesse,* and six thousand at Foulkstone, that is, somewhat equally distant from them both; as also that two of these troops (unless some other order be thought more fit) be directed to strengthen the third, when they shall see the enemies' fleet to head towards it; I say that, notwithstanding this provision, if the enemy, setting sail from the Isle of Wight in the first watch of the night, and towing their long boats at their sterns, shall arrive by dawn of day at the Nesse, and thrust their army on shore there, it will be hard for those three thousand that are at Margat (twenty-four long miles from thence) to come time enough to reinforce their fellows at the Nesse—nay, how shall they at Foulkstone be able to do it, who are nearer by more than half the way?—seeing that the enemy at his first arrival will either make his entrance by force, with three or four shot of great artillery, and quickly put the first three thousand that are entrenched at the Nesse to run, or else give them so much to do that they shall be glad to send for help to Foulkstone, and perhaps to Margat, whereby those places will be left bare. Now let us suppose that all the twelve thousand Kentish soldiers arrive at the Nesse ere the enemy can be ready to disembark his army, so that he will find it unsafe to land in the face of so many prepared to withstand him; yet must we believe that he will play the best of his own game (having liberty to go which way he list), and under covert of the night set sail towards the east, where what shall hinder him to take ground either at Margat, the Downes, or elsewhere, before they at the Nesse can be well aware of his departure? Certainly there is nothing more easy than to do it. Yea, the like may be said of Weymouth, Purbeck, Poole, and of all landing-places on the south-west. For there is no man ignorant that ships, without putting themselves out of breath, will easily outrun the soldiers that coast them. '*Les armées ne volent point en poste*' ('Armies neither flye nor run post'), saith a marshal of France. And I know it to be true that a fleet of ships may be seen at sunset and after it at the Lizard, yet by the next morning they may recover Portland, whereas an army of foot shall not be able to march it in six days. Again, when those troops lodged on the seashores shall be forced to run from place to place in vain after a fleet of ships, they will at length sit down in the midway and leave all at adventure. But say it were otherwise, that the invading enemy will offer to land in some such place where there shall be an army of ours ready to receive him; yet it cannot be doubted but that when the choice of all our trained bands, and the choice of our commanders and captains, shall be drawn together (as they were at Tilbury in the year 1588) to attend the

* That is, Dungeness.

person of the prince and for the defence of the city of London, they that remain to guard the coast can be of no such force as to encounter an army like unto that wherewith it was intended that the Prince of Parma should have landed in England.

"For end of this digression I hope that this question shall never come to trial; his Majesty's many movable forts will forbid the experience. And although the English will no less disdain than any nation under heaven can do to be beaten upon their own ground or elsewhere by a foreign enemy, yet to entertain those that shall assail us with their own beef in their bellies, and before they eat of our Kentish capons, I take it to be the wisest way; to do which his Majesty, after God, will employ his good ships on the sea, and not trust in any entrenchment upon the shore."

The arguments of men like Lord Admiral Howard of Effingham, Hawkins, Drake, and Raleigh prevailed, and though there was much money and energy expended on the preparation of unavailing defences by land, the main effort was put forth for the employment of the "good ships on the sea." Grudging economies and half-hearted measures on the part of the court and its officials were a constant source of trouble to those entrusted with the defence by sea; but even under these disadvantages they amply justified the advice they had given, and proved by a striking practical demonstration what is for all time the best way of protecting our country from the menace of foreign invasion.

The England of Elizabeth in the days of the Armada was much better prepared for naval than for land warfare. Years of maritime enterprise of every kind, from honest trade to thinly disguised piracy, had trained a race of hardy seamen and, if one may coin a new word, sea-soldiers—men who, without being sailors in the full sense of the word, had served as fighting men in over-sea expeditions, and were at home on shipboard. Men of all classes, from nobles and gentlemen of the court down to common folk of the port towns and the seaboard counties, had taken part in these enterprises, and the sailor of these times was also a fighting man. It was part of his business to learn how to handle cannon and small arms, for if a ship of the sixteenth century could not make a good fight, there was always the chance that crew and passengers would find themselves in slavery at Sallee,

Algiers, Tunis, or Tripoli. There was thus no lack of experienced men for the ships of the English fleet.

That fleet was composed of two classes of vessels—the queen's ships, and those temporarily enlisted from the merchant service. Since Plantagenet days the kings of England had always owned a small number of ships, which they maintained just as they kept a limited number of knights and men-at-arms in their pay to form their personal escort on land. In times of peace the king usually hired those ships to merchants, who employed them in trading voyages. When war was imminent they were recalled to the king's service. He took the crews that navigated them into his pay, and sent some of his fighting men on board. A number of trading ships belonging to the maritime cities and towns were impressed, and a special contingent was available from Dover and the other Cinque Ports, which under the terms of their charter were bound to provide 57 ships and 1,200 men and boys for fifteen days at their own cost, and for as long after as the crown paid the necessary expenses.

Henry the Eighth had several large ships built, and though for a while after this burst of activity the navy was neglected, Queen Mary expended considerable sums on the dockyards and on shipbuilding in the latter part of her reign, and left her sister Elizabeth the nucleus of an efficient navy.

There were 34 queen's ships in the navy that was put in commission to oppose King Philip's Armada, many of them of large size and carrying a powerful armament. These were the most formidable element in the English fleet, which, including all units "great and small," numbered no less than 197 ships. As in the Armada, some of these were "transports and victuallers," others small craft. But there was no such enormous disparity between the opposing fleets as is generally supposed—thanks to a popular tradition fostered by writers who were anxious needlessly to exalt the success of the English seamen. There were under the English flag an ample number of good ships to meet

(1.666)

Sir Walter Raleigh.

(*After the painting* (*artist unknown*) *in the National Portrait Gallery.*)

the Spaniards in the day of battle on fairly equal terms. Nothing is more misleading than the popular idea that the Great Armada was hustled up Channel by a crowd of little merchant ships. Barrow in his "Life of Drake," long a standard authority on the Armada campaign, goes so far as to say that "the best of the queen's ships placed alongside of the first class of Spaniards would have been like a sloop of war by the side of a first-rate." There was really no such matching of Davids against Goliaths.

So far as power can be measured by tonnage, the three best of the queen's ships were the *Ark* (Howard's flagship), of 800 tons; the *Triumph* (Frobisher's ship), of 1,100; and the *White Bear*, of 1,000. There were in the Armada seven galleons rated at 1,000 tons or more. Medina Sidonia's flagship, the *San Martin*, is rated at exactly 1,000 tons. The two largest galleons were the *Santa Aña*, of 1,200 tons, the flagship of Oquendo, and *La Reganzona*, of 1,249 tons, the flagship of Bertendona. But there were at the time several different methods of reckoning a ship's tonnage, and the English and Spanish systems of measurement gave very widely divergent results. Thus we have a report on one of the captured ships of the Armada, the *San Salvador*, made after she was brought into Portland,* and this report estimates her tonnage at 600 tons. In the Spanish list of the Armada she is noted as a ship of 958 tons. Allowing something for the hurried nature of the survey made by the captors of the ship, we may yet take it that the Spanish measurement, as compared with the English, increased the tonnage by at least one-fourth, and perhaps by one-third. This would make the *San Martin* a ship of slightly smaller tonnage than the *Ark*, and even the *Santa Aña* and *La Reganzona* ships of only at most 900 tons English measurement, and therefore not so large as the *Triumph* and the *White Bear*. In view of these figures the old talk of the best of the queen's ships looking in comparison with

* Laughton, "Armada Papers," ii. 155.

the Spaniards' like a sloop beside a three-decker is singularly absurd.

It is true that the Spaniards must have appeared to an unskilled observer much larger than the queen's ships, though not on this extravagant scale of discrepancy. Their high lightly-built fore and stern castles would give this impression. The upper works of the English ships were planned on a more moderate scale, with a considerable gain to their handiness and seaworthiness. Judging by contemporary pictures, the forecastle was kept very low. The stern castle was higher, but not with the exaggeration of the Spanish and Italian builders, and it was divided into two stages, the lower part of it being carried farther forward amidships than the upper part, so that there were two decks rising like steps from the waist of the ship—the forerunners of the quarter-deck and poop of the line of battleships of the next century. If ships were, to use Raleigh's phrase, "clapped together," the advantage would be with the tall Spaniard, and it was for this close fighting that they were designed. The English ships were intended for other tactics, and accordingly, whatever may be the question about their relative size compared with those of the Armada, there is no doubt whatever that they were much more heavily armed than the foreigners, and therefore far more formidable fighting units, so long as gun fire and not hand-to-hand conflict between their crews was the main factor in the battle.

The artillery of the latter part of the sixteenth century does not lend itself to the simple and exact classification by which we can estimate the power and efficiency of modern guns made by machinery to standard patterns. The gunners of the time had a great variety of often fanciful names for the different kinds of cannon, but even under each name there was no rigid standard of weight and size. Each maker had his own patterns, and though occasionally a battery of guns was made for a new ship, or to rearm an old one, the much more usual course was to select

from the guns in store, or that could be purchased or requisitioned here and there, a mixed lot, a quantity of cannon balls that approximately fitted the calibre being sent on board for each gun.

Without attempting the more precise classification proposed by writers who have made a detailed study of the subject, we may say that there were three leading varieties of guns used on shipboard. To use the names common in England at the time, there were, first, the heaviest kind of artillery, to which the name of "cannon" was specially applied — guns throwing a ball weighing from 24 to 48 lbs. The medium size, known as the "demi-cannon"—roughly speaking, a 30-pounder—was the most common. A few of the heavier "great cannon" were to be found on shipboard, but these were more usually guns for fortresses and siege-works on land.

There was a second class of guns designed to throw a somewhat lighter shot to a greater range. This was effected by making the calibre smaller and the bore of the gun longer, so as to burn a larger charge of powder before the shot cleared the muzzle. These guns were known as basilisks, or more generally culverins.* They threw shot of from 14 to 18 lbs. A lighter variety, the "demi-culverin," was an 8 or 9 pounder.

Cannon and culverins were the guns with which ships engaged each other before coming to the close fight side by side. They were the guns of the main and lower decks, the heaviest being mounted as bow or stern chasers. There was a third variety, the lightest of all, that was intended for the closest stage of the fight. These light guns were mounted in the upper works, so as to sweep the enemy's decks in order to clear the way for the boarders, or to repel those of the other ship. Some of them pointed inboard towards the waist of the ship (the part of the upper deck between the fore and stern castles), being mounted on swivels on the poop and forecastle top, or looking out through portholes in the castles on the main deck

* From *couleuvre*, an adder, a snake.

level. They had a large variety of names and calibres—sakers, perriers, minions, falcons, falconets, murderers, and fowlers. The heaviest were 4 to 6 pounders, often loaded with a bag of bullets or scrap-metal. The smallest were little more than big muskets mounted on swivels like the old wall-pieces of fortresses, some of them throwing balls weighing only a few ounces. Of these guns many were roughly-made breechloaders, the back part of the gun being detachable and duplicated, so that one "chamber," as it was called, could be loaded while the other was in firing position. The breech piece was held in place either by being slipped into a stirrup-shaped projection at the back of the gun and tightened up with a wedge, or by being screwed in with the help of a lever or handspike. These small cannon were thus a primitive kind of quick-firer.

Now it may be broadly said that not only had the English ships more guns than the Spaniards, but these guns were of the heavier calibres. The English had many guns of the first two classes, cannon and culverins, and comparatively fewer of the lightest class. This was the proper armament for ships that were meant to fight with their batteries, without closing on the enemy till he had been crippled by gun fire. The Spaniards, on the other hand, carried very few of the heaviest class and not many of the medium or culverin type, but their towering castles bristled with light pieces from tiny cannon down to big muskets fixed on swivels. This was the armament for the old-fashioned fight with the ships "clapped together"—the fight that Howard and Drake meant to deny to them.

Many of the ships in the official list of the Armada show a small total of guns, but there is reason to believe that even where a larger number is noted, the guns were not really all on board. The figure represents what was intended, not what was executed. This may have been the result of the readjustment of armaments carried out by Medina Sidonia when, finding some of his ships seriously underarmed, he had to

supply guns in a hurry for them. He perhaps took some of these from the larger ships. The *Nuestra Señora del Rosario* appears in the official list as a 46-gun ship. When she was captured there were only 41 found on board. The heaviest were three brass "demi-cannon" or 30-pounders. The total number of guns that could be used in an artillery fight at moderate range was only 14. The light pieces for the close fight were 27. She was a ship of over a thousand tons. Comparing her gun power with that of the English *Triumph*, of 1,100 tons, we find that the latter mounted 44 guns to the Spaniard's 41. Moreover, the battery was much heavier. There were only 12 light pieces for the close fight, but to the Spaniard's 14 heavier guns the *Triumph* could oppose no less than 32, including four "cannon"—that is, at least 40-pounders. These may be taken as typical armaments of English and Spanish ships of the largest class. Compared with their size, some of the smaller English ships were also very heavily armed, the larger calibres predominating. Of the Spanish ships of medium tonnage the batteries seem to have been almost entirely made up of the small pieces carried to resist an attempt of pirates to board them.

To sum up in terms taken from the naval science of to-day, the Armada was in much the same position as a modern fleet with few guns in its primary armament of heavy long-ranging artillery and a great lot of small quick-firers, opposed to a fleet with a large number of heavy guns and a moderate proportion of light quick-firing pieces. It is clear that, other things being equal, the victory of the latter would be a certainty.

But this advantage in artillery *matériel* was not the only one on the English side. The better guns were better served, laid more accurately, reloaded and fired more quickly. And the better seamanship of the English and their handier ships enabled the gunners to choose their range. Howard was in the position of a modern admiral with a battle fleet having a few knots

advantage in speed over that of his opponents. Finally, the English were ready for a real sea fight; the Spaniards were hoping for a kind of land battle on the sea, a hand-to-hand struggle for the possession of floating castles, not an artillery action of ship against ship. This factor in the comparison between the two fleets comes out very plainly in the official lists. The Spanish ships almost without exception carried more soldiers than sailors; the English, more seamen than soldiers. It was no gain, but a loss, to Medina Sidonia that his ships were crowded with musketeers and pikemen, unless he could close with the English. So long as these could keep away at medium cannon range, the more crowded the Spanish decks were with mere soldiers waiting for a chance to use their hand weapons, the heavier would be the loss of life, the greater the number of disabled and wounded men to be cared for.

It was therefore with good reason that Howard and Drake and their captains looked forward with confidence to the result of a fight with the Armada in the Channel. Notwithstanding the alarming reports that had come from Lisbon, they knew well that they could meet King Philip's great armament on fairly even terms. This fact has been obscured by the popular tradition that has made the conflict between the two fleets appear as a heroic struggle against desperate odds ending in an all but miraculous victory.

Such a misrepresentation of the facts of the past can serve only to encourage false theories as to the problems of the present. It may seem to a superficial view flattering to national pride to see in the victories of 1588 a marvellous triumph of weakness over strength. But it is surely more creditable to the seamen and soldiers who directed the fortunes of England in that great crisis to put romance aside, and place in the forefront of the record the plain fact that they were men who had grasped the new conditions of naval war, prepared in advance the necessary forces for the coming conflict, and despite the ignorance and

the parsimony of so many in high places, were able to secure that England should be ready to enter upon the fight on even terms with the enemy. To read into the story of the Armada the theory that England was saved from invasion by an improvised navy, materially inadequate to its task, and with its deficiencies supplemented and compensated by heroic deeds of battle and unexpected strokes of fortune, is to foster the false idea that the neglect of years of peace can be made up for at the last moment, and that in England's case—though not in that of less favoured nations—the laws of cause and effect will not work out to their inevitable results. Such ideas—not formulated in so many words, so that their falsity is apparent, but disguised under self-flattering formulas and vague wordy paraphrases—are too often current even in our own day. Men like Howard and Drake, Frobisher and Raleigh, knew nothing of them. This was not the least of the reasons why they were ready to face the day of peril when it came.

CHAPTER X.

THE ENGLISH FLEET AND ITS COMMANDERS.

By the beginning of January 1588 good progress had been made with the organization of the fleet. To watch the entrance of the Channel against the Lisbon Armada, Drake was in command of a squadron at Plymouth. A smaller fleet based on Dover kept some of its ships at sea even during the rough winter weather, or lying under the friendly batteries of Flushing at the mouth of the Scheldt, to watch the coast harbours of Flanders. These ships were commanded by Sir Henry Palmer. There was a promise that early in the spring the Dutch would send out a fleet to assist in this blockade of the outlets to the sea for the Spanish flotilla that was now being built and equipped in the shipyards along the course of the Flemish canals. The nucleus of the main fleet—the general reserve for the maritime defence of England —lay in the lower Thames.

The chief command of the naval forces of England had been placed in the hands of one of the great nobles, Charles Lord Howard of Effingham. He was a grandson of Thomas Howard, second Duke of Norfolk, famous as a soldier and statesman, whose life was a link between the Plantagenet and Tudor periods, for he had fought in the Wars of the Roses, and as Earl of Surrey had won the battle of Flodden Field for Henry the Eighth. One of his younger sons, William Howard, had been

given the title of Baron Howard of Effingham and the office of Lord Admiral of England. His son Charles, born in 1536, succeeded to the barony on his father's death in 1573, and twelve years later was given the office of lord admiral. He was fifty-two years of age in 1588.

He could claim near cousinship with the queen,* and was a prominent figure at her court. In November 1587 he entertained Elizabeth for five days at his house at Chelsea, and there were pageants in her honour, and tilting, in which the Earl of Essex was one of those who most distinguished themselves in the knightly game. A month later he received the special commission appointing him lieutenant-general of her Majesty and commander-in-chief of her forces for the defence of the realm against the Spaniards.

No doubt, as in the case of King Philip's appointment of Guzman, Duke of Medina Sidonia, to the chief command on the other side, a chief motive in the nomination of Howard of Effingham to the command of the English fleet was the fact that a noble of such high rank could more easily impose his

* Sir John Laughton ("Armada Papers," vol. i., p. lxxii) gives the following genealogical table showing the relationship of Howard with the queen :—


Thomas Howard, second Duke of Norfolk.
First Marriage.
Second Marriage.
Elizabeth = Sir Thomas Boleyn.
William, created Lord Howard of Effingham.
Henry VIII. = Anne
Mary = William Carey.
Henry, Lord Hunsdon.
Charles, second Lord Howard of Effingham, created Earl of Nottingham, married Catherine, his first cousin's granddaughter.
Elizabeth.
Catherine.

One of the many legends of the Armada is the story that Howard was a Catholic. He may have outwardly conformed under Mary, as many of the courtiers did, but in 1588 he was a Protestant, as is shown by his receiving the sacrament with Drake in Plymouth parish church.

will upon the subordinate officers than one chosen from amongst them, whose appointment might be the beginning of dissensions and jealousies. But unlike Medina Sidonia, Howard of Effingham had a real and practical knowledge of the sea and of war. He would be no mere ornamental figurehead, but a live admiral of the fleets he commanded. He had been at sea with his father, and he had commanded a fleet even during his father's lifetime, and that at a critical moment and under circumstances that enabled him to see a Spanish squadron at very close quarters. It was in 1570, when Philip's young bride, Anne of Austria, was on her way from Flanders to Spain for her marriage with the king. A formidable fleet served as her escort, and in England there was some apprehension that its presence in the Channel might be a prelude to a treacherous attack. So young Howard was sent out with a strong squadron of the queen's ships, nominally to act as a guard of honour to the Austrian princess during her voyage through the Narrow Seas, really to watch against a possible surprise. England still claimed that in right of her sovereignty of these seas foreign ships on meeting an English warship must salute her by lowering topsails. Howard demanded and obtained this acknowledgment. Hakluyt, in the dedication of his collection of voyages to Howard of Effingham, after the victory over the Armada had made him famous, tells, as an earlier act of prowess, how in 1570 he "environed the Spanish fleet in most strange and warlike sort, and enforced them to stoop gallants and vail their bonnets for the Queen of England."

But Howard, though he had some experience of the sea, and could discuss points of seamanship and naval tactics with sailors as one of themselves, was not like so many of those who served under him—a sailor formed to the work to be done by long years of voyaging and fighting far and near. He was more of a courtier than a seaman, and could not for a moment be compared to men like Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, and Fenner, who

were more at home on sea than on land. But he knew his own limitations and the capacity of his officers, and loyally accepted the understanding that he was to take counsel with these veteran experts. A naval council of war was named to assist him, and it included Drake, who was practically his second in command, his cousin Lord Thomas Howard, Lord Sheffield, Sir Roger Williams, Hawkins, Frobisher, and Thomas Fenner.

Lord Thomas Howard was the captain of one of the queen's ships, the *Golden Lion*. His selection as a member of the council was no doubt due to his kinship with the lord admiral, but he showed himself a good officer in the campaign, and in later years himself commanded fleets on active service. Sheffield's appointment was another instance of nepotism. His mother was Howard of Effingham's sister. He was a young man of twenty-five, and was acting as captain of the *White Bear*, one of the largest of the queen's ships. Sir Roger Williams was more of a soldier than a sailor. He came from the Welsh borders, and had the Celtic love of a good fight for its own sake. "He was," says Camden,* "perhaps in no way inferior to the best soldiers of that age, could he have put bounds to his courage, which ran away with his conduct and discretion." He had been a soldier of fortune, and had served on both sides in Flanders, first under Alva against the Dutch, and then as their ally under Leicester. In Alva's camps he had learned the discipline and tactics of the famous Spanish infantry, and he was the author of various military works. He did not remain long with the fleet, but soon went to Leicester's camp at Tilbury to help in drilling the half-trained levies that were mustering there.

The men who really counted in the lord admiral's council were the four veterans of the sea—Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, and Fenner. Drake was probably the greatest sailor of the day. Hawkins had been the master of this most apt pupil.

* Quoted by Laughton, i. 240, note.

Frobisher had been all his life at sea. He was now over fifty, and he had made his first voyage to the Guinea coast as a boy. He had served with Drake in the West Indies, and three times he had sailed into the northern ice in the hope of finding a north-west passage to the rich realms of Cipangu and Cathay, but had only succeeded in hoisting the queen's flag on frozen shores, and bringing back tales of gold mines in those icy lands —tales that led to loss and disappointment. But it was a good schooling for a seaman. Thus much was gain.

Drake, Frobisher, and Hawkins were Devon men. Thomas Fenner came of a Sussex family of sailors from Chichester. He had served under Hawkins, and twenty years before this date he had fought a Portuguese squadron of seven ships off the Azores, where he was caught by them single-handed in a 400-ton ship, the *Castle of Comfort*. Fenner's ship was heavily armed, and by superior gunnery and seamanship he beat off and escaped from his seven antagonists. He had served with Drake. He had been his flag-captain in the great raid on the West Indies, and was his vice-admiral in the fleet that sailed in 1587 to burn the galleons at Cadiz and "singe the King of Spain's beard." He had the reputation of being as wise in counsel as he was daring in action. With such seamen as these to advise him Howard had good guidance, and did not need the courtly soldiers that were ornaments to his council board.

But it must be said that, though like a wise commander he took expert advice, he always decided for himself. He was not like Medina Sidonia, who frankly confessed that he was too ignorant to know whether advice was good or bad. Howard, though he owed his position primarily to noble rank and court influence, was well worthy of it.

He hoisted his flag on December 20 as lord admiral on the *White Bear*, which was anchored with several other of the queen's ships off Queenborough, in the mouth of the Thames. As active operations were not usually to be expected before the spring, the

ships had reduced crews; but sea provisions were being got on board, repairs and refitting carried out, and fresh men were joining, for it was considered prudent to be ready for an attempt of the Spaniards early in the new year.

Danger might be expected from two quarters—from the Lisbon armada and from Parma's army and flotilla in the ports of Flanders. It seems obvious to us nowadays that Parma could not act without Medina Sidonia's assistance, but at the time there was almost as much anxiety about the Flanders army as was excited by the news of the great preparations at Lisbon. At Queenborough, forming the main squadron under the immediate command of Howard of Effingham, there were sixteen ships, small and large, some of them bearing names soon to be made famous in the battles with the Armada, and destined to be perpetuated in the royal navy down to our own time. There were the *White Bear* and the *Triumph*, two of the largest ships then afloat, both of over 1,000 tons, some twenty-five years old, an age before which the modern battleship is sent to the scrap heap, but at which the old oak-built wooden walls were still in their first youthful efficiency. There was the *Ark* of 800 tons, which Howard made his flagship for the campaign in the Channel. A contemporary print shows that she was a ship of the galleon type, with a high poop and forecastle, but not on the exaggerated scale of the Spanish vessels. She is shown pierced with three tiers of ports for guns, besides gun-ports in the stern, and has four masts. She carried a formidable armament of 4 "great cannon," 4 demi-cannon, 24 culverins and demi-culverins (32 pieces in all for the artillery fight), and 12 smaller guns for the fight at close quarters. She was sometimes called the *Ark Raleigh*, sometimes the *Ark Royal*. The name of an owner was often attached to that of the ship in the sixteenth century, and the *Ark Raleigh* was so called as she had originally been owned and built for Sir Walter Raleigh. Before the launch on June 12, 1587, she was sold to the queen for

£5,000 (equal to nearly £50,000 at the money values of to-day.)* No cash was paid to Raleigh, but the amount was struck off the debts he owed to the crown. When Howard transferred his flag to her from the *Bear* she was a brand new ship, and the builders' accounts show that her cabins had been fitted up with a costly luxury of decoration, so that she was well suited to be the flagship of the courtly lord admiral.

The *Victory*, which Hawkins was to command, was another 800-ton ship. She was launched in 1561, and "altered into the form of a galleon"—that is, provided with higher upper works—in 1586. She gave a famous name to the navy, and had a remarkable career of more than a hundred years. She was rebuilt in 1610, and was then classed as a ship of 1,200 tons, and renamed the *Prince Royal*. Under the Commonwealth she was named the *Resolution*, and was the flagship of Blake and Monk in battles with the Dutch during Cromwell's wars. When Charles the Second came back she was renamed the *Royal Prince*, and in the Four Days' Battle of the second Dutch War she grounded on the Galloper Shoal, and was burned on June 3, 1666, one hundred and five years after her launch, and seventy-eight after her fights with the Spaniards in the Armada campaign. These old ships were long lived. The *Victory* was the latest survivor of the fleet that defeated the Armada, as her namesake, now anchored at Spithead, is the survivor of the fleets that Nelson led, and that saved England from a more dangerous foe than King Philip.

* The *Ark* was a ship of the royal navy for nearly half a century after her first exploits in the Armada campaign. In 1596 she was the flagship of the expedition against Cadiz. In 1608, under James the First, she was reconstructed and renamed the *Anne Royal* after his queen-consort, Anne of Denmark. She was the flagship of another Cadiz expedition in 1625, but leaked so badly that it was with difficulty she got back to England. In 1636, while moored in the Thames, she fouled her anchor at low tide, sinking upon it, and when raised she was found to be so damaged and rotten that she was struck off the navy list and broken up. The name *Ark* has never appeared on the navy list since 1608—perhaps because it would be calculated to awaken memories of "Admiral Noah" rather than of Howard of Effingham and the Armada.

Another name in Howard's squadron is linked with memories of Nelson. This was Sir William Winter's ship, the *Vanguard*, of 500 tons, built two years before at Woolwich. She and her sister ship, the *Rainbow* (commanded by Lord Henry Seymour), were types of a new class of moderately sized ships of the English galleon class, built on the suggestion of Winter to carry a heavy armament for their tonnage. They had in all no less than 54 guns—32 of the cannon and culverin class for the main battery, and 22 lighter pieces. The *Rainbow*, though lying at Queenborough on January 5, was noted as about to be sent to join Palmer's squadron. Another 500-ton ship, not quite so heavily armed, was Lord Thomas Howard's *Golden Lion*.

There were two ships named after the queen, the *Elizabeth Jonas* of 900 tons and the *Elizabeth Bonaventure* of 600. The *Elizabeth Jonas* was launched in 1559, and Sir John Laughton gives from contemporary authorities this interesting explanation of her singular name,—

"The 3 day of July 1559, the Queen's Grace took her barge at Greenwich unto Woolwich to her new ship, and there it was named *Elizabeth Jonas*, and after her Grace had a goodly banquet, and there was great shooting of guns, and casting of fire about made for plessure." The ship "was so named by her Grace in remembrance of her own delivery from the fury of her enemies, from which in one respect she was no less miraculously preserved than was the prophet Jonas from the belly of the whale." *

As the *Elizabeth Jonas* was named to commemorate her Majesty's deliverance from troubles in the past, the other *Elizabeth*, launched two years later, was called *Bonaventure* to express a hope that she would have good fortune in the future.

Two other ships of medium size were the *Mary Rose* and the *Dreadnought*. This first possessor of a famous name was of only 400 tons, a very small fraction of the 17,900 tons displacement of the *Dreadnought* of to-day. Five small craft, the smallest the *George* of 20 tons, completed Howard's main squadron.

* "Armada Papers," ii. 334.

In the squadron "for Flushing and the Narrow Seas" Palmer's flagship was the *Antelope* of 400 tons. The powerfully-armed *Rainbow* was under orders to join him. He had with him the *Swallow* of 360 tons, commanded in the Armada campaign by Richard, the son of Sir John Hawkins, a young sailor who had seen hard service with his father and with Drake. Palmer's other ships were all small craft—the *Bull* and the *Tiger* of 200 tons, the *Tramontana* (150), the *Scout* (120), the *Achates* (100), the *Charles* (70), and the *Moon* (60).

Six of the queen's ships were under orders to join Drake's squadron at Plymouth immediately. Three were at Queenborough. The most famous in future years was the *Revenge*. She was a ship of 500 tons launched at Deptford in 1575. She was "galleon built," 92 feet long, 32 in the beam, and 15 in depth; but small as such dimensions seem to us now, they were about the standard for ships below the very largest class. She carried 46 guns—34 in the main battery, and 12 light pieces. On her arrival at Plymouth Drake made her his flagship. She was the same *Revenge* of whose last fight with the Spanish fleet off the Azores, when Sir Richard Grenville commanded her, Tennyson tells in his "Ballad of the Fleet." *

With the *Revenge* went the *Swiftsure* of 400 tons and the *Aid* of 250, both ships commanded by sons of the Fenner family. From Portsmouth, where they had completed their

* The *Revenge* sank at sea five days after her capture by the Spanish fleet. She was what sailors would call an "unlucky ship." Sir John Laughton writes of her: "According to Monson (Churchill, 'Voyages,' iii. 194), judging by 'the *Revenge's* precedent misfortunes, she was designed, from the hour she was built, to receive some fatal blow; for to her, above all other her Majesty's ships, there happened these unfortunate accidents. In 1582, in her return out of Ireland, where she was admiral (that is, flagship), she struck upon a sand and escaped by miracle. Anno 1586, at Portsmouth, being bound upon a southern expedition, coming out of the harbour she ran aground, and against the expectation of all men was saved, but was not able to proceed upon her voyage. The third disaster was in 1589, as she was safely moored in Chatham, where all the queen's ships lay, and as safe, one would think, as the queen's chamber; and yet, by the extremity of a storm, she was unluckily put ashore and there overset, a danger never thought on before, or much less happened'" ("Armada Papers," ii. 334).

(1,666)

The "Ark Royal," the Flagship of the English Fleet.

(*Drawn from the tapestry hangings in the old House of Lords.*)

fitting out, Drake was reinforced with the *Hope*, a ship of 600 tons and 50 guns; the *Nonpareil*, a galleon-built ship of 500 tons, with no less than 52 guns (32 heavy and 20 light), commanded by the veteran Thomas Fenner; and a small ship, the *Advice*, of 50 tons.

Till these six ships joined him at Plymouth the only "queen's ship" at Drake's disposal, the little *Makeshift* of 60 tons, was scouting in the Bay of Biscay. The fleet he had collected in the Hamoaze was made up of eighteen armed merchantmen. The largest was the *Merchant Royal*, belonging to the Levant Company. Such ships, destined for the Mediterranean trade, where even in times of peace they might have to fight the Barbary corsairs, were built and armed like the men-of-war of the time. Two years before she had been the flagship of a squadron of five Levant traders, was attacked off the island of Pantellaria, between Tunis and Sicily, by a squadron of two frigates and eleven galleys under the Spanish flag, and after a five hours' fight beat off the enemy with heavy loss. Of the ships that took part in this brilliant affair the *Edward Bonaventure* and a smaller vessel, the *Toby*, joined Drake's flag later. His other ships belonged to various private owners. Thus the *Thomas Drake* of 200 tons (one of the five ships of this size in the squadron) was the personal property of Sir Francis Drake, and had been commanded by his brother Thomas in the last raid on the West Indies. Another 200-tonner was the *Spark*, named after her master and owner, William Spark. The other ships were of smaller size, and, except the *Merchant Royal*, the whole squadron was made up of ships belonging to the western ports, and manned by those splendid sailors the men of Cornwall and Devon, a good number of whom, like the ships they sailed in, had already had experience of war.

Before the spring the fleets would be reinforced by numbers of armed ships from London and the other ports, but those already in commission—the queen's ships, and the Plymouth

ships of the "West Country"—were those that had to bear the brunt of the fighting. The most serious danger was a slackening of the work of preparation, perhaps the prelude of its complete abandonment. On January 18, 2,000 men were paid off and dismissed from the fleet, for there were rumours that the King of Spain had given up his great project, and Sir Edward Stafford, the queen's ambassador at Paris and Howard's brother-in-law, wrote in confirmation of this report. Howard of Effingham's letters to Walsingham reflect current opinion, and show how the work of preparation was going forward. On January 24 he wrote to Walsingham, the Secretary of State, about the reports from Paris.

"I cannot tell what to think of my brother Stafford's advertisement; for, if it be true that the King of Spain's forces be dissolved, I would not wish the queen's majesty to be at this charge that she is at; but if it be a device, knowing that a little thing maketh us too careless, then I know not what may come of it. But this I am sure of: if her Majesty would have spent but a thousand crowns to have had some intelligence, it would have saved her twenty times as much. Assure yourself he (the king) knoweth what we do here; and if the army * be or do dissolve, it is the preparation that her Majesty hath made that is the cause; for he cannot abide this heat that is provided for him. He did never think that we would thus have provided for his coming, but that the number of false alarms that he hath given her Majesty would have made her to have taken no alarm, and so to have had the advantage."

He suggested that, if the Armada were really broken up, a few more ships in the Narrow Seas would prevent Parma attempting anything—such, for instance, as an invasion by way of Scotland. Three days later he wrote again to Walsingham prudent warnings against optimist views of the situation. He thought neither the King of Scotland nor the King of France were any more to be trusted than the King of Spain, and as for the peace negotiations, from which many expected a good result, "there was never," he said, "since England was England, such a stratagem and mask made to deceive England withal as is this treaty of peace." If the war preparations were abandoned it would be a long time before such a good lot of seamen could be

* That is, Armada, or fleet.

again brought together. He was all for making ready for trouble. Incidentally he notes a fact that shows Drake was busy with gunnery practice in his squadron, and curiously asks Walsingham to give him advice to have less of it, instead of himself sending an order to his lieutenant.

"Touching Sir Francis Drake . . . there hath happened an accident in one of his ships at Portsmouth, that a piece broke and killed a man, with some other hurt. If you would write a word or two to him to spare his powder, it would be well."

Another passage in the letter tells of Palmer's close watch on the Flemish ports. He had reported that at Dunkirk barges were being laden with "ballast and great stones for the stopping of some haven." "I will have a watch on them," adds Howard.

Next day—January 28—Howard writes again to Walsingham; this time obviously in a fit of depression, and not without reason, for the peace negotiations were leading the Government—always anxious to spare expenditure—to a general slackening of preparations. Men were not being sent to the ships which had only half crews, and all the talk was of an early peace. Some of the young gallants who had volunteered for service were anxious to go back to court. "If there was to be a surcease of arms," wrote Howard, "it shall be but folly and to no purpose for me to lie here." He suggested that perhaps he and the other nobles might hand over the ships to their lieutenants. It would be a month before they could recruit the men wanted if they were to complete their companies, and it might be a difficult business for many, and some of the best among them had gone abroad. Then with a touch of courtly flattery for the queen, who would see his letter, he went on,—

"I protest I write not this to you because I am weary with being here; for if it were not for her Majesty's presence I had rather live in the company of these noble ships than in any place. And yet would I be glad that there were something to do . . . If you think that my continuing here with the navy serve to good purpose, I shall like well of it; but methinks if there be a surcease of arms, then my lying here will make a jest to many, and they have reason."

He felt sorrier, he said, for the young noblemen than for himself, though they managed to "live bountifully" in their exile from the court. It would be hard, he added, to find men "so well affected to this service and that love the sea as they do."

It must have been a dull time during those winter days for the gallants of the fleet that lay in the Medway mouth, among fogs and rain, with nothing better in reach than the little town of Chatham—not much to do beyond dull routine, and the hope of brilliant exploits against the Spaniards vanishing amid the rumours of a patched-up peace.

One likes Howard's praise for his younger comrades, and his flash of enthusiasm for the "noble ships" that were swinging lazily to their anchors, or being beached one by one at high tides to be "calked and tallowed"—the equivalent of the modern process of docking. "Noble ships" they were for their time, making a brave show with their decorations of paint, gilt and carved work, that had cost the queen some hundreds of good money, though a sailor of to-day would regard them as a lot of small craft, and they would make a poor show beside the steel-clad giants that are now moored in the Medway mouth. But all things are relative, and Howard's warships must have seemed to those who saw them marvels of strength and grace, such as the sailor's eye sees in a good ship, and giants of the deep beside the small coasting craft that lay around them.

But Howard and his young noblemen had to remain with the fleet off Queenborough, for the hoped-for peace seemed remote, and there was a quickening of the preparations. The queen's council decided that the main fleet must be ready by the tenth of March to leave the Thames for Portsmouth, for rumours from Lisbon said that King Philip's great Armada would be in the Channel in April. It was directed that all English ships must "be stayed"—that is, kept

in the home ports—and "put in order to be in readiness against April, to serve as cause shall require." Soldiers were to be mustered on the coasts, ready to be embarked on the fleet, and a contract was made to buy muskets in Holland at 23s. 4d. apiece. Lord Burleigh also noted that two men must be found "to pass to Lisbon for inteiligence." Information was badly needed. There were no newspapers to spread through Europe the tidings of what the Spanish king was doing, and the stories told by traders and travellers, coming mostly by way of France, began to bring the wildest exaggerations as to the numbers and power of the Armada. There was this gain, that England began to make ready for the worst, and did its best to be prepared. There were fears also — mostly bred of ignorance of the real conditions of such a problem—that Parma might find means to send an expedition to Scotland, and join a Scottish force in raiding the Border, perhaps in raising the north of England again in insurrection, for the northern counties still clung to the old religion, and had more than once fought for it.

But, even when the work of preparation was most active, the queen's council was a little too anxious to spare expense and save England on strictly economical lines—a mistake not confined to the men of the sixteenth century. Howard wrote to Walsingham that "if the Queen's Majesty would not spare her purse," he had men with him "who would not spare their lives." He complained of being left short-handed and ill-supplied, and said that this must be known well enough to the queen's enemies; "so they now make but little reckoning of us, for they know that we are like bears tied to stakes, and they may come as dogs to offend us, and we cannot go to hurt them." This allusion to the favourite sport of Elizabethan days was written "aboard her Majesty's ship the *White Bear*, this first day of February." Perhaps the ship's name suggested the comparison.

In February there was reassuring news from Scotland. King James was not listening any longer to the Spanish proposal that he should join them and avenge his mother's death by a march across the Border. In Holland there was a movement in several towns of the island of Walcheren to place themselves under allegiance directly to Elizabeth, and it was decided that Howard should take part of his fleet across to the Scheldt to visit her Majesty's Dutch friends, and strengthen them in their good dispositions. While making ready for this short cruise Howard wrote to Walsingham on February 14, telling him that the bitter weather that had prevailed of late had "sharply handled our men, for that many of them are but ill apparelled." There was, of course, no uniform for the navy till long after, and what clothing the men wore they bought for themselves. The difficulty now was that they had no money with which to buy it. It was one more instance of the closeness of her Majesty's purse-strings. Up to February 11 the men's pay was six weeks in arrear. Howard asked for a remittance of £3,165, 15s., being six weeks' pay for 3,015 men at 21 shillings a man. The pay was therefore at the rate of sixpence a day—worth at least four shillings if measured by present values. "The money that is already received," he said, "was employed for making a general pay through the whole navy from the first of December to the first of January, and for the wages and conduct in discharge of 2,000 men out of the navy to the 18th of January, upon the last diminishing of our numbers."

Before sailing Howard transferred his flag to the *Ark*, which was henceforth his flagship. He was well pleased with her. "Tell her Majesty," he wrote to Lord Burleigh, "from me that her money was well given for the *Ark Raleigh*, for I think her the odd ship in the world for all conditions; and truly I think there can be no great ship

make me change and go out of her." On February 20 he sailed from the Medway with the *Ark*, *Bonaventure*, *Golden Lion*, *Vanguard*, *Mary Rose*, *Dreadnought*, *Swallow*, and *Foresight*, the *White Lion* (a ship of 140 tons and Howard's personal property), and six pinnaces and a ketch. The fleet went across to the French coast near Cape Gris-Nez, after anchoring for a few days in the Downs. The weather had changed for the worse, and the ships felt its effects. Sir William Winter wrote to the government on February 28, "from aboard the *Vanguard* in the Downs," a warning that plenty of naval stores would be wanted for the coming campaign, telling them that—

"This winter's weather, although we have been but awhile abroad, hath so stretched our sails and tackle, torn many of our blocks, pulleys, and sheevers, stretched our boats and destroyed some of our pinnaces—as the *Lion's* for one, who is utterly lost and must be furnished of another—as a man would never believe it unless he doth see it; these be the fruits that the seas bring forth, especially at this time of the year, as it is not unknown to you." *

But, lest this report should be taken too seriously by the landsmen at Whitehall, he added,—

"Our ships doth show themselves like gallants here. I assure you it will do a man's heart good to behold them; and would to God the Prince of Parma were upon the seas with all his forces, and we in view of them; then I doubt not but you should hear that we would make his enterprise very unpleasant for him."

On Friday, March 1, with the wind blowing hard from the westward, Howard steered for the Scheldt. On the Sunday morning the fleet was at Flushing, and anchored above the town, the *Elizabeth Bonaventure* falsifying her name by having the bad luck to run hard aground on a sandbank. There was some disorder on board, and "many of the ship went out to save themselves for fear." But her commander, Lord Henry Seymour, kept the rest to their posts, and was presently joined by Howard and Winter, who did all they could with him to float her again, but it was more than twelve hours before she could be got off, none the worse for her mishap.

* "Armada Papers," i. 81 ("stretched"—that is, strained).

This accident somewhat delayed the festivities, but on the Tuesday Howard and his officers dined with the governor of the town, Sir William Russell, who was holding Flushing for Queen Elizabeth. The councillors of the province of Zeeland and the burgomasters of several towns were among the guests. Warmed by good liquor and patriotic feelings, the Dutchmen protested their friendship for the English queen and their readiness to serve under her lord admiral. It seemed that the policy of making the island province at the mouth of the Scheldt a dependency of England, rather than a state of the Dutch Republic, was on a fair way to success. "I dare assure her Majesty," wrote Howard, "that at this hour she is no more assured of the Isle of Sheppey to be at her devotion anyways, than she is of the whole Isle of Walcheren and all the towns." *

There was a return of hospitality by dinners on board the ships, and the people came off in boat loads to inspect their wonders. On one day there were at least 5,000 of these visitors. We may take it that the English sailors made the quiet old town, nestling behind its green sea dikes, a lively place for a while. To cheer both Dutch and English there came news of the first fight in the Channel, which was a score for England. The *Charles*, one of the small craft of Palmer's squadron, while crossing from the Downs, had met "half seas over" (that is, half way across) a Spaniard from Dunkirk chasing two English barques. The *Charles* had gone to the rescue, and the English ship and the Spaniard "had a good fight together; but the *Charles* at length made him run on ground under the town of Dunkirk, for he was surely sped." Such is Howard's report.† There was still more important news from the enemy—news just a month old when it

* "Armada Papers," i. 100.

† Howard adds: "We will not meddle with him except they come out and seek it, for I would be loth to do anything in this time of treating [that is, negotiation] that might hinder it; but yet I must not suffer her Majesty's subjects to be spoiled. We had but one in the *Charles* which was ill hurt. He is hurt, even like Sir Philip Sidney, above the knee, and the bone all broken: a very great hurt. I have him aboard mine own ship, and am in hope to recover him."

(1,666)

SIR JOHN HAWKINS.

reached Howard, who tells how "there came into Flushing on Monday a Dane that came from Lisbon, who doth affirm that the Marquis de Santa Cruz is dead; but he saith the preparations go on very great."

At the end of the week this festive visit to Flushing came to a close, and the fleet was again at anchor "off Margat," on March 10. On that same Sunday, Howard, who had already written a long dispatch to Walsingham, sent off another letter to him with news that had evidently made the lord admiral anxious about the way in which hopes of peace had retarded the English preparations. He told of information he had just received by "one who came of purpose from Dunkirk." *

"Who doth assure me that on Wednesday last there came a Scottish gentleman out of Spain to the Duke of Parma, and brought a packet from the king and declared that the Spanish forces by sea are for certain to part from Lisbon on the 20th of this month with the light moon, and that the number of the fleet when they all do meet, of great and small, will be 210 sails; and the number of soldiers, beside the mariners, are 36,000. I am sorry Sir F. Drake is not in more readiness than he is. I know the fault is not in him. I pray to God her Majesty do not repent this slack dealings.....I am afraid he will not be ready in time, do what can be done. All that cometh out of Spain must concur in one lie, or else we shall be stirred very shortly with heave and ho. I fear me ere it be long her Majesty will be sorry that she hath believed some as much as she hath done, but it will be very late."

But there was still to be a long respite. Medina Sidonia's weary delays at Lisbon were to give Howard and Drake ample time for preparation. No one could then realize how much the death of Santa Cruz meant for Spain and England. We know it now.

Howard told Walsingham that if the Spaniards came soon four of his ships that he had left in the Medway when he sailed for Flushing would be still so unready that he would have to leave them "to guard Chatham Church." He begged for definite and early news about the negotiations. If there was to be war he would try to "choke up" Dunkirk harbour, "for from thence do I fear most." In a postscript he urged that an embargo

* "Armada Papers," i. 107.

should be put on all shipping in England. He was evidently very anxious.

It would seem to be from this time that illusions about the possibility of peace were abandoned, and war preparations were pushed forward vigorously, though still somewhat hampered by the economic views of her Majesty and some of her most trusted counsellors.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ARMING OF THE MERCHANT SHIPS—HOWARD AND DRAKE UNITE AT PLYMOUTH.

WHILE Howard was warning his government that the Spaniards might soon be expected in the Channel, Medina Sidonia was altering the armament and lading of his ships at Lisbon, and King Philip was sending him letter after letter from Madrid urging dispatch, and insisting that the Armada must be ready to sail by March 31, though, as we have seen, it was not till May 30 that it at last left the Tagus, and then only to put back to Corunna. This being noted as a reminder as to how matters really stood, we proceed with the story of the preparations in England and the movements of the fleet.

All the news that reached England seemed to confirm the report of the early sailing of the enemy from Lisbon. There was "very foul weather" in the Channel in March, but light craft sent out from Plymouth brought back the news that war was talked of in the French ports on the other side. In Havre the report was that the Armada would be at sea on March 24, and "a man of Marseilles" said that there were in it 24 great galleasses, and between 400 and 500 ships in all. There was a crowd of shipping from Scotland at Havre, and Captain Robert Keble of Harwich, who brought the news from there, told how he had been involved in a quarrel with the Scots, and was fined 30 crowns by the governor for brawling with them, after the

Scottish seamen had provoked him by saying "that if they might catch him at sea, they would heave him and his overboard, and all other Englishmen, and would pull their hearts out of their bodies, calling them 'English dogs,' saying they would be revenged of the blood of their queen." * One can readily imagine that there was some rough work between English and Scots in the quayside wine shops of Havre.

Drake at Plymouth, like Howard in the Medway, had suffered through the irresolute policy of the queen's council, who up to the last moment had been building their hopes on peace being arranged and the Armada dispersed. His ships had their crews reduced, and, to use Howard's simile, he found himself "like a bear tied to a stake." To make matters worse, some kind of fever had broken out among the men living idly in their narrow quarters on board the squadron. If he had his own way, he would have sailed with what he had with him to "singe the King of Spain's beard" once more, and burn his ships in their ports, or to swoop down upon the West Indian convoy. There were times when he was working out a plan for making some such bold stroke at his own risk, and there was an idea of his taking with him the refugee pretender, Dom Antonio, and landing him in Portugal, where he professed to have enough adherents to raise an insurrection against King Philip.

But, apart from its fixed belief in some good result from the negotiations, the council's plans were all dictated by ideas of what was to be at the outset a passive defence, with no bold preliminary counterstroke. The whole plan was vitiated by turning upon a division of forces; it was the very plan on which the Spaniards were counting for the success of their enterprise. There were to be two fleets—the "Eastern," under Howard, to guard the "Narrow Seas;" the "Western," under Drake, based on Plymouth: "by which means," to quote Lord Burleigh's summary of the scheme, "the Spanish navy shall not be able to

* "Armada Papers," i. 123.

come to the Low Countries to join with the Flemish navy (that is, Parma's flotilla), for the English Western shall follow them if they come to the east, and they shall be intercepted by the English Eastern navy." Diversions might be attempted after the Armada sailed by sending a squadron to land Dom Antonio in Portugal, and to sail for the Azores to stop the Indian treasure fleet, if it happened to be then on its way. It was a plan that risked defeat in detail.

Drake wrote from Plymouth on March 30 proposing something more practical. He urged that his fleet should be reinforced and allowed to strike a blow at the main force of the enemy. He pointed out that everything depended on dealing effectually with the Lisbon fleet.

"If her Majesty and your lordships think that the King of Spain meaneth any invasion in England, then doubtless his force is and will be great in Spain; and thereon he will make his groundwork or foundation, whereby the Prince of Parma may have the better entrance, which, in mine own judgment, is most to be feared. But if there may be such a stay or stop made by any means of this fleet in Spain that they may not come through the sea as conquerors—which I assure myself they think to do—then shall the Prince of Parma have such a check thereby as were meet." *

Then, after proposing that the Western fleet should be strengthened, as it would most likely strike the first blow, and as he hoped God "would put into her Majesty and her people courage and boldness not to fear any invasion in her own country, but to seek God's enemies and her Majesty's where they may be found," he went on:—

"My very good lords, next under God's mighty protection the advantage and gain of time and place will be the only and chief means for our good; wherein I most humbly beseech your good lordships to persevere as you have begun, for that with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more good upon their own coast, than a great many more will do here at home; and the sooner we are gone the better we shall be able to impeach them."

Having thus insisted on his plan, he turned to other matters. He told of a report that had reached him that the Biscayan ships were flying English flags.

* "Armada Papers," i. 124.

"Whereof there are made in Lisbon 300 with the red cross, which is a great presumption, proceeding of the haughtiness and pride of the Spaniard, and not to be tolerated by any true natural English heart."

Drake's indignation was aroused by misleading information. It was true that white flags with a red cross were being flown by and made for the ships of the Armada, but it was not the cross of St. George, but a red saltire or St. Andrew's cross. Among the multiplicity of flags flown by the Armada, royal standards, banners of provinces and cities, and those of commanders and noble volunteers, this red saltire on a white ground was common to all the ships, the device being taken from the Burgundian arms of the royal house of Spain.

He referred to a more serious matter when he reported that his ships were short of gunpowder, having only what would "scant be sufficient for one day's service," and he added:—

"I have sent unto your good lordships the note of such powder and ammunition as are delivered unto us for this great service; which, in truth, I judge to be just a third part of that which is needful; for if we should want it when we shall have most need thereof, it will be too late to send to the Tower for it. I assure your honours it neither is nor shall be spent in vain."

This last is perhaps an allusion to the warning he had received to be sparing of mere target practice. The lack of a good supply of ammunition was to be a source of trouble from first to last in the operations against the Armada.

Drake was given a further supply of powder, but there was no reply to his requests to be allowed a free hand to raid the Spanish harbours again. The council was convinced that the chief business was to collect all available resources for a defensive war. The preparations for fighting on land were being carried forward, and orders had been sent to all the ports and seaboard towns to fit out ships for service with the fleet. London made a brave response to the appeal, fitting out and paying all charges for thirty ships of from 300 tons downwards.* But of the smaller ports some were very backward and sent excuses, some

* See the details in Appendix II., List of the English Fleet.

of them sound enough to pass muster. Others did at once what was asked. The Mayor of Poole wrote, in reply to a demand for a ship of 60 tons and a pinnace, that there was the *Primrose of Poole*, the only ship of over 60 tons then in harbour. She was of 120 tons, and had just been fitted out for a voyage to Newfoundland, "having in her 2 sakers, 4 minions, 1 falcon and 2 falconets, and 500 pound weight of powder, and 8 calivers"—17 guns in all. There was also a pinnace of 30 tons "called the *Elephant*"—perhaps because she was so small. But he pleaded to be released from sending these ships to the fleet, for the merchants of the town had lost money in privateering ventures, and the mayor and corporation further begged their lordships

"To consider of the great decay and disability of this poor town by reason of embargoes, want of traffic, loss at sea and by pirates which have and do continually lie at Studland Bay, being the mouth of this harbour, robbing both our poor neighbours and others resorting to this town." *

The petition throws a curious light on the conditions prevailing in the Channel in the Armada year. One wonders that it was not thought worth while to send Drake out to give the pirates of Studland Bay short shrift.

Sir George Cary, "Captain of the Isle of Wight," wrote from Carisbrooke Castle, in reply to an order for a ship and a pinnace to be supplied by the island, protesting that the islanders were "most desirous by all possible means to maintain her Majesty's good opinion so graciously conceived of them," but pleading, like the mayor of Poole, poverty and inability to comply.

"For that the island is utterly unprovided of any warlike ships or vessels fit for employment in such services, the greatest thereunto belonging not exceeding the burden of 70 tons, and that the insufficiency and great poverty of the merchants of Newport is such (being rather a poor market than a merchant-like town) as may hardly extend to the furnishing of one quarter of a ship fit in so warlike a manner to be set forth." †

Alluding to a statement that the island had sent out privateers, he said this was not so, though he himself had speculated in this way with "more loss than gain."

* "Armada Papers," i. 130. † *Ibid.*, i. 131.

The mayor and aldermen of Hull, in reply to a demand for two ships of 60 tons and a pinnace, replied that they had impressed some seamen, but for the present had no ships available.

"Forasmuch as all the best ships meet for service belonging to this port be abroad in the parts beyond the seas and at London, we are in no way able, as most willingly we would, to accomplish your lordships' appointment in so short a time, until God send the ships and mariners (now being abroad) to be comen home." *

The Mayor of Lyme Regis, after acknowledging the receipt of an order to supply "certain shipping to serve under the conduct of Sir Francis Drake," reported that they had no ship of even 60 tons, but only three smaller vessels. One of these, the *Revenge*, of 40 tons, they had fitted out, but they pleaded poverty and heavy losses as a reason for being treated as gently as might be in this matter of charges for defence.†

The Mayor of Exeter had been required to provide three ships and a pinnace for Drake's fleet. They offered the only ships available—two good-sized vessels just ready for Newfoundland—which Drake accepted "rather than three others of lesser portage." ‡ The mayor then complained that, as the letters of the council had been expressly addressed only to Exeter and Topsham, "all the rest of the places and creeks belonging to the Port of Exeter" had refused to share the expenses, and he suggested that letters should be sent to "Topsham, Kenton, Exmouth, Lympstone, Sidmouth, Seaton, Colyton, Dawlish, Teignmouth, Tiverton, and Cullompton," ordering them to provide the cost of a third ship among them.

King's Lynn had been ordered to furnish two ships of at least 60 tons, and a pinnace. The mayor wrote that the neighbouring towns had all refused to help, and asked for letters to be sent directing them to make their proper contribution. Meanwhile, though most of its ships were abroad, Lynn was

* "Armada Papers," i. 136. † *Ibid.*, i. 138.
‡ *Ibid.*, i. 143.

doing what it could, assigning for the fleet the *Mayflower* of 100 tons and a pinnace of 40.*

Ipswich and Harwich had been directed to send three ships and a pinnace, but succeeded in getting the demand reduced, and were ordered to provide instead "three sufficient and serviceable hoys," with six or eight guns in each, and forty men, "whereof most to be musketeers." They found the three small craft and the men, but asked for guns to be given them from London, and complained that "they had found some very unwilling to contribute." †

Weymouth was to have provided two ships and a pinnace for Drake, and two more ships and a pinnace for Howard's fleet. The mayor and corporation pleaded poverty; their town was "of small ability and in part decayed," and they had been at great expense to erect a battery for its defence, though it was "not thoroughly furnished with the needful ordnance by reason of our poverty." Still, they had ready to send to Drake a ship of 80 tons with 50 men, and to Howard a pinnace of 30 tons with 30 men, besides "two other ships for the lord admiral," but they asked that the neighbouring district should be required to share the charge with the town.

One would have thought that a port like Southampton would have made no difficulty about furnishing its quota of two ships and a pinnace, but the mayor wrote that on the receipt of the order he had assembled the aldermen—

"To consider as well of the charge, as how the same might be levied among so poor and insufficient a number of inhabitants any way able to contribute towards the same; and finding the charge to amount to 500 pounds or thereabouts, we see it not possible how the same (no, not the fourth part thereof) can be levied among us, in respect of the disability and poverty of the town, which ever since the embargo in Spain, being about 16 years, hath grown from time to time so to decay as within the half of that time there hath been almost no trade or traffic within this town; whereby not only those among us that were of any reasonable estate of wealth or stock to exercise trade or merchandise are so low drawn and impoverished as [that] they have been constrained in effect to give up and forsake their traffic, but even the handicrafts men, which, by the common trade to this

* "Armada Papers," i. 144. † *Ibid.*, i. 145.

town, were in some competent sort maintained, are wonderfully decayed, and so the town dispeopled of many of her Majesty's natural subjects; in whose places some few strangers of foreign countries are come to inhabit here, and they (God knoweth) but very poor, living with the labour of their hands." *

How could they find £500 when the whole taxation levied on the place was only £120, "and that gathered with much difficulty and murmurs of the people"? There had already been a contribution for munitions of war, and expense for "repairing the sea banks . . . with some little fortifications to strengthen the town against the enemy." It had been said that the place had made money by privateering against the Spaniards. It had really lost £4,000 in that business. There had been a local press for seamen that had carried off 110 men. Even if they could provide the ships, it would not be possible to man them. They therefore petitioned that it would please the queen, "of her princely bounty and clemency," to wholly excuse them from this burden.

These excuses, sent from so many of the coast towns, are historically interesting from two points of view. First, they show that there was not *everywhere* that whole-hearted enthusiasm for the national cause which is generally supposed to have been characteristic of the time. Oratorical popular historians are often misleading, because they relate as what actually happened what ought to have happened. And, secondly, though we may set off something against the statements of the mayors and aldermen on the ground that men who are excusing themselves from facing expense for the public service are apt to rate their own resources at the very lowest, yet we have in these letters definite particulars as to facts that must locally have been notorious, and which the mayors would not dare to allege in a discussion with officers of the crown, at a time when officials were arbitrary and strong-handed, unless the truth of the allegations could be sustained on inquiry. These statements point to much poverty and loss of trade in the seaports under

* "Armada Papers," i. 155.

pressure of the long quarrel with Spain, and suggest that the "spacious times of Queen Elizabeth" were not by any means a period of unbroken national prosperity.

But, though some hung back, the ships from the ports were now joining Drake and Howard, and the council could form some idea of what would be the total number available, and so far yielded to Drake's arguments as to decide on considerably strengthening the force at Plymouth by uniting with it the greater part of the Eastern fleet under Howard.

Both commanders had to complain of the way in which their ships were supplied with provisions. A strange—perhaps a calculated—parsimony on the part of the officials made it impossible to accumulate the reserve of supplies necessary even for a short voyage. The ships were thus tied to the ports. Howard wrote to Burleigh from his flagship off Margate on April 8, warning him that with the existing system of sending a month's supply at a time, and letting the provisions on board be consumed before the new supply arrived, and its being delivered all at once, so that it took four or five days to take on board, and even ten days if the weather was bad, there might be serious danger of "want of victual in time of service." He pointed out that if the enemy came in the middle of May they would find the fleet with just three days' provisions on board. That this should be so "passeth my reason," he said. He urged that larger supplies should be sent, and this absurd system of making the fleet try to live from hand to mouth be abandoned. But his warnings and those of others were unheeded, and when the crisis came the fleets were ill supplied. The queen has been blamed for this parsimony. Sir John Laughton thinks that it was not her fault but that of subordinate officials in the victualling department. But Mr. Julian Corbett puts the matter in its true light when he argues that Elizabeth cannot be cleared of all responsibility. "In the face of her flag-officers' letters," he says, "she certainly cannot be

held guiltless of the policy which led to the navy being victualled only from month to month, and to the neglect of adequate reserve stores. The policy was no doubt adopted deliberately and not out of mere parsimony, in order to compel her more unruly and adventurous officers to keep within hail, but it was almost certainly hers. It was adopted at any rate against the advice and even the protests of all her admirals, and seeing how completely she was her own war minister, it is impossible to acquit her of responsibility for the way it crippled the free action of her fleets." *

Drake, like Howard, was haunted by the fear of being hampered by want of provisions for his ships. One sees this in the remarkable letter he wrote to the queen's secretary on April 13, in reply to inquiries as to the plan of operations he had proposed a few days before. He had been asked what precisely he thought should be done, and to what extent the Western fleet should be strengthened. Now that so large a force was reported to be collected at Lisbon, his idea appears to have been, not to try to repeat there his Cadiz exploits, but to wait for the Armada outside the port and harry it during its run northwards. Thus he wrote†:—

"If your Majesty will give present order for our proceeding to sea, and send to the strengthening of this fleet here four more of your Majesty's good ships, and those 16 sail of ships with their pinnaces which are preparing in London, then shall your Majesty stand assured, with God's assistance, that if the fleet come out of Lisbon, as long as we have victual to live withal upon that coast, they shall be fought with, and I hope through the goodness of our merciful God, in such sort as shall hinder his ‡ quiet passage into England."

And he insisted both on the need of early action and the importance of the fleet being properly supplied.

* Corbett, "Drake and the Tudor Navy," ii. 143, note.

† "Armada Papers," i. 148.

‡ Drake has a forcible style of his own, though he was a man of the sword rather than the pen; but he is sometimes involved in his way of putting things, and archaisms add to the obscurity. In this last phrase "his" = "its" and refers to the Armada's passage. "His" for "its" is good Old English. The form "its" was only just coming into use at the end of the sixteenth century, and is never used by Spenser, and rarely by Shakespeare and Bacon.

"The advantage of time and place in all martial actions is half a victory; which being lost is irrecoverable. Wherefore if your Majesty will command me away with those ships which are here already, and the rest to follow with all possible expedition, I hold it in my poor opinion the surest and best course; and that they bring with them victuals sufficient for themselves and us, to the intent the service be not utterly lost for want thereof; wherefore I most humbly beseech your most excellent Majesty to have such consideration as the weightiness of your cause requireth; for an Englishman, being far from his country, and seeing a present want of victuals to ensue, and perceiving no benefit to be looked for but only blows, will hardly be brought to stay. I have order but for two months' victuals, beginning the 24th of April, whereof one whole month may be spent before we come there; the other month's victual will be thought with the least to bring us back again. Here may the whole service and honour be lost for the sparing of a few crowns."

On April 17 it was decided that Howard should go westward to Plymouth "with the greatest part of her Majesty's ships." But before the lord admiral moved from the Downs, Drake was summoned from Plymouth to London to confer directly with the queen and her council as to his proposals. He succeeded in persuading them that the time had come for active operations against the enemy. At a meeting of the council on May 10, it was resolved that Howard should take command of a great fleet formed by uniting, at Plymouth, Drake's squadron, the greater part of the Eastern fleet, and such ships from the ports as were provisioned for a voyage of some weeks. Drake was to be Howard's right-hand man, and the lord admiral was left free to act on his proposal. The fleet was to be employed "as his Lordship thought meet," but he was to "have care so much as in him lies to impeach any attempt in Ireland, in Scotland, and in England," the council thus reminding him that his task was ultimately defence, but for the moment they bowed to Drake's sound advice that attack was the best means for defence.

Drake returned to Plymouth, and a few days later Howard set sail from Margate, and, after reconnoitring the coasts of France and Flanders about Calais and Dunkirk, sailed down Channel. The distribution of the fleets was now assuming the final form in which the opening of the Armada campaign was

to find them. Palmer's fleet of light craft in the eastern end of the Channel passed under the command of Lord Henry Seymour, Sir Henry Palmer becoming his rear-admiral and Sir William Winter his vice-admiral. Three large queen's ships, the *Rainbow*, *Antelope*, and *Vanguard*, were its most powerful units. There were two other queen's ships of 200 tons, two of 150, one of 120, and two of 100, with seven smaller craft, and, of "private vessels" from the Cinque Ports and the east coast ports, 12 ships of 100 tons and upwards, and 11 smaller craft. A flotilla of Dutch ships from the Scheldt and the ports of Holland was to co-operate. The *Bonavolia*, the only galley in the queen's navy, had originally been attached to the Eastern Channel fleet, but she was found unfit for the rough waters of the Narrow Seas, and was stationed in the Thames, where she lay at the Nore, under the command of Captain William Borough, the informal flagship of a number of hoys and other small craft armed and detailed to watch the entrance channels of the river.

Howard sailed from Margate for Plymouth with 11 ships and 8 pinnaces belonging to the queen, 16 ships and 4 pinnaces provided by the port of London, and 7 ships lent by private owners to the navy. About a score of ships, small and large, were coming from Bristol and the western ports to the same rendezvous, and Drake had already got together some 40 ships.

On Thursday, May 23, at daybreak, Howard's fleet was signalled well out to sea off Plymouth. Drake had his fleet in the Sound, and at once weighed anchor and went out to meet the lord admiral. The junction of the fleets was a stately pageant on the sea. Drake had formed 30 of his best ships in triple line ahead—that is, in a moving column three abreast—the *Revenge* leading and flying his admiral's flag, and with his light craft thrown out in advance. The *Ark Royal* led the fleet approaching from the south-eastward, flying three flags—the royal standard, Howard's flag as lord admiral of England, and a rear-

admiral's flag to be given to Drake. The Plymouth fleet saluted by firing its guns, dipping its flags, and lowering its topsails. The salute was acknowledged, and both fleets lay to while a pinnace took the rear-admiral's flag from the *Ark* to the *Revenge*. As soon as he received it, Drake hauled down his admiral's flag and hoisted the new one. Then, "casting about," he headed for the harbour, allowing Howard's great ships to take the lead, and so the united squadrons entered the Sound.

Three days before, the Armada had sailed from Lisbon. While Howard in the *Ark* was leading his fleet into Plymouth, Medina Sidonia in the *San Martin* was a few miles north of Cape Roca with his squadrons "heaving many a mile" on the Atlantic surges.*

* Thursday, May 23, Old Style (used in England) = June 2, New Style (used by the Spaniards). See Chapter VIII. as to contemporary movements of the Armada.

CHAPTER XII.

WAITING FOR THE ARMADA.

When Howard reported to Lord Burleigh that he had joined Drake and assumed command of the combined fleet at Plymouth, he went on to say, "Here I mean to stay these two days to water our fleet, and afterwards, God willing, to take the opportunity of the first wind serving for the coast of Spain, with intention to lie on and off between England and that coast to watch the coming of the Spanish forces; which, I doubt not, if God send us the good hap to meet them, but that in like sort He will send us a good success to conquer and overcome them." *

On May 24—the day after his arrival—Howard held a council. Drake found, to his disappointment, that there was still a doubt as to whether it was best to go out and meet the Spaniards on their own coasts or wait for them in the Channel. Howard seemed by what he had written the day before to have decided the question, but now the whole matter was debated again, and with such a strong opposition in the council of war to the bolder policy that it had to be adjourned till next day. It was not until the morning of the 25th, the Saturday before Whitsunday, that it was at last resolved that the fleet should sail for the Bay of Biscay.

But two causes delayed the start. The wind was contrary, blowing freshly from the south-west. Howard expressed the

* "Armada Papers," i. 179.

fear that the same wind that was keeping him inside the headlands of Plymouth would bring the Spaniards into the Channel, for reports had come that they were on the point of sailing. They were actually at sea. Then provisions were running short, and the store-ships that had been promised from London had not arrived. On May 28 Howard wrote twice on the same day to Burleigh, complaining that he should be thus crippled at the most critical moment. But he added that he would sail, badly provided though he was, and take all risks, though he had only three weeks' supply left.

"God willing" (he wrote), "the first wind that will serve us to put out we will be gone towards them; for we have done watering and only are watching here for a wind, all things else being in readiness. God send us a wind to put us out, for go we will though we starve. The fault is not mine. We must do as God will provide for us." *

On Thursday, May 30, the wind at last changed, and the fleet put out to sea. On that day the Armada, creeping slowly up by the coasts of Portugal and Galicia, was nearing Cape Finisterre. Howard was in time enough if he could have swept quickly southward, but he waited for some days in the "Sleeve," the mouth of the Channel, hoping against hope that the long-delayed victuallers would join him. Then the weather became stormy and the wind adverse. On June 6 there was a gale from the Atlantic that was soon driving the ships up Channel, and Howard ran back to his anchorage at Plymouth, for he rightly feared that if he tried to keep the sea he would be forced so far eastward that Plymouth would be left uncovered, with a wind blowing that might well bring the Spaniards up, supposing they were good sailors enough to make the most of a fair breeze, even though it raised a heavy sea.

But this same gale was making wild weather in the Bay of Biscay. It was dispersing the Armada while Howard was seeking shelter at Plymouth. Three days after he anchored there, Medina Sidonia ran into Corunna, and storm-battered galleons

* "Armada Papers," i. 187.

were crowding into the northern ports of Spain, while the *urcas* were holding boldly on for the appointed rendezvous off the Scillies.

At Plymouth fresh orders from London reached Howard. The court had been frightened at the idea of the fleet going to the Spanish coast, and was haunted by the fear that the Spaniards would slip past them at sea and have England at their mercy. Thus Walsingham, the queen's secretary, wrote to Howard:—

"My very good Lord,—Her Majesty, perceiving by your lordship's late letters to me, that you were minded to repair to the Isles of Bayona,* if the wind serve, there to abide the Spanish fleet or to discover what course they meant to take, doubting that in that case your lordship should put over so far the said fleet may take some other way, whereby they may escape your lordship, as by bending their course westward to the altitude† of 50 degrees, and then to shoot over to this realm, hath therefore willed me to let your lordship understand that she thinketh it not convenient that your lordship should go so far to the south as the said Isles of Bayona, but to ply up and down in some indifferent place between the coast of Spain and this realm, so as you may be able to answer any attempt that the said fleet shall make either against this realm, Ireland, or Scotland."‡

When this disappointing order reached Howard, he had already enough to trouble him. The long-promised "victuallers" or store ships had not arrived, and with the wind from the west and south-west it might still be long before they reached Plymouth. "If this weather holds I know not when they will come," he wrote. It was strangely wild weather for June. The smaller ships of the fleet crowded the sheltered anchorage of the Cat-water. Drake's larger ships and four or five of Howard's squadron lay between the shore and the island that has since been named after the famous sailor. Below Drake's Island in the Sound lay the *Ark* and four other of the largest ships. No smaller craft dare anchor in such open waters. There was then no protecting breakwater piled on shoals between the entering headlands, and the flagship and her consorts rolled and pitched at their moorings as the tides swirled in and out, broken into a tumble of white-capped waves. "We have danced as lustily as

* Off Corunna. † That is, latitude. ‡ "Armada Papers," i. 192.

the gallantest dancers at the court," said Howard in the midst of a grave dispatch to Walsingham, and then congratulated the queen on having such stoutly-built ships.

He was fretting at being thus kept in harbour when the Spaniards might, for all he knew, be on the coasts of Ireland or Scotland or about to come driving up the Channel before the very gale that held him bound. That they had put to sea he now knew for certain, for, amongst less trustworthy tidings, there had come the report of three captains of trading ships that had seen the great fleet "off the Rock, 12 or 15 leagues distant, on May 20th"—that is, off Cape Roca,* outside Lisbon, on May 30, by the new way of reckoning dates. The Spaniards were steering west and by north, "which they did to catch the westerly winds and the best course they could keep either for Ireland, Scotland, or England," is Howard's comment. If they had gone to Ireland or Scotland, as soon as he had news he would be after them. But the wild weather of the last days gave the hope that they had not yet got across the Bay. This was clearly Howard's idea, for he still talked of looking for them in that direction.

As to the council's plan for keeping the fleet in some central position, from which it would guard all the British Islands, Howard was good seaman enough to see the absurdity of it, even if he had not had men like Drake and Frobisher to advise him. "It is a hard matter," he wrote, "and a thing impossible for us to lie in any place or to be anywhere to guard England, Ireland, and Scotland." He explained again and again to the queen, through her secretary, that the only sound way to protect the country from attack was not to linger in the Channel, but to go in search of the hostile fleet where it was most likely to be found. Thus, in his letter of June 14, he writes:—

* On the date named the Armada was running for Cape Espichel. Probably it was next day the traders saw them well south of Cape Roca, and beating out to the westward.

"The opinion of Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Frobisher, and others that be men of greatest judgment and experience, as also my own concurring with them in the same, is that the surest way to meet with the Spanish fleet is upon their own coast, or in any harbour of their own, and there to defeat them; for if they have been so long at sea as the advertisements do declare, they must now be landed in Ireland or Scotland ere this, or else somewhere on the coast of France. But I am verily persuaded that they mean nothing else but to linger it out upon their own coast, until they understand that we have spent our victuals here; and therefore we must be busy with them before we ourselves be brought to that extremity." *

Writing again the next day (June 15), he said that "he did not a little marvel at the orders sent to him," and he explained again to Walsingham the reasons for his own plan on which the queen had now put such a peremptory veto.

"The meaning we had to go on the coast of Spain, it was deeply debated by those which I think the world doth judge to be men of greatest experience that this realm hath; which are these: Sir Francis Drake, Mr. Hawkyns, Mr. Frobisher, and Mr. Thomas Fenner; and I hope her Majesty will not think that we went so rashly to work, or without a principal and choice care and respect of the safety of this realm. We would go on the coast of Spain; and therefore our ground was first to look to that principal; † and if we found they did but linger on their own coast, or that they were put into the Isles of Bayona or the Groyne,‡ then we thought in all men's judgments that be of experience here, it had been most fit to have sought some good way, and the surest we could devise, by the good protection of God, to have defeated them." §

Writing for the queen and her landsmen advisers he explained the conditions of the problem he had to solve. He pointed out that if he had reached the Spanish coast he had meant to land nowhere, to do no injury to the inhabitants, and to make it known that he came only to deal with the fleet. He evidently hoped thus to be able to obtain information and some supplies locally. As for lying off between England and Spain, that meant the risk that a wind that would bring the Armada up would drive his own fleet to leeward. The enemy might reach Ireland or Scotland with a wind that would keep him in the Channel. If he lay out as far as Cape Clear to prevent such a stroke he might find that the Spanish fleet had slipped up by the coast of France for the Isle of Wight, "which, for my part, I think, if they come to

* "Armada Papers," i. 200. † That is, principally. ‡ Corunna.
§ "Armada Papers," i. 202, 203.

England, they will attempt. Then are we clean out of the way of any service against them." All these difficulties would have been met by going directly for the Spanish coast. "The seas are broad," he wrote, "but if we had been on their coast, they durst not have put off, to have left us on their backs."

But he added he must and would obey. With a touch of sarcasm he said he was glad that there were men at court better able to judge what should be done than his colleagues at Plymouth. He thought her Majesty had been persuaded during the conference at London that it was best to go south. He confessed he had at the time been of the contrary opinion, but he was in error, and would "ever yield to those of greater experience"—a frank admission that he was guided by the views of Drake and the other veteran captains. He would now put his former instructions "in a bag," again praying her Majesty to believe that what he had intended was not lightly resolved upon. But even as he abandoned the project, from which he had hoped so much, he once more urged its advantages and the drawbacks of the plan now imposed upon him.

"If we had now been betwixt Spain and England, we had been but in hard case, the storm being so strong and continuing so long as it hath done; but upon the coast of Spain we had had a land wind and places of succour. We meant not to have spoiled any town or village; only we must of necessity water; and when we lie betwixt both coasts, we must come to this coast to water, for so we are enjoined; and if the wind do not serve us to come on our own coast, then in what case shall we be, now that we must not go on the coast of Spain? We lay seven days in the Sleeve, which was as long as we could continue there without danger, as the wind was; and if some had been with us, they should have seen what a place of danger it is to lie on and off in." *

This episode and these letters of the Lord Admiral of England protesting against plans made by seamen being overruled by the fears of landsmen in London, convey a useful lesson for all time. In a naval war the danger always exists of the admirals being tied to the home waters by ignorant panics among politicians

* "Armada Papers," i. 204. The "Sleeve" was the lower part of the Channel. Compare the French name "La Manche" for the whole Channel.

and the general public. History is full of such examples down to the wars of our own time.

On June 19 the weather had moderated and the wind had changed. Though the store ships had not arrived, a small supply had been collected locally, and Howard gave the order to sail. Before the whole of the fleet was out in the Channel there were signs that the break in the bad weather was not likely to last. He got his ships out only to run back to Plymouth two days later before a heavy gale from the south-west.

He had no idea then of the chance he had lost, partly through the change in the weather and partly through lack of information. Nothing is more striking in the story of these old naval wars than the way in which commanders were being continually crippled or misled by scanty means of collecting reliable intelligence and the slowness of its transmission when obtained. The magic of the wireless telegraph is a thing of to-day, but long before it was even dreamed of, and even in the days of sailing ships, methods had been elaborated for scouting over wide stretches of sea, watching the nearer waters from every headland, and sending the information by signal from point to point over sea or land. But in the days of the Armada campaign all this seems to have been unthought of. Beacons were piled on the English capes and hilltops to signal the coming of the Spanish fleet, but there seems to have been no effectual watch kept about Land's End and the Lizard, near as they were to Plymouth, and likely as they were to be chosen as a landfall for the enemy's fleet approaching England. There was apparently no idea that it was worth while to keep in touch with the Scilly Islands. And though there were plenty of small craft that, manned by the coast folk of Cornwall and Devon, could have kept the sea in the wildest weather, the scouting was confined to sending a pinnace from time to time on a roving commission in the Bay of Biscay. One would think that it would have been an obvious precaution to keep a number of well-mounted men ready to bring news from the extreme west

to Plymouth, if King Philip's tall ships were sighted from the Cornish headlands. But we hear of no such precautions, and we have indirect evidence that nothing of the kind was attempted.

The result was that Howard and Drake at their anchors at Plymouth learned, almost by accident and when it was too late, that for a whole week or longer more than twenty of the enemy's ships had been beating about the stormy seas round the Scilly Islands, some of them being at times actually on the Cornish coast, whence they must surely have been seen, for though it was a time of cloudy skies and many a driving rain-squall, it was midsummer June with its long days, during which there would be no fogs, and even in the wildest weather there must have been hours during which there was a clear view far to seaward.

On June 22 Howard had written to Walsingham, telling of his having been forced to put back, complaining of the way he was left without supplies, and bluntly adding: "I am very sorry that her Majesty will not thoroughly awake in this perilous and most dangerous time." * Next day, Sunday, June 23, he had the first news of the Spaniards, and it was nearly four days old when it reached him. He received a letter written on the preceding Friday by Sir Francis Godolphin, a Cornishman, telling him that on Thursday, the 20th, a barque of St. Mawes (near Falmouth), bound for France, had run back to port, and her skipper related that he had—

"Encountered with nine sail of great ships between Scilly and Ushant, bearing in north-east with the coast of England. Coming near unto them, he doubting they were Spaniards, kept the wind of them. They perceiving it began to give him chase. So in the end three of them followed him so nearly that the Englishman doubted hardly to escape them. At his first sight of them there were two flags spread, which were suddenly taken in again, and being far off could not well discern the same. They were all great ships, and as he might judge, the least of them from 200 tons to 500 and 800 tons. Their sails were all crossed over with a red cross. Each of the greater ships towed astern of them either a great boat or pinnace without mast." †

Before he sighted the foreigners the skipper had been

* "Armada Papers," i. 219. † *Ibid.*, i. 220.

spoken by a friendly ship, and told "as he loved his life not to proceed, for the Spanish fleet was on the coast." But he paid no regard to the warning.

On the Saturday there arrived at Plymouth a Cornishman, who had been chased by a fleet of ships, the nearest of which fired on him. And on the very day on which Howard wrote his dispatch there came to him "one Simons of Exeter," who reported that—

> "On Friday last he was chased with a fleet of great ships, having some of his men hurt with shot from them; escaping their hands, landed in Cornwall, and came post to Plymouth unto my lord admiral."

All the ships were described as having great red crosses on their sails. There appeared to be two fleets, which Howard noted as one of six sail, the other of fifteen. On the Thursday when the St. Mawes barque was chased the English fleet was outside Plymouth, on the Friday it was running back to harbour there. If Howard had known the Spaniards were so near, who can doubt that he would have tried to beat to windward in search of them in the face of the wildest weather.

The storeships had arrived on Saturday evening, and all through the night and next day the long-delayed supplies were being rushed on board the fleet. Howard hoped that all would be on board in twenty-four hours, "for no man shall sleep or eat till it be dispatched," he wrote to the queen's secretary in the Sunday's letter telling the news of the enemy's appearance. He had now a report from one of his own pinnaces, sent out to cruise between Land's End and Ushant, that it had been chased by a Spanish squadron—"seven ships of 800 or 900 tons and some Biscayans of 300." "It is very likely that this stormy weather hath parted the fleet," wrote Howard. "I hope in God we shall meet with some of them," and in a postscript written at midnight he added that he hoped to be sailing in three hours.

The Spanish ships that had been reported as so near the English coast were those that held on their course through the

storm in the Bay of Biscay, while Medina Sidonia and the greater part of the Armada ran back to the northern ports of Spain. These bolder or luckier sailors had reached the appointed rendezvous at the Scillies, and sent to look for the admiral in Mounts Bay, and despite the bad weather beat about for a week or more expecting his arrival with the rest. Just as their presence was reported to the English commander the pinnaces sent by Medina Sidonia had brought them orders to put back to Corunna. On the night between Sunday, June 23, and Monday, with a wind blowing fair from the north-east, Howard had sailed out of Plymouth, eager to fall upon the scattered Spaniards—so eager that he had left his storeships only partly discharged, and ordered them to follow him.

But the same wind that brought Howard out gave the Spaniards a good start on their homeward voyage. The English had not even a distant sight of any of them, and within twenty-four hours the wind had changed again, and was blowing up Channel from the south-west. Howard, having thus failed to cut off the enemy's stragglers, had to be content to obey his orders and keep his fleet watching the entrance of the Channel. For some days he beat about between the Scillies and the French coast, the main body under his own immediate command in mid-Channel, a squadron under Drake near the coast of France, and another under Hawkins towards the Scillies.

Then, when it was found that there were no tidings of the enemy on the French coast, the fleet was concentrated and moved down to a station off Ushant, with some of the smaller ships strung out towards the Scillies to watch the Channel entrance, and a few pinnaces pushed out into the Bay of Biscay as advanced scouts. Drake had already on July 4 addressed to Howard a memorandum on the advisability of now resuming his former plan and sailing for the Spanish coast. The memorandum is a brief conclusive document, and is worth quoting in full. Thus it ran :—

"To maintain my opinion that I have thought it meeter to go for the coast of Spain, or at least more nearer than we are now, are these good reasons following, written on board her Majesty's good ship the *Revenge*, this fourth of July 1588:

"The first, that hearing of some part of the Spanish fleet upon our coast, and that in several fleets, the one of 11 sail, the other of 6 sail, and the last of 18 sail, all these being seen the 20th and 21st of June; since which time, we being upon the coast of France, could have no intelligence of their being there, or passing through our Channel; neither hearing, upon our own coast, of their arrival in any place, and speaking with a bark, which came lately out of Ireland, who can advertise nobody of their being in those parts, I am utterly of opinion that they are returned, considering what weather they have had since that time; otherwise they could * have been here without our knowledge.

"I say further, that if they be returning, our staying here in this place shall but spend our victual, whereby our whole action is in peril, no service being done. For the lengthening of our victual by setting a straiter order for our company, I find them much discontented if we stay here; whereas if we proceed they all promise to live with as little portion as we shall appoint unto them.

"Our being upon the coast of Spain will yield us true intelligence of all their purposes.

"The taking of some of their army [that is, Armada] shall much daunt them and put a great fear amongst them.

"My opinion is altogether that we shall fight with them much better cheap [that is, on much better terms] upon their own coast than here; for that I think this one of the unmeetest places to stay for them.

"To conclude, I verily believe that if we undertake no present service, but detract time some few days, we shall hardly be able to perform any matter of importance. FRANCIS DRAKE." †

A thoroughly characteristic letter this, with the writer's sound sense and clear judgment coming out plainly enough through the crabbed halting phrases. He felt sure that the Armada had disappeared only because it had been dispersed and driven back by the storms; he was eager to fall upon the wind and wave battered squadrons, while they were still refitting in their ports; and he promised for his sailors that though they might grumble if they were kept tossing idly off Ushant on short rations, they would be ready to make shift on starvation allowance if only there was prospect of a good fight.

A council of war was held on board the *Ark* on July 7. Thomas Fenner in a long memorandum notes the considerations which were urged in support of Drake's view. His surmise as to what had happened to the Armada had been confirmed by

* Probably "not" is omitted here by a copyist or by a slip of the writer.

† "Armada Papers," i. 237.

tidings obtained by pinnaces sent into the French ports. From Conquet had come the news that the Spaniards—

"Were dispersed and returned in great misery, as by sickness and foul weather much beaten and despoiled. Also we understood of their return by a pilot of Conquet; the like in effect from the Mayor of Rochelle, in that he certified many of their fleet to be seen about Cape Finisterre some days after the sight of them upon the coast; withal by three English mariners now in our company, which came from Rochelle in a bark of Millbrooke. Upon their coming from there they were aboard a pinnace of Rochelle, then coming from the sea, that had taken two Spale [that is, Seville] Spaniards of 30 tons apiece, laden with wine and oil, who did deliver the certainty of the dispersion of the fleet into many harbours of the coast of Biscay and other places." *

Fenner proceeds to set forth at length, in such arguments as would be addressed to the council, what this failure must mean to the Spaniards, and how good an opportunity it offered for "beating down the hope of any good success to them, by visiting their coast and following their ruin."

Some of the council of war thought that before going southwards the fleet should run back to Plymouth for supplies, but the bolder spirits carried the day. To help their arguments the wind had that morning gone north, and at three in the afternoon, when the captains returned to their ships, signals were made to steer under full sail for Spain.

One of the strangest things about this bold dash southwards, in direct contradiction with Howard's orders from the court and at the risk of semi-starvation for his crews, is that every historian of the Armada in the last two centuries, with one notable exception, says not a word about it, and does not even know that it took place. The exception is Mr. Julian Corbett in his work on "Drake and the Tudor Navy." He points out † that in his "Relation" Howard himself distinctly says that he sailed for the Groyne (Corunna), "which course was held from July 8, 1588, until the 10th of the same with a north wind, at which time the same changed to southerly, 40 leagues short of the coast of Spain or thereabouts." ‡ True, Howard says not a word of this move-

* "Armada Papers," i. 240. † In a note, vol. ii. p. 181.
‡ "Armada Papers," i. 6.

ment in letters written to London on his return to Plymouth, perhaps because he had disobeyed the queen's orders in going so far. Fenner's memorandum speaks of the voyage to Spain and its disappointing end, and there is a reference to it in a contemporary report of the Venetian ambassador at Paris. The fact that it is not mentioned elsewhere or recorded in various narratives of the campaign written soon after the event, adds one more instance to the many others that might be cited of the danger of being misled by the dearth of contemporary evidence into denying the existence of facts which rest on the quite sufficient demonstration of one clear statement confirmed by other circumstances.

One of these independent and quite unconscious confirmations of Fenner's and Howard's allusions is to be found in the narrative of Pablo de Arambur, who, it will be remembered, went scouting from Corunna with two pinnaces while Medina Sidonia was refitting his fleet. Pablo steered for the Scillies, entered the Bristol Channel, and captured a small English ship.* To repeat what has already been told in detail, on July 21 by the Spanish reckoning, July 11 of the English calender, when 40 leagues from the port of Llanes (a small place on the coast of the Asturias), he saw early in the day three ships, one of 200 tons, the others smaller, and at three in the afternoon a great fleet of 60 ships, 10 of them very large, steering north-north-east. He followed them at a distance for two hours, and made up his mind they were English. Then he steered for Santander, but beating up against southerly winds did not make the port till two days later. By that time the Armada had left Corunna, so he could not report to the admiral. Medina Sidonia had sailed on the 22nd—July 12 in the Old Style calendar of England.

There can be no doubt that what Pablo de Arambur saw was the rearmost division of Howard's fleet. On the 10th (O.S.) a change of the wind had forced the lord admiral to give up his attempt to reach the Spanish coast. If he had had plenty of

* See pp. 107, 108.

supplies on board he might, and almost certainly would, have held on. When he reluctantly gave the order to return he was, if Fenner's memorandum is correctly read, about ten leagues from Spanish ground. Arambur saw the English ships next day, as he reckoned, 120 miles north of Llanes.* It would seem that in his run south Howard had not steered directly for Corunna, but kept well into the Bay, nearer the French coast than the course for the "Isles of Bayona" would have carried him. Perhaps he hoped before approaching Corunna to obtain water and supplies from some small place on the north coast of Asturias, and then raid one or more ports, where he might surprise detachments of the enemy's fleet. When he was so near the Spanish coast the Armada was on the point of coming out of Corunna. The same change of wind that drove Howard back took Medina Sidonia out to sea.

Late on the 12th† Howard reached Plymouth again. Next day he wrote to the queen's secretary a letter‡ that, with its studied reticence about his recent proceedings, and his mention of other steps taken to get news of the Spaniards, would make one feel sure he had never tried to reach Spain himself, were it not that we have his own subsequent assertion of this fact confirmed by scanty yet sufficient independent evidence.

From this letter, and another written four days later, we gather that Howard was once more passing through an anxiously trying time. Some of Drake's small craft were out scouting in the Bay, but we can now see that the news that reached Plymouth was much belated and therefore misleading. Reports obtained at second hand through France, or from ships spoken at sea, all

* One suspects that Pablo's reckoning was not quite reliable. If he was so far out as he thought, he could hardly have reached Santander in two days against bad winds.

† The fact that Howard reached Plymouth on the 12th would seem to show that Pablo de Arambur was something more than 40 leagues from Llanes when he saw his ships. Pablo probably worked by dead reckoning on a chart that made the distance from the Scillies slightly less than it really is.

‡ "Armada Papers," i. 256.

belonged to the time when the Spanish fleet was still scattered in the northern ports, and only the very latest told of a new concentration at Corunna; but the impression in England was that in no case could the enemy be soon ready for sea, and that very possibly no further attempt would be made till next year. Bad weather down the Bay and in the Channel made the work of the pinnaces difficult. They never sighted the great Armada, though it was actually on its way, and at one time was scattered over a wide expanse of sea. It was a bad summer. Seymour wrote from Dover that only for the days being longer it might well be taken for winter.

At Plymouth there was the everlasting trouble about supplies, and to make matters worse no money had been sent to pay the men. The families of the Devon sailors in the town were in dire distress. "I cannot stir out," wrote Howard, "but I have an infinite number hanging on my shoulders for money. We do all we can to relieve them." There had been some sickness on board the fleet before it sailed for the last time. It had increased rapidly, and there had been many deaths at sea and in port. "We must now man ourselves again," ran the lord admiral's report the day after he anchored at Plymouth, "for we have cast many overboard, and a number in great extremity which we discharged. I have sent with all expedition a press for more men." And four days later he wrote,* "Some four or five ships have discharged their men; for the sickness in some is very great, so that we are fain to discharge some ships to have their men to furnish the others;" but he added bravely, "Neither sickness nor death shall make us yield until this service be ended."

The queen ordered three of the best ships to be paid off and laid up as a measure of economy, but Howard pledged his personal fortune for the cost of keeping them in commission. He did not share the optimistic view of the court that all danger was over, but he thought it was deferred for a while, and might be

* "Armada Papers," i. 273.

finally averted for good and all if the fleet sailed again to attack the Spanish ports, where he believed the King of Spain's ships still lay; and he felt strong enough to entertain the idea of also detaching a squadron to intercept the West Indian treasure fleet that would soon be on its way home. He was busy discussing these plans with Drake, sending his sick ashore, hunting up men to replace them, and collecting and loading up supplies, and hoped soon to be at sea again steering straight for Corunna, when suddenly the news came that the Spanish fleet in full strength was off the Lizard.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE FIGHT OFF PLYMOUTH.

On Friday, July 19, early in the afternoon, a pinnace, the *Golden Hind*, commanded by Thomas Fleming, ran into Plymouth Sound with the startling news that the Spanish Armada, still supposed to be refitting in its own ports, and perhaps with no serious intention of leaving them till next year, was off the Lizard. A popular tradition, which has been traced as far back as 1624, when men who had lived through the crisis of 1588 were still living, asserts that the news was brought to Howard by Fleming when the lord admiral was amusing himself with a game of bowls on the green turf of Plymouth Hoe with some of his officers, and that Drake refused to break off the game, saying there was time enough to finish it and to beat the Spaniards afterwards.

If the game was ever played it must have been quickly ended, for there was plenty of hard work to be done. The ships had to be hurriedly made ready for sea and worked out of the harbour by sheer hard pulling, with boats and pinnaces towing them by dint of main strength on their oars; for there was little wind, and what there was came from the wrong direction, blowing from the south-west, so that sails were useless till the ships could be got outside the heads, where they would have sea room.

All the afternoon and through the night and the forenoon of

(1,666)

The Armada in Sight.

(From the picture by Seymour Lucas, R.A. By permission of Mr. Arthur Lucas.)

next day the work went on. It was a very anxious time, for the wind was fair for the enemy in case they chose to make a dash at Plymouth. If they appeared, a part of the fleet might be caught outside, and attacked under conditions in which it would be no difficult matter for the Spaniards to force a fight at close quarters, where the English advantage in manœuvring would disappear, and the weight of numbers would tell against Howard.

But, as we have seen, Medina Sidonia had chosen to throw away the best chance that fortune had offered him, and to take no advantage of the surprise he had accomplished by good luck rather than skill. His great crowd of ships was during Saturday creeping up slowly from the Lizard, and it had passed Fowey at three o'clock in the afternoon, when, through driving showers of rain that made the view indistinct, the opposing fleets at last caught sight of each other. The Spaniards saw a number of ships outside Plymouth, but on account of the rain were not able to make them out clearly enough to count them. For the English, it must have been equally difficult to distinguish details. They could judge that they were heavily outnumbered, if only from the wide extent of the enemy's front. But it was not till next morning that Howard was able to tell that the Armada mustered about 120 sail, "whereof there are four galleasses and many ships of great burden." *

The Spaniards knew that the next day would see some hard fighting. If they held their course through the night they would next morning be to the leeward of Plymouth, with the English

* Letter to Walsingham, written "from aboard the *Ark*, thwart of Plymouth, the 21st of July 1588"—his first hurried dispatch announcing the arrival of the enemy (Laughton, i. 288). It would seem that since he heard the news of the Friday he had been too busy to write. In a postscript he alludes to his voyage to the Spanish coast, of which so far he had said nothing in his letters: "Sir, the southerly wind that brought us back from the coast of Spain brought them out." And he adds a pressing request that shows he was anxious as to the shortness of his supply of ammunition: "Sir, for the love of God and our country, let us have with some speed some great shot sent us of all bigness, for this service will continue long, and some powder with it."

coming down with the wind to attack them with all the advantage the "weather gauge" would give to handier ships and better seamen, and no chance of forcing on the close fight with "ships clapped together," from which they hoped for victory. Medina Sidonia made the signal to lie to, and through the short summer night galleon and galleass drifted slowly under nearly bare poles a few miles to the west of Plymouth. The wind held from the south-west, but did not blow heavily; there were showers of rain from the cloudy sky, and only an occasional interval of dim moonlight. Through the darkness the lights of ships at the entrance of the harbour led the Spanish lookout men to believe that Howard was still keeping his station there. The Armada's position was marked out for the English by the many poop lanterns and the dimmer light that came from portholes and skylights.

At dawn on the Sunday morning the weather was clearing up, and the day was one of blue sky, bright sunshine, and smooth sea. As the sun rose the cannon of the *San Martin* made the signal to get under way. The lookouts on forecastle and maintop were scanning the sea. Between the green headlands of Plymouth Sound there were a number of ships. Under the land some more * were working their way to the westward between the Armada and the Cornish coast. These were taken to be the vanguard of Howard and Drake's fleet working out to get to windward of the Armada. But presently a great crowd of sails was seen coming from a direction in which no enemy was expected—not from Plymouth or the English coast, but away to seaward and to windward of the Spaniards. The first thought was that it was a new fleet coming from some western port to the help of Howard at Plymouth.

It was Howard's main fleet bearing down to the attack. After dark on the Saturday evening he had made sail with some fifty or sixty of his best ships, and boldly made his way with the wind

* According to one account, eight; according to another, eleven.



THE FIGHT OFF PLYMOUTH. Sunday, July 21 (July 31), 1588.

abeam across the front of the enemy's fleet. He worked out from the land far enough to give a wide berth to the dangerous spot where wave and tide foamed over the Eddystone rocks—the scene of many a shipwreck, and unmarked till, more than a century later, the first wooden lighthouse tower was erected there. Then he changed his course and beat down Channel for many a mile, leaving the lights of the Armada between him and the land, and holding on till they were glimmering low on the horizon. Then under easy sail he steered for the enemy. It was a bold manœuvre to gain the all-important position to windward for his first fight with the Great Armada.

What was the formation of the two fleets at this moment? It would seem that Howard was coming up from the south-west in line ahead. "*En ala*" is the phrase in the Spanish accounts, and this certainly means "in line." The story of the fight makes line abreast quite out of the question. We may take it, then, that the *Ark* led the way, preceded by some of the light pinnaces and followed by the heavier ships, not in the close-hauled line with evenly kept intervals that was the outcome of another hundred years of experience in naval war, but in a looser order —ships, it may be, not all in each other's wake, but some of those that could sail better working out to the front on each side of the flagship as the moment for action drew near.

The popular narratives of the time, and the famous tapestries that decorated the old House of Lords, now known only by engravings, have led to a general impression that the Spanish Armada awaited the attack arrayed in a great crescent, its horns pointing westward some four miles apart. But the crescent was not a formation for ships under sail at any time; it was not even a recognized formation for galleys. These fought in line abreast, though this line may have sometimes accidentally become a crescent by the wings being pushed forward more rapidly than the centre. The Spanish fleet was organized in squadrons. Soldiers were directing the fight, and there was a tendency to work the

squadrons like regiments on a battlefield. With guns mounted in broadside batteries, the old galley formation of line abreast was impossible. The line ahead had not yet been adopted. The ships undoubtedly fought in groups, and signalling being still in a very rudimentary stage, it was left to the captains in each group to give each other mutual support, and to the group leaders to bring their squadrons into action as the opportunity offered. Beyond signalling to begin or break off the fight the commander-in-chief could do little.

Besides the misunderstandings arising from attempts to reconcile the details of the fight with a crescent formation of the Armada, other difficulties have arisen from the use of the terms vanguard and rearguard in the Spanish accounts. It is not easy to see how there could be vanguard and rearguard in the ordinary sense of the words in a fleet sailing in a great crescent, and again the report of vanguard being driven into rearguard on meeting an attack coming from the rear of the fleet seems utterly devoid of meaning. But in the Spanish naval reports and orders of the time "vanguard" and "rearguard" have a peculiar meaning. It came from the older time of the galleys. If we imagine a fleet formed in three divisions—van, main body, and rear—and moving in a huge column, we can see how on forming into line abreast the vanguard would take position on one wing, the main body with the admiral in command would form up in the centre, and the rearguard coming out on its flank would form the other wing. It was the usual custom for the vanguard to form on the right, the place of honour, though the rule was not always strictly observed. Thus at Lepanto the vanguard formed on the left, near the land. But from the general practice it became the custom to speak of the right wing as the "vanguard" of the fleet and the left wing as its "rearguard."

Mr. Julian Corbett has suggested what appears to be a very probable scheme to explain the formation of the Spanish Armada in this first day's fighting off Plymouth. It is a modification of

the elaborate eagle formation described by Pigafetta, and is the more probably correct because it explains both how it was that the formation, as seen from the attacking fleet, was described as a crescent, and how it was that, running up from the original rear of the enemy's fleet, Howard first engaged the vanguard and then the rearguard.

In the accompanying plan of the fight off Plymouth, the arrangement of the Spanish fleet is based on Mr. Corbett's diagram. The Armada was steering up Channel, the two best squadrons—those of Portugal and Castile—forming the "main battle," and taking the lead. Diego de Valdes, the admiral of the Castilians, was with Medina Sidonia on board the *San Martin*. The four other fighting squadrons, divided into couples, formed, two of them, the "vanguard" or right wing, under Leyva (Guipuzcoan squadron, Oquendo; and Levant squadron, Bertendona), and two of them the "rearguard" or left wing, under Recalde (Andalusian squadron, Pedro de Valdes; and Biscay squadron, Recalde). These wings are thrown back, to use a soldier phrase, *en echelon* on each flank, and in the midst of the fleet are the light craft and the *urcas de carga* or store ships. The galleasses are conjecturally distributed—two with the main body and one each with the wings.

With this arrangement the English and Spanish narratives—otherwise quite unintelligible—become fairly clear, though there are still some minor difficulties as to how certain ships came to be engaged. Mr. Corbett makes the suggestion that a few of the galleons had been detached from their proper squadrons to equalize the force at the disposal of the squadron commanders.

The wind went round to west-north-west while the English fleet was coming up to the attack. The Spaniards—once the projected dash at Plymouth had been abandoned—had no other object but to proceed up Channel, and the Armada was on a course that would carry it past the port, its speed being regulated by that of the slowest of the storeships it was escort-

ing. Medina Sidonia had no special desire to fight, but at the same time no wish to avoid a battle. With the English crowding every sail to close with him, he held his course, confident in the power of his four rearward squadrons to beat off the assailants.

The ships that had come out under the land were now running down to join the main English fleet which, strung out in a long line, was closing up rapidly, the ships heeling over under their press of sail before the freshening breeze. To the English sailors in the leading ships the Armada must have looked like a huge moving mass of sails, the rearward ships plainly visible with their high built sterns, tall spread of painted canvas, and many fluttering pennons and banners. The order of the four nearest squadrons would suggest a crescent, within the curve of which the centre would seem like a forest of spars and sails.

The sight evidently impressed those who saw it, for after the day's work was done Howard wrote to Walsingham: "We durst not adventure to put in among them, their fleet being so strong." But he knew that there was no need "to put in among them," and it was his business to give the Spaniards no chance of coming to hand-to-hand conflict. To inexperienced landsmen among the courtly volunteers in the English ships the ordered squadrons of the Armada might seem to present a display of invincible numbers and strength, but for the fighting seamen of Howard's fleet the spectacle had no terrors. They understood that they were not to close with the tall galleons, but keep to the tactics of "fighting loose and large" that would give full scope for their superior gun power, and would be made possible by their better seamanship and handier ships. Thus they realized from the outset that a greater advantage than mere numbers was on their side, and that they could count on eventual success, however brave and skilled in their own ways of war their enemies might be; and those who had fought the Spaniards on land or sea knew that they were lacking in neither quality.

About nine o'clock the head of the advancing English line was coming within long cannon range of the rearmost ships of the enemy's right, the big Levantines, built for the Mediterranean trade, and armed with light artillery to defend themselves against the galleys of the Turks and the Barbary pirates. Up to the mainmast head of the *Ark* ran the "bloudie flag," the red signal for battle, and a little pinnace, appropriately named the *Defiance*, opened the fight by firing one of her guns and sending its shot bounding over the green water towards the nearest of the galleons, then tacked and left it to the great ships to carry on the action.

The *Ark*, leading the line, swept up to close range of the Spaniards, and opened fire with cannon and culverin, choosing for her target the largest ship of the squadron, De Leyva's great *Rata Coronada*, of 800 tons. The splendid galleon swung to her helm to bring her broadside to bear, and answered back with quick flashes of her lighter artillery. But from first to last the Spaniards "shot wide," and foam splashes in the sea told of the shorter range of their cannon. Not so the fire of the English. The round balls crashed on the heavy timbers of the galleon and made havoc in the crowded gun-decks. Leyva, brave *caballero* as he was, would have gladly closed and led his pikemen and musketeers on to the English decks, but he was not given even a chance of this. The *Ark* swept by at full cannon range, leading the fleet to the attack of the other wing, while the rest of the English ships as they passed poured their shot into the Levantines.

To understand the fight we must remember that all the while the Armada was moving eastward, to leeward of the attack, and unable even to make a show of closing, except by beating up against the wind. For any ship to do this would be to leave the ordered array of the fleet, and place itself in a position where it would be no easy matter for others to come to its help. What the gallant Leyva did was apparently to tack

The Flagship of the Guypuscoan Squadron fired and taken by the English.

(The rest of the Armada continue their course in the form of a half moon. Off the Isle of Portland both fleets come to an engagement.)

(*Drawn from the tapestry hangings in the old House of Lords.*)

and interpose between Howard's advancing line and the crowd of badly armed cargo ships in the centre. Thus, followed by some at any rate of the Levantines, he was coming to the help of the menaced left wing, soon to be mingled with them as they held their course retiring before the English onset. Thus only can we understand the clear statement in Medina Sidonia's journal that "the enemy's fleet passed firing on our van [that is, right wing], under the charge of Don Alonso de Leyva, which drove into the rear [that is, left wing], under the charge of the Admiral Juan Martinez de Recalde."

As Howard bore down upon the Biscayan squadron on the left, old Recalde, full of eager fighting spirit, checked his course and swung round to meet him broadside to broadside with his flagship. But only one of the Biscayan galleons, the huge *Gran Grin*, followed the veteran admiral's example. The rest of the captains of Biscay and Andalusia held their course, and even began to edge away towards the *urcas*, driving in among Leyva's ships. Recalde and his consort found themselves isolated among the most formidable of their adversaries. Howard's *Ark*, Drake's *Revenge*, old Hawkins's *Victory*, and Frobisher's huge thousand-ton *Triumph* passed and repassed the two galleons in clouds of fire and smoke, sending a storm of iron into their lofty sides. The Spaniards answered back, but with less effect, mostly cutting up spars or rigging here and there. It was soon clear to the Spanish captains that to run the well-handled English ships aboard was hopeless. A crowd of other vessels of the English fleet were firing on the confused mass of galleons that lay between them and the *urcas* in the centre, doing their part of the day's work in keeping the two ships that were cut off isolated from succour as long as possible.

It was faring hard with Recalde. His galleon, the *Santiago*, had lost heavily by the English fire, spars and rigging were badly cut up, and there were two shots in the foremast, making him afraid to see it go overboard and leave him helpless. But

rescue was coming. However irresolute Medina Sidonia may have been when the captains sat in council round his cabin table, he was brave enough in battle. With his flagship the *San Martin*, and the *San Juan* and *San Mateo* of the Portugal squadron, he had cleared out from the centre, beat round to landward of the crowd of ships, and worked his way to the assistance of his comrades in the rear, bringing with him the ships of Biscay and Andalusia, rallied to the fight by his example—perhaps now realizing for the first time that the admiral in chief command meant to risk a battle. To await the closing of this crowd of heavy ships would for Howard have been to abandon his whole plan of action. Reluctantly he signalled to break off the fight, abandoning the attack on the *Santiago* and the *Gran Grin*, and rallying his fleet to windward of the enemy.

Presently it was seen that fortune was favouring the English. The ship of Pedro de Valdes, Admiral of Andalusia, the fine galleon *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, was in dire distress. He had been in action with the English ships during the fight round Recalde, "without coming to hand stroke and with little harm done, because the fight was far off." Then, as the battle ended, like a good comrade he thought of finding out what he could do to help his brother admiral, and sent a pinnace to Recalde to ask "whether he had received any harm." What followed let Pedro de Valdes tell in his own words. *

"His answer was that his galleon had been sore beaten, and that his foremast was hurt with great shot; praying me that I would come to relieve him, for that otherwise he should not be able to abide any new fight if it were offered the same day. Whereupon, making towards him with my ship, according to his desire, it happened that another Biscayan ship of his company, lying so in the way as I could neither pass by nor bear room, on a sudden fell foul in such sort with the prow of mine as she brake her spritsail and crossyard; by reason of which accident, and for want of sail, my ship being not able to steer readily, it happened again that, before I could repair that hurt, another ship fell foul with her likewise in

* Laughton, "Armada Papers," ii. 134. Letter of Pedro de Valdes to King Philip.

the selfsame manner, and brake her bowsprit, halyards, and forecourse. Whereupon finding myself in so ill case, I presently sent word thereof to the duke, to the end he might stay for me until I had put on another forecourse, which I carried spare, and put myself in order."

The ships with which Valdes had thus come in collision were not, as he thought, both Biscayans. One belonged to his own Andalusian squadron—the *Santa Catalina*, a galleon of 730 tons. What damage she received is nowhere stated. All three ships must have suffered, but the case of the *Rosario* was the worst, and the mishap had very serious results for Pedro de Valdes. But it was not the only misfortune of the Spaniards. Suddenly there was a loud explosion, and one of the largest galleons of the squadron of Guipuzcoa—the *San Salvador*—was seen to be enveloped in a cloud of smoke. As it rolled away the ship looked like a wreck. All the upper part of her lofty carved and gilded stern had been blown out, the two decks of her stern castle had been shattered to matchwood, and a mast had gone over the side. The wreckage was ablaze in many places, and the decks were strewn with killed and wounded. It says something for the discipline of the Spaniards that they at once set to work to save the crippled ship. The explosion that had blown away the upper works of the stern had strained the hull so that she was leaking badly. But the pumps were manned, the fire was extinguished, and the wounded collected and succoured. Help was sent from other ships, and Medina Sidonia thought for a while that the *San Salvador* would be safe enough. He had reason to be anxious about her, for on board was one of the chief paymasters of the Armada, who had with him a good half of "the king's money"—the military chest of the expedition.

While Pedro de Valdez was extricating his disabled flagship from its entanglement with his consorts, and the crew of the *San Salvador* were rallying from the first shock of the explosion and salving their half-wrecked vessel, Howard signalled to his fleet to renew the engagement, and at their head bore down upon the

Spaniards. But Medina Sidonia again dashed to the rescue, and there was such a formidable array of high-decked galleons rapidly interposed between the disabled ships and the enemy that Howard after a few long-range shots drew off for the second time. A council of war was then assembled on board the *Ark*, and it was decided to follow up the Spaniards during the short summer night with the prospect of cutting off and capturing at dawn some of the disabled ships—"plucking their feathers one by one," to use a phrase of Howard's in a later dispatch. Drake in the *Revenge* was ordered to lead the fleet, keeping well ahead and showing the way with the big stern lantern on his poop, the light of which would guide the other ships. The wind and sea were rising, the sky was overcast, and the night would be a dark one while it lasted.

This Sunday battle off Plymouth was on the whole an inconclusive affair. In the light of subsequent events we can see that it was the first step in the systematic harrying of the Armada up Channel which prepared the way for the successful attacks a week later. But taken by itself, it was one of those indecisive actions in which both sides, with some show of reason, claim the victory, such as it is. Medina Sidonia could flatter himself that, although three of his best ships had suffered serious damage, in only one case was this the direct result of the enemy's fire, and for all that Howard could do, the Armada was holding its course up the Channel, the English having never ventured to press their attack. Howard might be well satisfied that he had driven the Spaniards to leeward of Plymouth, and given his captains and crews an opportunity of practising against the enemy the tactics on which he relied for eventual success; familiarizing the newcomers in his fleet with the sight of the enemy's assembled squadrons; giving them the confidence in themselves and their weapons that the veterans already possessed; and incidentally inflicting some damage on his opponents, while suffering only the most trifling losses himself.

Drake, in his matter-of-fact way, set little value on this first day's performance. After the fight, by Howard's request, he sent off one of his light craft to slip past the enemy in the darkness and warn Seymour at Dover that they were coming. In his letter to Seymour he thus summed up his impressions of the day *:—

"We had them in chase, and so coming upon them there hath passed some cannon shot between some of our fleet and some of them, and as far as we perceive they are determined to sell their lives with blows. The fleet of the Spaniards is somewhat above a hundred sails, many great ships; but truly I think not half of them men-of-war."

Evidently the veteran enemy of the Spaniards was in no boastful humour. Others in the fleet were disappointed and thought more might have been done. Henry Whyte, the captain of the little *Bark Talbot*, wrote to Walsingham †:—

"The majesty of the enemy's fleet, the good order they held, and the private consideration of our own wants ‡ did cause, in mine opinion, our first onset to be more coldly done than became the valour of our nation and the credit of the English navy; yet we put them to leeward, kept the weather of them, and distressed two of their best ships, whereof Don Pedro's was one."

This was doubtless the feeling of many more, for it was obvious that the main force of the Armada was still untouched and unchallenged.

Plymouth had listened through the Sunday morning to the booming of the cannonade out in the Channel, and from the headlands and the rigging of the ships in the Sound anxious eyes had watched the distant cloud of battle smoke, and seen the fleets gradually drifting to the eastward. Then pinnaces from Howard brought news of what had been done. The mayor of the town, William Hawkins, the elder brother of the more famous Sir John, sent off a hurried dispatch to the queen's council, telling them the lord admiral had been "in fight with the enemy" to windward of them, "which we beheld," but not venturing to

* Laughton, i. 290. † Laughton, ii. 63.

‡ In more modern phrase this would perhaps be "a latent consciousness of our own failings or deficiencies."

speak of a victory. He was beating up men for his lordship in town and country, and sending them out to the fleet in such "ships and bottoms" as were available as fast as they arrived, for he knew Howard would have need of them. The rest of the fighting ships in the Sound ran out in the evening to join the fleet, and Plymouth slept more soundly that night, for the danger to the good town was over.

Farther up Channel all was anxious preparation for a possible swoop of the Spaniards on some point along the coast. The Earl of Sussex was busy putting Portsmouth into a state of defence. Round Carisbrooke Castle, Sir George Carey, the governor of the island, was mustering every available pike and musket, horseman and footman, for the defence of the Isle of Wight, which many good judges held would be the first place the enemy would attack. Dover was expecting news of Parma's army and flotilla. The levies of Kent were moving to Margate and Folkestone. Down at Tilbury, Leicester was busy with William Pett, ancestor of a line of famous shipwrights, devising means to close the river channel with a boom of chains and barges and great masts, in case the Spaniards should make a dash for London by the river line.

CHAPTER XIV.

HOW DRAKE TOOK THE *ROSARIO*—THE FIGHT OFF PORTLAND.

By sunset the squadrons of the great Armada had re-formed and were holding their course once more up Channel in stately array. While they were re-forming, Pedro de Valdes, in the crippled flagship of Andalusia, was trying to rejoin the fleet, having cut away the wreckage and made what sail he could now that the foremast was gone and a full spread of canvas on the other masts might send them after it. He had dispatched more than one pinnace to ask help from his commander, and fired signal guns to call attention to his perilous plight. Writing afterwards of his misfortunes, in a long letter to King Philip, Don Pedro bitterly complained that Medina Sidonia had abandoned him to his fate.

"I did send word," he says, "two several times to the duke, and discharged three or four great pieces, to the end all the fleet might know what distress I was in, praying him either to appoint some ship or galeass to tow me ahead, or to direct me what other course I should take. Nevertheless, although he was near enough to me, and saw in what case I was, and might easily have relieved me, yet would he not do it; but, even as if we had not been your Majesty's subjects nor employed in your service, discharged a piece to call the fleet together, and followed his course, leaving me comfortless in the sight of the whole fleet, the enemy being but a quarter of a league from me; who arrived upon the closing of the day; and although some ships set upon me, I resisted them and defended myself all that night till the next day, hoping still that the duke would send me some relief, and not use so great inhumanity and unthankfulness towards me; for greater, I think, was never heard of among men."*

* "Armada Papers," ii. 135.



THE GENERAL COURSE OF THE ARMADA UP THE CHANNEL.

Strong words these, and a clear charge against Medina Sidonia of disgracefully abandoning a comrade in the presence of the enemy. The charge has been repeated by both Spanish and English historians of the Armada; but there is some evidence that Don Pedro at least overstated the case against the duke, and that Medina Sidonia really made some attempt to help him. He says in his diary that seeing the disabled condition of the *Neustra Señora del Rosario*, he himself tried to bring the *San Martin* up to her and pass a towing hawser to Don Pedro, but the rough weather and the rising sea forced him to desist. He would have stood by the crippled ship longer, but Diego Flores de Valdes, the Admiral of Castille, who was with him on board the *San Martin*, and throughout acted as his chief adviser, warned him that if he shortened sail instead of taking his place at the head of the fleet, half the Armada would be missing by morning, "and that the enemy's fleet being so near, all the Armada should not be imperilled, esteeming it certain that by shortening sail the expedition would be ruined." Medina Sidonia accepted this advice; for giving which, and for his half-hearted counsels generally, Diego Flores was sent to prison on his return to Spain.

Before proceeding on his way the duke, according to his own account, ordered no less than seven ships to stand by the *Rosario*. These were the flagship of the Castilian squadron, the great *San Cristóbal*, the Andalusian *San Francisco*, a galleon of 900 tons, one of the galeasses, and four pinnaces. Their orders were to take the *Rosario* in tow and remove her people; "but neither the one nor the other was found possible, owing to the heavy sea, the darkness, and the weather."

The attempt of the duke's flagship to pass a hawser to the *Rosario* was apparently not a very persevering or determined effort. Don Pedro knew nothing of it, and he was unaware of the ships standing by him; perhaps in the gathering darkness he took them for enemies. But that they were there for a while

is certain, for we have the evidence of the captain of the *Margaret and John* of London, a ship of 200 tons, John Fisher of Cley in Norfolk, a good fighting sailor, who had taken his ship to Cadiz with Drake the year before to help in singeing the King of Spain's beard. Fisher, in making a claim to some share in the capture of the *Rosario*,* tells how on the evening of this first fight off Plymouth he saw the galleon drifting dismasted behind the enemy's fleet, and eager to take advantage of the chance thus offered, bore down all alone upon her. It must have been after dark that he closed upon the disabled ship, for then only he saw that standing by her there were "a great galleon, a galleass, and a pinnace." But on seeing the English ship they made sail and left the *Rosario* to her fate. Perhaps they thought the small ship boldly bearing down on them through the darkness was one of the advanced scouts of a powerful squadron detached to attack them. They must have felt very anxious about their position, for the Armada had held its course up Channel, and they might expect at any moment to see the English fleet make its appearance following it up. The *Rosario* and her consorts had really drifted to seaward, and were no longer in the wake of the Armada or on the course that Howard would take in pursuing it. But they could hardly have known this.

Captain Fisher, having made certain that the *Rosario* had been left alone, came up close alongside of her about nine o'clock, with the intention of boarding. The galleon towered high above the English ship, a dark mass rolling heavily in the rough sea, without a light to be seen on her decks or at her ports. Fisher decided reluctantly that "by reason of her greatness, and the sea being very much grown, we could not lay aboard without spoiling our own ship." Looking up from his own heaving deck he could see no one moving on the galleon, and the silence and darkness of all on board the ship made him

* "Armada Papers," ii. 104.

think that she had been abandoned by her crew. To make sure of this he ordered a volley of 25 or 30 musket shots to be fired into her.

The challenge brought an unexpected reply. There was a sudden show of light as portholes opened in the tall side of the galleon, and then with a flash and a roar two cannon were fired, and the shot went screaming through the rigging of the *Margaret and John*. Fisher answered with a broadside that at close range crashed with deadly effect through the Spaniard's sides. Then he put his ship about and stood off. The enemy's ship relapsed into darkness and silence.

Then for three hours Fisher stood by her, keeping to windward. The night was very dark, and at times there came indistinctly through the gloom the sound of a voice calling out in Spanish. Fisher could not understand what it meant. He had traded in the Mediterranean, and probably knew some Spanish, but lying to windward he could not catch the words distinctly. Some of his sailors told him they thought the voice came from the water, and was that of some one swimming and calling for help; so the ship's boat was sent out to search, the men lying on their oars and shouting at times, but finding no one and getting no reply.

At midnight Fisher saw between him and the land the lights of the English fleet, now in full pursuit of the enemy. So, "fearing his lordship's displeasure if we should stay behind," he made all sail to rejoin. On the Monday morning he went on board the *Ark*, and reported to the lord admiral "in what distressed state we had left the ship, our enemy; praying leave that we might be permitted to return to finish our attempt, or that his lordship would send a pinnace to Dartmouth or Plymouth, that some shipping might be sent forth to fetch her in; for that she could not posssibly escape if she were assaulted and sought for."

While brave John Fisher was giving his report to Lord

Howard, there came news that, however satisfactory it might be to the admiral, meant bitter disappointment for the captain of the *Margaret and John*. A pinnace had come alongside the *Ark*, and Captain Cely, one of Drake's men, climbed up the side and reported that the *Rosario* had just been secured by Sir Francis, and that the Admiral of Andalusia, Don Pedro Valdes, with a crowd of gallant officers and 450 men, were his prisoners.

Let us see how this happened. Drake in the *Revenge* had been ordered to lead the English fleet during the night. Until shortly after midnight the stern lantern of the *Revenge* showed the way. The *Roebuck* and a couple of pinnaces were near her. Then some distance astern came the fleet, headed by the *Ark* and the *White Bear*. Suddenly Drake's lantern disappeared. The result was not a little confusion and hesitation in the fleet. The *Ark* held her course, followed by Lord Sheffield's ship, the *White Bear*, but the rest of the captains shortened sail or even lay to, waiting for the dawn, which would come about 3 a.m., to clear up the mystery of the sudden disappearance of their guide.

Drake explained next day that he had seen in the darkness three or four large ships going down Channel to seaward of him, and thinking the enemy might be doubling back under cover of the night, he had turned off his course to overhaul and examine them, extinguishing his poop lantern, so as not to mislead the following fleet. He found that they were peaceful German traders bound westward, and let them pass. But having thus gone off his course he found something else to examine—a large ship drifting slowly eastward under a scanty show of sail, which a closer view showed to be a galleon minus her foremast. He declared that till this moment he knew nothing of the mishap to the flagship of Pedro de Valdes; but notwithstanding his protests, and the story of the German merchantmen, there was at the time a strong suspicion in the English fleet that he had left

his station and imperilled the whole pursuit to secure a rich prize for himself. Most historians have adopted this damaging theory of his conduct. His earlier buccaneering exploits lent some colour to it. One can only say that it is not proven; and if he did go in search of the crippled Spaniard, one may say in mitigation of his action that he may well have believed that as soon as his own light disappeared Howard would light up the poop lanterns of the *Ark* and assume the leadership of the fleet.

Having by chance or design found the crippled Spaniard, Drake, who had been followed by the *Roebuck* and a couple of pinnaces, stood by till dawn. The first light of day showed the *Rosario* with ports open, guns run out, and musketeers lining her bulwarks. Drake hailed her with a summons to surrender. The *Revenge* lay alongside her within call, and the *Roebuck* close by, both ships cleared for action. Don Pedro must have seen from the first that his case was hopeless. His ship could not manœuvre to escape the raking fire the English vessels would pour into her, while keeping out of range of all but the few light guns mounted astern. But he replied that he must have honourable terms, or he would fight and sink. Drake answered back that he had no time to parley. Let the Spanish commander come on board and surrender, or he would open fire at once.

Don Pedro bowed to hard necessity. He left the *Rosario* for the *Revenge*, and told Drake that if he must yield he was pleased that it should be to the most famous captain of the time. Drake assured him that he and his officers should have good treatment, and that the lives of his soldiers and crew would be safe, and then received on board the *Revenge* some forty gentlemen, officers and volunteers of the captured flagship. One of the pinnaces was sent off to Howard with the good news. Drake ordered the *Roebuck* to escort the *Rosario* into Torbay, and while the *Revenge* crowded sail to rejoin the fleet he enter-

tained his noble prisoners at breakfast in the great cabin. Don Pedro told during the meal how he had been abandoned by Medina Sidonia, and Drake expressed his sympathy. The Andalusian admiral and other Spanish officers were on board the *Revenge* during the next ten days, sharing as prisoners the perils of more than one hard-fought action, and witnessing the discomfiture of their comrades from the point of view of their captors. The *Rosario* was sent into Torbay, where the sheriff expressed his disgust at having so many prisoners on his hands, by saying he wished the "Spaniards had been made into water-spaniels."

The other badly disabled galleon, the *San Salvador*, though the upper works of her stern had been blown out by the explosion, had succeeded in keeping company with the Armada during the night. More than this, although Medina Sidonia had found the weather too bad and the sea too rough to succour Don Pedro in the *Rosario*, he had somehow been able to send help to the *San Salvador*. The duke notes in his diary that "the sea and wind increased greatly" during the night, nevertheless it was found possible to remove "the wounded and burnt men" from the *San Salvador*.

At dawn on the Monday morning (August 1 by the Spanish reckoning, July 22 by the English) Howard in the *Ark* found himself out to the south-east of Start Point, with only the *White Bear* and the *Mary Rose* in his company, and the rest of the fleet far away to windward. A league to leeward was the Armada—near enough to make the lord admiral somewhat anxious about his isolated position. But Medina Sidonia was more intent on keeping his course than on turning to chase the three English ships back to their supports, so Howard was able to wait under shortened sail till the fleet closed up to him. While this was being done the news came of the capture of Don Pedro de Valdes.

There was soon to be another prize. The *San Salvador*

reported to Medina Sidonia that she was sinking. Whereupon the duke ordered "the king's money and the people to be taken out of her." Some of the light craft of the fleet effected this. They had been directed to scuttle and sink her as soon as the men and the treasure were safe; but during the salvage she had fallen astern of the Armada, and Hawkins, in the *Victory*, bore down upon her, drove away the Spanish feluccas, and sent a party on board to set the pumps going again. The *San Salvador* was thus kept afloat and taken into Weymouth, where the queen's commissioners had to complain that no small amount of plunder was taken out of her before they came into possession.

There was no fighting that day, the English fleet following the Spaniards up Channel, but keeping out of cannon shot, and looking for the opportunity of capturing further stragglers. Medina Sidonia made a change in the order of the Armada. Recalde's flagship had not yet repaired her damages, so he gave up for the time being the command of the rear (or left wing), and the duke ordered Don Alonso de Leyva "to pass with the van and join himself to the rear, thereby making one squadron of the van and rear"—that is, uniting the two wings in one command. Leyva was further reinforced with three of the galleasses, and four of the great galleons of Portugal—namely, the *San Mateo*, the *San Luis*, the *Florencia*, and the *Santiago*. He had thus with him forty-three of the best ships of the Armada with which "to confront the enemy, so as there should be no hindrance to our joining with the Duke of Parma," writes Medina Sidonia. He himself formed the rest of the fighting ships into a vanguard division. Between him and Leyva's array of galleons and galeasses went the *urcas*. Having ordered this reorganization of his fleet, the duke took one of those strong measures that are characteristic of weak men, a step that caused disgust and discontent among his officers. He thus relates it in his diary:—

"He called to him all the sergeant-majors and commanded them to go in pinnaces and range the fleet according to the prescribed order, giving it to each of them in writing that they should put every ship in her appointed place, and also that if any ship did not keep that order or left her appointed place they should without further stay hang the captain [that is, sailing-master] of the said ship; and that for this purpose they should take with them the provost-marshals of the tercios [regiments] and their men; and that three sergeant-majors were to attend to the rear, and the other three to the van, so as the better to carry out this order."

There was already an ill-feeling against their chief among his subordinates, for the impression had got abroad that Pedro de Valdes had been left to his fate without good reason, and there was now added to it a deep resentment at receiving orders enforced by the threat of hangmen in pinnaces watching that the ships kept station.

The duke was happily unconscious of all this. His ignorance "of the sea and of war" made him quite satisfied with his own proceedings, and in the evening, when the wind and sea were going down, he sent off a pinnace to Dunkirk to warn Parma that he was coming.

After sunset the wind fell to a dead calm. The moon rose in a clear sky and showed the two fleets drifting with loose sails, the nearest ships almost within cannon range of each other. During the day the fleets had been well out to sea, crossing the wide bay east of the Start Point. Now the limestone cliffs of the long promontory of Portland loomed up in the moonlight to the northward.

In the still night the drift of tidal currents swept the ships on both sides into detached groups. The Spaniards were to seaward of the English, and separated widely from the rest of Howard's fleet. Frobisher's *Triumph*, the largest of the English ships—perhaps the largest in both fleets—lay close in to Portland, with some smaller ships in her company. The sky was clear, and after midnight the moon shone brightly, so that it was easy to mark the positions of the ships. At 1 a.m. Medina Sidonia was roused from his rest with news that several of his captains


HAMPSHIRE
DORSETSHIRE
POOLE
ISLE OF WIGHT
THE NEEDLES
STUDLAND B.
LYME BAY
WEYMOUTH
DURLSTON Hd
Wind N.E. at sunrise after a dead calm during the night.
The Armada steers for the Isle of Wight, after the battle.
PORTLAND BILL
FROBISHER'S Ships isolated near the land
MONCADA'S Attack
MEDINA
SIDONIA
RECALDE
LEWA
HOWARD
(1) Main body of Armada interposes between HOWARD & FROBISHER and then attacks before the wind but loses the advantage on its sudden change.
(2) English counter-attack after change of wind.
DRAKE
S.W.
S.E.
After the Armada has (on a N.W. course) interposed between Frobisher and the main English fleet and turned to close with it, the wind goes round rapidly through S.E. to S.W.
English movements
Spanish "

THE FIGHT OFF PORTLAND BILL. Tuesday, July 23 (Aug. 2), 1588.

desired earnestly to speak with him. Don Alonso Vanegas, one of the officers of the *San Martin*, tells the story * how some boats pulled alongside the flagship in the moonlight, and there came on board "the good Don Alonso de Leyva, and Oquendo, and Juan Martinez de Recalde, whom the desire of their valiant hearts to come to hand fight with the enemy would not allow to repose." They met their chief in the cabin of the *San Martin*, and told him that there was now an opportunity of forcing the English to a fight at close quarters. In the dead calm of the moonlit night the four galleasses, using their long oars, could bear down upon the detached ships of the enemy under Portland Bill, and bring them to action—perhaps succeed in boarding them before the wind rose again. But a calm in those northern seas was not likely to last long. When the wind rose Howard would come to the help of the endangered ships; but in that case the Armada would also close in upon them, and there would be good hope of "coming to hand stroke with the enemy."

The admiral accepted the suggestion, and told Oquendo to go at once to Don Hugo de Moncada, who commanded the four galleasses, and order him to attack the detached ships at once, promising him on the part of the duke that if he succeeded he should be given a pension of 3,000 ducats a year which King Philip had granted to Medina Sidonia for one of his sons. "Oquendo carried out his mission very well," says Vanegas; "but the galleasses did not do what they were ordered, a thing they could have done." From other sources it appears that Moncada was in a sulky fit of bad humour. He had already a quarrel with Medina Sidonia. He did not like the way in which his squadron of galleasses had been broken up, one here one there, to assist the other commanders. He had asked to be allowed to keep them together and use them for a combined attack on Howard's flagship; and when this plan was rejected by the duke, he thought he was robbed of an opportunity of winning distinction that would

* Duro, ii. 381.

make him a great man in the king's eyes, and secure for him the chief glory of the campaign. So now he refused to take the chance offered to him, thinking perhaps it was beneath his dignity to have his galleasses used to prepare the way for a great exploit of his chief. Whatever were his motives, the incident of his clear disobedience to orders shows how little union there was among the leaders of the Armada.

When the sun rose about four o'clock a wind had sprung up from the north-east. With the English ships scattered inshore, the wind was fair enough for the Spaniards to give them something of the advantage of the weather gauge, and Medina Sidonia saw that there was some chance of forcing the enemy to close action—of "catching them between the sword and the wall," to use the Spanish phrase. It was not a very hopeful position, for the wind was good enough to carry the detached English ships out to sea across the front of the Armada, unless the Spaniards could close very rapidly. Their chief hope of forcing a close fight still lay in Moncada's galleasses holding Frobisher for a while.

When at sunrise Medina Sidonia hoisted the signal for battle on the *San Martin*, Moncada had at last got his galeasses under way—three hours too late. Vanegas tells how the duke sent Captain Gomez Perez in a pinnace to the flagship of the galleasses "to say aloud to Don Hugo de Moncada certain words which, according to report, were not to his honour." So we may take it that it was in an angry humour that Moncada bore down upon Frobisher.

The accounts of the battle off Portland—Spanish and English—are confused and contradictory. Any detailed and consecutive account of what happened must be largely the work of conjecture. Certain points, however, are fairly clear.

With the wind in the north-east, Howard's one chance of joining hands with Frobisher's squadron and helping him out of his peril was to put the fleet on a north-west course, and this

was his first manœuvre. The Armada, running on the same course to windward of the English, was in a better position, and, led by the *San Martin*, succeeded in interposing between Howard and Frobisher. The nearest ships of the two fleets were exchanging artillery fire, and in this (as throughout the whole campaign) the advantage was with the English. Spanish accounts speak admiringly of the rapidity and accuracy with which their opponents worked their guns—guns heavier than those of the Armada, with longer range, and therefore more destructive effect than the lighter pieces with which the upper works of the galleons bristled. There was much noise and smoke on the one side, but hard hitting on the other.

To landward of the crowd of ships, now wrapped in white clouds of cannon smoke, Frobisher's *Triumph* and five other English ships were holding their own in dangerous isolation against the four galeasses of Moncada and some of the galleons that had come to their help. To the anxious spectators who watched the fight from the cliffs of Portland it must have seemed that old Frobisher was doomed to destruction. In an attack in the moonlight calm of the night before, Moncada's galleasses, with their well-manned oars, would have had almost the advantage of steamships fighting against vessels under sail. But now, with the fresh north-easter to fill his canvas, Frobisher was no longer forced to await helplessly the attack. Even with such restricted sea-room he was able to manœuvre smartly enough to avoid the enemy's attempts to run him aboard, and good gunnery did the rest. He raked the Spaniards and sent his heavy shot ripping among the oars of the galleasses, with much damage to the rowers who were working them. Moncada found he had to rely chiefly on his sail power, and seamen who had counted on oars to keep their ships in position and close with their opponents must have found it a difficult business to handle the huge wide-beamed galleasses under sail only. Hour after hour Frobisher held his own with but slight loss,

while inflicting serious damage on his assailants. He was the hero of this fight off Portland Bill.

When the Spaniards found that they had succeeded in interposing between the English fleet and its detached squadron, it must have seemed to them that the battle was won. Medina Sidonia was still chiefly intent on the destruction of Frobisher, and was sending, "by oar and sail," urgent messages to Moncada, pressing him to finish the business. Even if he had wished to reinforce him for this purpose, it would have been no easy matter. After the first move of the day, sea fights in those times generally ceased to be an ordered battle and became a *mêlée*. Signalling was of the most rudimentary kind. An admiral could display a flag as a warning to begin the fight and another to break it off. The only other way of giving orders was by sending messengers in row boats or sailing pinnaces. Few such messages could be sent, and, except for the nearest ships, the transmission of orders was such a slow and uncertain process that it was all but useless. An admiral could also direct his ships by an order given before the action to conform to his own movements, but simple as this might be when, at a later date, fleets had learned to fight in the close-hauled line of battle, it was no easy matter in the days when the traditions of galley warfare still influenced the tactics of the sea, and ships were massed in squadrons on lines borrowed from battles on land. After the first encounter had brought the opposing fleets into contact in a fog of smoke, each captain's field of view became narrowly restricted. He could have only the vaguest idea of the general course of the battle, and had to do what seemed best from his individual standpoint. It is no wonder, therefore, that fleets engaged in close battle were more like mobs of ships upon the sea than an ordered array of units working together with a common purpose on well understood lines of action.

Every Spanish commander knew thus much of Medina Sidonia's purpose—that a prolonged artillery duel with the more

heavily armed English vessels meant failure and loss, and that the one hope of victory lay in boarding the enemy. Though no such inspiring order had been issued, all their naval traditions gave them for their guidance what was in effect Nelson's order of a later day, that when in doubt as to what was best to be done, a captain should remember that he could not do wrong if he laid his ship alongside one of the enemy's. And now the first move of the battle had placed most of the ships of the Armada fairly to windward of Howard's line. All the Spaniards had to do was to let the north-easter fill their sails and bear down on the English with the wind astern, and there would be good hope of running them aboard. Then pike and sword would come into play, covered by the sweeping fire that would beat down from their tall castles on the English decks.

Thus there began, under a common impulse, a series of attempts to close upon the English. Martin de Bertendona, in the stately *Regazona*, a galleon of 1,200 tons, the flagship of the Levant squadron, bore down upon the *Ark*. Alonso de Leyva, in the *Rata Coronada*, picked out for his antagonist another of Howard's leading ships. Others of the Levant squadron promptly followed their admiral's example, *La Trinidad Valencera*, another of the giants of the Armada, among them. These Levantine ships were not heavily gunned, but they were crowded with men. If they could close, it would be serious work for the English. Another attack was made by the galleons of Portugal. The *Florencia* was sailing with the Levantines, and followed Bertendona's lead. Independently of this, the *San Mateo*, *San Luis*, and *San Felipe* joined in the attack, and Oquendo's flagship the *Santa Aña* of Guipuzcoa. These were some of the ships whose vigorous onset won them special mention in Medina Sidonia's record of the day. Bertendona particularly distinguished himself. The crowd of sail on the tall masts of his *Regazona* swept him swiftly towards the *Ark*, and he had almost run her aboard when Howard tacked and stood out to seaward.

Ship after ship of the English line followed his example. The Spaniards had completed the isolation of Frobisher, but they had failed to bring their opponents to close action, the English always being able to avoid it, "by reason of the lightness of their vessels," says Medina Sidonia. But another reason was the thorough seamanship of their crews, and the confident courage that enabled them to await the Spanish onset to the last moment, and then slip away to a safe distance, only to close up to effective cannon range at the first opportunity.

For Howard that opportunity came soon enough with an unexpected turn of good fortune. The wind was quickly changing, going round first to the south-east, then to the south-west, giving the full advantage to the English fleet, and robbing the Armada of the first fruit of its temporary success. While the wind was still going round to the southward, the seaward wing of the Spaniards had been attacked by an English flagship, with a crowd of some fifty ships (many of them small craft) following her. Captain Vanegas explains that this attack took the Armada somewhat by surprise, the English working round its exposed flank favoured by the thickness of the powder smoke and the handiness of their own ships. Mr. Corbett argues with good show of reason that the flagship that led this sudden counter-attack was Drake's *Revenge*. If this was so, Drake found himself again in action with Recalde and the Biscayans, his antagonists of a few days before. The Biscay admiral's flagship suffered severely in the fight, in which once more all attempts to board the English proved hopeless, and only gave the gunners of the *Revenge* and her consorts a better target for cannon and culverin.

When the wind changed, Howard, with some of his best ships —among them his kinsman Thomas Howard's *Golden Lion* and Hawkins's *Victory*—had again steered to the help of Frobisher. The Armada was rallying before the south-west wind, the *San Martin* and a few of her consorts isolated both from the returning ships and those engaged with Drake and from Moncada's

battle with Frobisher. Howard steered for the opposing admiral's flagship. It was a point of honour for admiral to meet admiral in battle, and the *San Martin* and the *Ark* exchanged broadsides, Howard's ship being cut up in her rigging and the Spaniard being badly hit in the hull. There was a good deal of loss of life in her gun-decks, and several leaks were started by shot holes near the water-line. This final stage of the battle did not last long. With the English fleet now having the wind in its favour and coming into touch with Frobisher, Medina Sidonia realized that he had nothing to gain by prolonging the fight, and the rough handling his own ship had suffered made him all the more ready to break it off. The wind was blowing fair up Channel, so he signalled to the Armada to follow him, and steered for the Isle of Wight.

MARTINUS FROBISHERUS Eques auratus
FORBISHERVS quans NEPTVNIA regna Frequenta
Pro Patria at tandem glande Peremptus obit

(1,666)

SIR MARTIN FROBISHER.

CHAPTER XV.

THE FIGHT OFF THE ISLE OF WIGHT—THE FLEETS ARRIVE OFF CALAIS.

After the Portland battle, Howard was reinforced by five ships sent to him by Sir George Carey, the Governor of the Isle of Wight. He had already been joined by a few small vessels from the western ports. Other ships were fitting out at Portsmouth, and as he went further up Channel he would join hands with the powerful squadron of Winter and Palmer from Dover.

He could thus count on his fleet gradually increasing in numbers, while that of the Spaniards was, if anything, likely to diminish by losses in battle. Though Palmer and Winter were anxious about Parma's flotilla, it could not in any case do much to add to the fighting force of the enemy, for it was made up entirely of small craft destined to act as transports.

But Howard had found that his fleet, even without the promised reinforcements, was too unwieldy to be commanded as a single squadron. He had a hundred sail with him, counting large and small ships, and after the battle off Portland he organized them in four squadrons. One of these he kept under his own immediate direction, giving the command of the others to Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher. He had arranged a plan of attack on the enemy for the following night. A number of light craft were to make a simultaneous onset upon the Armada from different points in the darkness before the dawn. It was

hoped that the enemy would thus be thrown into confusion, and that there would be an opening for an attack in force by all the four squadrons at sunrise.

But the plan had to be abandoned, for again after sunset the wind fell away to a dead calm, and nothing could be done. With the morning the breeze blew once more lightly from the south-west. The two fleets crept slowly up Channel, the English some six miles astern of the Armada. Forty ships again formed the rearguard of the Spaniards. Recalde had resumed command of this force, with De Leyva to assist him. There was hardly any fighting during the long summer day. Howard had expended so much ammunition in the battles of the Sunday and the Tuesday that he was not anxious to be seriously engaged again till he received a further supply, for which he had written.

It was, therefore, only to make a show of attacking that some of the faster sailing ships of his fleet, during the morning, closed up with the Armada and fired on the rearguard at long range. The Spaniards answered with shots from their stern guns without quitting their stations or forming for battle. A lucky shot from one of the galleasses cut through and brought down the mainyard of a ship which Medina Sidonia in his diary describes as *capitana*, or flagship, of the English. It certainly was not the *Ark*, and may not have been even one of the flagships of the squadron leaders. It probably was simply the largest ship among those that had closed up to cannon range. The firing did not last long. It was a mere skirmish without any special result. The English ships shortened sail to allow their comrades to overtake them. The Spaniards held their course, moving in stately array of parallel columns of ships, each four or five abreast, with the galleons and galleasses of the rearguard protecting them. It was a fine sunny day with a smooth sea, so smooth that it was easy to carry out all kinds of repairing and refitting. Ships were even heeled over, and kept their way with decks aslope, while carpenters hung over their sides closing

shot holes low down towards the water-line with wooden plugs and sheets of lead. By evening the high coast of Dorsetshire by Swanage and the sandy cliffs where Bournemouth now stands showed up to the northward, and ahead the Needles rose out of the sea with the uplands of the Isle of Wight beyond them. Carey had ridden westwards from Carisbrooke, leading horse and foot to watch by Freshwater and the southern beaches against a possible descent of the Spaniards on the island.

The next day, Thursday, July 25, Old Style—August 4 in the New Style, used by the Spaniards—was an anniversary that Medina Sidonia might well wish to mark by some victorious exploit. It was St. Dominic's Day, and the famous founder of the Friars Preachers, Domingo de Guzman, had been a son of his own noble house. For Perez de Guzman, Duke of Medina Sidonia, August 4 was thus a day made auspicious by religious, national, and family tradition. It was a fine summer day, with a clear sky and bright sunlight. Before the dawn the wind had gone down again to almost a dead calm. It had blown very lightly from the south-west during the hours of darkness, and the Armada had made but little progress. When the breeze fell and the sun rose the great fleet was off Dunnose, south of the Isle of Wight, so close in to the land as to be plainly visible from the cliffs.

In earlier wars the French had made the seizure of the Isle of Wight the first point in their plans for the invasion of England. Some of the Spanish captains had proposed the same course to King Philip, and the best soldiers in England had suggested that this would be the place where the Spaniards would be likely to attempt their first descent. The presence of the Armada in practically unbroken strength off the island therefore marked a critical stage of the campaign. Sir George Carey had formed a great camp about Carisbrooke Castle, and at dawn he had ridden to the southward cliffs whence his scouts were watching the enemy's movements, and with them not a few of the islanders,

who in the last months had heard terrible tales of Spanish cruelty, and were now in dread of seeing bands of desperadoes landed to sack and burn their villages.

Howard had followed up the enemy with his fleet arrayed in four squadrons—Frobisher, on the left, nearest the land; his own squadron, with that of Hawkins, formed the centre; Drake, with the west country ships, was on the right, to seaward. The four flagships were the *Triumph*, *Ark*, *Victory*, and *Revenge*. Howard's business would be to fall upon the Spaniards at all risks if they should attempt a landing, and to continue harrying the enemy's fleet if it proceeded up Channel. The sharp fight off the Isle of Wight was brought about by the chance that offered itself of cutting off one of the Spanish galleons, and the eagerness of Medina Sidonia to engage the English on what he held to be a fortunate day.

Howard tells how at sunrise on the Thursday morning it was seen that "there was a great galleon of the Spaniards short of her company." Spanish accounts show that this was the *San Luis* of the Portuguese squadron, a galleon of 830 tons and 38 guns, built for fighting. She had fallen astern of the rearguard during the night, and another ship, the *Santa Aña*, an Andalusian armed trader, had also lost her station, though she was nearer the Armada than the *San Luis*. Nearest to the isolated galleon—a tempting prize—was the squadron of Sir John Hawkins. There was not a breath of wind, and the two fleets were drifting with the set of the tide on the summer sea. Hawkins resolved to cut off the *San Luis*. Sails were useless, but boats were lowered and set to work to tow the *Victory* and some of her consorts towards the galleon.

Hawkins was light-heartedly taking a serious risk, for the galleasses of the rearguard were ships that, thanks to their long oars, could manœuvre in a dead calm, and in such summer weather would have a great advantage over mere sailing ships. As the *Victory* approached the *San Luis*, it was seen that three



THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE OFF THE ISLE OF WIGHT.
Thursday, July 25 (Aug. 4), 1588.

galleasses were coming out from the rearguard, making good way under the impulse of their hundreds of rowers, and towing with them a great galleon, which proved to be the *Rata Coronada* of Don Alonso de Leyva, ever ready and eager for action when there was fighting to be done. Howard, seeing this, got his boats out to tow his own ships, and the *Ark* and her consorts began to creep slowly towards the enemy. It was a bold stroke, for in a calm all the advantage would be in favour of the Spanish tactics, and it would be by the merest chance, by the accidental drift of the ships, that the English would be able to bring their broadsides to bear on the enemy at the critical moment.

Before the galleasses could come to the rescue, the *Victory* had towed close up to the *San Luis*, so close that the Spaniards, manning their bulwarks with musketeers and bringing to bear on the attack some of the light artillery and swivel guns of their tall castles, were able to send such a storm of small shot down upon the boats that they had to cast off their tow ropes and pull away to save themselves from destruction.

The galleasses and the *Rata* were now coming up, and Hawkins in the *Victory* would have had a bad time of it, only that he too had effectual help at hand, for by this time the *Ark* and Lord Thomas Howard's *Golden Lion* had towed to close cannon shot. Then a fiercely-fought battle began around the rescued *San Luis*. And as a light breeze sprang up from the southwards, gradually freshening and filling the hitherto idle sails, ship after ship on both sides came into action.

As to the general course of the fight, there is again the same difficulty that we found in the case of the battle off Portland. We have only the partial impressions of individual combatants, and the brief reports of the two admirals in chief command. The firing was heavy while it lasted. Carey, who anxiously watched the fight from the island cliffs, writes that the fleets were "well in sight" and that the action "continued from five

of the clock until ten, with such expenditure of powder and bullet that during the said time the shot continued so thick together that it might rather have been judged a skirmish with small shot on land than a fight with great shot at sea." Howard claimed that the galeasses suffered severely. The stern lantern of one of them was shot away and came drifting past the *Ark* on the tide; another had her bows shattered; and a third was so riddled with shot holes near the water-line that she was towed out of the fight with weights shifted to tilt her over and keep the leaks out of the water. The *San Martin* herself was in the thick of the battle and suffered severely, being hulled many times and having her rigging cut up. Medina Sidonia tells how the English ships came nearer than on the first day, the smooth sea allowing them to open their lowest ports and fight their heaviest guns. He notes that they cut the mainstay of the *San Martin* and killed many of the soldiers. He tells how the *San Luis* came to his help as well as other ships, including the flagships of Recalde and Oquendo, and then he describes "how the enemy's *capitana*" (flagship), which had been engaged with him, was roughly handled and was towed out of the fight by eleven boats. This would at first sight seem to indicate the *Ark*, but there were three other flagships in the English fleet, and another Spanish account describes the ship thus towed out of action as the largest of the enemy's vessels. This would indicate that it was Frobisher's 1,100-ton *Triumph*.

The wind, freshening rapidly, had now gone round to the south-west. Till this shift of the wind gave the English the weather gauge, Medina Sidonia had hoped to close with them in hand-to-hand fight. But he now gave up the attempt, and about ten o'clock "seeing that in the proposed assault the advantage was no longer with him," and that the drift of the tide was carrying him dangerously near the cliffs, he signalled to break off the fight, and led the Armada away up Channel,

"the enemy remaining a long way astern." Carey and his comrades watched them from the cliffs till, as he writes in his report that evening, "both fleets shot into the sea out of sight by three of the clock; whereupon we have dissolved our camp, wherein we have continued since Monday." With the Armada, pursued by Howard, disappearing over the sea-horizon up Channel, all anxiety about the long-expected Spanish descent on the Isle of Wight was over.

That afternoon Medina Sidonia sent off Captain Pedro de Luna in a pinnace to Dunkirk to report to the Duke of Parma the progress of the Armada and its "success," for the Spanish admiral counted the indecisive action of the morning as a victory. De Luna was instructed to tell Parma "that it was fitting he should come out with as little delay as possible to join the Armada."

The capture of Pedro de Valdes by Drake had left the squadron of Andalusia without an admiral. Medina Sidonia now named as its commander Don Diego Enriquez, son of the Viceroy of Peru, "having seen him to be careful and able in matters belonging to the sea." As the duke, according to his own admission, knew nothing of "matters belonging to the sea," we may conjecture that Don Diego became an admiral chiefly because his father was a viceroy. But in the fleet he was counted a good fighting man.

Howard had expended so much ammunition in the three battles that he found his magazines nearly empty. He had already written to London * that "for the lack of powder and shot he should be forced to forbear to assail and to stand upon his guard until he should be furnished with more." This was before the sharp fight off the Isle of Wight, after which he sent pressing requests for supplies to Lord Sussex, the governor of Portsmouth. Sussex sent him all he could spare, and more, for he reported to the council that he had sent off so much that "he had

* "Armada Papers," i. 327.

altogether unfurnished himself," and asked for powder and shot for the garrison to be sent down. But the ordnance officers had not much to give him, for all available ammunition was being hurried off to the fleet. Want of due provision for the crisis was now endangering everything.

The queen was at the old palace at Richmond. There she received the news of the fights in the Channel, and the progress of the enemy's fleet. Her council was haunted by the fear that, without waiting for Medina Sidonia, the Duke of Parma would put to sea with his flotilla, and reach the Kentish coast with his army, or even raid the Thames. With Seymour's fleet in the Downs or at Dover, and the Dutch with more than fifty sail on the Flanders coasts, there was really not the remotest chance of Parma getting across the Narrow Seas with a flotilla of barques, pinnaces, and barges encumbered with soldiers and their horses, and having not one large fighting ship to protect them. But we need not wonder at the fears of the queen and her counsellors; for even now, with three hundred years of experience to throw further light on naval problems, we find excellent and patriotic people, who are intelligent enough in other matters, starting newspaper scares about some foreign power ferrying an army across the water into England without having secured command of the sea.

So, on the very morning on which Howard was in close fight with the Armada under the southern cliffs of the Isle of Wight, the council sent orders to Seymour that, notwithstanding any former directions he might have received, he should "bend himself to stop the issuing of the Duke of Parma's forces from Dunkirk." Seymour took this to mean that he was closely to blockade the port, and in a letter written from Dover early on the Saturday morning he told the council that he would do so, "as near as wind and weather will give us leave;" though he added that lying off Gravelines and Dunkirk was often no easy matter. He pointed out that he had not been sent all the ships promised to him, and that he could only count on the queen's ships if the weather was

at all unfavourable, as his armed merchantmen did not stand rough weather well. And he added in a postscript:—

"So long as the wind holdeth west-south-west your lordships may not look to have us on the other coast; neither can the enemy come out. To make it more plain to your lordships: whensoever we ride upon the other coast, if the wind come without the land, our merchants' ships are forced to forsake us, as not able to ride; so that our trust for this service is only upon her majesty's ships, in number eight, besides pinnaces which are not able to ride it out. I am driven to write this much because in my former letters your lordships, having many matters, do forget them." *

Seymour's style is certainly involved. Probably he felt worried by having to try to explain nautical problems to mere landsmen, who in the press of business overlooked his previous remonstrances and explanations. He, too, was overvaluing the power of the Spanish flotilla, which eight good ships would have been enough to stop or harry into panic-stricken confusion. He could have kept his eight queen's ships off Dunkirk even if there was a wind not blowing from the land but outside its general direction, when, if there was a stiff breeze, the merchant ships would be in dread of driving on the Flanders banks. But he did not consider himself strong enough without these auxiliaries.

On the Saturday morning, though the wind was still south-west, he sailed with all his ships, in deference to the council's orders; but instead of steering directly for Dunkirk, he headed first down Channel, and then stood across towards Boulogne, doubtless intending to run up before the wind to his station off Dunkirk and Gravelines. In the afternoon, in mid-channel (he prefaces his letter, "Written in the seas midway between Folkestone and Boulogne"), he sent off by a pinnace a dispatch to Walsingham, in which he expressed the opinion that the Spaniards would have been up Channel before this, only that their real object must be an attack on the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth. He was glad to hear that Howard was dealing with them, but he urged Walsingham to keep a close watch on the Thames mouth. He then returned to the subject of his

* "Armada Papers," i. 331.

earlier letter to the Council.* This is an interesting letter, for it shows us an experienced commander at sea utterly misjudging the situation. He, too, imagines that somehow the crowd of small craft conveying Parma's army may slip across to Margate without the sea having first been cleared of the English and Dutch fleets; he is persuaded that the Spanish Armada, instead of coming up Channel to cover the invasion, will engage in a separate enterprise at the Isle of Wight; and, strange to say, he does not know that Medina Sidonia's great fleet has passed him that very day without showing a sail on the horizon—a proof that Seymour had kept his ships close together, without sending any of his light craft away towards the French coast as soon as he got clear of Dover. He was so sure that Medina Sidonia was down Channel that he did not even trouble to look for him.

Having shown how Seymour and the Squadron of the Narrow Seas were thus mystified and involved in the "fog of war," we must return to the proceedings of the main fleets. After the fight on the Thursday morning Howard had followed up the Armada, keeping well astern (as Medina Sidonia remarked), the lord admiral having hardly any ammunition left, and therefore being anxious to avoid a fight. To use a later expression of his, he "was putting on a brag countenance"—pursuing, though he could not afford to attack until the new supplies of ammunition reached him. The wind blew lightly from the south-west, and little progress was made during that day and the next. There were even hours of calm, when the fleets drifted with empty sails on the smooth sunlit sea. The Spaniards took advantage

* "I humbly pray you," he writes, "that ye will so consider of your commandment there as you do not danger us here. I mean for riding afore Dunkirk. For if we should ride where you should have us, and as my lord admiral advises, I dare assure your honour it is ten to one that we shall be put to Flushing, or at the least to Yarmouth, as divers of us were of late; and of some of them no news is heard as yet. And if we should be so put from thence, then we shall leave the gap open to our enemy. What danger and hurts our fleet incurred and sustained in the last storm which did put us from the other coast, I do think is not made known to your honour and the rest of my lords."—"Armada Papers," i. 133.

of the fair weather to repair their damages, and many of their ships were seen to be kept heeled over while their carpenters plugged the shot-holes near the water-line that were so many proofs of the good gunnery of the English.

In the calm, fine weather of the morning, boats from many of the English ships gathered round the *Ark*, which displayed all her flags as if for some festive occasion. On her deck there was a scene that was more like a function at court than an incident in a naval campaign. An English commander-in-chief on active service still had in those days the valuable privilege of bestowing, as the lieutenant of the sovereign, immediate rewards for good service done against the enemy. So the lord admiral assembled on his flagship's deck a brilliant gathering of captains and noblemen, and in their presence conferred the honour of knighthood on six of his officers. Two of them, his kinsmen Lord Thomas Howard and Lord Sheffield, were titled men already, but the tradition of the age of chivalry still lived on, and even a peer of the realm could feel honoured by the knightly accolade, all the more if it was given in testimony that he had so borne him in battle as to deserve knighthood. The other new knights were Roger Tounshend, George Beeston, John Hawkins, and Martin Frobisher.

The ceremonial done, there was good cheer in the cabin of the *Ark*, over which the situation was discussed, and it was decided not to fight again till the fleets had reached the Strait of Dover. Storeships with ammunition were coming in, though they did not bring any large quantity, so that it would have to be husbanded. Musketeers had also been marched down to the coast towns with orders to embark as soon as possible. These reinforcements Howard refused. His stock of provisions was not great, and he had men enough for the kind of fighting on which he relied.

Like Howard, Medina Sidonia had expended most of his ammunition. He had more powder than ball left; so on this

Friday morning he sent off another pinnace to the Duke of Parma, in charge of one of his pilots, Domingo Ochoa, asking that the duke would forward to him a supply of "shot of 4, 6, and 10 lbs., because much of his munition had been wasted [that is, expended] in the several fights." The lightness of the "shot" asked for shows that the Armada was chiefly armed with very small guns. Ochoa was also to ask the duke to send out to Medina Sidonia forty of his light craft, "to the end he might be able with them to close with the enemy, because our ships being very heavy in comparison with the lightness of those of the enemy, it was impossible to come to hand-stroke with them." The pilot was also to urge the Duke of Parma to be ready to come out as soon as the Armada arrived. Medina Sidonia notes in his diary that he was anxious as to whether the duke would be ready, all the more because he had no news from him and no reply to his earlier messages.

After the fine, calm day there came a wild night, with a rising wind and squalls of rain. But through rain and darkness the Armada was followed up by the pursuit. At sunrise on the Saturday (July 27, O.S.; August 6, N.S.) it was seen that during the darkness the Spaniards had edged across Channel to the French coast. It was this move that took them out of sight of Seymour's fleet as it ran down the English coast from Dover towards Folkestone and then steered for Boulogne.

At ten in the morning the Spaniards were in sight of Boulogne. They then steered for Calais with a light, fair wind. In the afternoon Cape Gris-Nez was rounded, and at four o'clock the *San Martin*, proudly leading the fleet, was off Calais Harbour.

The tide was setting strongly from the westward and the wind freshening, and Medina Sidonia's pilots warned him that "if he went on farther the currents would carry him out of the English Channel and into the North Sea," so he decided to

anchor; and at five p.m., when the Armada was stretched out along the French coast between Calais and Gravelines, the signal was made to let the anchors go, and the crowd of galleons, galleasses, urcas, zabras, and pinnaces were soon swinging to their moorings—a floating city, gay with hundreds of fluttering flags and banners. The duke sent one of his staff-officers, Captain Don Pedro de Heredia, "a soldier of great assurance," ashore to Calais, formally to report his arrival to the French governor, Monsieur Gourdan, and offer him "his friendship and good offices." Heredia came back with a friendly message from the governor, and the disquieting warning that a change in the weather might make the position of the fleet very unpleasant and perhaps very dangerous. The result was that, when late in the evening the duke sent off his secretary, Arceo, to Dunkirk to report the arrival of the Armada to Parma, he was told to urge him to act speedily, as "he could not tarry there without endangering the whole fleet."

Before sunset Howard with the English fleet had come up and anchored to seaward and windward of the Armada, a little more than a cannon shot from the nearest galleons. He had received reassuring news by a ship from Havre, which informed him that there were no preparations in France for an auxiliary expedition to help the enemy. This had been the subject of much anxiety, for it was expected that the Guises and the Catholic League would seize the opportunity of the presence of the Armada in the Channel for a stroke against Elizabeth and the Protestant cause. But here once more national interests and jealousies, not religious zeal, became the motive that directed policy.

Howard had also been reinforced. Counting his ships, the Spaniards saw that there were more than thirty fresh sail in the English fleet, and Medina Sidonia noted that "Achines" must have joined with his squadron from Dover. As we know, Hawkins had been with the lord admiral from the first. The

newcomers were the thirty-six ships of the Squadron of the Narrow Seas, under Seymour and Winter.

Thus, as the sun went down on the Saturday evening, the whole English fleet was concentrated in close touch with the Armada, and the final struggle for the command of the strait could not be long delayed.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE FIRESHIPS.

More than one writer has described the Duke of Medina Sidonia as having arrived at Calais depressed with a sense of failure. Those who write thus read into the events they relate their knowledge of what came after. There is no reason to believe that the commanders and the men of the Armada had any such feeling. There may have been disappointment among the more experienced captains at the fact that they had never succeeded, in any of their three battles, in forcing the English to the close hand-to-hand action on which they counted for victory. Veterans who had fought at Lepanto and Terceira were brought face to face with embarrassing tactics that were something new in naval warfare. But they had been warned of this before they set out; though, even so, the realization of what it meant must have been irritating and disappointing.

Yet they had held their own in battle. The two ships lost at the beginning of the week, the *San Salvador* and the *Nuestra Señora del Rosario* had not been taken in a fair stand-up fight, but sacrificed as the result of accidents—a collision that disabled the one, and a chance explosion that wrecked the other. And two ships out of more than a hundred were a very trifling loss. For all practical purposes the Armada was as strong as on the day when it sighted the Lizard and entered the Channel.

As for Medina Sidonia, his very "ignorance of the sea and of war" must have helped to make him well satisfied with his performance. At the council of war off Plymouth he had interpreted King Philip's instructions as meaning that his task was to take the Armada up Channel with or without a battle, and join hands with Parma, reaching a station off Dunkirk from which to co-operate in the transport of the Flanders army to England. That task he had accomplished. Incidentally he had fought three battles, in all of which he could flatter himself that he had held his own. Howard had not prevented him from going where he would. Here he was at the eastern entrance of the Channel, with his fleet practically intact and in safe and easy communication with Dunkirk, which was only seven leagues away from his anchorage. His only anxiety was as to the state of preparation of Parma and the Flanders army. But if Parma was not ready, that was not the admiral's fault. He could tell the king that Medina Sidonia had done his duty and accomplished his task, even if Alexander Farnese was not ready to seize the opportunity thus prepared for him.

Granted that, Medina Sidonia was in a fool's paradise. We who know what happened in the next two days, and who also have read the lessons of three centuries of war, can see this readily enough. But better men than the Admiral of the Ocean Sea and Commander-in-Chief of the Great Armada had not grasped the principles of maritime warfare at the time, and some excellent men and prominent politicians do not understand them even now. So we need not judge the duke too severely if he had the idea that somehow his fleet could escort an army embarked in a huge flotilla of small craft across the sea without first engaging and decisively defeating the English fleet. Though he did not realize it, the Armada was already a failure. Even though he had suffered no serious loss—and indeed no loss worth reckoning—in the battles in the Channel, thus much they had shown: that the English seamen could always choose their

own position when matched against the unweatherly galleons, and that the English fleet outmatched the Armada in gun power, and had men behind the guns that could use them with telling effect. This meant that in a pitched battle it would be impossible to repeat the experiences of Terceira; that ships could not be "clapped together" to allow their men to come to "handstroke;" and that, therefore, numbers of men and the undaunted valour and skill at arms of men and officers would be useless. A pitched battle would mean a defeat, and defeat would seal the fate of the whole project of invasion.

It was by other means that the Armada was routed and destroyed. There was no battle "fought to a finish" between ordered lines and massed squadrons. But even what actually occurred confirms the lesson of the earlier engagements—that the Armada had not the effective fighting power to clear the way for Parma's flotilla, had Parma been ready and eager to act. He, indeed, appears to have realized what the admiral failed to grasp, for under pretexts of unreadiness he declined to risk his veterans while the English fleet was master of the Narrow Seas.

Sunday was a day of rest for the Spaniards—the last that many of them were ever to see again. The sails were all furled, and flags and pennants fluttered brightly from the forest of masts where the ships, 108 in all, lay anchored together a little to the east of Calais. The chaplains, mostly Franciscan and Dominican friars, said Mass at improvised altars on the decks; and the English anchored to seaward could hear the sound of the ships' bells marking the solemn moments of the sacred rite. When the "church parades" were over, there was little for officers and men to do beyond taking on board the water casks brought off by pinnaces dispatched to the fleet by the friendly French Governor of Calais.

One minor incident broke the peace of the day. An English pinnace in the morning ran in close to the fleet and fired her light broadside at the nearest ship, then tacked

and ran out again just as one of the galleasses had manned her guns. A single shot was sent after the English ship, and it made a hole in her mainsail. The Spaniards saw in this piece of bravado one more proof that the enemy's ships could come and go as they would.

Watching the English fleet they saw that seven more ships had joined, and estimated the force present at more than 140 sail. The new arrivals, however, were only storeships with provisions and ammunition. In the morning they saw a signal flown from the English flagship, and boats gathering round the *Ark* and returning to their own ships after a while. The lord admiral was holding a council of war. But nothing happened during the day to indicate active operations being resumed. Only in the afternoon Drake's ships closed in to the west of Calais, and took up a new anchorage that placed them dead to windward of the Armada.

In the morning Medina Sidonia had received bad news. A letter arrived from Parma, dated from Bruges. It was disappointing that the great soldier was so far off, instead of having his headquarters close by at Dunkirk, as the admiral expected. Parma was not ready. He reported that he would want a week yet for preparation, and, further, that even then he could not get his flotilla out of the Flemish ports unless the Dutch blockading ships were first driven off. And Medina Sidonia knew well that he could not do this until he had disposed of the main English fleet. That Sunday morning he began to realize the difficulties of the situation.

The message was brought by one of the admiral's officers, Don Rodrigo Tello, whom he had sent off in a pinnace to Dunkirk while the Armada was still crossing the Bay of Biscay. Tello had been with Parma at Bruges, and had come back by way of Dunkirk, which he left on the Saturday evening. He told Medina Sidonia that neither men nor stores were being embarked there. The duke sent off another letter to Parma by

Don Jorge Manrique, urging him to make an effort "to come out at once." In the evening there came a message from the secretary, Arceo, at Dunkirk, which fully confirmed Tello's information. Arceo wrote that "the munitions were not embarked, and that it seemed to him impossible that all things could be prepared within a fortnight."

During the morning the Governor of Calais had sent his nephew to the *San Martin* with "a present of refreshments," and a message that suggested that even if the English remained inactive it would be no easy matter for the Armada to wait for a week, much less for a fortnight. For the governor had directed his kinsman "to acquaint" the admiral "that the place wherein he had anchored was very dangerous to remain in, because the currents and cross-currents of that channel were very strong." The admiral sent his purveyor ashore to buy provisions, and the Calais men who came off with them brought many of their friends to see the fleet.

Medina Sidonia knew well that Howard, Drake, and Hawkins would not leave him unmolested in his exposed anchorage. The gathering of boats from the flagships round the *Ark* in the morning meant that something was being planned. As one of his officers wrote, it was certain those "devilish islanders" would be soon attempting some stroke. With the enemy to windward, and a strong tide setting in towards the shore twice in the twenty-four hours, Medina Sidonia suspected that fireships would be tried against him. The fireship, loaded up with tar-barrels and fagots, was a common engine of sixteenth and seventeenth century warfare. She was the torpedo of the day—a dangerous weapon to handle, and more often than not a failure, yet when it reached its mark destructive enough. The fireship was sailed by a crew of volunteers, who in case of failure and capture expected no quarter. They took her in as close to the enemy as they dared, then lashed the helm, fired the combustibles, and made their

escape in a boat that towed astern, leaving the burning vessel to drift with wind and tide down upon the enemy's fleet, fall foul of some ship, and set her on fire. Medina Sidonia expected that some such attempt would be made that night, when, as the pilots told him, soon after midnight the tide would be setting strongly from the west round Gris-Nez and up the flat shores beyond Calais. He took the recognized precaution of ordering a number of picket boats to pull backwards and forwards before the fleet during the night. If fireships came in, the boats' crews were to grapple them and tow them to where they might burn to the water's edge without doing any damage.

Medina Sidonia's suspicions were fully justified. Indeed he was guessing the obvious.* Fireships were already being got ready days before at Dover Harbour, and the council on board the *Ark* decided that the time had come to use them. Winter was at once sent off to bring them across Channel. Then it was suggested that they might not arrive in time, and another plan was adopted. It was resolved to sacrifice some of the lighter ships of the fleet, and hastily fit them as fireships during the day. Drake offered for the purpose an armed merchantman that was his own property, the *Thomas Drake* of 200 tons, which had been with him on his last raid on the Spaniards in the West Indies. The English 200-ton ships were heavily armed, and were formidable fighting units, and one wonders at such a vessel being thus thrown away. Perhaps the reason was that it was thought lighter ships might be more easily towed away by the enemy's picket boats, and would thus have less chance of getting into the midst of the Armada, running foul

* Not a little nonsense has been written, representing the employment of the fireships off Calais as a wonderful stroke of inventive genius, though it was an everyday proceeding of the time. There is even the legend that the queen herself suggested it to her veteran commanders. Kingsley, who has followed legend rather than history so often in his "Westward Ho!" writes of Elizabeth (chapter xxxi., p. 600, Everyman's Library edition) as "she who was the guiding spirit of that devoted band and the especial mark of the invaders' fury, and who, by some Divine inspiration (as men then not unwisely held), devised herself the daring stroke which was to anticipate the coming blow."

of a galleon, and holding on to her with entangled spars. Four other ships of the fleet were requisitioned, and three of those that had come with stores. Some of the owners afterwards made exaggerated claims for compensation.*

The work of piling up the eight ships with anything and everything that would burn freely was carried on during the afternoon. There was such haste about the business that the guns were left in position on the doomed craft, and the charges in them were not drawn. The Spaniards had noticed that Drake's squadron had shifted its position in the afternoon, and anchored again directly to windward of the Armada. This move was for the purpose of being better placed for sending in the fireships. The ships were manned by small crews of volunteers. At midnight the tide had turned, and was setting strongly towards the enemy's anchorage with a fresh breeze from the westward. The conditions were perfect for the enterprise, and the eight ships started off together.

Some of the Spaniards who had served in Flanders had

* A memorandum of "Allowances for Ships Burned," dated the following October, and printed by Sir John Laughton ("Armada Papers," ii. 287), gives the names of the ships and details of tonnage and valuation allowed, which may be thus tabulated :—

Ship.	Tonnage.	Valuation. £	s.	d.
Captain Yonge's flyboat (the *Bear Yonge*)	140	550	0	0
Cure's ship	150	600	0	0
The *Angel* of Hampton	120	450	0	0
The *Thomas* (*i.e.*, the *Thomas Drake*) of Plymouth	200	1,000	0	0
The *Bark Talbot*	200	900	0	0
The *Bark Bond*	150	600	0	0
The *Hope*	180	600	0	0
The *Elizabeth* of Lowestoft	90	411	10	0

Thomas Meldrum, merchant, claimed for this last ship £416, 10s., alleging that when burned she had on board—besides sails, anchors, cables, and guns—7 cwt. of shot, 150 lbs. of powder, 12 pikes, 6 tuns of beer, 15 cwt. of biscuit, 3 barrels of beef, 4 firkins of butter, 1½ cwt. of North Sea cod, 1 "wey" of cheese, and 4 dozen candles. Sir John Laughton says of this claim (ii. 288, note): "It seems improbable that in the threatening scarcity of victuals this biscuit, beef, etc., was burnt. Meldrum was very likely trying to get as much as he could, and if the treasury would pay for the victuals twice over, so much the better for him; but it nowhere appears that he got it."

actually witnessed, and all had heard of, another fireship exploit of three years before, the fame of which had gone all over Europe. In the winter of 1584–5, Parma had besieged Antwerp. In order to cut the city off from succour by sea, he conceived the daring plan of constructing a bridge of massive timbers across the Scheldt below the place. The bridge was to be 2,400 yards long, and armed with batteries of siege guns, 80 pieces in all. When the work was begun the Dutch laughed at the idea of the Spaniards attempting to bridge a river of such width, 72 feet deep in the middle, and swept by tides that sent masses of drift ice whirling up and down. But the bridge was built—trestle piers and spans of timber near the banks, barges held together by chains carrying a floating roadway in the middle, blockhouses rising from the structure at intervals, bullet-proof stockades running its entire length, guns grouped here and there, and great rafts moored above and below it to keep off anything that might be sent drifting on the tide to damage it. It was a marvellous work. Its designers and constructors were two Italian engineers, Baptista Plato and Propercio Barocchio. The Italians were then the most skilful engineers in the world.

There was at the time in Antwerp another Italian engineer, Giambelli of Mantua. He had years before offered his services to Spain, and had been refused. Then he had gone to help the Dutch rebels. In this year of the Armada he was over in England, employed by the queen to put the coast fortifications in order. He worked for Leicester at Tilbury, and for George Carey at Carisbrooke Castle. At Antwerp, in the days of Parma's siege, he had been one of those who confidently predicted that the bridge on the Scheldt would never be finished. When on February 25, 1585, it was completed and armed, and the event was celebrated by the Spaniards with much firing of guns and blowing of trumpets, Giambelli promised to destroy it. After discussing various schemes, he at last persuaded the

governor to allow him to send down upon the bridge two explosion fireships, that were long famous as the "Devil ships of Antwerp."

He was given two small ships, the *Fortune* of 70 and the *Hope* of 80 tons, after larger craft had been applied for and refused to him. In each of the ships he built in the hold a solid magazine chamber of brickwork and masonry, loaded up with 7,000 lbs. of gunpowder, and roofed with "blue gravestones placed edgeways, and six feet thick." Around and over the magazines were piled stones, scrap iron, balks of timber, shot, and chains. Above all this was built a light fireproof deck, on which was heaped a quantity of firewood. The idea of "the wicked, witty man" was that the harmless blaze on deck would deceive the Spaniards into the idea that his "devil ships" were ordinary fireships. They might grapple them, and even put out the fire, but the real mischief would still be done by the terrible "mines" in their holds. For in the *Fortune* long slow matches would be burning down below; and in the *Hope* there were still more cunning devices—clocks made by Bory, a watchmaker of Antwerp, with an alarm movement that, instead of starting a clanging bell, would set in action a firing mechanism of flint and steel with plenty of priming powder about it. Further to deceive the Spaniards as to what was intended, thirty-two small fireships of the common kind were to be sent down the river at intervals of a few minutes before the *Hope* and *Fortune* started on their deadly errand.

On the night of April 4, 1585, there was a sudden alarm in the Spanish camps. Down the Scheldt, adrift with the stream and ebbing tide to help them on their way, a procession of blazing ships was coming from the direction of Antwerp. The long winding reach of the river was dotted with masses of flame that lit up the sky and the high banks. The bridge and its approaches were promptly manned. For a while Parma

(1,666)

The Fireships at Calais.

(*Drawn from the tapestry hangings in the old House of Lords.*)

himself was in the middle of the structure where the trestle work from the south side ended.

Ship after ship drifted or was pushed to the banks or entangled in the protecting booms and rafts, and soon some thirty river craft were burning away harmlessly at various points just above the bridge. It seemed that the attempt of the rebels was an utter failure. Nor was there any anxiety among the Spaniards when one of the heavier ships, the *Fortune*, forced her way through the obstacles, and ran foul of the bridge with a heavy blow. She was pushed off with pikes, and a band of volunteers boarded her, led by an Englishman, Roland Yorke, who had for some time been serving with Parma. Yorke not only put out the fire on deck, but found the slow matches, that had so far failed to act or only flickered harmlessly, and he cut them and drew them away.

Then the *Hope* ran into the bridge. Another band of volunteers was moving to board her, and Parma himself had come up to direct the operations, when his officers, hearing from Yorke of the slow-match business, persuaded him to leave the bridge, and he went back to Fort Ste. Marie at its southern end. The volunteers had boarded the *Hope*, and were throwing the firewood from her deck overboard, when one of the clocks ticking its death-watch in her hold set the steel wheel buzzing round against its flints, and fired the mine. The three and a half tons of powder went off in an explosion that was heard through all West Flanders and Zeeland. Two hundred yards of the bridge were swept away, and went in drifting wreckage down the Scheldt. An immense wave from the river swept over the dams on either side, flooding camps and meadows. Eight hundred men were killed, many more wounded. Stones from the mine ship fell a mile away. The hurtling showers of stone, iron, and wood rained down on the banks on both sides of the river. An iron-bound balk of timber struck Parma on the shoulder, "between helmet and corslet," and he lay for a while

stunned, "like one dead," his sword in his hand, instinctively drawn as the explosion thundered over the river.

Jacob Jacobzoon, the Dutch admiral, lay down by Flushing with a squadron that ought to have been ready to attack the broken bridge at dawn, and pass through the gap with a relief convoy for Antwerp. But Jacobzoon had blundered about the time, and was idle at his moorings. Even when he heard the explosion he had not the wit and enterprise to move. So Parma was able to repair his bridge, and Antwerp fell.

This story of Giambelli's "devil ships," and the awful ruin wrought by one of them, has been told here in order that there may be some explanation of the wild panic produced in the Armada by Howard's fireships on that Sunday evening off Calais in 1588. Soon after midnight the Spaniards saw sweeping towards them with wind and tide from the direction of Drake's squadron eight dark masses, each defined by a flicker of light that soon rose into red flames, blazing higher and higher as the fireships came nearer. As the metal of their armament heated, gun after gun fired itself off with a flash and a roar, as if there were a crew on board eager for fight.

It was known that Giambelli of Mantua had entered the service of Elizabeth. He might be with Howard's fleet. In any case, what was more likely than that he had planned this attack? Medina Sidonia tells in his diary that he and his officers thought the ships that were bearing down on the Armada were *maquinas de minas* (contrivances of mines)—not mere fireships, but something like the "devil-ships of Antwerp," that would presently explode in volcanoes of destruction amid the anchored fleet. The officers in the guard boats had the same idea, for they did not dare to grapple them, but pulled hard for the Armada. At the sight of the returning boats it was realized that there was now nothing to stop the line of moving fires.



THE FIRESHIP ATTACK; THE BATTLE OFF GRAVELINES; AND THE PERIL OF THE ARMADA ON THE BANKS OF ZEELAND.

Already some of the ships were shaking out their sails when Medina Sidonia passed the order along his lines to up anchor and bear away to the eastward. But alarm was now becoming panic. Few of the ships waited to get their anchors up. Most of them cut their cables, and more than 150 great anchors, "the least of them worth 500 ducats," were left in the ooze and sand of Calais roads.

Then came a scene of hopeless confusion. The ships had been crowded together in their anchorage, line behind line, bows westward to the tide, the largest of the galleons and the four galleasses on the seaward side of the far-spread forest of masts and spars. As cables were cut, and the sails set in the darkness, and each one without order or settled plan swung round towards Gravelines, and hurried to put as much distance as they could between them and the fireships, galleons and smaller craft ran foul of each other with crashing timbers and entangled spars. One of the Levant galleons, the *San Juan de Sicilia*, came into collision with Moncada's huge flagship, the *San Lorenzo*, the *capitana* of the galleasses running into her astern and smashing up her rudder. Moncada got his oars out, set a foresail, and worked his way towards Calais, leaving the rest of the fleet heading for Gravelines.

The *San Martin*, Medina Sidonia's flagship, had waited to bring her anchors up. Then as she went about and got under way she found herself bearing down on five ships tangled together in a crowd. Other ships loomed up darkly to port and starboard in the glare of the fires. The *San Martin* hove to to avoid collision, and there was something like panic on board, for some of the fireships were drifting close astern, and who could say at what moment there would be a shattering, death-dealing explosion? One of the officers begged the admiral to abandon his ship for a boat or pinnace and seek safety on the French shore, as Parma's officers had urged him to leave the bridge at Antwerp. But, whatever his enemies might say,

the Duke of Medina Sidonia was no coward. He spurned the pusillanimous counsel, his officers restored order, and by good seamanship the *San Martin* worked her way through the tumult.

The fireships were now passing astern of the Armada. There were no explosions beyond the frequent discharge of their guns. One by one they grounded in the shallow water along the low shore east of Calais, and burned harmlessly to the water's edge.

The fleet was scattered in disorder towards Gravelines and Dunkirk like a flock of frightened sheep, when Medina Sidonia, realizing that all danger was over, fired one of the *San Martin's* guns as a signal for the fleet to anchor. But for most of the ships this was impossible. They had left their anchors at the bottom of the sea, and the most they could do was to heave to and drift on the tide. A few of the galleons anchored near their admiral. It was only as the dawn came and the sun rose that he realized that he was almost alone, with the rest of the Armada away to the eastward and still in utter disorder. The English fireships had done their work by the mere terror of their appearance. "Fortune was so favourable to the enemy," wrote a Spanish officer, "that their contrivance worked out just as they intended, so that they dislodged us with eight ships, a thing they would not have ventured to do with their 130. . . . When the morning came they had gained the weather gauge of us and thrown us into confusion without much exertion on their side, for we found ourselves scattered in every direction." *

* Duro, ii. 283.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE TAKING OF MONCADA'S GALLEASS, AND THE BATTLE OFF GRAVELINES.

At dawn on the Monday morning (July 22, O.S.; Aug. 1, N.S.) the English could see the results of the fireship attack and the panic among the Spaniards. The greater part of the Armada blotted the brightening skyline miles away to the north-east, off Gravelines, under sail, but in no regular order; here groups of ships massed together, there solitary sails working to rejoin their consorts. Nearer, but still some distance away, to the east of Calais, were four or five large galleons anchored together. Close to the old wooden jetty of Calais harbour a galleass was to be seen with bare masts—only her foresail set and her oars out.

It had been decided that the Spaniards were to be attacked before they could rally from the disorder into which the fireships would throw them. Here was the hoped-for opportunity. Howard signalled to unmoor and get under way, and anchors came up and sails were set. The wind was still blowing steadily from the south-west, fair for the attack, which would be helped for a while by the set of the tide also, for the ebb would not begin till some time after sunrise. A prompt onset would capture the outlying Spanish ships, or drive them into the irregular array to the north-eastward, and the Spaniards would be forced to meet the main attack with the wind dead against

them, and the shoals that begin off Dunkirk and extend along the Flanders coast to leeward of them, giving them scant room for safe manœuvre.

It was a time for concentrating every effort and employing every ship in bringing the Armada to action without delay. But what appears to us the obvious doctrine of war—that the main force of the enemy is the one objective to be kept in view, and that with its destruction everything else will be secured—was not a current axiom with sixteenth century commanders. They were accustomed to devote at times much effort and time to obtaining some local advantage, leaving the main business to wait till that was secured. So this day the Lord Admiral of England seemed for a while to forget all about the attack on the enemy's fleet, when, as he came abreast of Calais, he saw that the isolated galleass near the entrance of the port, instead of being under way, was hard aground on the bar, and was using her oars in an unavailing attempt to get off before the tide turned.

When he saw this Howard steered for the disabled ship, eager to secure such a prize, and neglecting everything else. All his squadron of ships, large and small, followed him, though it was a business he might well have left to some of the lighter craft.

The stranded galleass was Don Hugo de Moncada's splendid *capitana*, the *San Lorenzo*, disabled by the collision of the night before. When she lost her rudder, Moncada had tried to work into Calais steering with his oars; but, ignorant of local pilotage, he had run aground, and only fixed his ship more firmly on the bank by misdirected efforts to work her off as the tide rose. She was a prize worth the taking—the finest ship then upon the sea, said the Spaniards.

As the *Ark* stood in for her prize, keeping the lead going, Howard soon found that he could not get near the galleass without going aground himself. He therefore let go an anchor,

and manned his long boat "with fifty or sixty men, amongst whom were many gentlemen as valiant in courage as gentle in birth." The *Margaret and John* of London—the same ship that had first attacked the disabled *capitana* of Pedro de Valdes off Plymouth—had come up with the *Ark*, and was getting ready her pinnace, manning her mostly with musketeers, and putting her lieutenant, Richard Tomson of Margate, in command of the party. By this time Calais was awake to the fact that there was going to be a fight at the harbour entrance, and the people crowded out to see it, and "stood in multitudes" on wharves and beach.

The two boats pulled in to the stranded galleass. Not a gun was fired at them, probably because the great ship lay so that not a gun could be brought to bear. But Moncada's musketeers lined the high bulwarks, and greeted the long boat and the pinnace with a shower of bullets. The boats pulled close in under the high sides of the galleass, where it was not so easy for the Spaniards to fire on them, as to do so they had to lean over the bulwarks, and so gave a better mark for return fire. What followed let Richard Tomson tell.

"There we continued a pretty skirmish with our small shot against theirs, they being ensconced within their ship and very high over us, we in our open pinnaces and far under them, having nothing to shroud and cover us; they being 300 soldiers, besides 450 slaves, and we not at the instant 100 persons. Within one half-hour it pleased God by killing the captain with a musket shot to give us victory above all hope or expectation; for the soldiers leaped overboard by heaps on the other side, and fled with [to] the shore, some swimming and wading. Some escaped by being wet; some, and that very many, were drowned. . . . Some very few soldiers remaining in her, seeing our English boats under her sides, and more of ours coming rowing towards her, some with ten and some with eight men in them, for all the smallest ships were nearest to the shore, put up two handkerchers upon two rapiers signifying that they desired truce. Hereupon we entered [boarded] with much difficulty by reason of her height over us, and possessed us of her." *

It was evidently Moncada's personal influence that maintained the resistance for the half-hour. By the time that he

* Letter to Walsingham, July 30 (Laughton, i. 347). Tomson exaggerates the numbers on board the *San Lorenzo*. There were 244 soldiers, 124 sailors, and 300 rowers.

fell, killed by a bullet through the head that destroyed both his eyes, the English light craft were crowding in, more boats were approaching, and the crew realized that they were soon to be attacked by overwhelming numbers in a wrecked ship with all her consorts miles away. To hold out under such circumstances would mean that when the ship was boarded and carried little quarter would be given them, and the crowd of galley slaves freed from the oars must have been a further source of danger and weakness. So they jumped overboard "in heaps," struggling through the shallows, swimming in deeper water; here swept away and drowned, there picked up by friendly shore boats.

The victors, who had won the galleass so easily got completely out of hand, and began to ransack and plunder the ship. Some soldiers and a few of Moncada's officers were made prisoners and passed into the boats. While the sacking of the ship was in progress, a boat pulled off from Calais, and two French officers from the governor, Monsieur Gourdan, came on board—one of them his nephew. They were in some danger of being roughly handled by the victors, who mostly considered that all foreigners, whether Frenchmen or Spaniards, were much the same thing. They called for some one "to parle" with them. The gallant gentlemen who had joined in the expedition against the galleass seem to have been no linguists, for Richard Tomson tells how he parleyed with Gourdan's officers, "none being then in place that either understood or spake French but myself." Having heard that they came from the governor, Tomson asked "what his pleasure was." They answered (says Tomson), "that he had stood and beheld our fight and rejoiced on our victory, saying that for our prowess and manhood showed therein we had well deserved the spoil and pillage of the galleass, as a thing due to us by desert; and that he willingly consented that we should have the pillage of her; further requiring and commanding us not to offer to carry away either

the ship or ordnance, for that she was on ground under the commandment of his castles and town, and therefore did of right appertain unto him."

Tomson replied "that for our parts we thanked Monsieur Gourdan for granting the pillage to the mariners and soldiers that had fought for the same, acknowledging that without his leave and goodwill we could not carry away anything of that we had gotten, considering it lay on ground hard under his bulwarks [ramparts]; and that as concerning the ship and the ordnance, we prayed it would please him to send a pinnace aboard my lord admiral, who was here in person hard by, from whom he should have an honourable and friendly answer, which we all are to obey and give place unto."

Tomson's politeness and diplomacy were all thrown away, for though the Frenchmen, when they parted from him, seemed well satisfied, before they could get back to their boat they were set upon by "some of our rude men, who make no account of friend or foe." They robbed them of their jewels, pulling the earrings from their ears. Thus roughly handled, plundered, and insulted, the two officers went back to Monsieur Gourdan in a fury. He at once ordered his forts and seaward batteries to open fire on the galleass.

"All the bulwarks and ports were bent against us," says Tomson, "and shot so vehemently that we received sundry shot very dangerously through us." This cannonade drove the plunderers out of the *San Lorenzo*. They scrambled into their boats, carrying their booty with them. Then Gourdan sent off his soldiers to take possession of the galleass in the name of the King of France.

Before he abandoned her Tomson had found time to have a look round the ship, and reported to Walsingham that she would be worth, with her armament, about 80,000 crowns. There were on board "4 whole cannons, 8 demi-cannons, 12 culverins and demi-culverins, 16 sakers and minions"—40 guns in all, some of

them the heaviest in the Armada.* There were "200 barrels of powder, and of all other things great store and plenty, but very little or no treasure that I can learn to be there." He suggested that if Gourdan were not too "incensed" by the treatment of his officers, he might perhaps be persuaded to surrender the whole or the better part of all this to the queen. But Gourdan stuck to his prize, and succeeded in floating the galleass into Calais.

Howard and the English general were indignant at the governor's conduct, which they regarded as rank treachery. There is no doubt that he was quite justified in the action he took after the maltreatment of his envoys. But it was disappointing for Howard to have wasted precious time in the capture of the galleass, and then find that she had to be left to Monsieur Gourdan of Calais.

The prisoners were sent across to Dover, where next day Lord Burleigh's son, Robert Cecil, had a friendly talk with one of them, "a proper gentleman of Salamanca." The Spaniard, speaking Italian, which Cecil understood, told of the discontent in the Armada with Parma's conduct. They had waited in vain for him in Calais Roads, and would be waiting still if the "device of the fireworks"† had not driven them from their anchors. The gentleman of Salamanca, trying to make the best of a bad business, suggested plans by which the invasion might yet be accomplished, and these wild guesses Cecil sent on to his father as useful information. Burleigh must have had a quiet laugh, knowing how safe his diplomacy had made England against any action of the young King of Scots, for on this broken reed the Spaniard was counting when he said that Medina Sidonia would

* Tomson's account of the armament of the galleass is so detailed that he must have examined it carefully. Comparing his total of forty guns with the fifty assigned to each of the galleasses in the official lists of the Armada, we have one more indication that these lists overstate the number of guns in the fleet, probably because the figures given represent what was ordered and intended, not necessarily what was executed.

† Robert Cecil's Letter to Burleigh, Dover, July 30 (Laughton, i. 342).

go north and get help in Scotland, and that he would thus "draw away our fleet to the northward," and *tenere il mare netto* (keep the sea clear) for Parma, who would ferry his army across the strait while Howard, Drake, and Hawkins were chasing the Armada, though he confessed the Zeelanders—the Dutch fleet—might prove an obstacle to this plan.

The fight for the galleass—interesting as its story is—was but a side issue of the Monday's operations. While it was in progress Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher were bearing down on the Spanish fleet. The isolated group of galleons that were nearest to Calais to the eastward were the *San Martin*, the *San Marcos*, and two or three other large ships. As soon as he saw the English preparing to move, Medina Sidonia had signalled to his consorts to weigh anchor and make sail. He intended to rejoin the rest of his command, which were all far to leeward, by running down to them before the south-west wind. He was under way, with the English in pursuit, when his pilots told him that if he held on he would be forced to fight with the Dunkirk banks close under his lee, so he changed his plans, shortened sail to await the English attack, and sent off a swift pinnace to bid the rest of the squadrons, now re-forming on their flagships, to beat up to windward and join him, while he delayed the enemy's onset. It was a brave resolve, and one more proof that Medina Sidonia, however he might be deficient in skill, had no lack of courage.

Howard, after his disappointing experience on Calais bar, had made sail to follow up Drake, and before he could join him heard the opening fire of the great fight that is known as the Battle off Gravelines, the nearest thing to a pitched battle in the whole Armada campaign, yet even so not a battle fought out to a decisive finish.

When Medina Sidonia hove to with his handful of galleons, while the pinnaces were carrying the orders to the Armada to beat up to windward and form in order of battle around the *San*

Martin, the Spaniards saw the English fleet bearing down on them, "led by three *capitanas*." These were Drake's *Revenge*, Hawkins's *Victory*, and Frobisher's *Triumph*. They were leading three squadrons of the fleet into action, while Seymour was coming up with Howard from the direction of Calais. The experience of the earlier actions had given the English complete confidence in themselves, and they had no fear that the enemy would be able to run them aboard even in a close fought engagement. Ammunition, too, was not plentiful, and there was none to be wasted at long ranges, so the attack held their fire till they were almost within musket shot. Then Drake fired first his bow-guns then his broadside into the galleons, and swept past them, the ships of his squadron imitating his example and pouring their shot into the enemy as they went by.

Frobisher did not understand what his colleague was doing, and afterwards—jealous of the general credit given to Drake as having done most for the defeat of the Spaniards—spoke of him as having come on like a braggart and then gone off like a cowardly knave. But Drake knew his business well, and was content to leave the isolated group of galleons to be dealt with by Hawkins and Frobisher, to whose help Seymour and Howard were coming up before the wind, while he went on to deal with the main body of the Spanish fleet, which now, only half formed for battle, was beating up to its admiral's assistance. He was in fact taking the chief risks of the day, but with a clear vision of the possibilities presented by the situation of the enemy; for the Armada was straggling over miles of gray-green sea, between him and the Zeeland shoals, and if he could draw Howard and the rest of the fleet on to follow his example, it might be beaten in detail. His squadron might have to face superior numbers for a while, but presently the balance of force would be turned against the enemy.

But just as Moncada's galleass had proved temptation enough to keep Howard at Calais bar, so the Spanish flagship and her

consorts kept Hawkins's and Frobisher's squadrons occupied, and Drake, unsupported, came back in action with the leading galleons of the main body. Recalde and Oquendo, Alonso de Leyva, and young Enriquez were bringing up some fifty good ships, among them the galleons of Portugal and the three remaining galleasses, to the rescue of Medina Sidonia. Drake could only delay them, making a bold fight of it, in which the *Revenge* had the guns of both her broadsides in action, and was "riddled with every kind of shot."

During this partial rally of the Armada the *San Martin*, supported only by the *San Marcos* and three other galleons, was in close battle with desperate odds. Exposed to the fire at short range of two squadrons of ships that passed and repassed them discharging their broadsides, coming close enough to give full effect to the fire, but not close enough to be run aboard, the galleons suffered severely. Of his flagship Medina Sidonia reports that "the *capitana* was sorely distressed by great shot between wind and water, so as by no means could the leak be stopped, and her rigging was much spoiled."

Of the closely fought battle that now developed it must be confessed that, despite numerous narratives, both English and Spanish, and the shrewd conjectures of experts who have carefully compared them, we can no more form a general idea and scheme that has anything like certainty than those could who, looking out from the Dover heights and the South Foreland cliffs, saw, far off on the horizon, the smoke cloud that wrapped the contending fleets * and listened to the cannonade booming over the sea. Adams's chart and the old tapestry that once hung in the House of Lords, now known to us only by engravings, show the

* The fight was far enough out from Gravelines to be seen in the distance from Dover. Robert Cecil, in his letter to his father, written on July 30 (O.S.), speaks of "that sight which we saw upon the land [that is, we upon the land saw] yesterday; where, as terrible as it was in appearance, there was few men hurt with any shot, nor any one vessel sunk. For as this man [that is, the gentleman of Salamanca] reporteth they shoot very far off; and for boarding, our men have not any reason."

Spaniards in a great crescent with its horns towards the south-west, and the English coming on in straggling lines, several squadrons abreast, before the south-west wind, and driving fairly into the concave of the crescent. One feels that this is a conventional representation. The chart shows the fight well out into the North Sea, between the Dunkirk shoals and the Goodwin Sands, and the ships, represented by small perspective views, are so drawn that the battle picture of the two fleets covers seventy or eighty square miles of sea. Thanks to the picture of the tapestry having so often been reproduced, the popular impression of the battle is that it was an attack on a stationary mass of great galleons formed in the traditional crescent array. One English narrative, by a sailor who took part in the fight, speaks of the enemy being in a crescent. But all the Spanish narratives convey very strongly the impression that the Armada never succeeded in forming in any regular battle order, and that the whole engagement was a very confused piece of business—more of a *mêlée* and a running fight than an encounter between two ships set in ordered lines and squadrons.

To arrive at anything like an idea of what the battle was like, one must remember that ships and fleets in action are always on the move.* Medina Sidonia was at anchor with his five ships when the English fleet made its first movement to attack him. He got his anchors up, and at first ran down towards the rest of the Armada, but then realizing the danger pointed out by his pilots that he might be forced on the Dunkirk and Flanders banks, he hove to, sent orders to the rest of the galleons to beat up to windward and join him, and then began to work out to seaward with the wind abeam. I take it that he

* The exceptions to this statement are few, though there have of course been cases where a battle has been fought out on one stretch of water. This happened in the rare instances where, as in Nelson's battle of the Nile, one of the fleets anchored, and the ships of the attack were laid close alongside of them. But such a battle is not likely to be seen again.

would be east and a little north of Calais Roads, and inside the west end of the Outer Ruytingen Banks when the fight began. He would have to work out to seaward to clear the banks, and this move would bring the action within distant view of the South Foreland. Once he was well clear of the Ruytingen—and he would give it a wide berth, for there were no charts that actually showed its extent except in the roughest way—he could run to the north-east outside the banks. Hard pressed in the first stage of the action, he would be gradually assisted by more and more of his fleet, till at the hottest stage of the seven hours' fight some fifty of the Armada were with him, and these the best and most powerful ships.

The course of the action would be dominated by the objects that the chiefs of both sides had in view. Medina Sidonia clearly was chiefly anxious to reassemble his fleet, and to gain enough sea room to be free from the haunting danger of being forced into the dangerous shoal water along the coast. The Englishmen knew of this danger for the Armada even better than the Spaniards, but it would seem that the attacks made upon the enemy by Howard's squadrons had primarily no more definite object than to harass them and do as much damage as possible; and in this spirit, once it was seen that the enemy were trying to work out to seaward, there would be an effort to hinder them. So, amid the confused account of the battle one sees indications of the English attack being chiefly directed on two points—on the Spanish van to check the seaward movement and turn the galleons back towards the shoals, and on the rear in the hope of cutting off and destroying any ships that fell away from their consorts. Perhaps what the English took for a crescent formation on the part of the Spaniards was nothing more than an accidental grouping of the ships, the Spanish captains who were the more resolute and eager for the fight crowding to the help of the threatened ships in van and rear, while in the centre those who were content to do the least

possible service held their course with the general direction of the fleet, keeping out of close action, and firing at longer range when the opportunity offered.

At the two extremities of the Spanish array the fight was close and hot. It had begun at musket range, and there were times when ships were "within pike's length" of each other, and within reach of voice, even amid the din. As Robert Cecil wrote to Burleigh, the English "had not any reason" to board the enemy. Their business was to use to the utmost their superior gun power. Some of the Spanish ships tried to use the opportunities offered by the fight at close quarters to run aboard their nearest antagonists, but these efforts were always foiled. It would seem that they were neither very frequent nor persistent. One cannot help entertaining some suspicion that after the panic of the night before the Spaniards had not all recovered from their temporary demoralization.

Both English and Spanish accounts tell of galleons being separated from their consorts and battered persistently by ten, fourteen, or even more of Howard's ships, the English moving round them, choosing their own station, and giving them broadside after broadside at closest range. Such was the fate of the *San Felipe* of the Portuguese squadron. Attacked by Hawkins in the *Triumph*, she was forced out of the line and pounded with the gun-fire of a crowd of English ships. Don Diego Pimentel came to her succour in the *San Mateo*, only to be himself isolated and as roughly handled. Both ships had sails and rigging cut up aloft, and below were so riddled that they were leaking at a score of shot holes, and there was terrible slaughter in their crowded gun decks. Pimentel was one of the best fighting men of Spain, and he made attempt after attempt to grapple the nearest enemies, in the hope of coming to a hand-to-hand fight. At such close quarters, and with their ammunition for their artillery running short, the Spaniards used their small arms. Arquebusiers and musketeers kept up a

rattling fire from the bulwarks and the fore and stern castles, but without aim and at random in dense clouds of blinding smoke, so that it inflicted but little loss on the assailants. One of the few English officers killed was believed to have fallen under the deliberate aim of a Spanish musketeer, but it may have been a chance shot, and in any case the probability is that it was fired in ignorance of what was passing. The English were full of admiration of the splendid defence made against heavy odds by the crippled ships; and one of Hawkins's officers, standing up on the bulwarks, sword in hand, called out that such fine soldiers should not throw away their lives, and if they surrendered to the queen would have good quarter. He dropped with a bullet through his head, and his comrades thought it was a treacherous answer to a chivalrous summons.

The *San Mateo* and *San Felipe* were saved, though only for a while, by the *San Martin* and some of the most powerful of the galleons coming to the rescue and covering their retreat. Medina Sidonia tells how he was drawn towards them by hearing the heavy musketry fire, and by its being seen from the top that in the thick of a dense cloud of smoke the masts of two Spaniards towered amid a crowd of enemies. The *San Martin* had already suffered heavily. Other ships of the Armada, which the admiral mentions as being much damaged and left with hardly a shot for their ordnance, are the *Trinidad Valencera*, the *San Juan de Sicilia*, and the *Santa Maria de Begoña*. The battle had now lasted seven hours, and there was no slackening of the English cannonade, while some of the Spanish ships had their magazines so empty that they had to depend chiefly upon musketry.

If the fight had continued there is no doubt that several of the galleons must have been destroyed or forced to strike their colours. But a sudden change in the weather put an end to the battle. The wind had been going round to the north-west, freshening and raising a heavy sea, and the sky had become

overcast. Suddenly from the north-west came a violent squall with blinding showers of rain. Every ship had to look to her own safety, the seamen crowded aloft to shorten sail, and the firing ceased abruptly, the English fleet standing away from the enemy for their own security while the storm was at its worst. In the midst of the wild burst of wind and rain a large Spanish ship was seen to heel over and sink among the waves. The English thought it was the *San Juan de Sicilia*. It was the *Maria Juan*, a 665-ton galleon of the Biscay squadron. Of her crew of nearly 300 only 80 were saved.

When the rain squall ended there was still wild weather, and Howard, with most of his ammunition expended, and the wind in such a point that the enemy's ships, with their rigging badly cut up and with leaky hulls, were in dire peril of being driven on Zeeland shoals, thought that enough had been done, and did not seek to renew the engagement.

A letter written by Howard that evening to Walsingham shows that he did not feel like an admiral who had scored a victory, for he spoke of the battle as a running fight, in which he had inflicted considerable damage on the enemy; but he regarded them as still formidable enough. "We have chased them in fight until this evening late," he says; "but their fleet consisted of mighty ships and great strength; yet we doubt not, by God's assistance, to oppress them." And he added in a postscript: "I will not write unto her Majesty before more be done. Their force is wonderful, great, and strong, and yet we pluck their feathers little by little. I pray to God that the force on land be strong enough to answer so present a force."

This is not the language of a victor who feels that he has made an end of his enemy. Evidently he still feared that the invasion might be attempted. He spoke of the capture of the galleass as if it were the one solid success of the day, and told how the Governor of Calais had seized her, suggesting that Walsingham should write to Monsieur Gourdan, praying him

"either to deliver her, or at leastwise to promise upon his honour that he will not yield her up again unto the enemy." He asked for ammunition and victuals to be sent to the fleet, for most of the ships were ill supplied, and Seymour's squadron provisioned only for a day, and "we know not whether we shall be driven to pursue the Spanish fleet."

Drake, a more experienced sailor, took a sounder view of the situation. Writing to Walsingham that same evening from the *Revenge*, he said,—

> "God hath given us so good a day in forcing the enemy so far to leeward as I hope in God the Prince of Parma and the Duke of Sidonia shall not shake hands this few days; and whensoever they shall meet I believe that neither of them will greatly rejoice of this day's service."

The Armada had not only been driven away from and to the leeward of Dunkirk, so that all touch with Parma was lost, but it had been even more "distressed" than Howard imagined. As Medina Sidonia put it in his diary, "nearly all the great ships were spoiled and unable to resist longer, as well from the damage they had received as from not having any shot for their ordnance." His own ship, the *San Martin*, was leaking badly, and the rough weather made it impossible to stop the shot-holes near the water-line, "whereby she was in danger of being lost." In the galleons that had been closely engaged there had been considerable loss of life, and the ships were cumbered with wounded and dying men. The wind now blowing from the north-west, and tending to drive the Armada on to the "Zeeland shoals," was raising what for the Spaniards was a heavy sea, and many of them were in bad condition to face it. For besides the leaks in their hulls, spars had been damaged, and standing and running rigging cut up. And to make matters worse, most of the ships had left their anchors at the bottom of Calais Roads, and either had no heavy anchors to replace them or had not yet got them out to their cat-heads, so that they had not the resource of anchoring available if they were driven into the shoal water.

The *San Mateo* and the *San Felipe* had suffered most, and were being kept afloat only by hard labour at the pumps. There was such scant hope of saving them that Medina Sidonia ordered their crews to be taken off, and the two ships abandoned to their fate. But the rising wind and sea prevented the boats from rescuing all their people. Before sunset the attempt had to be given up, and the galleons were seen driving away to leeward as the night came on. The Armada was closing up and sailing to the north-east with the wind abeam. The duke had talked of turning back in order to regain touch with Parma; but the pilots warned him that for the present this was impossible, "because with the sea and wind from the north-west, setting straight on to the coast, they must perforce go into the North Sea, or else that the whole Armada would drive on to the banks."

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PERIL OF THE ARMADA ON THE "BANKS OF ZEELAND," AND ITS VOYAGE NORTHWARDS.

During the first hours of the night the wind and sea increased, until at two a.m. the storm was at its worst. The pilots of the *San Martin* reported that though they were doing their best to keep the ship under shortened sail close up to the wind, she was making such leeway that she must be drifting towards the Zeeland shoals. Few could sleep on board any of the ships, for all knew the danger, and were expecting that any moment "they would strike one of the banks."

As the dawn came on the Tuesday morning * the weather moderated. But the sea was still rough, with a fresh north-wester blowing when the sun rose. Then it was that the Spanish admiral fully realized his dangerous position. The *San Martin* was well astern of the Armada, with only a few ships in company with her—the much-battered flagship of Recalde; Don Alonso de Leyva's big Levanter, the *Rata Coronada;* the Portuguese galleon, *San Marcos;* the *San Juan Bautista,* now used by Diego Flores de Valdes as his flagship; the three surviving galleasses, the *Patrona, Girona,* and *Napolitana*—eight ships in all. The rest of the fleet were scattered along the north-east trend of the Flanders coast, struggling to edge away from the long lines and patches of broken foam-

* July 30, O.S.; August 9, N.S.

crested water that told of the dreaded shallows to leeward. Two galleons, the *San Mateo* and the *San Felipe*, after being kept afloat through the night, had driven ashore in the early morning, and lay among the breakers, the former "between Ostend and Sluys" the latter near Nieuport.

Half a league astern of the *San Martin* was Howard's fleet, in good order and under easy sail. For the English mariners this spell of rough Channel weather was nothing alarming, and with their handier ships, in better condition for work even in a gale, they found no difficulty in keeping plenty of sea-room between them and the coast. Medina Sidonia expected that, as on the day before, the enemy would bear down on his isolated group of ships. The duke, therefore, fired two guns as a signal to the Armada to form for battle; but it is clear that he had not much hope of their being able to do anything of the kind, for he sent off one of his pilots in a pinnace to warn the captains to beat out to windward, "because they were very near to the banks of Zeeland." The *San Martin*, with her consorts, was now steering north-eastward under shortened sail, but every moment being forced more and more to leeward. The English followed up the Spaniards astern and to seaward of them, but keeping far beyond even the longest cannon shot. One of the Spanish officers,* writing of these anxious hours, tells how it seemed that the enemy were blind to their chance of destroying the handful of galleons and galleasses. "We saw ourselves," he says, "lost or taken by the enemy, or the whole Armada drowned upon the banks. It was the most terrible day in the world, for every one was despairing of any good fortune, and expecting death. But it pleased our Lord to blind the enemy, so that he did not fall upon us."

Medina Sidonia, however, understood well what the unwonted inaction of the English meant. "The enemy remained aloof," he writes, "seeing that the whole Armada must be lost."

* Duro, ii. 271.

With few shot left in their magazines, Drake and Howard had no reason to begin a battle when they could see galleons, galleasses, and caravels drifting steadily to destruction. They could wait to glean the grim harvest of the wreckage, and force eventual surrender of stranded and disabled ships; and they would have the help of Admiral Justinus of Nassau, who had so far not appeared on the scene of action, but who was waiting at the mouth of the Scheldt with thirty sail.

The leadsmen in the long overhanging bows of the Spanish ships were now giving warning that the keels were coming dangerously near the shelving bottom along the outlying fringe of shoals. The *San Martin* was in six fathoms of water. The galleass *Patrona*, on the landside of her, reported only five. Some of his officers losing heart proposed to the duke that he should strike his colours, and obtain the help of the English to tow the ships off the lee shore. So at least life would be saved. Another suggested that to escape captivity the duke should embark in a pinnace and try to reach one of the Flanders ports. But once more Medina Sidonia showed that, though he knew so little of the sea and of war, he was brave enough to face the dangers of both to the end. He would hear of neither surrender nor flight, but said he was ready for death, and he showed he fully expected it to come soon by confessing to one of the chaplains and receiving absolution. He tells in his journal how, when all hope was lost, the Armada was saved from imminent destruction.

"The pilots on board the flagship—men of experience of that coast—told the duke at this time that it was not possible to save a single ship of the Armada; for that with the wind as it was in the north-west, they must all needs go on the banks of Zeeland; that God alone could prevent it. Being in this peril and without any remedy, God was pleased to change the wind to west-south-west, whereby the fleet stood towards the north without hurt to any ship."

The sudden change of wind did not bring as complete a deliverance as the duke supposed, for the *San Mateo* and the *San Felipe* had already gone ashore. But the rest of the

Armada was now running out towards the deep water with the wind on its quarter, and re-forming its array; and still the English made no sign of attacking, but followed at a respectful distance.

Howard was waiting for a fresh supply of ammunition before he could attempt anything serious. As soon as the wind changed, and the Armada was seen to have escaped from its dangerous situation, he had hung out the council flag from the *Ark* to call his colleagues on board. Winter could not attend the council. He had been hurt by the recoil of one of his guns in the fight of the day before. It was decided to send part of the fleet to keep watch in the Narrow Seas lest Parma should still attempt something. The rest was to follow up the Armada with Drake's squadron in the vanguard, making a show of readiness to attack, though there was no ammunition to make the threat good if Medina Sidonia and his admirals should turn back and show fight. Pressing requests for supplies were sent off to London. Winter and Seymour were selected for the watch on Dover Strait and the Flanders ports, a return to the duty they had been doing so long. They were to part company with the fleet after sunset, so that the Spaniards might not notice the movement. Winter, disabled by the accident, made no objection, but Seymour was furious. He wrote an angry letter to Walsingham, complaining he was being robbed of the chance of doing good service, though he had shown in the battle of the day before that the *Rainbow* could fight as well as the bigger ships. Howard might yet regret that he had not her with him. He thought Drake had influenced the lord admiral to send him back to the strait, and he never forgave Sir Francis for it.

There was another council of war the same afternoon on board the *San Martin*. Veteran admirals and generals and the chief pilots of the Armada met round Medina Sidonia's cabin table in anxious debate. The situation they had to face was a

strange one. Four times the fleet had been in action, but there had been no decisive defeat. They could even claim that in actual fight the Armada had held its own, though it had been hard pressed. Out of nearly 150 ships only some half-dozen had been lost in one way or another. But the survivors of the fighting squadrons had suffered severely. Leaking hulls and damaged spars and rigging made them more unweatherly than ever. Ammunition was almost exhausted for their batteries, and there had been heavy losses in action among soldiers and sailors. In the last hard-fought battle off Gravelines 600 had been killed and 800 wounded. The ships were full of sick and disabled men. The Armada had come to cover Parma's descent on England. But Parma had failed them, and no one could say when he would be ready. Between the Armada and the Flanders ports there was now the English fleet, which had not lost a ship in action, and indeed had been continually reinforced since the first engagement, nine days before, off Plymouth. And the south-western wind was blowing freshly up the North Sea, and making it no easy business for King Philip's fleet to sight Dunkirk again, even if no exultant enemy stood in the way.

The pilots urged that the fleet was in no condition for further campaigning in those dangerous Narrow Seas, and that the best course was to take advantage of the fair wind to run up the North Sea, round Scotland, reach the open Atlantic, and so return to Spain. Medina Sidonia evidently welcomed the proposal, but some of the best of his captains, veterans of many wars and men who had throughout those last days been in the thick of all the fighting, protested against the plan. They denounced it as unworthy of *caballeros* to run home to Corunna or Santander without having effected anything, perhaps departing at the very moment when Parma and the Flanders army were ready to join them. There is the old jest that "councils of war never fight," and that this illustrates the saying that

"in the multitude of counsellors there is safety." In a multitude of counsellors the easiest course, along the line of least resistance, is very apt to be selected. So now most of those who sat in debate in the great cabin of the *San Martin* seemed to side with the admiral and his pilots. But Recalde, Oquendo, and Leyva spoke for the braver minority. Despite loss and damage, they argued that most of the Armada was still available for an attempt to do something. Recalde urged the duke to lie on and off till a change of the weather would give them again a fair wind for the Channel, and then risk one more fight, whatever might be the result. Leyva supported him, saying that although his own ship, the *Rata Coronada*, had been so battered that she was leaking like a sieve, and had expended so much ammunition in the four battles that there were only thirty cartridges for her guns left in her magazine, he would rather take her into action again with musket and arquebus and sink fighting than see the Armada running away to the northward like a pack of cowards. But the more prudent counsel prevailed. Medina Sidonia salved his own conscience, and gave some poor satisfaction to the fighting minority by recording the resolution of the council as a decision to sail northwards, but turn back and fight if wind and weather again became favourable.

So the Armada was set upon a course a little west of north, and sped out into the open sea with Howard's fleet in chase, but making no attempt to outsail and close with the Spaniards. After dark Seymour and Winter parted company to return to Dover.

The two galleons abandoned on the "Zeeland banks" were taken by some of the ships of the Dutch squadron. The news reached Flushing early on July 31 (O.S.) that a great ship was ashore between Ostend and Sluys. Three ships that lay off the town went out to attack her, and at one in the afternoon found the *San Mateo* lying aground. Don Diego de Pimentel, who

was in command of the disabled galleon, refused to surrender when summoned, and short-handed as he was, made a good fight for two hours, "but at last yielded himself." Several Englishmen from Flushing garrison had gone out with the attacking expedition, among them William Borlase, who wrote a report of the affair to Walsingham,* telling, as if it was a matter of course, how there was a massacre of prisoners when the galleon was at last boarded by the victors. "I was the means," he says, "that the best sort were saved; and the rest were cast overboard and slain at the entry." The "best sort" were the officers and gentlemen volunteers, who could be held to profitable ransom—"Diego de Pimentel, son and heir of the Marquis of Tavara," and "another marquis's son, and divers particular gentlemen of good account." These were worth saving; common soldiers and sailors, who would have to be lodged and fed and released at last without ransom, might be cast overboard.

The crew of the *San Felipe* were more fortunate. Driven ashore between Ostend and Nieuport, but nearer the latter place, whence pinnaces put out and took the Spaniards off the ship before the "Zeelanders and Flushingers" arrived to take possession, they got her off the bank, kept her afloat with the pumps, and took her with the *San Mateo* into the Scheldt, where the two galleons were beached for repairs under the guns of Flushing.

On the Wednesday that saw these exploits the Spanish and English fleets were far out in the North Sea, the Armada making good progress with the strong south-west wind, and Howard keeping it ever in sight. All the night Drake had been on the alert, watching lest by a change of course Medina Sidonia should get away from the pursuit during the hours of darkness. In the afternoon the wind became lighter, and the English, better sailors, seemed to be closing on the Armada. Its rearguard was made up of the three galleasses and a few galleons under Recalde. Medina Sidonia, on seeing the English vanguard nearing him,

* "Armada Papers," ii. 29.

"struck his topsails and lay to, and shot off three pieces, so as our fleet should also lie to and wait for the rearguard and the *capitana*." He goes on to tell how, "when the enemy saw that our *capitana* had brought to, and that the galleasses of the rearguard and as many as twelve of our best ships had done the same, they also brought to and shortened sail, without shooting of ordnance against us." Howard had no real intention of fighting. The manœuvre was intended only for what it effected—namely, to delay the Spanish retreat by a feint of engaging the rearguard. It was part of that policy of "putting on a brag countenance," to which he was limited by the non-arrival of the ammunition he had so pressingly asked for.

This day of leisurely chasing the enemy at a distance "without shooting of ordnance" was an opportunity for much letter-writing in the English fleet. Hawkins, in his long dispatch "from the sea aboard the *Victory*," * wrote to Walsingham a summary of the operations since the first fight off Plymouth. He said the English ships had suffered little, and if supplies were sent to them, they would "weary the enemy off the seas." But he considered the Armada was even now a formidable force, for he added, "Yet, as I gather, certainly there are amongst them fifty forcible and invincible ships, besides thirty hulks and thirty other smaller ships whereof little account is to be made." He considered the enemy must be "mightily and diligently looked unto and cared for." He suspected that they were now bound for Scotland, "where my lord would follow and impeach [prevent] their landing." As for the English fleet, the men were long unpaid and "needed relief." This should be looked to.

Drake wrote from the *Revenge* the same day to Walsingham in more cheery strain, despite the disappointing fact that he had been ordered to send back to Dover the noble prisoners he had kept on board his flagship since the capture of the *Rosario*. Pedro de Valdes and his officers had had the unpleasant experi-

* "Armada Papers," i. 358-362.

ence of making the voyage up Channel as the unwilling guests of Drake, who took them into the thick of three battles, where they had to run the risk of being killed by the fire of their own comrades. Drake counted them as good value to hold in view of subsequent ransom, and it was unwelcome news when, amongst dispatches for the fleet, there arrived the order to hand them over to the queen's officers ashore. He sent them off by the pinnace that took back the letters, and wrote to Walsingham (with some certainty that the queen would see his letter):—

"If they [the prisoners] should be given from me unto any other, it would be some grief to my friends. If her Majesty will have them, God defend [forbid] but I should think it happy.

"We have the army * of Spain before us, and mind, with the grace of God, to wrestle a pull with him. There was never anything pleased me better than to see the enemy flying with a southerly wind to the northwards. God grant you have a good eye to the Duke of Parma; for with the grace of God, if we live, I doubt it not but ere it be long so to handle the matter with the Duke of Sidonia as he shall wish himself at St. Mary Port † among his orange trees."

It will be noticed that even Drake, with his knowledge of maritime war and his optimistic cheery outlook upon events, still thought that the Duke of Parma's flotilla might be a source of danger, even with the Armada "flying to the northwards." The same fear haunted the queen's advisers. The court had returned to London from the old palace on Richmond Hill, and on this same last day of July the council drew up a series of questions to be sent to the lord admiral for his replies and explanations. One paragraph of the document, though doubtless intended to elicit his opinion, took the form of a warning rather than an interrogation:—

"To inform the lord admiral that some Englishmen, and Spaniards also that are taken, do say that the intent of the Spanish navy is to draw along the English navy from the coast of Flanders; that the sea being clear, the Duke of Parma might come out with his forces to invade the realm, and namely to come to London." ‡

This is plainly an echo of the language held by the "proper gentleman of Salamanca" in his talk with Robert Cecil at Dover.

* That is, Armada. † Puerto Sta. Maria, near Cadiz.

‡ "Armada Papers," i. 356.

There is the very expression about having "the sea clear"—the Spaniard's "*tenere il mare netto.*" Howard had provided against this imaginary danger by sending Seymour and Winter back to the strait. But the same document shows that the queen and her council understood the tactics of the campaign as little as its strategy, and were inclined to complain of what seemed to them meagre results. For they inquired:—

> "What causes are there why the Spanish navy hath not been boarded by the queen's ships? And though some of the ships of Spain may be thought too huge to be boarded by the English, yet some of the queen's ships are thought very able to have boarded divers of the meaner ships of the Spanish navy."

For the worthy counsellors who drafted this question naval war was still the "clapping together of ships" to produce a hand-to-hand *mêlée* on their decks. Even the news of the actions in the Channel had not revealed to them the significance of the new method of fighting at short cannon range, which made even the enemy's ships that were "too huge to be boarded" as helpless as "the meanest" against the heavier armament and better gunnery of the English.

What produced "half-doings" instead of greater results was no backwardness about boarding the enemy, but the short-sighted parsimony of the queen and her advisers. No storeships with provisions and ammunition had joined the fleet in the North Sea. Howard, eager as Drake and Hawkins to "wrestle a pull" with Medina Sidonia, had not the powder and shot for another battle. Nor could he long continue the pursuit with food and water in short supply, the wearied overworked crews complaining that they were badly fed and that the beer was undrinkable, and with the fever that had begun in some ships in Plymouth Sound spreading rapidly among the crews now that the excitement of more active operations was gone. Seymour and Winter's squadron had been selected for the watch in the strait, not because there was any idea of robbing them of laurels reserved for Drake, but because they had only a day's

provisions left, and must be sent back to port. The rest of the fleet was little better provided, so it was not free to keep the sea for long.

It was in the hope of delaying the enemy, and gaining time for his "victuallers" to find him, that Howard more than once made a feint of attacking, and forced the Spaniards to shorten sail, form on their rearguard, and collect their stragglers. There was a manœuvre of this kind in the afternoon of Thursday,* the third day after the Gravelines battle, the second of the North Sea pursuit. "Again," writes Medina Sidonia, "the *capitana* and the galleasses brought to and abode their coming; whereupon they also brought to, not coming within cannon shot." This apparent reluctance on the part of the English to come on—this "letting 'I dare not' wait upon 'I would'"—surprised and puzzled the Spaniards, but their own good conceit of themselves prevented them from divining the cause of it, and they flattered themselves that the imposing array of their rearguard was keeping Howard and the terrible "Draques" at a respectful distance.

At daybreak next morning (Friday, Aug. 2 and 12) it looked as if at last there would be some fighting. During the darkness the English in ordered squadrons had gained on the Armada, and their attitude seemed to prelude an attack. But, says the Spanish admiral, "seeing that we were in good order and our rearguard strengthened, they rested and turned back towards England, and we lost sight of them."

Shortness of supplies had brought Howard to the end of his tether. At early dawn he had held a hurried council, the officers meeting him on board of Drake's *Revenge*. The night before he had met his officers and discussed the position with them. It was reckoned that by next morning the fleets would be nearly east of the Firth of Forth, well out at sea. The course the Spaniards were holding gave no sign of any intention of a land-

* August 1, O.S.; 11, N.S.

(1,666)

LORD HOWARD OF EFFINGHAM.

ing there, as had been expected by some. The enemy was keeping too far out from land. It was decided to "have a new fight with them for a farewell" next day, and then proceed to the Forth to obtain water and fresh provisions. But those who looked for the "farewell fight" next day were disappointed. The ships had closed up, but the council flag again called the officers to the *Revenge*, where they were told that inquiries through the fleet had shown "that there was not munition enough to make half a fight," and orders were given to draw off from the pursuit.

So, just a fortnight after the day on which the Armada concentrated off the Lizard, the Spaniards saw the English fleet bearing away to the westward, while the galleons held their northward course. Before noon the English ships, hull down, were whitening the horizon with their sails. Soon the Armada was alone upon the northern sea. The last hostile sail had disappeared where gray-green waters met the blue sky line.

That fortnight in which the English fleet had harried the Armada up Channel, scared it from its anchorage, forced it out into the open sea, and pursued it far to the north, marked an epoch in naval war. It was the first great campaign of the new era, when sail and gun replaced oar and sword. For England it was the first step in that development of naval power that culminated gloriously at Trafalgar.

CHAPTER XIX.

ANXIOUS TIMES IN ENGLAND AFTER THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE ARMADA.

Howard had intended to take his fleet into the Forth, with a view not only to obtaining at the earliest moment the most necessary supplies, but also in the expectation that an imposing naval demonstration in sight of the Scottish capital would make a useful impression on the young King of Scotland and his advisers. It would be a warning to them that it would not be prudent to give any help or countenance to the Spaniards in case they should try to effect a landing in the north of the kingdom.

But a change in the weather compelled a corresponding change of plans. The wind blew strongly from the north-westward, and it was decided that instead of beating into the Forth against it, with the chance of its becoming worse, the fleet should run down to the English coast. Then the wind rose to a gale, scattering the fleet. Part of it took shelter at Harwich; with the rest, Howard continued his voyage to Margate and the Downs.

There had been singularly little loss of life in the Channel fighting, perhaps because in the earlier battles the range had been a long one for the lighter guns of the Armada, and in the close fight off Gravelines more damage had been done aloft in the English ships than on decks or below. But now there was

a heavy toll of dead among the fever and scurvy stricken crews. Hospitals were improvised in sheds and barns at Margate, and what the imperfect medical craft of the time could do was done for the sick; but there were many deaths. "It would grieve any man's heart," wrote Howard, "to see them that had served so valiantly die so miserably." *

There was still some anxiety as to Parma's armaments, and as to what had become of the Armada. Killigrew wrote from Holland that the Dutch would soon have a hundred ships at sea, and Seymour reported from his station at Dover that he had sent their Admiral Justinus of Nassau a report of recent occurrences, and requested him still to "stand upon his guard." † He noted in his letter that though the Dutchmen had not given much active help, "these Hollanders have lighted upon these argosies which we did distress, and have received great spoil thereof."

As to the Armada, two pinnaces had been detached by Howard "to follow the fleet afar off until they [the enemy] were shot beyond the isles of Orkney and Shetland." But there were no reports from these scouts, and there was much conjecturing as to what course the Spaniards had taken, and what they might yet attempt.

Thomas Fenner, one of the best of English sailors, in a long letter written to Walsingham on August 4 "from aboard the good ship of her Majesty, the *Nonpareil*," judged the probabilities of the situation with singular insight.‡

"I will [he said] deliver your Honour mine opinion, wherein I beseech your pardon if it fall out otherwise. I verily believe great extremity shall force them if they see England again. By all that I can gather they are weakened of eight of their best sorts of shipping, which contained many men; as also many wasted in sickness and slaughter. Their masts and sails much spoiled; their pinnaces and boats many cast off and wasted; wherein they shall find great wants when they come

* August 4, "Armada Papers," ii. 36.

† Borough, commanding the galley *Bonavolia* at the Nore, sent the council, as late as August 4, elaborate details of arrangements for the defence of the Thames against Parma.

‡ "Armada Papers," ii. 39.

to land and water,* which they must do shortly or die; and where or how my knowledge cannot imagine. As the wind serveth, no place but between the Foreland and Hull . . . and otherwise the wind as it is at north-west they have no place to go withal but for the Scaw in Denmark, which were an hard adventure as the season of the year approacheth. If the wind by change suffer them, I verily believe they will pass about Scotland and Ireland to draw themselves home; wherein, the season of the year considered, with the long course they have to run and their sundry distresses, and, of necessity, the spending of time by watering, winter will so come on as it will be to their great ruin."

In a postscript he enlarged thus upon the probable effects of the stormy weather upon the enemy:—

"Which storm hath in mine opinion touched the enemy very near; for divers considerations follow—namely, the great sea-gate [that is, swell] about those isles; the hugeness of their shipping, who were so light as in fair weather would hardly bear their topsails; also the cold climate they are in toucheth them near, and will do daily more and more. Mine opinion is they are by this time so distressed, being so far thrust off, as many of them will never see Spain again."

Howard was not so clear-sighted, or so certain that all danger was over. In his report to Walsingham, written from Margate on August 8, after saying that he had only part of the fleet, the rest being driven to other ports by the storm ("the most violent as ever was seen at this time of the year"), and after pressing the queen's secretary to hurry supplies down to him, he went on:—

"I know not what you think of it at the court, but I do think, and so doth all here, that there cannot be too great forces maintained yet for four or five weeks on the seas; for although we have put the Spanish fleet past the Frith, and I think past the Isles, yet God knoweth whether they go either to the Naze of Norway or into Denmark, or to the Isles of Orkney to refresh themselves, and so to return; for I think they dare not return [to Spain] with this dishonour and shame to their king, and overthrow of their Pope's credit. Sir, sure bind, sure find. A kingdom is a great wager. Sir, you know security is dangerous, and had God not been our best friend we should have found it so. Some made little account of the Spanish force by sea; but I do warrant you all the world never saw such a force as theirs was." †

Drake was more optimistic, but still not as certain about the outlook as Fenner, and advised that there should be no haste

* And try to obtain fresh water.

† "Armada Papers," ii. 59. Howard also was anxious about Parma, and inquired where his forces by sea were.

to disarm. To Walsingham he wrote of Medina Sidonia*: "Whether he mind to return or not, I know not; but my opinion to your Honour is that I think he neither mindeth nor is in case to do so." And writing again the same day he said:—

"I have not in my former letter touched whether it be meet or no for her Majesty to continue her forces, for that some haply say winter cometh on apace. My poor opinion is that I dare not advise her Majesty to hazard a Kingdom with the saving a little charge. The Prince of Parma is very† . . . and will not let to send daily to the Duke of Sidonia if he may find him."

But the queen and her council "had a saving mind," and were anxious to cut down expenses by paying off the ships as soon as might be. Howard was summoned to London to confer with them, but delayed his departure from Margate for some days. Drake, anxious about the result of the coming deliberations, wrote directly to the queen, giving it as his opinion that the Armada had probably gone to Denmark to refit, and so might still be a danger, and suggesting that some one should be sent there to make inquiries, and "to deal according to your Majesty's great wisdom" with the King of Denmark.

Indeed, all the correspondence between soldiers, sailors, and politicians shows that there was in England, so far, no exultant sense of victory, but much perplexity and anxiety as to the immediate future. On the same day, August 8, the queen's secretary, Walsingham, writes to Burleigh‡: "It is hard now to resolve what advice to give to her Majesty for disarming, until it shall be known what is become of the Spanish fleet;" and to the lord chancellor: "I am sorry the lord admiral was forced to leave the prosecution of the enemy through the wants he sustained. Our half-doings doth breed dishonour and leaveth the disease uncured."

Wild rumours were in circulation. One day there came a report that the Duke of Parma had tried to sail from Dunkirk, but had been driven back with loss; then a contradictory report

* "Armada Papers," ii. 61. † Drake omits a word here.
‡ "Armada Papers," ii. 69.

that the rough weather in the Channel had driven the Hollanders from the blockade of the Flanders ports, and the duke might come out if he would. On August 8, when the queen had gone to the Tilbury camp to visit the reigning favourite, Leicester, there came through Margate a report "that the Duke of Parma was determined this spring tide to come out, and that he looked that by that time the Spanish fleet would be returned, according to an agreement between him and the Duke of Medina." * This was at first thought to be serious news, and Elizabeth spoke of remaining with her troops, "a conceit her Majesty had that in honour she could not return, in case there were any likelihood that the enemy would attempt anything." Further consideration dispelled the alarm, and Elizabeth went back to London.

Burleigh suggested the dismissal of the smaller ships, the paying off of sick men, and the reduction of the fleet to an effective squadron of its best units, for he thought the return of the Armada unlikely. Howard, on reports received from France, suggested new alarms.† The Duke of Parma's preparations were more forward than he had supposed. The Armada might have obtained supplies in Scotland, though he feared more that they had reached Denmark and would be helped there with ships as well as provisions, and he heard "for certain that there is great preparation of shipping and men at Dieppe and Newhaven [Havre], and that they are ready to come out." All available ships should be got ready, "for we must divide ourselves into parts to prevent all danger." The fleet must be kept up for six weeks till the winter weather came, and some of the ships that had been employed already were no longer seaworthy. "Some have spent their masts, and some are grown with this last storm into leaks; and therefore I do assure myself a good many will not be able to sail." Finally, he begged that the

* Walsingham to Burleigh ("Armada Papers," ii. 82).
† "Armada Papers," ii. 91.

men should be paid their wages. They were crying out for money, and if he had not pledged his word he would pay them, "they would have run away from Plymouth in thousands" weeks ago. Then he wrote of the misery of the sick men dying in out-houses and barns at Margate.

The story of preparations at Dieppe and Havre was a false report, but the fear of the Guises bringing France to the aid of Spain had long haunted Howard's mind, and made him ready to credit the rumour. Drake, in a long letter to Walsingham,* written when these stories were flying about, takes no notice of them; but he again argues that the Armada must have gone to Norway or Denmark. The wind, he thought, would have taken them there, but in a distressed condition, with much sickness on board, leaky hulls, sails and rigging cut up, and few anchors. Some, he knew, thought they had gone to Scotland, but he did not believe it.

"Norway or the out isles of Scotland can relieve them but with water and a few cows or bad beef and some small quantity of goats and hens, which is to them as nothing. And yet these bad reliefs are to be had but in few places, and their roads [anchorages] dangerous."

He thought that it was much more likely that the Armada had gone to Denmark, and if so, it might be a serious matter.

"The only thing which is to be looked for is, that if they should go to the King of Denmark and have his friendship and help for all their reliefs, none can better help their wants in all these parts than he; for that he is a prince of great shipping, and can best supply his wants, which now the Duke of Medina Sidonia standeth in need of, as great anchors, cables, masts, ropes, and victuals."

So once more he suggested that an embassy should be sent in a good ship to the Danish king. As for Parma, he was not so anxious as others, though he expected he might attempt something. "The Prince of Parma," he said, "I take him to be as a bear robbed of her whelps; and no doubt but, being so great a soldier as he is, that he will presently, if he may, undertake some great matter." But he thought that if the fleet showed

* "Armada Papers," ii. 97, August 10.

itself before Dunkirk it would be enough to make the Spaniards see that nothing could be done, and set them throwing the blame of failure on each other.

Phantom fleets are always appearing in war time. So on August 14, as Seymour in the *Rainbow* lay in the Downs inside the south end of the Goodwins, the point he had chosen from which to keep touch with his lighter craft going and coming in the Channel, there came on board the skipper of an Emden ship bound for Havre with pitch and tar, "delivering me news," writes Seymour, "which he himself saw, so far as he could descry, a great fleet off Housdon in Holland, and that great fleet did stand to the northward in his sight." Another ship from Brill reported having seen no fleet, but this did not disprove the Emden man's story. About the same date Walsingham had a report from Scotland that the Armada was anchored in Moray Firth. This story, believed for a few days, was quite unfounded. It was just possible that what the Emden skipper saw was the Dutch fleet of Justinus of Nassau, though it was not likely they were so far up the coast as Huisdinen by the Helder. The great fleet may have been nothing more than a crowd of fishing-boats seen dimly in the twilight, and taken to be large ships through a mistake as to the distance, as torpedo destroyers have been taken for cruisers in our own day by unpractised observers.

Count Justinus of Nassau, with forty sail in his fleet, was at sea, but watching the Flanders ports, with Flushing and the Scheldt as his base. On August 17, wind and weather being unfavourable for keeping his station, he ran across Channel, looked into Dover, and then joined Seymour in the Downs. He reported that Parma had only thirty ships, for which he could not find sailors, and a number of flat-bottomed boats. He had intelligence that any soldiers that had embarked had been landed again.* Seymour took a fancy to the Dutch admiral,

* Count Justin to Walsingham, August 17 ("Armada Papers," ii. 125).

SEMPER EADEM
ELISABET D.G.ANGLIAE, FRANCIAE, HIBERNIAE, ET VERGINIAE REGINA,
FIDEI CHRISTIANAE PROPVGNATRIX ACERRIMA. NVNC IN DNO REQVIESCENS.

(1,666)

QUEEN ELIZABETH.

Dressed as she went to St. Paul's for the Thanksgiving, after the defeat of the Spanish Armada.

and forwarding his report to Walsingham, wrote that he found Count Justin "very wise, subtle, and cunning," and therefore did trust him—counting, it would seem, on the subtlety and cunning being used only against the queen's enemies.

Howard had attended a meeting of the queen's council in London two days before, and it had been decided that the fleet should be reduced to a hundred ships. This was to be done by paying off a considerable number of merchantmen and small coasters, most of which had done little service beyond "making a show." A hundred sail, including the queen's ships and the best of the auxiliaries, would, it was thought, be enough to deal with any emergency that might arise. At the same time large numbers of the land forces were to be disbanded.

Howard returned to Margate on August 21, and found that the order of the council had been executed and the number of ships in commission considerably reduced. He was alarmed at the persistence of the fever, which had now brought the crews down to such an extent that what was left of the fleet was very short-handed. It was while he was trying to find some means of dealing with the pestilence that, on the day after his arrival, Sir Edward Norreys, who had gone northward in one of the pinnaces, came back with what both he and the lord admiral took to be certain intelligence that the Armada was returning to join hands with Parma. He sent on the news to Walsingham as soon as he heard it (August 22), saying he would now lay everything else aside except the preparation for active service. He asked for sailors, stores, and ammunition to be sent to him, and expressed a regret that the forces by sea and land had been reduced so soon. He could not count on taking to sea more than sixty sail, great and small, "very ill-manned."

Writing again to Walsingham next day he gave further news of the enemy,* dismissing as improbable a story that had come of the Armada having passed the Orkneys, "for many

* "Armada Papers," ii. 144.

hath met with them since that time." The latest tidings had been brought to him by Sir Henry North, who arrived at Margate the evening before from Ipswich.

"He declareth that there came one thither that came from the eastwards, and said to divers of the town that, as I take it, about the 16th of this present he saw them bear this ways, and that they were thwart of Berwick and kept the midst of the Channel." *

"That which must be done must be with speed," he added, assuring the queen's secretary that all were of good courage, despite the losses by sickness. "God knoweth what we shall do if we have no men," he said. "Many of our ships are so weakly manned that they have not mariners to weigh their anchors."

Howard's allusion to the report which he rejected seems to point to a piece of news that had been sent by Carey to the council from the Isle of Wight on the 22nd. As it happened, this dispatch of Carey's conveyed the first true tidings of the Armada's movements after Howard gave up the pursuit on August 2. Carey's statement ran thus:—

"This morning there arrived here divers mariners of this island, which came in a bark of Hampton [that is, Southampton] from Shetland; who upon oath affirm that on this day fortnight, being the 8th of this present, they being come 12 leagues from Shetland, south-east, where they had been a-fishing, they descried a very great fleet of monstrous great ships, to their seeming being about 100 in number, lying just west, with both sheets aftward, whereby their course was to run betwixt Orkneys and Fair Island; Shetland lying north and by east of Orkneys 21 leagues, and Fair Island lying 10 leagues from Orkneys, about east-north-east. Since which time, for 7 days together, they say they found the wind at sea most at south-east; whereby they judge the Spanish fleet could fetch no part of Scotland except some of the out isles; for themselves, lying by a wind, which a fleet could hardly do, it was seven days before they could reach Moray Firth, which is far in the north of Scotland." †

This good news, precise as the details were, was doubted in face of the reports from the east coast. Carey had sent the letter through Lord Huntington, and it was evidently sent post haste to London and thence to Margate, for Drake alludes to Huntington's information in a letter written to Walsingham on

* That is, well out to sea. † "Armada Papers," ii. 137.

the 23rd—on the whole a reassuring letter, and giving further evidence of the great seaman's sound judgment.* "The uncertainty of the reports," he wrote, "makes me rather to rest upon mine own conjecture than upon any of them, they disagreeing so much as they do." He pointed out that this was a season of westerly winds in the northern seas, and therefore it was "his poor opinion" that if perchance the Armada was returning, it was because with foul winds it had been unable to make its way round Scotland and Ireland, and not in pursuance of some plan for concerted action with Parma. If any such action were intended Medina Sidonia would have to count upon a most unlikely concurrence of favourable circumstances, for he must have good weather and arrive at the highest of the spring tides, and Parma must have all his men embarked that day, and there must be a fair wind and a smooth sea for his small craft encumbered with troops. He was "credibly informed" that it was only on a spring tide that Parma's transports could get out of Dunkirk, Sluys, and Nieuport.

There was no harbour on that coast for Medina Sidonia's ships, so he must have fair weather, and even if he had this luck, "if we should find him there he is like, God willing, to have unquiet rest," and the banks under water would be good allies for England against his great ships. Drake protested that he held that they should think more of Parma than anything Medina Sidonia could now do. He was urging Howard to go to the Flanders coast, and hoped that Walsingham would use his influence to the same end, "for there are many causes that might move us to be there more than we are, and much better for us and better service;" and he ended with a pious hope that "God would give us all grace to live in His fear, so shall we not need greatly to fear the enemy."

If the Spaniards had really been coming back and been "thwart of Berwick" on the 16th, something should have been

* "Armada Papers," ii. 146.

heard of them much farther south by the 23rd. So there might well be a suspicion that once more the phantom fleets of the anxious days of war had been seen, and not realities. But on the 24th there came news that put an end to the alarm.* That afternoon Howard met on board the *Ark* off Margate one of his spies, a sailor just arrived from a village near Dunkirk, who told him the Duke of Parma had gone away to Brussels, and that his flotilla was being dismantled. And the same day arrived "young Norreys," who had followed the Armada in one of the pinnaces detached from the fleet three weeks before, and reported that he had last seen the Spaniards west of the Orkneys sailing for the Atlantic.

So at length the time of anxious conjecture was over, and it was seen that Fenner's forecast had proved right. The Armada had failed, and was in full flight for Spain. Orders were given to pay off the fleet, and while this was being done there came the first news of the great disaster that strewed the western coasts of Ireland with the wrecks of Medina Sidonia's galleons.

* E. Winter to Walsingham ("Armada Papers," ii. 149).

CHAPTER XX.

THE SHIPWRECKS.

At the council of war held on board the *San Martin* on July 30 by the English reckoning, August 9 by the Spanish, the decision, as recorded by the admiral, had been,—

> "That they should go back to the Channel if the weather would permit it; but if not, that then, constrained by the weather, they should return by the North Sea to Spain, seeing that there were such great lack of provisions in the fleet, and that the ships were spoiled and unable that hitherto had resisted the enemy."

We may take it that Medina Sidonia had not the slightest intention of returning to the Channel; nor can he be blamed for this, considering the condition of the Armada, when after heavy loss and manifold damage in four battles, and after narrowly escaping shipwreck on the Zeeland banks, it ran out into the North Sea.

The English fleet had pursued him for three days. On the afternoon of August 2 (12) it gave up the chase at a point which Howard describes as east of the Firth of Forth,* and Fenner as "in fifty-five degrees and about two-and-thirty leagues from our coast in that height" (that is, latitude). Then during three anxious weeks the Armada was seen no more, and the only news of it came in the form of contradictory and sometimes alarmist reports, as we have seen.

Thomas Fenner alone of all the English captains had rightly

* "Armada Papers," ii. 32.



THE HOMEWARD VOYAGE OF THE ARMADA.

judged what its course would be. As he conjectured, Medina Sidonia was thinking only of rounding Scotland and Ireland and reaching Spain by way of the Atlantic, without again exposing his shattered fleet to the trial of battle. In the few lines with which the Spanish admiral closes his journal of the campaign after the disappearance of the English fleet, he tells how the wind held steadily in the south-west till he left the "Sea of Norway" (North Sea), so that "it was not possible to return to the English Channel though we desired it." One suspects that the desire was not very strong, and that the steady wind from the south-west was very welcome.

For during these days when the Armada was running to the northward the admiral was lapsing into a state of brooding depression. To a great extent he relinquished the command to his lieutenants, Diego Flores and Bobadilla. He knew that throughout the fleet there was a general disposition to attribute the failure to him, and though he had shown courage in battle, he was talked of as an incompetent coward.

It was perhaps to vindicate himself by putting on record the shortcomings of those who he considered should have given him more effective support, that, as soon as the Armada was well on its way northwards, he condemned to death no less than twenty of its officers for default of duty.* But only one was actually executed—hanged to the yardarm of a pinnace by the provost-marshal. "The rest were deprived of their commands, but there was no further punishment, such was the great clemency of the duke," says Vanegas.

Francisco Cuellar, captain of the galleon *San Pedro*, which had been in the thick of the Gravelines fight and suffered severely there, gives a different account of this execution.† He explains that in order to have the opportunity of stopping their leaks by plugging shot holes near the water line, some of the

* "Narrative of Vanegas," Duro, ii. 396.
† Duro, ii. 340.

ships would crowd sail and run out ahead of the Armada, and then lie to for a while under shortened sail while the work was being done. In this way one afternoon the *San Pedro* was lying out ahead of the fleet, with another ship, one of the *urcas*, still farther in advance. He had had little rest and was very tired, so he had lain down to sleep in his cabin, when he was roused and told the unpleasantly startling news that one of the provost-marshal's pinnaces had come alongside, with orders from the Duke of Medina Sidonia to hang him from the yardarm, for having disobeyed the command that no one should sail ahead of the flagship. He was told that the same summary sentence of death, without trial, had been passed upon Don Cristobal de Avila, the captain of the *urca*. Cuellar asked to be taken to the flagship to appeal personally to the duke, but was told he could not see him; and he adds that it was well known that the duke was now leaving everything in the hands of his lieutenant, Francisco de Bobadilla, whom he blamed for this harsh sentence on himself. Failing to see the duke, he was so lucky as to persuade the provost to take him to the ship of the auditor-general, the chief-justice of the Armada, Don Martin de Aranda. He protested to the auditor that he had done good service in the battles with the English, and if to-day he had broken the letter of a general order it was to save the king's ship. Aranda told him to stay on board his ship, and promised him that his life would be saved unless the duke sent a written order to the contrary signed with his own hand. No such order came, and Cuellar remained on board the auditor's ship till her destruction on the west coast of Ireland exposed him to new peril of his life. How narrowly he had escaped a miserable end he realized when he saw the provost-marshal's pinnace run back to the fleet with the corpse of Cristobal de Avila dangling from the yard-arm of her long lateen sail.

Vanegas, who was serving on the flagship, tells * how, before

* Duro, ii. 375.

the Armada left the North Sea, the men's rations were reduced to eight ounces of biscuit, a small measure of water, and a little wine. This was done to make the supplies last till Spain could be reached, but with the result that sailors and soldiers began to die of hunger and thirst. To economize the water supply it was ordered that all the mules and horses should be thrown overboard. Forty mules for the artillery and forty fine horses, the personal property of the duke, were thus thrown into the sea from the *San Martin* alone. One wonders that with soldiers serving on board, who knew of the expedients resorted to in order to feed a besieged garrison, these animals were not kept to be slaughtered for meat to eke out the men's rations.

There was already sickness in the ships, and with the lack of food and water it increased to a terrible extent. With semi-starvation, fever, and scurvy in every ship, the chaplains were kept busy administering the last consolations of religion to dying men, and each day read the burial service over one or more canvas-shrouded corpse, and "committed them to the deep." Even before the north of Scotland was passed, rough weather was adding to the distress of the crews, and the unfortunate Armada, though still keeping good order and sailing together as a great fleet, was under the shadow of hopeless disaster that was soon to destroy it almost utterly.

As we have seen, it was sighted on August 8 (18) by the fishing-boat that had gone to the Shetlands from Southampton, "a very great fleet of monstrous great ships," steering for the wide strait between the Orkneys and Fair Isle, and still making a brave show. Medina Sidonia closes his diary with the note that the Armada rounded the islands on August 10 (20), with the wind from the north-east. He says nothing of the broken weather that delayed him and began the dispersion of his fleet as it made its way between the Orkneys and Shetlands heading for the North Atlantic. Nor does he say anything of the first of the long series of disasters that strewed

the coasts of Scotland and Ireland with the wrecks of his galleons.

About midway between the two island groups north of Scotland lies the lonely Fair Isle—a rocky island, cliff bound, accessible at few landing-places, and then inhabited only by a few fishermen and sea-fowlers, who lived there in extreme poverty. In the night of August 9 or 10, the 650-ton *Gran Grifon*, the flagship of the squadron of *urcas*, commanded by Juan Lopez de Medina, crashed on the rocks below its black cliffs, and stuck fast where she struck, swept by the seas raised by the north-east wind. Juan Lopez reached the island next day with only a handful of his crew of nearly 300 men. Only the scantiest provision had been saved from the wreck, the island could afford only the slenderest supplies, and the Spaniards lived there for six weeks "in great hunger and cold." They were without shelter, almost without food, eking out their small store by killing sea birds, trying to kindle fires of sea-sodden wreckage on the bare treeless ground. At last a passing coaster took them off, and landed them at Anstruther, in Fifeshire, where they surrendered to the bailies of the town. Melville, the Presbyterian clergyman of Anstruther, describes how he saw Lopez de Medina asking for quarter for himself and his comrades in misfortune—"A very reverend man, of big stature and grave and stout countenance, gray haired, and very humble-like." Here, as elsewhere, the Spaniards who reached Scotland were well treated, and eventually sent back to Flanders or Spain.* There was, even among the Scottish Protestants, no hostility to Spain like that which prevailed in England, and there was often a friendly feeling for the men of a nation that was a possible ally.

* Local tradition in the north of Scotland and the Orkneys and Shetlands asserts that the galleon wrecked on Fair Isle was the flagship of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, Commander-in-Chief of the Armada. This statement is to be found in some popular histories and standard books of reference. It doubtless arose from the fact that the wrecked galleon was a flagship, and the confusion between the name of Juan Lopez de *Medina* and the title of the Duke of *Medina* Sidonia.

After passing between the Orkneys and Shetlands the Armada had to battle against strong westerly winds and endure much bad weather. The sailing orders issued by Medina Sidonia, on the advice of his pilots, prescribed that the fleet was to hold on to the north-westward till it reached the latitude of 61½ degrees.* It was intended, it would seem, to keep well away into the open ocean on the next course ordered, "West-south-west until you be found under 58 degrees, and from thence to the south-west to the height [latitude] of 53 degrees," for the express warning is given "to take great heed lest you fall upon the island of Ireland, for fear of the harm that may happen to you upon that coast." The warning was grimly justified by what happened.

The *San Marvin* kept on her northerly course until the latitude of 62 degrees was reached, so that she was well up towards the Faroe Islands. Vanegas tells how it was bitterly cold in this high latitude, and how of the many negroes and mulattoes on board the flagship nearly all died. The summer had been a time of broken weather, and the later weeks, when it was verging into autumn, were cold and rainy, even as far south as the Channel. Away in the North Atlantic it must have been a miserable time for those ill-fed southern sailors—Spaniards,

* In the "direction given by the Duke of Medina for the course which the Spanish fleet should hold on their return to Spain" (Laughton, "Armada Papers," ii. 240), it is ordered that "the course that is first to be held is to the north-north-east until you be found under 61 degrees and a half." This is an impossible course, that would have carried the Armada to the coast of Norway, instead of to the channel between the Orkneys and Fair Isle. The document must be a translation from a paper from one of the galleons wrecked in Ireland, for it comes from the Irish papers. The translator was probably David Gwyn, who was acting as interpreter in Ireland, but whose knowledge of Spanish was not as complete as he pretended. In this case I feel sure that there is a mistranslation, and that the course ordered by Medina Sidonia was north-north-west. In Spanish north-north-west would be "*nordueste*," which a careless translator might interpret "north-east," the Spanish for which would be *nordeste*. A sailor would have thought twice before writing down "north-north-east" as the course of a fleet that had run up the North Sea and passed the north of Scotland; but Gwyn, though he had pulled at the oar of a Spanish galley and claimed to be a sailor, was a landsman.

Portuguese, and Italians—accustomed only to voyages in the Mediterranean and the tropic seas. It was more like winter than summer, and there were days when the dull, cloud-packed skies sent down showers of sleety rain as the great ships straggled for miles over gray foam-flecked seas. Men huddled below in the noisome gun-decks and in the fore and stern castles. Only the pilots and the men told off to trim the sails kept the decks, chilled to the bone with wind and wet. Day and night gangs of sailors or soldiers had to take their turn at the never-resting pumps to keep the ships afloat, of which many were holed by English shot, and all were strained with rolling and pitching in the rough seas.

In the North Sea the Armada had kept together in one great array of well-ordered squadrons. After it entered the Atlantic the fleet began to break up under the stress of rough weather. A considerable number of ships still followed the *San Martin*. Others formed haphazard groups obeying the lead of one or other of the squadron flagships. Others kept company in twos and threes, and others again became isolated, ploughing their solitary way over the lonely sea, failing to keep up with the rest on account of their crippled condition. Some of them, despite hard work at the pumps, settled down lower and lower in the water each day until at last they sank in the ocean, far from all succour or refuge, their fate unrecorded and unknown, and their belated arrival hoped for till, as the months went by and there was no news of them, they were at last set down as lost. Of others we know the disastrous fate.

Three ships at least, driven by the weather, or compelled to seek some place where they might find water and food, ran before the wind to the west of Scotland. They entered the Sound of Mull. But one was wrecked near Lochaline and another off Salen. The third is generally said to have been one of the largest ships of the Armada, the great galleon *El Duque de Florencia*, of 961 tons and 52 guns, with a crew of nearly 400

men. She had been originally one of the fighting galleons of the "Armada of Portugal," but had been detached from it to strengthen the Levant squadron. But the ship that reached Tobermory Bay and anchored there was certainly not the *Florencia*, but another galleon of the Levant squadron, the *San Juan de Sicilia*, of 800 tons and 26 guns. Local tradition speaks of her as a wealthy treasure ship. But with the stories of the cargoes of gold and silver brought from the Indies each year by the "Plate Fleet," and of the rich booty found on board some of the Spanish traders captured by English sailors, there was a popular belief that every galleon had a fortune under her hatches. So it came that even fighting ships were thought of as floating gold mines. Very detailed stories were told of the wealth of the galleon. Her captain, it was said, was a grandee of Spain, who ate and drank from dishes and goblets of gold. And there was a further romance of a Spanish princess, who had made the voyage with him, and whose personal luggage included treasure chests and jewel cases full of diamonds and emeralds.

The local tradition further tells how the Highlanders of Tobermory boarded the galleon, and at first were good friends with her commander and crew, till a quarrel arose over an injury or insult put upon the local chief by the grandee of Spain. On this the Highlander contrived to fire the magazine, and the great ship, shattered by the explosion, went down at her moorings, taking all her supposed treasures with her into the depths of Tobermory Bay. The tale of the princess and her jewels is, of course, the wildest romance. There may have been some plate for the commander's table, and some moderate sum in ducats and pistoles made up of the personal property of officers and volunteers, and perhaps some public money for the expenses of the voyage; but she was not a flagship, and the military chest of the expedition, the "king's money," was elsewhere. But the glamour of supposed treasure sunk in the bay, vouched for by

local tradition, has been sufficient motive for more than one organized effort to recover the wealth of the *Florencia*. The latest attempt has been carried out in two successive summers with the most efficient of modern diving and salvage appliances. The wreck has been found, and various objects of antiquarian interest and a few Spanish coins recovered. But so far, in all these attempts, more money has been expended than is ever likely to be repaid in Spanish gold.

As to the story of the galleon having been deliberately wrecked by the Tobermory men, it is a legend. She was blown up by the treachery of one Smallett or Smollett, an ancestor of the novelist, and an agent of Walsingham. He was a trader of Dumbarton, and made his living by taking supplies to the western islands. It was thus easy for him to enter into relations with the Spaniards, and to board their ship in connection with a contract for supplying them with provisions. He found means to set fire to the ship in or near "the powder room," and she was blown up with the loss of nearly all on board.*

Including the *Gran Grifon*, wrecked on Fair Isle, four ships were lost on the coast of Scotland. But it was on the shores of the "island of Ireland" that the most numerous and the most tragic of the disasters of the Armada took place, and that the survivors of shipwreck had to face the greatest dangers and endure the most merciless treatment. Medina Sidonia's sailing instructions had warned his captains of the perils to be encountered there. A sixteenth-century sailor tells how, on the west coast of Ireland, "the ocean sea raiseth such a billow as can hardly be endured by the greatest ships;" and there was wild weather that August and September on the "ocean sea." Ships in better con-

* For the local traditions, the story of the treasure-seeking, the discussion as to the identity of the galleon, and the documents relating to her destruction, see Colonel K. M. Foss's pamphlet, "The Tobermory Galleon Salvage;" the late Mr. Andrew Lang's most convincing article, "The Mystery of the Tobermory Galleon Revealed," in *Blackwood's Magazine*, March 1912; Colonel Foss's article, "The Tobermory Galleon," in the *London Morning Post*, April 6, 1912; and Mr. Andrew Lang's reply in the same newspaper, April 9, 1912.

dition and with healthy crews might indeed have made no great account of the surges that the western gales were driving towards the cliff-bound shores of Donegal and Clare, but it was no easy matter for King Philip's galleons, with patched-up rigging and leaking hulls, and between decks full of sick and dying men, with rotting provisions and nearly empty water casks, to fight their way southwards in the Atlantic storms without being driven on the dreaded coasts. Many were, it would seem, not so much forced to make a dangerous approach to the Irish shores by mere stress of weather, as compelled to take all risks in order to find some lonely bay or unguarded fishing port where they could obtain a much needed supply of water, and some scanty provision of meat and barley bread. Others again may have steered for Ireland in despair of keeping afloat in the open sea in their leaky condition and short of hands for the pumps. In one case we know it was because nearly all the crew were dead, and the survivors could no longer handle the sails, that a Spanish ship was forced to seek a port where death of another kind awaited them.

The dangers to be feared on the Irish shores were not only those of the "ocean billow" and the frowning cliffs, with their outlying death-traps of wave-swept rocks and skerries. There was besides all these the savagery of relentless foes. The unfortunate island had only lately been the scene of a most cruel war of extermination, in which the followers of the Irish chiefs and the adherents of not a few of the Anglo-Irish Lords of the Pale had, after a prolonged and bitter struggle, been not subdued but massacred by the Elizabethan adventurers who were engaged in clearing the country of its people to make way for new colonists from across the Channel. It was a war in which the queen's flying columns had systematically gone out, not to conquer, but to slay; and in the massacres men, women, and children of Irish, English, and Scottish descent had been slaughtered in cold blood by the queen's agents, some of whom were men

whose names are associated with the glories of the Elizabethan period in peace and war.*

Except in a few of the fastnesses of bog and mountain in the far west this ruthless system had trampled out all resistance, but Lord Deputy Fitzwilliam and the governors of the provinces had reason to fear that a Spanish descent might raise for a while the smouldering flame, and even a few hundred Spanish regulars under good officers might be a formidable force to deal with, guided by Irish allies, who could show them the way by hill path and bog track to carry on a partisan warfare with the columns from the English garrisons.

The news that the Armada had left the North Sea and rounded Scotland was therefore a source of anxiety to the queen's officers in Ireland, though they expected at most to have to deal with only relatively small forces of the enemy. The west, where O'Rourke of Breffni and a few other chiefs still were unsubdued, was the danger point, and Fitzwilliam had confided the care of it to a veteran soldier, Sir Richard Bingham, the Governor of Connaught.

* Essex, the father of Elizabeth's favourite, "attacked Rathlin Island, the stronghold where the Scots had left their wives and children, their sick and aged, and after receiving the surrender of the scanty garrison, massacred them to a man, and hunted out and slew every living soul, man, woman and child, who had taken refuge in the caves and fastnesses of the island, in all some 650 persons" (Walpole's "Kingdom of Ireland," p. 127). Drake commanded the ships that conveyed the expedition to Rathlin. Raleigh and Spenser and Sir Humphrey Gilbert took part in the systematic extermination of the Munster people. Of the appearance of the land after the work was done Spenser himself writes: "Notwithstanding that Munster was a most rich and plentiful country, full of corn and cattle, yet after one year and a half they were brought to such wretchedness as that any stony heart would rue the same; out of every corner of the woods and glens they came, creeping forth upon their hands, for their legs could not bear them. They looked like anatomies of death; they spoke like ghosts crying out of their graves. . . . In short space there were none almost left; and a most populous and plentiful country left void of men and beasts." It is over the methods of the gentlemen adventurers who wrought this havoc that Kingsley in "Westward Ho!" attempts to throw a sunlit veil of romance, as when he makes Raleigh say, "Can I not establish plantations, build and sow and make the desert valleys laugh with corn? Shall I not have my Spenser with me to fill me with noble thoughts and raise my soul to his heroic pitch? Is not this true knight-errantry, to redeem to peace and use, and to the glory of that glorious queen whom God has given to me, a generous soil and a more generous race?"

Bingham knew the Spaniards well, and spoke their language. He had fought beside them and against them. He had served as a volunteer in the Spanish siege of St Quentin, and under Don John of Austria in the world-famous victory of Lepanto. Then he had met the Spaniards in battle as a volunteer with the Dutch insurgents in Flanders and Brabant. In the Irish wars he had been among the most merciless, and he and the troops he commanded were not likely to shrink from wholesale massacre of even helpless enemies.

His garrisons held the seaport towns of the west, and he arranged a system of patrols to watch the coasts. His object was not merely to be ready to oppose a hostile descent, but to prevent the Spaniards from obtaining food, water, or shelter in any of the ports and bays of his province. Fearing that the Irish might be friendly to the enemies of England, he industriously spread among the coast population the report that if the Spaniards landed, the foreigners would massacre the old and carry the young away into slavery. The people of the ports, who had long traded with Spain, must have known better; but some of the rude fisher folk of the west perhaps believed the tale.

Unfortunately for the Spaniards there was little friendliness for them among the coast folk. In some cases the Irish acted as the allies of Bingham's men in killing and plundering the wretched refugees cast upon their shores. In other cases, even where none of the queen's men were present to direct the work of slaughter and robbery, the Irish acted in the spirit of the old Cornish wreckers, and regarded all that the storms cast upon their rocks as fair plunder, and any survivors of the wrecks as dangerous rivals for property that had already enough native claimants to divide it.

The demoralizing war of extermination had made both sides cruel. But in several instances the Spaniards were helped and protected by the Irish chiefs, who controlled their wild followers, and gave the refugees such poor hospitality as they could afford.

WRECKS ON THE IRISH COAST.

The few priests and friars living in hiding among the clansmen were also humanely active on behalf of the shipwrecked crews.

The first wreck took place on the rock-bound coast of "the O'Doherty country," the peninsula of Inishowen in Donegal, between Lough Foyle and Lough Swilly. A group of four ships, detached from the main body, had either turned too soon on the south-west course, or been driven from the assigned track by stress of weather. They were a great galleon of the Levant squadron, *La Trinidad Valencera* of 1,100 tons, with a crew of 413 men; and three *urcas*, the *San Salvador* (650 tons and 261 men), the *Barca de Amburg* (600 tons, 289 men), and the *Castillo Negro* (750 tons, 289 men). In the open sea north of Ireland the *Barca de Amburg* was found to be

sinking, and the *Trinidad* and the *Castillo* took what was left of her crew off her before she disappeared under the waves. The *Trinidad* then parted company with her consorts, only to drive on the rocks of Inishowen. There were, including one hundred officers and men of the lost *urca*, some four hundred and fifty men on board of the *Trinidad*, "whereof many sick and weak," says Don Alonso de Luzon,* the captain of the troops embarked on her. Don Alonso tells how in "a broken boat of their own" he landed first with four or five comrades, their drawn rapiers in their hands. They were met by "four or five savage people, who bade them welcome and well used them, until some twenty more wild men came unto them, after which time they took away a bag of money containing 1,000 reals in silver, and a blue cloak richly laid with gold lace." In all the Spanish narratives the Irish coast folk are described as *selvajes*, "wild men or savages." One does not wonder at it, for their condition was more miserable than that of the Indians whom some of these gentlemen adventurers had seen on the shores of the Spanish Main. Francisco Cuellar, who, after escaping from another wreck, lived some months among them, describes them as living in utter poverty, ill-housed, ill-clothed, and half-starved, men and women wearing only a rough shirt-shaped garment, and a cloak, though some of the men had roughly-made goatskin breeches. The men wore their hair hanging over their foreheads, and cut short above the eyebrows, and had no kind of headgear; the women wore a rag twisted round their heads. Their houses were miserable huts, the beds being heaps of damp rushes. They had one meal a day of barley bread, butter, and sour milk, seldom tasting meat of any kind. Gentlemen who wore "blue cloaks richly laid with gold lace," and had bags of silver reals and ducats on their belts, might well regard the ragged starving crowd of wild Irish as *selvajes*.

* "Armada papers," ii. 272.

Beyond the taking of this tempting booty O'Doherty's people proved hospitable enough. The wrecked galleon was not far from the shore, hard on the rocks, with the breakers foaming about her. But her towering sides prevented the sea from sweeping over her decks, so that steps could be taken for bringing off her crew. Of the galleon's own boats only one was available, but the Irish brought out another, probably one of the canoe-like *corraghs* built by stretching skins on a wooden frame—boats of a kind that are still handled with marvellous daring and skill in the wildest weather by the Irish fishermen of to-day. For the use of this boat the clansmen asked and were given 200 ducats—not an extortionate charge for salvage. For two days the Irish and Spaniards worked strenuously and successfully at the rescue of the shipwrecked men. There were some accidents and considerable loss of life. Many of the Spaniards, impatient at the slow working of the two boats, and fearing the ship would break up, tried to swim ashore. Some succeeded, but many failed to reach the land, and in all a hundred were drowned.

Don Alonso de Luzon saw that arms and ammunition were landed, and at the end of the second day, when the rescue work was completed, he had on shore under his command 350 men armed with muskets and a few pikes. They had "very ill entertainment;" but it was not the fault of their poverty-stricken hosts, suddenly called upon to provide for this crowd of hungry men. The Spaniards bought from the O'Dohertys "certain gearrans" (little horses), which they killed, cut up, and cooked on driftwood fires, and they had also "some small quantity of butter that the common people brought to sell."

For a week the shipwrecked Spaniards and the O'Doherty clansmen lived together in good fellowship, saving some property and stores from the wreck. But by this time the news of what had happened had spread through the country, and there arrived two of Sir Richard Bingham's captains with a strong force of

pikemen and musketeers. Alonso de Luzon was summoned in the queen's name to surrender. It would have been better for his unfortunate followers if he had decided to fight it out, and die, if need be, sword in hand. But with "many sick and weak," and all half-starved, he lost heart and surrendered on terms. Even then this was done subject to the subsequent good pleasure of Fitzwilliam, for the only conditions that Bingham's captains would grant to the Spaniards were "that their lives should be saved till they came to the viceroy, and that they should be suffered to repair unto him, every private soldier with one suit of apparel, and every gentleman with two." Don Alonso thought that this was security enough. He did not anticipate a massacre in cold blood of defenceless men. So he ordered his soldiers and sailors to ground their arms. The officers handed over their swords and rapiers, and the men gave up "350 muskets, and calivers, and some few pikes."

It was Bingham's settled policy throughout to destroy all the "common sort" of the Spaniards who fell into the hands of his flying columns, reserving the gentlemen and officers till further orders from the lord deputy, as these might be worth holding to ransom. On the night after Alonso de Luzon's surrender the soldiers and the "savage people" began killing and plundering the prisoners. Very few of them escaped death. The gentlemen were marched under escort to Drogheda. Four of them died on the way. They were robbed of their money and gold chains and other valuables, some of this property being taken by John Kelly, the sergeant-major of the force that had captured them; and whatever was left was taken by the rascally interpreter, David Gwyn, famous afterwards for his galley romances, who was employed to examine them and take down their statements in writing at Drogheda.

The weather had become worse as the Armada turned southward in the open Atlantic, and the westerly gales drove large numbers of ships to the Irish coast. Of these at least twenty

were wrecked under the giant cliff walls of the west, or on outlying rocks and reefs. Such names as Spanish Point and Spaniards Bay in Clare are memorials of the fate of one or other of King Philip's splendid galleons, and at many a seaport and fishing village along the west coast of Ireland one hears the traditional story of local wrecks, and perhaps it is added that below tide-mark great anchors and cannon are still lying at the bottom of the sea. Any one who has ever looked out on the ocean from these western cliffs on a wild day, and seen the huge waves breaking in thunder and spray upon the towering faces of their giant walls, and boiling round detached headlands and pinnacles of rock, and over half-sunken reefs, can realize the terrible fate of the ships that were storm-driven upon this inhospitable shore. They went to their doom with half-starved, sickly crews, with no knowledge of local pilotage, no friendly light or beacon to warn them of danger. Every port of refuge was closed against them, and the few who could struggle to the shore from the shattered ships found waiting for them armed enemies more merciless than the stormy sea.

Bingham and Fitzwilliam fairly revelled in the slaughter of the shipwrecked crews, and one at least of the Irish chiefs of the west, O'Donnell, was as merciless as they.* Bingham's government of Connaught then included the country of Thomond (now County Clare, and belonging to the province of Munster). He therefore controlled the coast from the peninsula of Innishowen in Donegal down to the mouth of the Shannon. He wrote to the queen's secretary from Athlone on October 1 †:—

"After the Spanish fleet had doubled Scotland, and were in their course homewards, they were by contrary weather driven upon the several parts of this province and wrecked, as it were by even portions, three ships in every of the four several counties bordering upon the sea coasts—namely, in Sligo, Mayo, Galway, and Thomond—on the rocks and sands by the shore side, and some three or four besides to seaboard of the out isles, which presently sunk, both men and ships,

* Canon D'Alton, "History of Ireland," iii. 119.
† "Armada Papers," ii. 261.

in the night time. And so can I say, by good estimation, that 6,000 or 7,000 men have been cast away on these coasts, save some 1,000 of them, which escaped to land in several places where their ships fell, which since were all put to the sword. Amongst these were many gentlemen of the middle sort, and some reserved alive, but none of their greatest commanders have happened into our hands."

He took a personal part in the massacres. He marched 400 shipwrecked men into Galway, and there ordered his troops to slay them all. Then he reported that, "having made a clean dispatch of them, both in the town and in the country abroad, he rested Sunday all day, giving praise and thanks to God for her Majesty's most happy success in that action, and our deliverance from such dangerous enemies."

A miserable attempt has been made to defend, or at least palliate, this ruthless cruelty on the plea that it was a recognized practice to kill prisoners of war when they could not be safely guarded, and it would therefore be dangerous to give them quarter. But Bingham and Fitzwilliam had ample means of guarding their disarmed prisoners. There was no fighting spirit left in the broken, disheartened, and starving men thus cast on the Irish shore. We have seen how Alonso de Luzon, an officer of the "*tercio* of Sicily," the best regiment in the famous Spanish infantry, with no doubt many veterans of that corps among the 350 men who had landed with arms in their hands in Inishowen, did not attempt a fight against Bingham's captains. Crowds of unarmed wretches such as were thrown on the shore of Galway Bay would have been no more dangerous than so many sheep.

Fitzwilliam was even more cruel and merciless than Bingham. From a letter written by the latter to the queen on December 3, it appears that the viceroy ordered the cold-blooded slaughter of officers, whom the Governor of Connaught had spared when he killed their men. These unfortunate Spanish gentlemen, after escaping from the perils of shipwreck, had seen their followers cut off to a man, but they might reasonably expect to be held to ransom and see their country again. Fitzwilliam doomed

them to death, and all but two were executed. Bingham tells the story to the queen as if it were good service that would be welcome to her. He is evidently anxious that she should realize that he has done his work thoroughly and effectively. He talks* of his "fear to offend your Majesty by pressing too far into your Highness' presence with my rude and uncomely letters," and of his "serviceable care to answer the trust and charge it hath pleased your Highness to lay upon me." But he goes on to say that he, "her poor and faithful soldier," ventures to send her

"these few and humble lines as a thanksgiving to Almighty God for these His daily preservations of your sacred person, and the continual deliverance of us, your Majesty's subjects, from the cruel and bloody hands of your Highness' enemies."

Then after attributing the "great and horrible shipwrecks" to the direct intervention of the Almighty, he tells how fourteen or fifteen ships of the Armada have been shattered on the shores of his province.

"The men of which ships did all perish in the sea, save the number of 1,100 or upwards, which we put to the sword; amongst whom there was divers gentlemen of quality and service, as captains, masters of ships, lieutenants, ensign-bearers, other inferior officers, and young gentlemen, to the number of some fifty, whose names I have for the most part set down in a list, and have sent the same unto your Majesty; which the same being spared from the sword till order might be had from the lord deputy [Fitzwilliam] how to proceed against them, I had special direction sent me to see them executed, as the rest were, only keeping alive one Don Luis de Cordova and a young gentleman, his nephew, till your Highness' pleasure be known."

Further on in the letter he tells how

"my brother George had one Don Graveillo de Swasso† and another gentleman by licence, and some five or six Dutch boys and young men, who, coming after the heat and fury of justice was past, by entreaty I spared them, in respect they were pressed into the fleet against their wills, and did dispose them into several Englishmen's hands, upon good assurance that they should be forthcoming at all times."

But even these two gentlemen and the five or six Dutch youths were not allowed to live. Fitzwilliam went down to Connaught

* "Armada Papers," ii. 299.

† It is curious to find this impossible name in a letter of Bingham's, for he knew Spanish.

to see for himself how his work was being done, and Bingham reports how the viceroy

"made his way through this province, and in his passing along caused both these two Spaniards, which my brother had, to be executed, and the Dutch men and boys which were spared before, reserving none but Don Luis and his nephew."

It is not easy to set down patiently the story of such deeds as these, and one feels sickened at reading Bingham's vaunting record of this "cruel and bloody work," introduced by his praise to God for deliverance from the "cruel and bloody hands of the queen's enemies."

Going northwards by the shores of Sligo Bay, where three galleons had been driven on the rocks, Fitzwilliam tells how he saw there miles of wreckage strewing the coast, "timber enough to build five of the greatest ships that ever I saw, besides mighty great boats, cables, and other cordage, and some such masts for bigness and length as I never saw any two could make the like." A few of those who escaped from these wrecks were reported to be sheltered by the O'Rourke clan in the wilder parts of Breffni, the Sligo of to-day, which the lord deputy had not yet entirely subdued. From Dublin, on his return there, he wrote to the queen's secretary *: "Since it hath pleased God, by His hand, upon the rocks, to drown the greater and better sort of them, I will, with His favour, be His soldier for the dispatching of those rags which yet remain." It was ignoble work for a soldier, and no better for the lord deputy's ill-assorted piety.

Among the ships wrecked on the coast of Mayo was the gallant Don Alonso de Leyva's *Rata Coronada*. She had been hotly engaged in the four battles in the Channel, and when he brought her out of the fight off Gravelines she was full of shot holes, "leaking like a sieve." He patched her up a little in the North Sea, and kept her afloat till she was caught in the western gales off the Irish coast. She was driven ashore in

* "Armada Papers," ii. 286.

Blacksod Bay, but Leyva and part of the crew were rescued by another ship that had run into the bay for shelter. The ship is said to have been one of the three surviving galleasses. With his ship crowded up with the remnant of two crews, and short of provisions and water, the commander of the galleass gave up all hope of reaching Spain. No supplies were to be looked for on the Irish coast, so he resolved to steer for Scotland, whither the western gale would help him. He made his way northwards past the headlands and rock walls of Donegal, and the worst perils seemed to be over. But the gale increased and the galleass was driven against the high cliffs of Dunluce Castle, near the Giant's Causeway. She was shattered to matchwood, and Leyva and all on board perished, save five men who swam ashore.

Don Juan Martinez de Recalde, Admiral of Biscay, had kept six other ships with him, and still flew his flag in the battered *Santiago*. Forced on the west of Ireland by the gale, he succeeded in running into the Shannon. He had a sufficient force to protect himself, and probably obtained water and some other supplies. But Bingham says that of the seven ships two were wrecked and one burned. He gives no details. The burned ship may have gone hard aground and been set on fire to prevent her being secured by the English, or Recalde may have abandoned and burned her in order to reinforce the reduced crews of the other ships. He had only four ships when a few days later a coaster, who brought the news to Galway, saw him anchored by the "Blaskeyes"—Blasket Island on the Kerry coast. Bingham recording the news expressed the opinion that Recalde would be likely to get back to Spain, which he did.

Another storm-beaten ship which succeeded in taking shelter in a port on the Kerry coast was not so fortunate. It was one of the *urcas*—name not stated—which ran before the gale into Tralee Bay with her crew reduced to twenty-three miserable men, all sick, starving, and unable to work their ship any

longer. Sir Edward Denny, the Governor of Tralee Castle, was absent at the moment. The wretched Spaniards surrendered to Lady Denny and her garrison. They begged for their lives, and some said they had friends at Waterford, who would find ransom for them. But the grim chatelaine ordered all the twenty-three to be put to the sword, "because there was no safe keeping for them."

Spaniards Point, on the Atlantic coast of Clare near Kilkee, is locally said to take its name from several of the galleons having been wrecked there. It is one end of an amphitheatre of dark perpendicular cliffs, with rocky ledges shelving to a narrow beach and outlying reefs to add to its dangers. It answers fairly well to the description of the place where the ship was wrecked that carried the auditor-general of the Armada and Francisco Cuellar of the *San Pedro*, whom he had saved from the hangman in the North Sea, though other indications point to Sligo Bay as the scene of the disaster. The ship, which Cuellar does not name, was one of the galleons of the Levant squadron. When the gale drove her towards the Irish coast two other ships were in her company. One of these we can identify, for he says that Don Diego Enriquez was on board of her. He was the son of the Viceroy of Peru, and commanded the *San Juan* of the squadron of Castille. After the loss of the *Rosario* and the capture of Pedro de Valdes by Drake, Medina Sidonia had given Enriquez the command of the Andalusian squadron.

Cuellar tells how the three ships tried in vain to double "el Cabo de Clara," and, failing this, found they were driving on a rocky coast, and anchored half a league from the shore in the hope of riding out the storm. The "Cabo de Clara" cannot have been Cape Clear. By the time they got so far south the three ships would have successfully passed all the headlands of Kerry, and when they sighted Cape Clear in a westerly gale would have no land, but only open sea, to leeward of them. Nor can it have been the western point of Clare Island, much farther

north in Mayo, for there would have been no need to try to round the point. The ships could have run before the wind between Clare Island and Achill into the shelter of Clew Bay. I suspect that the Spaniards were very vague about the names of the headlands they sighted through rain and spray, and the Cabo de Clara may have been Loop Head. If they had doubled it they could, like Recalde, have found shelter in the Shannon. If they missed doing this they would be driven on some part of the cliff-bound coast that trends away to the north-east from the head. Into this great inward curve ships are often driven by an Atlantic gale, and the coast answers perfectly to Cuellar's description.* He tells how, when the anchors dragged, the ships drove towards a very narrow beach surrounded on the one side and the other by "very great cliffs such as never were seen." † He might well use superlatives to describe these walls of rock rising hundreds of feet above the Atlantic surge. But other indications suggest that the disaster took place much farther north, and the rock-bound coast of Donegal has many a dangerous bay with "very great cliffs such as were never seen."

The three ships struck on the rocky beach below the cliffs, and the sea broke over them, sweeping even their highest decks. The three crews numbered altogether some 1,300 officers and men. More than a thousand were drowned in the surf below the cliffs, for, says Cuellar, in less than an hour all three galleons were dashed to pieces. The people of the coast had seen them trying to ride out the gale at their anchors, then dragging ashore, and had gathered from far and near to share the plunder of the wrecks. Here the Irish were fiercely hostile; the Spaniards who reached the shore were helpless to defend themselves. Many were killed on the beach and the rocks, and those who escaped with life were stripped of everything.

* I do not base this surmise on the fact that Loop Head is in the modern county of Clare. The name was given to the district later, and was of purely English origin.

† Duro, ii. 342.

Diego Enriquez, a soldier serving at sea, made an attempt to save his life that a sailor would have regarded as madness. His ship the *San Juan* had a long boat, with a large locker decked over and accessible by a small hatch or scuttle. Enriquez, with the son of the Count of Villafranca and two Portuguese noblemen, entered this covered space, taking with them 16,000 crowns worth of jewels and coin. By his orders the hatch was then fastened down and roughly calked. The boat was got out of the ship on the lee side, and some 70 men crowded on to it before it pushed off. Then it was swept by a sea, and capsized, leaving the 70 struggling in the water. The surf rolled the boat over and over, and finally sent it crashing on the rocks. The four nobles were taken out of the wreckage dead or nearly dead. Enriquez breathed his last as the coast men seized him.

Cuellar was one of the 300 who reached the shore, and still more fortunate in being one of the very few who escaped with life from the hands of the wreckers. He tells how, "after commending himself to God and Our Lady," he went up to the highest part of the poop of the ship, and standing there watched for a while "this so great spectacle of misery." Some were drowned by the water rising in the stranded ship; others were swept overboard by the waves; some leaped into the sea only to disappear at once and never come to the surface again; others were seen supporting themselves on floating planks and casks or astride of spars and beams." "I stood watching this scene," he says, "not knowing what to do with myself, or what course to take, for I could not swim, and the waves of the sea ran high, and the land and the beach were full of enemies who were leaping and dancing with delight at our misfortune." He could see them attacking, stripping, and maltreating those who struggled to the shore.

Presently Martin de Avila, the auditor-general, reached the poop, very downcast at their plight, and the two men talked

together as to making an attempt to save their lives, Avila saying that something must be done at once, as the ship would be gone to pieces in another quarter of an hour. Most of the crew and the rest of the officers had been drowned, and by this time Avila and Cuellar found themselves almost alone on the wreck. They looked for something that might serve as a raft, and found a hatch cover as big as a large table drifting alongside. Cuellar reached it, and steadied himself on it after a plunge in the sea that made him swallow so much salt water that he thought he was drowning. Then Avila slipped down the side to the raft, foolishly spoiling his chance of life by first cramming his pockets with gold and silver ducats. Then they pushed off, only to be caught by a wave that broke over them and swept the unfortunate auditor away. Cuellar, clinging to the hatch, could not help him, and heard him cry out as he sank. Holding on for bare life, as wave after wave struck the frail raft and drove it to the shore, Cuellar was badly hurt by collision with floating planks; and when at last he was cast on the beach, he could only struggle beyond the reach of the surf, and then fell down, exhausted and covered with blood.

Cuellar's narrative of his subsequent sufferings and adventures, when he reached Antwerp in the following year, after a series of marvellous escapes from manifold perils, is too long to reproduce here, or even to summarize in much detail. In the pandemonium of plunder on the shore he escaped notice, being perhaps taken for dead by most of those who saw him. His story shows that some of the English garrison of the district were among the wreckers, and he tells of the subsequent arrival of 200 armed horsemen to share in the spoil. He got away from the dangerous beach only to discover that he could find neither shelter nor food. A "monastery" towards which he made his way in the hope of receiving hospitality there proved to be ruined and deserted, but in the roofless church

he saw a terrible warning of the fate that might be his own, for twelve Spanish corpses hung in halters from the cross-bars of the windows. Returning to the beach at the risk of his life in the hope of finding there some of the biscuit from the wrecks, he saw the shore strewn with corpses in hundreds, stripped and left unburied to be devoured by wolf and raven. With the help of two forlorn comrades, who had fared worse than himself, he buried in the sand the body of Enriquez and that of "another captain a great friend of his," and while he was thus engaged a gang of plunderers arrived. By these and some of the English horsemen he was stripped of his clothes and his few valuables, and only life was left him. Wrapped in a mat of straw, barefooted, shivering with cold, limping with a wound in the leg, and starving, he wandered inland, and found succour from some of the Irish, who were almost as bereft of everything as himself. During the seven months he was in the country he had adventures which, as he himself says, read more like romancing than simple truth. He gives a terrible picture of the utter misery of the people. After helping to hold a castle of the O'Rourke's against the English he made his way northwards, and in Donegal heard of the shipwreck of Leyva and the loss of many of the galleons, and saw in the hands of starving clansmen, or hidden in their wretched huts, gold chains, jewels, and coin that they were hoarding up, though such treasures were for the present useless to them. More than once a priest helped him. Once a Franciscan rescued him from those who were ill-treating him. The friar dared not wear the habit of his order, and at first sight Cuellar thought he was one of the *selvajes*, the wild men. He was pleased to meet a man with whom he could talk freely in Latin. His last benefactor, to whose kindly help he owed his final escape, was a Catholic bishop living among the poor people like one of themselves. Cuellar writes Irish names on a phonetic system of his own, which makes most of them unrecognizable. He

calls the bishop "Don Reimundo Termi, Obispo de Times"—perhaps he was an archbishop of Tuam. He says that the good prelate was *muy buen cristiano* (a very good Christian), and "went in the savage dress (*en habito de selvaje*) so as to escape discovery." Out of his poverty he was giving hospitality to a number of shipwrecked Spaniards, and with some of these Cuellar sailed in a fishing-boat to Scotland—a dangerous voyage in a very unseaworthy craft. There his troubles were at an end; for, to their honour be it said, the Scots, both Catholics and Protestants, proved good friends to all the shipwrecked Spaniards who reached their shores. The nobles subscribed money to send them over to the Spanish army in Flanders. But even this last stage of their Odyssey was not without its dangers, for some of them were captured at sea by Dutch rovers and put to death. Cuellar escaped even this final peril, and having joined Parma's garrison at Antwerp, wrote the story of his adventures, to be sent to his friends in Spain, who had long counted him as dead.

The hunting down of the shipwrecked Spaniards in Ireland at last came to an end when Fitzwilliam, judging that few now remained, proclaimed mercy for all who surrendered before January 15, 1589. Numbers of ragged, half-starved refugees came into the English garrisons. They were sent to England and shipped across to Flanders, where Parma was now paying a small ransom for every common soldier or sailor, and arranging larger payments for the freedom of officers and nobles.

One of the ships which had escaped the dangers of the Irish coast was driven by the westerly gales so far out of her course that she found herself once more in the entrance of the English Channel. She was the *urca, San Pedro el Mayor*, one of the hospital ships of the Armada. It is hard to understand how she had wandered so long in the northern seas, for it was in the last week of October that she was wrecked on the rocks inside Bolt Head, near the village of Hope in Devonshire. A week after the

shipwreck George Carey was sent over from Plymouth to take possession of her. He reported to the queen's council * that "great pilfering and spoils" had been made by the country people, and he took order for the salving of what remained. His report contains some interesting particulars.

"The ship is a hulk and called the *St. Peter the Great*, one of those two ships which were appointed for the hospital to the whole navy. She is in burden as they say 550 tons, but I think not so much. The ship is not to be recovered; she lieth on a rock and full of water to her upper decks. . . . There was put into her as much drugs and pothecary stuff as came to 6,000 ducats, of which I think there will come little good of the same, being in the water almost this sennight, the weather being such as none could get aboard. There hath been some plate and certain ducats rifled and spoiled at their first landing, both from their persons and out of their chests. The ship, I think, will prove of no great value; the ordnance is all iron and no brass; their ground tackle all spent save only one new cable."

The fact that the Armada had two hospital ships shows that in this matter the Spaniards were far in advance of the time. Carey's remark that the tonnage of the *urca* was overestimated is one more indication that Spanish measurements gave larger total tonnage than the English system; and the absence of all ground tackle suggests that after their experience in Calais Roads many of the ships of the Armada were in the same plight.

To complete the story of the shipwrecks it must be noted that the damaged *San Salvador* was lost in Studland Bay, near Poole, while being taken round from Weymouth to Portland. Of the prize crew 34 were saved and 23 drowned, including "six Spaniards and Flemings that came in the same ship out of Spain." Out of the whole Armada only three ships can have yielded any spoil to the west country—the captured *Rosario*, and the wrecked *San Pedro el Mayor* and *San Salvador*. Nevertheless, in many old houses of Devon and Cornwall, oak chests, quaintly carved and clamped with iron, and other objects of Spanish workmanship, are shown as relics of the famous fleet. Most

* "Armada Papers," ii. 294.

of them cannot be spoils of the Armada. They may have been plunder of galleons taken in other naval campaigns of the Elizabethan period; but probably most of them came to England through the peaceful trade with Spain that was carried on for many a long year before and after the famous war with King Philip.

CHAPTER XXI.

LOSS AND GAIN.

MEDINA SIDONIA had sent back pinnaces with dispatches for the king from the Bay of Biscay, and again on his arrival off the Lizard. During the week of fighting in the Channel he made no attempt to send any news to Spain, using his dispatch boats only to communicate with the Duke of Parma.

The first news of the battles in the Channel reached Madrid in a letter from King Philip's ambassador at the French court. It told of a great victory won by the Armada over the combined fleets of Howard and Drake. But the good tidings were based only on reports that were in circulation at Havre and other northern towns in France, whence the rumour of a Spanish triumph spread all over Central Europe.

King Philip was so little persuaded that his great Armada was "invincible" that he forbade the news to be published at Madrid, and vetoed proposals for premature rejoicings, saying that it was better to wait for certain intelligence. His prudence was soon justified. Parma sent dispatches overland, telling that the Armada had been forced away into the North Sea, but explaining that when this mischance occurred he was already embarking the Nieuport division of his troops, and expressing a hope that Medina Sidonia would be able to return to the Flanders coast, as he was now ready to co-operate with him,

and had satisfied himself by a practical test that he could embark all his army in thirty-six hours.

All hope of any such co-operation was soon dissipated, and a first revelation of the failure was brought by a dispatch sent off by Medina Sidonia in a pinnace that had left the fleet after it had passed to westward of the Orkneys. It told of the fighting in the Channel, the escape of the fleet from disaster on the Zeeland Banks, and the northern voyage. It was a confession that the whole enterprise had miscarried.

There are several detailed accounts of the way in which the king received this disappointing news. They differ so much in particulars that one sees that some at least of the writers were only reproducing current gossip at second or third hand; but they all present the same general picture, and it accords with what is known of the king's character and his action on other occasions when he had to face misfortune. He read his admiral's letter, and then, without a change of countenance or a falter in his voice, said that he bowed to the will of God, "who gave or refused success according to His good pleasure;" and added that, if one fleet had failed, Spain was still rich enough to fit out another. One writer represents him as saying that if some water had run to waste, it did not matter so much provided the fountain from which it came was still safe. Then, say the narrators, he took up his pen and went on with the writing on which he was engaged when the admiral's letters were handed to him.

But so far King Philip knew only part of the evil tidings. When Medina Sidonia sent home this dispatch from the North Atlantic the Armada, though it had suffered severely, was still almost intact, so far as the number of ships went, and the king might look forward to seeing some hundred and thirty sail returning to refit in the northern ports. The worst disasters were yet to come, and no one in Spain could foresee the miserable state in which even the ships that escaped destruction would reach home.

Medina Sidonia had kept a considerable number of galleons

and smaller craft together, about fifty in all. His pilots had steered well out into the Atlantic before setting the course for Corunna, and so had avoided the dangerous shores of the "island of Ireland." Progress was slow on account of the constant bad weather. Food and water were served out in scanty rations, and bad and insufficient food, hard labour at the pumps, and the effects of the wet and cold, increased the sickness among the men. There were fevers and scurvy in every ship. The *San Martin* alone committed nearly 200 dead to the deep. The admiral had handed over the active duties of command to Diego Flores and Bobadilla. He had lost heart, and was ill and utterly broken in spirits. His hair had whitened, and he looked like an old man, as he sat all day in the great cabin of his flagship, brooding in silence, with his head resting on his hands.

On September 18 a fierce Atlantic gale caught the remnant of the fleet in the Bay of Biscay, and scattered the ships, sending some of them to the bottom. The *San Martin*, leaking badly, found herself alone. On the 21st land was sighted. The pilots were out in their reckoning, and thought the shore was that of the Sisaargas Islands outside Corunna. The *San Martin* was really near Santander. Then the wind fell to a sudden calm, the sails hung loose from the yards, and the long swell that followed the gale was carrying the ship towards the rocky coast. One more disaster was narrowly averted by boats coming out from Santander and towing the flagship into the port. Most of the crew were so ill that they were at once transferred by kindly hands to the hospitals of the city.

Other ships had already reached the northern ports. Then day after day more and more of them came straggling in with starving, sickly crews, and the same terrible report of the numbers they had buried in the Atlantic. Hundreds of dying and stricken men were landed, so that all the northern coast cities and towns were like one great hospital, and the news sent mourning through the whole peninsula.

Medina Sidonia had at once landed from his flagship at Santander, and on September 23 he wrote to the king,* announcing his arrival, and saying that for the last three weeks he had himself been ill. He reported that twenty-one large ships had reached Laredo—galleons of Castille and Andalusia and one of the galleasses. Eight were at Santander, and five or six in the Biscay ports, among them the flagship of Miguel de Oquendo, the Admiral of Guipuzcoa. Six or seven more ships were off the port of Santander, and those that were at Laredo had been directed to come thither with the first favourable wind. Then he went on to say:—

"The hardships and sufferings which have been endured cannot be described to your Majesty, for they have been greater than have ever been seen in any voyage, and there is a ship among those arrived here whose people passed fourteen days without a drop of water to drink. In my flagship 180 persons have died of the sickness, including three of the four pilots on board, and all the rest are ill, many of them of an infectious disease; and all those in my personal service, to the number of 60, are dead or so sick that only two of them remained with me."

He then explained that, after having endured so much, the position of the remnant of the Armada was still very serious, for with these crowds of sick in the ports the scanty supply of wine and biscuit that remained would not last eight days. Money would be needed, for he had not "a single maravedi." He would have to leave all business to others, "for he had neither the health nor the head to arrange anything." The district round Santander was poor, and could supply very little; he asked, therefore, for corn to be sent. As many as possible of the sick would be cared for. The Archbishop of Burgos was giving orders to this end, and sending doctors and helpers. He promised detailed reports on the condition of the ships, and ended by begging that there might be no delay in sending assistance and supplies.

Four days later he wrote to the king's secretary, Juan de Idiaquez. He told again how the pilots had mistaken their

* Duro, ii. 296.

position, and instead of reaching Corunna had nearly wrecked the *San Martin* off Santander. It would not be possible to concentrate the fleet at Corunna for some time, such was the condition of the ships and the misery of the crews. It was impossible to imagine the damage several of the galleons had received, and it would need a large sum in ducats to repair and refit them. His illness continued, he said, so that he was good for nothing; but even if he were well he could be of no service to his Majesty, "for he knew nothing of the sea or of war." So he asked the king to forget him in such matters; and he begged him, "since it had not pleased our Lord to call him to this vocation, not to place him in it, since neither in conscience nor duty could he fulfil it, as he had so many times declared." He was most anxious to serve his Majesty, but "as to business on the sea, in no case and in no way would he have anything to do with it, even though this refusal cost him his head; for that would be better than failing to discharge an office of which he understood nothing, and having to trust to the counsels of others, given he knew not with what purpose."

It was a pitiful confession of utter failure and hopeless incapacity—the echo of his protest that he was unfit for the command, written to the king when it was first offered to him—the fulfilment of his prediction that if he was given the direction of the great enterprise he would have bad news to send of the result.

King Philip replied in a long letter that was a marvel of impassive self-control. There was no word of blame for his incompetent admiral, no expression of disappointment at failure and defeat—only sympathy and encouragement for the beaten, disheartened man, and elaborate and thoughtful directions as to the steps to be taken to care for the unfortunate sailors and soldiers of the Armada.

Addressing the admiral, in the very first lines of the letter, by his titles, "Duke of Medina Sidonia, my Captain-General of the Ocean and of the Coast of Andalusia," he seemed anxious

that he should know at the first glance that there was no thought of superseding or disgracing him. He began by telling him how sorry he was to hear of his illness; how anxious for his restoration to health, which he prayed God might soon grant him, so that he might be able to attend to the affairs of the Armada "with the care he had always bestowed on matters of such importance to the royal service." He expressed his approval of the steps the admiral had already taken, and advised him that it would be well to have lights displayed by night at various points along the coast, in case other ships should miss their bearings, and to have pilots sent out to guide any stragglers into harbour. Further, he told him that as ships might still be in the Bay of Biscay in distress for provisions and water, light craft with supplies should be sent out for a distance of thirty or forty leagues to assist them. Then came directions for help to be provided for those who had reached the northern ports. Hospitals must be formed for the sick and wounded, and all who were fairly well and could be spared from the ships must be billeted on shore. The Archbishop of Burgos, the Bishop of Pampeluna, the provincials of the Jesuits and the other religious orders, and certain of the civil authorites would provide beds, medicines, medical comforts, doctors, surgeons, and apothecaries. All skilled attendants on the sick that could be sent to the coast towns would be thus employed. Orders to this affect had been sent to the persons concerned. Supplies of provisions were also on the way. The troops were to be landed and sent inland to be billeted in the larger towns, where it would be easier to lodge and feed them; and payment would be made for their rations, so as not to burden the inhabitants. Orders had been given to forward a large supply of clothing to the ports for the crews whose clothes had been worn out. An experienced officer was being sent to regulate expenses and supervise the survey of the ships. In order to lighten

the work that was to be done, and prevent the difficulties that would arise from having to keep a large number of ships in the northern harbours, the galleons of Portugal should be sent as soon as possible to Lisbon, and those of Castille and the Levant to Cadiz. This would make it easier to use the biscuit factories of Portugal and Andalusia to feed the crews.

So, through page after page of the letter, these practical measures are set forth in patient detail, then before closing the letter the king adds some friendly words,—

"One of the things that give me the most anxiety is your health, and so once more I charge you to take great care of it, and regularly inform me of its improvement, which I trust in the Lord will be granted to you, so that you may make use of it in His service."

And he expressed the hope that the duke would soon be well enough to attend personally to the work of reorganization.

But Medina Sidonia was chiefly anxious to be "again among his olive groves at Port St. Mary," as Drake had predicted. He wrote to the king saying that he was too ill to be of further service, and would have better hope of recovery if he were allowed to leave the colder climate of Northern Spain and retire for a while to his estates in Andalusia. The king, with new assurances of his good-will, granted him leave of absence, and he travelled southwards, leaving to others the task of doing what little could be done to repair the ruin caused by the great disaster. He lived to hold high command again by the choice of the king he had served so ill—that king, in the judgment of those who knew him best, the most astute of European sovereigns. It is one of the enigmas of history.

Others of the commanders were less fortunate. Diego Flores de Valdes lay for months in prison. He had been chosen by the king to be Medina Sidonia's chief adviser in the conduct of the enterprise, and Philip held him and not the courtly admiral

responsible for its failure. Juan Martinez de Recalde, the brave old Admiral of Biscay, and Miguel de Oquendo, who commanded the galleons of Guipuzcoa, had brought part of their squadrons back, but landed utterly broken down with the hardships of the terrible voyage, and both died within a fortnight. Gregorio de Alas, the Rear-Admiral of the Portuguese Galleons, died at Santander. Of the nine squadron leaders of the Armada four were dead—Recalde, Oquendo, Moncada (killed in the fight on Calais bar), and Enriquez (shipwrecked in Ireland); Diego Flores de Valdes was disgraced and in prison in Spain; Pedro de Valdes,* a prisoner in England; Lopez de Medina, a refugee in Scotland.

Of the total loss of life in the campaign and in the northern hospitals after the return of the ships, no accurate statistics were ever published. Perhaps the account that the king ordered to be made of them was never completed. It would seem to have been out of the eagerness to do all he could to repair the disaster, which we trace in his correspondence, that he ordered lists to be drawn up not only of the dead, but also of the widows and orphans who had depended on them, in order that help might be given to these. But the lists, if they were ever finished, have disappeared from the Spanish archives. The estimate that, with losses in battle and by shipwreck and exposure and the deaths in the hospitals, the total loss of life must have been at least 10,000, is probably no exaggeration. It may have been even greater.

It was only after the lapse of some weeks that the list of the ships that had been lost could be completed, for as each belated straggler returned, hope revived that others might yet be heard of. But at last even the most sanguine despaired of ever seeing the missing ships again, and the long catalogue of losses was

* Pedro de Valdes, with the help of Parma, arranged his ransom, and returned to Spain. He was Captain-General of Cuba in 1602, the first governor who bore this title. He built the Morro Castle of Havana, famous in many wars. He died in 1614.

drawn up. Sixty-four ships, large and small, had been lost in one way or another. Of these only four or five were losses in battle—the *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, dismasted in collision and taken by Drake; the *San Salvador*, crippled by fire and explosion and taken into Weymouth after her crew had abandoned her; and the galleass *San Lorenzo*, grounded on Calais bar, taken by Howard's boats and then abandoned under the fire of the French batteries. In all three cases an accident had disabled the ship before she was taken. One ship, perhaps two, were sunk by gun-fire in the Gravelines battle. The galley *Diana* was wrecked on the French coast near Bayonne. The galleon *Santa Aña* of the Biscayan squadron, which had failed to reach the rendezvous off the Lizard, took refuge at Havre in a sinking condition, and was returned as lost there. Two galleons, the *San Mateo* and the *San Felipe*, were stranded on the Zeeland shoals and subsequently floated into the Scheldt. These represented the losses up to the day when Medina Sidonia sailed northwards to return to Spain by rounding Scotland and Ireland.

The losses during this latter part of the expedition were far heavier. The *Gran Grifon* was wrecked on Fair Isle. The *San Juan* and two other galleons were lost on the west coast of Scotland. We can trace 16 or 17 galleons and large urcas and another of the galleasses lost on the Irish coasts. But this is not the total of the Irish shipwrecks. Then there were several ships that foundered in the open ocean. A third galleass disappeared in this way, and only one of these famous ships saw Spain again. The total loss was 42 galleons and urcas, 20 light craft, 3 galleasses and a galley—or 64 ships in all. Even this did not complete the total of losses, for after the return of the ships a leaky urca, the *Doncella*, sank at Santander; and the flagship of Oquendo, another *Santa Aña*, caught fire and blew up while the admiral was dying on shore.

The losses of the victors in battle had been comparatively trifling. Contemporary statements to this effect are confirmed

by the fact that, though we have a long list of officers and gentlemen volunteers who served in Howard's fleet, not one man of rank is recorded as having been killed in action, not half a dozen as having been wounded. Yet, in the fighting at close quarters off Gravelines on narrow exposed decks, these must have been in as much danger as their sailors and soldiers, and even in more peril, for the brilliant dress then worn by nobles and gentlemen would draw the fire of the arquebusiers. The almost negligible proportion of loss among the officers confirms the assertion that few of the crews were killed or wounded in the Channel fights. The real losses came later. We have no exact record of the numbers who died of sickness on board the ships and in the improvised hospitals in barns and outhouses about Margate and Harwich. But the loss must have been serious, if we may judge from Howard's reports as to the extent to which the pestilence paralyzed the fleet. It threw a gloom over the weeks that followed the return of the ships from the North Sea—anxious weeks in which it was not yet realized that there had been a great victory, and in which men thought of new dangers that would have to be faced with half-manned ships.

For just as the Spaniards had only by degrees realized the extent of their defeat and loss, so in England it was some weeks after the fight off Gravelines that men felt sure that the danger of invasion was over, and became aware that the enterprise of King Philip had ended in widespread disaster that must paralyze the power of Spain upon the seas for years to come. Then it was that the exploits of Howard, Drake, Hawkins, and their comrades were for the first time counted as solid successes and not mere "half-doings." Then too, as the tidings of the shipwrecks arrived, the legend arose that Heaven had fought for England and sent the winds and storms to bring the designs of the Spaniards to naught.

Looking back through three centuries on the days of the Armada from our happier day, when Spain and England are

good friends, with memories of a glorious struggle for freedom waged side by side, and with an English princess sharing the throne of the successor of King Philip, we can view the events of this far-off war in the cold light of truth.

Partisan legends, that so long distorted the story of the Armada, are only of interest now in so far as they help us to realize how fierce were the passions provoked by the conflict. They are but the dying echoes of old hatreds. It is the facts that matter, and the more we know of them the more ready shall we be to acknowledge that the Spaniards were gallant foes, and to link in equal honour such names as those of Recalde, Oquendo, and De Leyva with the names of Howard, Drake, and Frobisher. The story of England's victory is that of a well-won success which was never imperilled except by the halting measures of the politicians who met round Elizabeth's council board. The record of the destruction of the Armada after the last shots had been fired in the North Sea is one of the most dread tragedies of history.

From the story of the Armada we can gather lessons that have their value even now when the steel-built giants of modern navies have displaced the old sailing-ships. For the essential factor in all war on land and sea is the man and not the machine, and human nature is unchanged through the centuries. The all-important lesson is that it is the chief that counts for most. The fate of the Armada shows how feeble leadership can bring to naught even the keenest valour of subordinate commanders and paralyze a whole campaign from the very outset. Now that once more England may have to face peril upon the sea, her best hope of security lies less in the fact that she can multiply her battleships than in the tradition of leadership handed down through more than three hundred years of naval wars, and inaugurated by the men who harried the "Great Armada" up Channel from Plymouth to Gravelines.

And amid present anxieties the story of the Armada is

worth the telling for the sake of that other obvious lesson—that our safety depends not upon armies on the land but on effective power upon the sea. We may place it beyond the limits of reasonable probability that England will ever again see the guardianship of the "Narrow Seas" entrusted to a fleet so unevenly matched with its opponents as that of Howard, or so hampered by the half-measures of an incompetent administration. Even thus handicapped the Elizabethan sailors successfully defied all the power of the greatest fleet that till then had sailed the seas. We may count on the sailors of our own day solving as successfully an easier problem. And this once granted, invasion scares may be dismissed as the outcome of ignorance of the history of the past and the conditions of the present.

APPENDIX I.

General Catalogue of the Armada.

(The first figures after each name are those of the Lisbon Catalogue; the figures in italics, those of the reorganization at Corunna.)

1. Armada of Portugal.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
San Martin . .	1,000	48	300	177	477	Flagship of Medina Sidonia.
			308	*161*	*469*	
San Juan . . .	1,050	50	321	179	500	
			366	*156*	*522*	
San Márcos . .	790	33	392	117	509	
			278	*108*	*386*	
San Felipe . . .	800	40	415	117	532	
			331	*108*	*439*	
San Luis . . .	830	38	376	116	492	
			339	*100*	*439*	
San Mateo . .	750	34	277	120	397	
			279	*110*	*389*	
Santiago . . .	520	24	300	93	393	
			307	*80*	*387*	
El Duque de Florencia . .	961	52	400	86	486	Transferred to Levant Armada at Corunna.
San Christobal .	352	20	300	78	378	
			132	*79*	*211*	
San Bernardo . .	352	21	250	81	331	
			171	*65*	*236*	
Augusta . . .	166	13	55	57	112	"Zabras" (light craft).
			49	*43*	*92*	
Julia	166	14	44	72	116	
			87	*48*	*135*	

2. Armada of Biscay.

Admiral Juan Martinez de Recalde.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
Santa Aña. . .	768	30	256	73	329	Flagship at Lisbon; damaged in the Biscay gale; lost at Havre.
El Gran Grin. .	1,160	28	256	73	329	
			261	*75*	*336*	
Santiago . . .	666	25	214	102	316	Flagship at Corunna.
			206	*106*	*312*	
La Concepcion de Zubelzu . . .	486	16	90	70	160	
			161	*58*	*219*	
La Concepcion de Juanes del Cano	418	18	164	61	225	
			167	*58*	*225*	
La Magdalena .	530	18	193	67	260	
			183	*61*	*244*	
San Juan . . .	350	21	114	80	194	
			141	*49*	*190*	
La Maria Juan .	665	24	172	100	272	
			213	*93*	*306*	
La Manuela . .	520	12	125	54	179	
			115	*48*	*163*	
Santa Maria de Monte Mayor .	707	18	206	45	251	
			156	*47*	*202*	
La Maria de Aguirre . . .	70	6	20	23	43	"Patax."
			15	*19*	*34*	
La Isabela. . .	71	10	20	22	42	,,
			29	*24*	*53*	
The "patax" of Miguel Suso .	36	6	20	26	46	,,
			20	*25*	*45*	
San Estéban . .	96	6	20	26	46	,,
			25	*10*	*35*	

3. Armada of Castille.

Admiral Diego Flores de Valdes.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
San Christóbal .	700	36	205	120	325	Flagship.
			187	*116*	*303*	
San Juan Bautista	750	24	207	136	343	
			206	*90*	*296*	
San Pedro . . .	530	24	141	131	272	
			184	*90*	*274*	
San Juan . . .	530	24	163	113	276	
			207	*77*	*284*	
Santiago el Mayor	530	24	210	132	342	
			190	*103*	*293*	
San Felipe y Santiago	530	24	151	116	267	
La Asuncion . .	530	24	199	114	313	
			170	*70*	*240*	
Nuestra Señora del Barrio . .	530	24	155	108	263	
			196	*81*	*277*	
San Medel y Celedon . . .	530	24	160	101	261	
			197	*75*	*272*	
Santa Aña . . .	250	24	91	80	171	
			99	*54*	*153*	
Nuestra Señora de Begoña . .	750	24	174	123	297	
			219	*81*	*300*	
La Trinidad . .	872	24	180	122	302	
			162	*79*	*241*	
Santa Catalina .	882	24	190	159	349	
			186	*134*	*320*	
San Juan Bautista	650	24	192	93	285	"Nao."
			183	*57*	*240*	
Nuestra Señora de Socorro . .	75	24	20	25	45	"Patax."
			20	*15*	*35*	
San Antonio de Padua . . .	75	12	20	46	66	„
			20	*20*	*40*	

4. Armada of Andalusia.

Admiral Pedro de Valdes.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
Nuestra Señora del Rosario .	1,150	46	304	118	422	Flagship.
			240	*119*	*359*	
San Francisco .	915	21	222	56	278	
			238	*85*	*323*	
San Juan . . .	810	31	245	89	334	
			249	*84*	*333*	
San Juan de Gargarin	569	16	165	56	221	
			165	*38*	*203*	
La Concepcion .	862	20	185	71	256	
			191	*69*	*260*	
Duquesa Santa Aña	900	23	280	77	357	"Urca."
			207	*65*	*272*	
Santa Catalina .	730	23	231	77	308	
			220	*69*	*289*	
La Trinidad . .	650	13	192	74	266	
			156	*54*	*210*	
Santa Maria del Juncal . . .	730	20	228	80	308	
			227	*66*	*293*	
San Bartolomé .	976	27	240	72	312	
			184	*56*	*240*	
El Espíritu Santo	70	...	33	10	43	
			18	*15*	*33*	

5. Armada of Guipuzcoa.

Admiral Miguel de Oquendo.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
Santa Aña . . .	1,200	47	303	82	385	Flagship.
			275	*125*	*400*	
Nuestra Señora de la Rosa . . .	945	26	233	64	297	
			238	*85*	*323*	
San Salvador . .	958	25	321	75	396	Blown up off Plymouth.
			281	*90*	*371*	
San Estéban . .	736	26	196	68	264	
			201	*73*	*274*	

ARMADA OF GUIPUZCOA—*Continued.*

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
Santa Marta . .	548	20	173	63	236	
			166	*73*	*239*	
Santa Bárbara .	525	12	154	45	199	
			135	*47*	*182*	
San Buenaventura	379	21	168	53	221	
			158	*54*	*212*	
La Maria San Juan	291	12	110	30	140	
			95	*40*	*135*	
La Doncella . .	500	16	156	32	188	"Urca."
			112	*29*	*141*	
La Asuncion . .	60	9	20	23	43	"Patax."
			18	*16*	*34*	
San Bernabe . .	69	9	20	23	43	,,
Santa Cruz . .	...	...	*125*	*40*	*165*	Joined at Corunna.

6. ARMADA OF THE LEVANT.

Admiral Martin de Bertendona.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
La Regazona . .	1,249	30	344	80	424	Flagship.
			291	*80*	*371*	
La Lavia . . .	728	25	203	71	274	
			271	*71*	*342*	
La Rata Coronada	820	35	325	84	409	
San Juan de Sicilia	800	26	279	63	342	
La Trinidad Valencera . . .	1,100	42	281	79	360	
			338	*75*	*413*	
La Anunciada .	703	24	196	79	275	
			186	*80*	*266*	
San Nicolas Prodaneli . . .	834	26	374	81	355	
			226	*68*	*294*	
La Juliana . .	860	32	325	70	395	
			347	*65*	*412*	
Santa Maria de Vison . . .	666	18	326	71	397	
			355	*93*	*448*	
La Trinidad de Scala	900	22	307	79	386	
			342	*66*	*408*	

7. Armada of the "Urcas" (Storeships and Transports).

Admiral Juan Lopez de Medina.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
El Gran Grifon .	650	38	243	43	286	Flagship; lost on Fair Isle.
			234	*45*	*279*	
San Salvador . .	650	24	218	43	261	
			218	*53*	*271*	
Perro Marino . .	200	7	70	24	94	
			80	*18*	*98*	
Falcon Blanco Mayor . . .	500	16	161	36	197	
			182	*34*	*216*	
Castillo Negro .	750	27	279	34	313	
			157	*46*	*203*	
Barca de Amburg	600	23	239	25	264	
			259	*30*	*289*	
Casa de Paz Grande . . .	650	26	198	27	225	
San Pedro Mayor	581	29	213	28	241	
			110	*34*	*144*	
El Sanson . . .	500	18	200	31	231	
			184	*31*	*215*	
San Pedro Menor	500	18	157	23	180	
Barca de Anzique	450	26	200	25	225	
			150	*28*	*178*	
Falcon Blanco Mediano . . .	300	16	76	27	103	
Santo Andres . .	400	14	150	28	178	
			26	*39*	*65*	
Casa de Paz Chica	350	15	162	24	186	
			154	*21*	*175*	
Ciervo Volante .	400	18	200	22	222	
			132	*39*	*171*	
Paloma Blanca .	250	12	56	20	76	
La Ventura . .	160	4	58	14	72	
			49	*15*	*64*	
Santa Bárbara .	370	10	70	22	92	
			26	*24*	*50*	
Santiago . . .	600	19	56	30	86	
			32	*33*	*65*	
David	450	7	50	24	74	
El Gato	400	9	40	22	62	
			30	*41*	*71*	
Esayas	260	4	30	16	46	
			23	*24*	*47*	
San Gabriel . .	280	4	35	20	55	
			31	*16*	*47*	

8. Squadron of Light Craft ("Pataxes" and "Zabras").

Admiral Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza at Lisbon. Augustin de Ojeda at Corunna.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
Nuestra Señora del Pilar de Zaragoza . .	300	11	109 *114*	51 *59*	160 *173*	Flagship.
La Caridad . .	180	12	70 *43*	36 *37*	106 *80*	"Inglesa."
San Andres . .	...	12	40 *27*	29 *38*	69 *65*	"Escoces."
El Crucifijo . .	150	8	40 *40*	29 *24*	69 *64*	
Nuestra Señora del Puerto . .	55	8	30 *28*	33 *27*	63 *55*	
La Concepcion de Carasa . . .	70	5	30	42 *18*	72 *18*	
Nuestra Señora de Begoña . .	64	...	20	26 *23*	46 *23*	
La Concepcion de Capetillo . .	60	10	20	26 *18*	46 *18*	
San Jerónimo . .	50	4	20	37	57	
Nuestra Señora de Gracia . .	57	5	20 *17*	34 *26*	54 *43*	
La Concepcion de Francisco de Latero . . .	75	6	20 *21*	29 *18*	49 *39*	
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe .	70	...	20 *17*	42 *32*	62 *49*	
San Francisco .	70	...	20	37	57	
Espíritu Santo .	75	...	20	47	67	
Trinidad . . .	...	2	...	23 *24*	23 *24*	"Zabra."
Nuestra Señora de Castro . .	...	2	...	26 *18*	26 *18*	
Santo Andres . .	...	2	...	15 *17*	15 *17*	
La Concepcion de Valmaseda .	...	2	...	27 *19*	27 *19*	

SQUADRON OF LIGHT CRAFT—*Continued.*

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
La Concepcion de Somanila . .	...	...	...	31 *18*	31 *18*	
Santa Catalina .	...	...	...	23 *20*	23 *20*	
San Juan de Carasa . . .	...	...	...	23 *29*	23 *29*	
Asuncion . . .	...	...	...	23 *18*	23 *18*	

9. NEAPOLITAN GALLEASSES.

Admiral Hugo de Moncada.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
Galeaza Capitana .	...	50	264 *244*	124 *144*	388 *388*	Flagship.
,, Patrona .	...	50	178 *221*	112 *100*	290 *321*	
,, Girona .	...	50	169 *196*	120 *102*	289 *298*	
,, Napolitana	...	50	264 *229*	112 *120*	376 *349*	

Four ships with 1,200 rowers, besides the sailors and soldiers.

10. GALLEYS OF PORTUGAL.

Admiral Diego Medrano.

Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total.	Remarks.
Galera Capitana .	...	5	... *56*	106 *53*	106 *109*	Flagship.
,, Princesa .	...	5	... *37*	90 *44*	90 *81*	
,, Diana . .	...	5	... *32*	94 *47*	94 *79*	
,, Bazana . .	...	5	... *46*	72 *26*	72 *72*	

Four ships with 888 rowers, besides the sailors.

Tabular Summary of the Great Armada (Lisbon List).

Divisions.	Ships.	Tons.	Guns.	Soldiers.	Sailors.	Total Men.
Armada of Portugal .	12	7,737	347	3,330	1,293	4,623
,, Biscay . .	14	6,567	238	1,937	863	2,800
,, Castille. .	16	8,714	384	2,458	1,719	4,177
,, Andalusia .	11	8,762	240	2,327	780	3,107
,, Guipuzcoa .	14	6,991	247	1,992	616	2,608
,, the Levant	10	7,705	280	2,780	767	3,547
Squadron of "urcas" (hulks or storeships)	23	10,271	384	3,121	608	3,729
"Pataxes" and "zabras" (small craft) .	22	1,121	91	479	574	1,053
Neapolitan galleasses .	4	...	200	773	468	1,241
Galleys	4	...	20	...	362	362
	130	57,868	2,431	19,197	8,050	27,247
Rowers (in galleasses and galleys)						2,088
Grand Total (soldiers, sailors, and rowers)						29,335

APPENDIX II.

List of the English Fleet.

The following list is based on that printed by Sir John Laughton in the "Armada Papers," Vol. II., pp. 323, etc. In a prefatory note to his lists Sir John says:—

"No dependence can be placed on the tonnage of even the queen's ships; it is given differently in almost every different list, and the differences are sometimes very great. The *Triumph*, for instance, varies between 900 and 1,100; the *Victory*, between 600 and 800; the *Tiger*, between 160 and 200 tons. As for the merchant ships, the tonnage, with a few exceptions, is not given in the state papers, and is here taken from the Harleian MS. referred to (168, *f.* 176), and is probably not more incorrect than that officially given for the queen's ships. The number of men is official, and as it was checked by the pay-lists and victualling accounts, cannot be very far wrong, though the frequent errors in the arithmetic do not give a favourable impression of the accuracy of the clerk who wrote the list, or of Langford who attested it."

1. The Queen's Ships.

Ships.	Tons.	Sailors.	Gunners.	Soldiers.	Total.
Ark (called also "Ark Raleigh" and "Ark Royal")	800	270	34	126	430
Elizabeth Bonaventure	600	150	24	76	250
Rainbow	500	150	24	76	250
Golden Lion	500	150	24	76	250
White Bear	1,000	300	40	150	490
Vanguard	500	150	24	76	250
Revenge	500	150	24	76	250
Elizabeth Jonas	900	300	40	150	490
Victory	800	270	34	126	430
Antelope	400	120	20	30	170
Triumph	1,100	300	40	160	500
Dreadnought	400	130	20	40	190
Mary Rose	600	150	24	76	250
Nonpareil	500	150	24	76	250
Hope	600	160	25	85	270
Galley Bonavolia	...	...	...	...	250

THE QUEEN'S SHIPS—*Continued.*

Ships.	Tons.	Sailors.	Gunners.	Soldiers.	Total.
Swiftsure	400	120	20	40	180
Swallow	360	110	20	30	160
Foresight	300	110	20	20	150
Aid	250	90	16	14	120
Bull	200	80	12	8	100
Tiger	200	80	12	8	100
Tramontana	150	55	8	7	70
Scout	120	55	8	7	70
Achates	100	45	8	7	60
Charles	70	36	4	...	40
Moon	60	34	4	...	38
Advice	50	31	4	...	35
Merlin	50	20	4	...	24
Spy	50	31	4	...	35
Sun	40	26	4	...	30
Cygnet	30	...	...	...	20
Brigandine	90	...	...	...	35
George Hoy	100	16	4	...	20

34 ships "great and small," 6,705 men.

2. "MERCHANT SHIPS APPOINTED TO SERVE WESTWARDS UNDER THE CHARGE OF SIR FRANCIS DRAKE."

Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
Galleon Leicester	400	160	Bark Hawkyns	150	70
Merchant Royal	400	160	Unity	80	40
Edward Bonaventure	300	120	Elizabeth Drake	60	30
Roebuck	300	120	Bark Buggins	80	50
Golden Noble	250	110	Elizabeth Founes	80	50
Griffin	200	100	Bark St. Leger	160	80
Minion	200	80	Bark Manington	160	80
Bark Talbot	200	90	Heartsease	...	24
Thomas Drake	200	80	Diamond of Dartmouth	60	40
Spark	200	90	Speedwell	60	14
Hopewell	200	100	Bear Yonge	140	70
Galleon Dudley	250	96	Chance	60	40
Virgin, God Save Her	200	70	Delight	50	40
Hope Hawkyns	200	80	Nightingale	40	30
Bark Bond	150	70	Small Caravel	30	20
Bark Bonner	150	70	Flyboat Yonge	50	50

32 ships; 2,294 men.

3. Ships "set forth and paid upon the Charge of the City of London."

Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
Hercules	300	120	Centurion	250	100
Toby	250	100	Passport	80	40
Mayflower	200	90	Moonshine	60	30
Minion	200	90	Thomas Bonaventure	140	70
Royal Defence	160	80	Release	60	30
Ascension	200	100	George Noble	120	70
Gift of God	180	80	Anthony	100	60
Primrose	200	90	Toby	120	70
Margaret and John	200	90	Salamander	110	60
Golden Lion	140	70	Rose Lion	100	50
Diana	80	40	Antelope	120	60
Bark Burr	160	70	Jewel	110	60
Tiger	200	90	Pansy	100	70
Brave	160	70	Prudence	120	60
Red Lion	200	90	Dolphin	110	70

30 "ships and barks;" 2,180 men.

4. "Merchant Ships serving under the Charge of the Lord Admiral, and paid by her Majesty."

Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
Susan Parnell	220	80	White Lion	140	50
Violet	220	60	Disdain	80	45
Solomon	170	80	Lark	50	20
Anne Frances	180	70	Edward of Maldon	186	30
George Bonaventure	100	80	Marigold	30	12
Jane Bonaventure	100	50	Black Dog	20	10
Vineyard	160	60	Katharine	20	10
Samuel	140	50	Fancy	50	20
			Pippin	20	8
			Nightingale	160	16
"These eight served about seven weeks in her Majesty's pay."			"These ships and barks served the whole time."		

MERCHANT SHIPS—*Continued.*

Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
Mary Rose	...	70	John of London . .	...	70
Elizabeth Bonaventure	...	60	Bearsabe	...	60
Pelican	...	50	Marigold	...	50
Hope	...	40	White Hind	...	40
Unity	...	40	Gift of God	...	40
Pearl	...	50	Jonas	...	50
Elizabeth of Leigh .	...	60	Solomon	...	60
			Richard Duffield . .	...	70

"The 15 ships that transported victuals westwards."

33 "ships and barks;" 1,561 men.

5. "COASTERS UNDER THE CHARGE OF THE LORD ADMIRAL, AND PAID BY HER MAJESTY."

Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
Bark Webb	80	50	Crescent of Dartmouth	140	75
John Trelawney . .	150	30	Galleon of Weymouth	100	50
Hart of Dartmouth .	60	70	John of Chichester .	70	50
Bark Potts	180	80	Katharine of Weymouth	66	30
Little John	40	20	Hearty Anne . . .	60	30
Bartholomew of Apsam	130	70	Minion of Bristol . .	230	110
Rose of Apsam . . .	110	50	Unicorn of Bristol .	130	66
Gift of Apsam . . .	25	20	Handmaid of Bristol	80	56
Jacob of Lyme . . .	90	50	Aid of Bristol . . .	60	26
Revenge of Lyme . .	60	30			
Bark of Bridgewater .	70	30			

20 "ships and barks;" 993 men.

6. "Coasters appointed under the Lord Henry Seymour, whereof some were paid by her Majesty, but the greatest part by the Port Towns, according as Order was taken."

Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
Daniel	160	70	Primrose of Harwich	120	40
Galleon Hutchins	150	60	Anne Bonaventure	60	50
Bark Lamb	150	60	William of Rye	80	60
Fancy	60	30	Grace of God	50	30
Griffin	70	35	Elizabeth of Dover	120	70
Little Hare	50	25	Robin of Sandwich	110	65
Handmaid	75	35	Hazard of Feversham	38	34
Marigold	150	70	Grace of Yarmouth	150	70
Matthew	35	16	Mayflower	150	70
Susan	40	20	William of Colchester	100	50
William of Ipswich	140	50	John Young	60	30
Katharine of Ipswich	125	50			

23 "ships and barks;" 1,090 men.

7. "Voluntary Ships that came into the Fleet after the coming of the Spanish Forces upon our Coast, and were paid by her Majesty for the Time they served."

Ships.	Tons.	Men.	Ships.	Tons.	Men.
Sampson	300	108	Grace of Apsham	100	50
Frances of Fowey	140	60	Thomas Bonaventure	60	30
Heathen of Weymouth	60	(80)	Rat of Wight	80	60
Golden Ryall of Weymouth	120	(50)	Margaret	60	46
Bark Sutton of Weymouth	70	40	Elizabeth	40	30
Carouse	50	25	Raphael	40	40
Samaritan of Dartmouth	250	100	Flyboat	60	40
William of Plymouth	120	60	John of Barnstable	...	65
Gallego of Plymouth	30	20	Greyhound of Aldborough	...	40
Bark Halse	60	40	Elizabeth of Lowestoft	90	30
Unicorn of Dartmouth	76	30	Jonas of Aldborough	...	25
			Fortune of Aldborough	...	25

23 "ships and barks;" 1,044 men.

"An Abstract.*

	Men.
34 of her Majesty's ships, great and small	6,705
34 merchants' ships with Sir Francis Drake westwards	2,294
30 ships and barks paid by the City of London	2,130
33 ships and barks, with 15 victuallers, under the lord admiral	1,651
20 coasters, great and small, under the lord admiral, paid by the queen	993
23 coasters under the Lord Henry Seymour, paid by the queen	1,093
23 voluntary ships, great and small	1,059
	15,925

Totals: 197 ships, 15,925 men.

"(Signed) Rog. Langford."

* Laughton, "Armada Papers," ii. 331.

APPENDIX III.

Executions of Catholics in England in 1587–8.

Every historian of Queen Elizabeth's reign admits that the Catholics took their full part in the preparations for the defence of the kingdom against the threatened Spanish invasion, despite the fact that King Philip had tried to strengthen his position by giving the enterprise something of the character of a crusade. But few make more than a passing allusion to the relentless persecution, in the face of which the Catholics clung to their allegiance. I think it is therefore of interest to note some of the facts thus usually passed over in discreet silence.

It must be noted that in the case of Catholics put on trial and condemned, the indictment was for high treason, but the treason alleged in the evidence was not levying war against the crown, or conspiring to that end, or correspondence with the queen's enemies. The indictments were all drawn under recent statutes that created a new kind of crime, and inflicted on those found guilty of it the barbarous form of capital punishment then used for the execution of traitors. It was treason to refuse the oath of the royal supremacy in matters of religion if tendered by a justice or other competent official, or to speak or write against the royal supremacy, or to proceed abroad to receive holy orders and exercise them on returning to England. It was thus treason for a priest to say Mass. Abettors of treason fell under the same penalty. Thus to be present at Mass was treason, or to conceal a priest, or aid his escape. Catholics naturally

counted those who suffered under these laws not as traitors and criminals, but as martyrs.

In the Rev. J. H. Pollen's "Acts of English Martyrs," a collection of contemporary documents, I find (p. 283, etc.) an interesting narrative written by Peter Penkevell, the son of a Cornish family, in which the writer relates how—

"The year that the Armada compassed England about, at St. Bartholomew's tide,* there were fourteen priests and laymen at one Sessions at Newgate arraigned, who all very constantly suffered martyrdom, except Mr. Foxwell, who was reprieved. Margaret Ward at that time was arraigned, condemned, and suffered martyrdom.† She was condemned for bringing a rope to a priest being prisoner in Bridewell, who by that means escaped, but was put to death for refusing to go to church, on which condition life was offered unto her openly at the bar. The laymen, that then suffered, for the most part were condemned because they said they had confessed their sins unto a priest. The names of the priests that I remember were first Mr. Deane, who had been some time a minister; Mr. Holford, or Bede; Mr. Clarkson; Mr. Earth, or Ley; and Mr. Mourton. At that time there was executed divers other priests, out of the Clink and Marshalsea, of whose names I remember no more but Mr. Flower and Mr. James. ‡

"Also in company with these was Mistress Lowe, arraigned and condemned for harbouring of priests, who was brought unto the place of execution willing to die, but by her husband's means was reprieved. §

"Also at York and other places there were divers priests and laymen executed at that time, whose names I know not. It was determined that within short time after, there should be all the priests in Wisbech and very many other Catholics arraigned, but the Earl of Leicester || dying, the same while in extraordinary manner, caused a sudden stop to these proceedings.

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* St. Bartholomew's Day is August 24.

† Of the case of Margaret Ward, Dr. Frederick George Lee writes ("The Church under Queen Elizabeth," p. 259): "Mistress Margaret Ward, a lady of Cheshire, suffered death at Tybourne in 1588, for aiding a poor persecuted priest, Father Richard Watson, to escape from Bridewell. She was often most infamously whipped and tortured acutely. For eight succeeding days she was hung up by the hands to a beam, her feet scarce touching the ground, a punishment which caused her to swoon. She was then taken down, carefully tended until she revived and recovered, then scourged anew, and hung up in the same way once again. She was offered her liberty if she would go to church, but declined. When her aid to the poor priest was thrown in her teeth as an act of disrespect to the queen, she replied that if her Majesty had the ordinary feelings of a woman, and had known how Father Watson was suffering, she herself would surely have aided Father Watson to escape."

‡ Father Pollen, in footnotes, gives a full list of the missing names for these two series of executions.

§ She was sent back to prison, and died there before the end of 1588.

|| Just after the breaking up of the Tilbury camp, Leicester died suddenly on September 4, 1588, at Cornbury, in Oxfordshire, of poison, said rumour, intended for his wife.

"But within two months after the magistrates returned unto their accustomed practice, there were arraigned Mr. Hewett and Mr. Hartley, priests."

Both were executed at London. Other executions in 1587–8 were Thomas Pilchard, priest, at Dorchester, March 21, 1587; John Hambley, priest, at Salisbury, at Easter, 1587; George Douglas, priest, at York, September 9, 1587; Alexander Crowe, at York, November 30, 1587; Edmund Sikes, priest, March 3, 1588; Edward Campion,* priest, at Canterbury, October 1, 1588; and Edward Burden, priest, November 29, 1588. These are a few names, not a complete list.

In no case was there any allegation or evidence of treason in the ordinary sense of the word. And while judges and executioners were thus kept at work, the process of steadily ruining the Catholic gentry and yeomanry by fines for recusancy went on automatically.

* Of the same name but, it would appear, not a relation of the more famous Edmund Campion.

APPENDIX IV.

Alleged Cruel Treatment of English Prisoners in Spain.

The popular tradition still lives on from the days of the struggle with King Philip that Englishmen in Spain were, almost as a matter of course, handed over to the Inquisition and treated with inhuman barbarity. Kingsley's "Westward Ho!" helps to keep the tradition alive, and Tennyson, in his "Ballad of the Fleet," makes Sir Richard Grenville allege the same belief as his motive for disobeying his admiral's orders, and remaining off "Flores in the Azores" to fight the famous battle of the *Revenge* against the whole Spanish fleet.

> "Then spake Sir Richard Grenville: 'I know you are no coward;
> You fly them for a moment to fight with them again.
> But I've ninety men and more that are lying sick ashore.
> I should count myself the coward if I left them, my Lord Howard,
> To these Inquisition dogs and the devildoms of Spain.'"

I think it therefore well to quote here at considerable length the masterly treatment of this question to be found in Sir John Laughton's Introduction to the "Armada Papers" (vol. i., pp. xv. *et seq.*). The conditions under which the book was published have given it a somewhat restricted circulation; so the facts and arguments he so convincingly and temperately sets forth will be new to most readers. Summing up the "grounds of ill-will" between England and Spain, he says:—

> "It was said and universally believed that unoffending English subjects, visiting Spain on their lawful occasions, were on the most shadowy pretexts seized by the

Inquisition, tortured, and burnt at the stake. That these stories had a very great effect on popular opinion is certain; it is as certain that they were much exaggerated and grossly misrepresented. Englishmen in Spain were of course subject to Spanish laws; and if they went to Spain for their own profit they were bound to submit to such laws as were therein in force; but the known instances of Englishmen residing for many years at the Spanish ports and carrying on a lucrative business there are too numerous to permit us to believe that the English, as such, were subject to any undue and irregular oppression; though as aliens in blood, in customs, and in religion they were not looked on with much favour. On the other hand, transgressors met with little consideration. On both sides sharp measure had been dealt out to pirates; the hanging of Oxenham and his fellows was a smaller analogue to the butchery at Smerwick, and both executions were quite in accordance with the customs of the age. Even prisoners in recognized war might be, and not uncommonly were, put to death if they were not judged worth keeping for ransom. . . . There would thus, according to the ideas and practice of the age, have been nothing out of the way in summarily slaying the men who, in 1568, were captured at San Juan de Lua, or were afterwards put ashore by Hawkyns. In Spanish law, as indeed in English law, smugglers forcibly resisting the king's authority were pirates, and might be put to death without more ado. It is probable that many of them were so put to death, but more seem to have been enslaved; and in after years some few returned to England with stories of Spanish tyranny and Spanish cruelty, which made a great impression on their countrymen. Prisons in the sixteenth century were nowhere luxurious abodes, and Spanish prisons are not likely to have been better than those of other nations. Howard, the philanthropist, has left a description of English prisons two hundred years later, when they were presumably less barbarous than in the days of Queen Elizabeth; and from this we may understand that, without any special malice or design on the part of the Spaniards, Englishmen — and especially Englishmen of a respectable position, merchants or masters of merchant ships—who had the misfortune to get into a Spanish prison, did experience grievous sufferings.

"Nor were the horrors of the prison house necessarily the worst part of their lot. The Spaniards, as also the French and Italians, had no scruples about making their prisoners useful; and an able-bodied man was as likely as not to find himself helping to tug an oar in one of the king's galleys, without the slightest regard paid to his personal dignity, or the cause of his imprisonment.

"That many Englishmen did thus rot in Spanish dungeons, or break their heart in Spanish galleys, is very well established, but the reason why is not so clear. As a general rule it is attributed to the Inquisition, and is assumed to have been on a charge of heresy. It seems, however, not impossible that there has always been a confusion of names. *Inquisicion* means equally the Inquisition and a judicial inquiry; *inquisidor* might be an inquisitor or a magistrate, or, in the Armada, the provost-marshal; and men reported to be lingering in the dungeons of the Inquisition may have been in some other and perhaps fouler prison on a charge of smuggling or piracy, brawling or contempt of court. And magistrates were not immaculate even in England. Even in England alleged prisoners were sometimes allowed to lie for months without a hearing, and when heard were sometimes wrongfully condemned. It is not to be supposed that similar blunders—blunders of ignorance, carelessness, or prejudice—did not occur in Spain.

"Still there is no doubt that many fell into the hands of the Inquisition, as we understand the word, the Holy Office. Always on the watch to detect and punish heresy, which in Spain was held to be as dangerous to the state as Popery was in England, the Holy Office did not professedly exercise jurisdiction over foreigners

who kept their religious opinions to themselves; but the man who openly and noisily preached his false doctrine, or denounced the dogmas of the church, be he Englishman or Spaniard, was arrested with as little ceremony as ever was a Popish recusant in England, and racked, imprisoned, or put to death, even as if he had been a Mayne, a Sherwood, or a Campion. When we recollect the atrocities that were practised in England against the Papists under Elizabeth, or a hundred years later in Scotland against the Covenanters under Charles II.; that Burghley advocated the use of the rack, and that the burning of women as witches was common even in the seventeenth century, we may allow that the Spanish Inquisition, abominable institution as it was, and aggravated by political conditions and the death-struggle with the Moors, was a disease of the age, and common alike to Papist and Protestant.

"But as to the wrongs and sufferings of English prisoners in Spain, a point which does not seem to have been duly considered is that we seldom have any account of them except that given by the men themselves. Miles Philips, for instance, and Job Hortop, two of the men who were landed by Hawkyns after the rout at San Juan de Lua, are credible witnesses when they describe how the Spaniards 'hung them up by the arms upon high posts until the blood burst out at their finger-ends,' and punished them severely for attempting to escape, breaking out of prison, or conspiring to seize the ship. We know from such narratives as that of Captain O'Brien how, two hundred years later, the French treated prisoners of war who committed such offences; and according to Garneray ('*Mes Pontons*,' par Louis Garneray), who professes to write from personal experience, the life of a French prisoner on board a hulk at Portsmouth was wretched beyond the power of words. But when those two men (Philips and Hortop)—smugglers and pirates in the eye of the Spanish law—describe themselves and their mates as being racked, burnt, or imprisoned because they could not say the Lord's Prayer in Latin, or give satisfactory answers to obscure questions on the Real Presence,* their statements require corroboration.

"So, too, the story of Robert Tomson, who, after residing for several years in Spain and Mexico, was, he says, dragged before the Inquisition and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for entering on a religious argument at a supper party, and denouncing images, pictures, and the invocation of the saints before a mixed company. During a long residence in Spain, Tomson must have outwardly conformed to the Catholic religion; as he afterwards married a Spanish woman, he must have again conformed; so that his untimely display of Protestant zeal was a relapse such as the Inquisition always judged severely, and for which it would have inflicted a heavier punishment than three years in prison, with permission to marry a rich heiress at the end of the time. The story† is therefore suspicious, and—as the other—needs corroboration.

"It is not often possible to subject such stories to a critical examination; but the case of Thomas Cely, which has been put prominently forward, admits and is deserving of a fuller discussion. In 1575 Dorothy, the wife of one Thomas Cely, a Bristol trader, petitioned the council, setting forth that 'her husband upon most vile, slanderous, spiteful, malicious, and most villainous words uttered against the Queen's Majesty's own person by a certain subject of the King of Spain, not being able to suffer the same, did flee upon the same slanderous person and gave him a blow; hereupon her said husband, no other offence in respect of their religion there committed, was secretly accused to the *inquisidores* of the Holy House and so

* Hakluyt's "Voyages," iii. 469, 487.
† Hakluyt, iii. 447.

committed to most vile prison, and there hath remained three whole years in miserable state with cruel torments.' *

"Dorothy Cely certainly believed that her husband was in the dungeons of the Inquisition, and petitioned the lords of the council and the queen to institute reprisals specially directed against foreign Papists. Mr. Froude, too, accepting the petition as sufficient authority, has lately repeated and emphasized the narrative. He says:—

"'Thomas Cely, a merchant of Bristol, hearing a Spaniard in a Spanish port utter foul and slanderous charges against the queen's character, knocked him down. To knock a man down for telling lies about Elizabeth might be a breach of the peace, but it had not yet been declared heresy. The Holy Office, however, seized Cely, threw him into a dungeon, and kept him starving there for three years, at the end of which he contrived to make his condition known in England.' † He thinks, however, that it was to no purpose, and that Cely was 'one of the many hundred English sailors who rotted away in the dungeons of the Inquisition, or were burned to please the rabble of Valladolid' ('Hist.' viii. 23, note).

"Whether the fate of the 'many hundred English sailors' rests on a more solid foundation than that of Cely does not appear; but Cely lived to command a ship against the Armada, to write a quaint letter, to plunder the Spanish prisoners, and to be granted a pension of £30 a year (May 5, 1590). He was still alive and in good health in July 1591.

"But Cely's letter is specially interesting for the naïve confession of the cause of his punishment, which was very different from that alleged in the petition, or the paraphrase of it; to knock a man down in a Spanish port, presumably on the wharf, for uttering foul and slanderous charges against the queen's character, can scarcely be considered the same thing as 'striking their secretary as I was before the *inquisidores*, they sitting in judgment.' It might be well before speaking too strongly of the cruelty to which Cely was subjected, to ask what would have been the fate of a foreign sailor in England who, in open court, struck the judge's secretary? As to why Cely was in the first instance before the magistrates, or *inquisidores*, or whether the Holy Office had anything to do with the matter, there is no evidence. It may have been for smuggling or for brawling, or possibly for contempt shown to the Host in its passage along the streets.

"Much more might be said on this moot point; but political affairs commonly depend on belief rather than on fact, and whatever the actual truth, it appears fairly certain that to the English the real or supposed cruelties of the Inquisition were a principal cause of the very strong feeling against the Spaniards and Papists."

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* S.P., "Spain," xvi.; Froude's "History of England," cabinet edition, viii. 22, where the petition is assigned to the impossible date of 1562.

† Froude in *Longman's Magazine*, August 1893.

APPENDIX V.

Calendar of the Summer Months of 1588.

New Style, Spanish.	Old Style, English.		New Style, Spanish.	Old Style, English.	
May 1	April 21	Sunday.	June 1	May 22	Wednesday.
,, 2	,, 22	Monday.	,, 2	,, 23	Thursday.
,, 3	,, 23	Tuesday.	,, 3	,, 24	Friday.
,, 4	,, 24	Wednesday.	,, 4	,, 25	Saturday.
,, 5	,, 25	Thursday.	,, 5	,, 26	Sunday.
,, 6	,, 26	Friday.	,, 6	,, 27	Monday.
,, 7	,, 27	Saturday	,, 7	,, 28	Tuesday.
,, 8	,, 28	Sunday.	,, 8	,, 29	Wednesday.
,, 9	,, 29	Monday.	,, 9	,, 30	Thursday.
,, 10	,, 30	Tuesday.	,, 10	,, 31	Friday.
,, 11	May 1	Wednesday.	,, 11	June 1	Saturday.
,, 12	,, 2	Thursday.	,, 12	,, 2	Sunday.
,, 13	,, 3	Friday.	,, 13	,, 3	Monday.
,, 14	,, 4	Saturday.	,, 14	,, 4	Tuesday.
,, 15	,, 5	Sunday.	,, 15	,, 5	Wednesday.
,, 16	,, 6	Monday.	,, 16	,, 6	Thursday.
,, 17	,, 7	Tuesday.	,, 17	,, 7	Friday.
,, 18	,, 8	Wednesday.	,, 18	,, 8	Saturday.
,, 19	,, 9	Thursday.	,, 19	,, 9	Sunday.
,, 20	,, 10	Friday.	,, 20	,, 10	Monday.
,, 21	,, 11	Saturday.	,, 21	,, 11	Tuesday.
,, 22	,, 12	Sunday.	,, 22	,, 12	Wednesday.
,, 23	,, 13	Monday.	,, 23	,, 13	Thursday.
,, 24	,, 14	Tuesday.	,, 24	,, 14	Friday.
,, 25	,, 15	Wednesday.	,, 25	,, 15	Saturday.
,, 26	,, 16	Thursday.	,, 26	,, 16	Sunday.
,, 27	,, 17	Friday.	,, 27	,, 17	Monday.
,, 28	,, 18	Saturday.	,, 28	,, 18	Tuesday.
,, 29	,, 19	Sunday.	,, 29	,, 19	Wednesday.
,, 30	,, 20	Monday.	,, 30	,, 20	Thursday.
,, 31	,, 21	Tuesday.	July 1	,, 21	Friday.

CALENDAR OF THE SUMMER MONTHS OF 1588—*Continued.*

New Style, Spanish.	Old Style, English.		New Style, Spanish.	Old Style, English.	
July 2	June 22	Saturday.	Aug. 7	July 28	SUNDAY.
,, 3	,, 23	SUNDAY.	,, 8	,, 29	Monday.
,, 4	,, 24	Monday.	,, 9	,, 30	Tuesday.
,, 5	,, 25	Tuesday.	,, 10	,, 31	Wednesday.
,, 6	,, 26	Wednesday.	,, 11	Aug. 1	Thursday.
,, 7	,, 27	Thursday.	,, 12	,, 2	Friday.
,, 8	,, 28	Friday.	,, 13	,, 3	Saturday.
,, 9	,, 29	Saturday.	,, 14	,, 4	SUNDAY.
,, 10	,, 30	SUNDAY.	,, 15	,, 5	Monday.
,, 11	July 1	Monday.	,, 16	,, 6	Tuesday.
,, 12	,, 2	Tuesday.	,, 17	,, 7	Wednesday.
,, 13	,, 3	Wednesday.	,, 18	,, 8	Thursday.
,, 14	,, 4	Thursday.	,, 19	,, 9	Friday.
,, 15	,, 5	Friday.	,, 20	,, 10	Saturday.
,, 16	,, 6	Saturday.	,, 21	,, 11	SUNDAY.
,, 17	,, 7	SUNDAY.	,, 22	,, 12	Monday.
,, 18	,, 8	Monday.	,, 23	,, 13	Tuesday.
,, 19	,, 9	Tuesday.	,, 24	,, 14	Wednesday.
,, 20	,, 10	Wednesday.	,, 25	,, 15	Thursday.
,, 21	,, 11	Thursday.	,, 26	,, 16	Friday.
,, 22	,, 12	Friday.	,, 27	,, 17	Saturday.
,, 23	,, 13	Saturday.	,, 28	,, 18	SUNDAY.
,, 24	,, 14	SUNDAY.	,, 29	,, 19	Monday.
,, 25	,, 15	Monday.	,, 30	,, 20	Tuesday.
,, 26	,, 16	Tuesday.	,, 31	,, 21	Wednesday.
,, 27	,, 17	Wednesday.	Sept. 1	,, 22	Thursday.
,, 28	,, 18	Thursday.	,, 2	,, 23	Friday.
,, 29	,, 19	Friday.	,, 3	,, 24	Saturday.
,, 30	,, 20	Saturday.	,, 4	,, 25	SUNDAY.
,, 31	,, 21	SUNDAY.	,, 5	,, 26	Monday.
Aug. 1	,, 22	Monday.	,, 6	,, 27	Tuesday.
,, 2	,, 23	Tuesday.	,, 7	,, 28	Wednesday.
,, 3	,, 24	Wednesday.	,, 8	,, 29	Thursday.
,, 4	,, 25	Thursday.	,, 9	,, 30	Friday.
,, 5	,, 26	Friday.	,, 10	,, 31	Saturday.
,, 6	,, 27	Saturday.			

THE END.